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A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE

BY

ROBERT GRANVILLE CALDWELL

Ph.D. (Princeton), Litt.D. (Wooster), Professor of American History,
The Rice Institute

★★

1860—1921

WITH MAPS

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PREFACE

THIS volume is essentially a study of American public life and opinion from 1860 to 1921. For a period in which the events and movements become increasingly complex, and among materials which after 1876 have not yet fallen into recognized and conventional forms, the purpose has been not so much to make a record, as to seek an interpretation. The facts themselves are, for the most part, remembered by many living men. Their meaning becomes the chief problem of the historian.

Approximately half the pages of this volume will be found to deal with topics which are usually considered social rather than strictly political. But in the selection of materials, war, politics, industry, westward expansion, and religion have all been studied in their relations to the feelings and ideas of the various sections of the American people. Great decisions must often, perhaps usually, be made before the evidence is known. In these circumstances, what people believe or feel counts more than the events themselves. How did people think and feel about the events through which they lived? How did their ideas and emotions react on those events?

Five chapters are given to the period of the American Civil War, an amount of space that can only be justified because these incidents, important as they were in the life of the nation, gripped the imagination and dominated the thought of Americans for more than a generation,

as nothing else, not even the Revolution, has ever done. With the war over, the central theme becomes the problem of Reconstruction and the immense social and economic revolution that has given us the new South. That part of the story is brought down to the present time in three chapters. The succeeding chapters consider in turn some of the larger forces in American life after the war. The passing of the frontier, the Industrial Revolution, and the rôle of the Churches and the Parties, are studied in separate chapters. From the period of the nineties, the pattern becomes more intricate, and the two chief themes, internal changes and the increasing interest in diplomacy, are followed side by side, in chapters which alternate from problems of domestic policy to those of foreign affairs. The main story ends with the close of the Wilson administration in 1921, although some changes, for example, the legislation affecting immigration, are traced a few years farther. From that time, too many threads are as yet unfinished to make possible even a tentative interpretation. In the study of their leaders as of the people the chief emphasis is always on motives rather than on deeds.

Certain subjects, particularly the Industrial Revolution, the Labor Movement, and Religion, have been examined somewhat more in detail than is usual in such a volume, because of the large place such forces have had in the formation of public opinion in a democracy. But selection is always necessary. Within the limits of a single volume, some fascinating by-paths can be followed only incidentally. Among these are the development of American literature, the rise of sports and organized amusements, the record of journalism, the changes in the methods and ideals of education, and especially the relations between literature and American life. Fortunately, this last topic may be traced in such an admir-

able and comprehensive work as the *Cambridge History of American Literature* (of which there is a college edition), or more briefly in such stimulating smaller books as John Macy's *Spirit of American Literature.*

The works referred to in the footnotes have been carefully selected to guide the reader in further study, especially of matters of controversy, and to indicate some of the many obligations of the writer. No book has been mentioned which the author has not himself found useful. Special attention is often directed to the newer books and articles, which are usually based on fuller knowledge. Strangely enough, no subject gets out of date faster than history. For the convenience of the reader, the general index will, as in the first volume, be found to contain a bibliography in special type.

The present volume could not have been completed at this time without the generous and scholarly assistance, especially in connection with the preparation of Chapter XI, of the author's brother, Albert Caldwell. To an even larger extent than in the first volume, he is also indebted to Major Putnam, whose coöperation, based on an intimate knowledge of the period, has gone far beyond mere editorial revision. In a period so full of controversy, the author must, of course, assume full responsibility for statements of fact and of interpretation. The preparation of this volume has been made easier by the generous encouragement and helpful criticism of the reviewers of the earlier volume, which covers the period from 1492 to 1860.

R. G. C.

December, 1926.

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A Short History of the American People

A Short History of the American People

CHAPTER I

THE SECESSION MOVEMENT

VERY few persons in the North had foreseen the full consequences of the election of Abraham Lincoln. During the campaign, Douglas and his friends had uttered solemn warnings of grave dangers in the situation, but these were generally regarded as mere political buncombe. A typical Republican orator, the eloquent Carl Schurz, exclaimed in St. Louis: "The slave states can not expose their territory without leaving unprotected the institution for the protection of which the war was undertaken. They have to cover thousands and thousands of vulnerable points, for every plantation is an open wound, every negro cabin a sore. Every border or seaboard slave state will need her own soldiers, and more too, for her own protection; and where will be material for a concentrated army? Scattered over thousands of miles without the possibility of concentration. . . . There is your dissolution of the Union. The Southern states can not desire it, for it would defeat the very objects for which it might be undertaken; they can not attempt it, for slavery would lay them helpless at the feet of the North." How far

was the orator from foreseeing that the three million slaves would prove a tower of strength in the midst of a mighty struggle, raising crops and protecting their master's property and family when no white men were left on the plantation![1]

The Southern leaders also had their illusion, which curiously enough led to the same conclusion that war would never come. The North was a manufacturing section, bound by the ties of commerce to the South. Its population was not homogenous but included more than two millions of foreign born Irish and German immigrants who would never fight for so unreal an abstraction as the Union. The first consequence of war would be to isolate the national capital, bring about confiscation of the three hundred millions of private debts which the Southern planter owed to the Northern merchant, and to divide every Northern community into discordant groups. Just as the North argued that secession was impossible, many in the South contended that it would be easy and profitable. Those who, like Sam Houston in Texas, prophesied the terrible calamities which would follow such a step were derided as pusillanimous traitors to the best of causes.

The Northern illusion was the first to be partially dispelled. On the fateful election day the legislature of South Carolina, which had selected the electors of that state according to the old method that had once been common and had now disappeared in other states, was still in session. The Legislature immediately arranged for the meeting of a Constitutional Convention in December, and every one knew that the threat of secession which had been so narrowly averted in 1833

[1] Lincoln shared this optimistic view. See his most recent and authoritative biographer:—Barton, W. E., *Life of Lincoln*, I, 456.

would this time be carried into full effect. When Congress met, on the first Monday of the month after the election of Lincoln, to listen to the last message of Buchanan, it was apparent that South Carolina would soon leave the Union and that she would almost certainly be followed by the other cotton states. Men who had scoffed at the reality of the national danger were eager to find some compromise which might even now avert so dread a calamity.

Fifteen states in the American Union recognized slavery within their limits, but of these fifteen only seven were ready to make the recent election the occasion for the extreme measures the full consequences of which no man could foresee. The states of South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, constituting as they did a well marked group, were almost certain to act in harmony and without much delay. North of the plantation states, was another group which made up the middle South under the leadership of the ancient Dominion of Virginia, and that also included Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, in each of which there was a sharp separation of society into two parts living in distinct sections of the state. In these four states, and especially in Virginia, there was a whole region which was made up of small farmers essentially western in their outlook, men who lived in secluded valleys of distant mountains and who were not in close contact with the plantation system that prevailed further south. These four states were not likely to act without much internal struggle and might possibly be saved for the Union by some wise plan of conciliation. Further north were the so-called border states, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware in which the number of slaves was comparatively small. In the border states slavery was no longer economically profitable and could

reasonably be expected to disappear. In fact each of them had within a decade considered the possibility of emancipation. Each of the border states was not only divided in its ideas, but in case of war would be in an especially vulnerable position. The men of this region would think long and carefully before they broke their connections with the Northern states to which they were bound by ties of geography and commerce almost as closely, in fact, as the event was to show, even more closely than their leading citizens were bound to the South by ties of sympathy and understanding.

In the far South there was an overwhelming majority and in the border states a powerful minority to which the ties of the Union had become distasteful on account of the long contest over slavery and tariffs, a majority proud of the fact that it included only a small number recruited by recent immigration. This group, realizing that in the Union it would be an increasingly self concious and powerless minority, knit together by what a sociologist has called "the consciousness of kind," and embittered by the memory of a long debate, was willing, and even anxious, to establish a new nation and to fight for it,, though in the process both slavery and state rights might finally have to be surrendered.[1]

In every long quarrel, it is immensely important to

[1] The poor whites, especially in Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama, were a very different group from the yeomen farmers of the border states. They feared emancipation and added strength to the Southern cause. For the reasons see Buck, P. H., "The Poor Whites," *Am. Hist. Review*, XXXI, 41.

For the reluctance of Virginia to secede, see *Am. Hist. Review*, XXXI, 81–101. A typical union man wrote in January, 1861, "While I ardently desire the Union to be preserved and reconstructed, I do not wish Virginia by any arrangement to be cut off from the Southern states and fastened irrevocably to a Northern Confederacy. If there *must* be two Confederacies, I would take

remember to what an extent time is a factor in the historical process. If one went back thirty years he might say that a difference over the tariff was an important original cause of the long contest which came to a climax in the last winter of the administration of James Buchanan. If one looked back ten years, he might point out that the real essence of the problem was the question of the expansion of slavery. But in that year 1860, from the point of view of the South, and increasingly in the long and bitter years of war, free trade, Kansas, even the preservation of slavery itself, vital as it seemed, had become secondary questions. The Southern leaders made the election of Abraham Lincoln the occasion for secession, because the administration that would assume the functions of the government on March fourth, had become to them the symbol of alien domination in which they could have no controlling part. When Virginia seceded and war came, whatever the quarrel had been originally, the contest became one for Southern Independence, to which all other issues were in a sense subordinate. By 1865, there were very few who would not gladly have sacrificed slavery itself to win what had now become their supreme desire.[1]

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my chances with the South." This letter shows why Virginia waited, and also why she seceded after the fall of Fort Sumter.

[1] In Southern diaries of the period there is abundant evidence that almost from the beginning of the struggle many thoughtful men and women saw that the inevitable effect of the war would be to destroy slavery. In strange contrast with the views of ministers before the war is the record of a church service on September 21, 1864, given by Mrs. Chestnut, in *A Diary from Dixie*, 326: "Went with Mrs. Rhett to hear Dr. Palmer. I did not know before how utterly hopeless was our situation. This man is so eloquent, it is hard to listen and not give way. Despair was his word, and martyrdom. He offered us nothing more in this world than the martyr's crown. He is not for slavery, he says: he is for freedom, and the freedom

It was no small part of the political genius of Abraham Lincoln that he saw clearly from the beginning that though slavery was the original cause of the contest, it was not the essential issue in that contest once begun. Just as the Revolution commenced about certain minor questions of taxation and was not fought to an end about taxation at all, just as the second war with England had its inception in the grievances of American sailors which were not even mentioned in the treaty of peace, so the Civil War, so-called, was a war on the one hand for Union, on the other for Independence, which drew to its support men like Robert E. Lee, who agreed with Washington and Jefferson that slavery was a moral wrong and an economic mistake. When once the war had begun, it was certain to be fought to a bitter end, even though every man in the whole South had been convinced that slavery would be protected inside the Union or be certain to disappear outside. And all this because there is so little logic and so much of feeling in the acts of great groups of men, especially in moments of passion and excitement. When Russell, the correspondent of the *London Times*, visited the South in the spring of 1861, he found that everywhere men who differed about questions which had seemed so important just before, were of one mind in their passionate desire for independence.

Could the problem have been solved and the great

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to govern our country as we see fit. He is against foreign interference in our state matters. That is what Dr. Palmer went to war for, it appears. Every day shows that slavery is doomed the world over; for that he thanked God. He spoke of our agony, and then came the cry, 'Help us, O God! Vain is the help of man.' And so we came away sunken to the depths." Similar views were expressed in many churches as early as 1862, views that would have been impossible in South Carolina, ten or even five years earlier.

calamity averted if a stronger and wiser man had been President of the United States in that fateful December of 1860? Or would vigorous action have merely hastened the inevitable result? These are questions about which men differed at the time as they will continue to differ. At any rate, when James Buchanan read his message to Congress on that first Monday in December it was quite apparent that here was no man of Jacksonian mould, and that a leader whose party had been so disastrously divided and defeated was in no position to do what had been done with impunity in a smaller crisis by the hero of New Orleans, fresh from a great popular endorsement. The message of the President was no clarion call to summon the North from its half dazed apathy, but rather a legal exposition of a problem which he hoped to leave for solution to his successor. The document was made up of two parts. In the first, the President argued in the spirit of Webster's reply to Hayne, that the Constitution of the United States was no mere temporary league, a rope of sand to be broken by the first breath of discontent. The Union was meant to be perpetual. From this premise he went on, in the second part of the message, to draw the surprising conclusion that no power existed in the executive or the legislature actually to coerce any state and to compel it to remain in the Union. In his own mind, as he afterward pointed out in self-defence, Buchanan distinguished between direct coercion to prevent secession, which he regarded as illegal, and authority to hold the forts and other property of the United States, which he might receive from Congress and exercise as the Chief Executive. But this was too subtle for the men who read the message and they surmised, and wisely, that secession need fear little direct opposition from the federal government, at least until after the fourth of March.

The very vagueness of the message was probably a fairly accurate picture of the Northern mind in December of 1860, however much it was criticized by those who soon learned to think of the problem with the realism which rises from war. The Northern public, so far as they spoke through newspaper editorials, was divided. There were first the radical abolitionists, typified by Phillips, Garrison, Chase, Whittier, and Horace Greeley. These were at the outset rather pleased with the idea of losing the Southern states and thus freeing the reduced nation once and for all from the hated incubus of slavery. If the South wanted to secede, by all means let her do it! Then there were the conservative classes, pessimists, who believed that the South had a genuine grievance and could never be conquered, without sacrifices which would be out of proportion to the whole result. When Russell, the correspondent of the *London Times*, arrived in New York in the spring of 1861, he found such sentiments almost universal among the merchants of that great commercial city. Finally there were the optimists, men like William H. Seward, who looked on the whole problem through rosy spectacles, who knew that the crisis was serious but who could not be blamed for failing to realize how serious. The secession movement was to them merely a plot of a few politicians, dissatisfied with the result of the recent election. In every Southern state the great majority of the people was, according to this view, fundamentally loyal to the Union. Given time and patience, the storm would blow over as it had in 1832 and in 1850. Their eyes refused to contemplate the fragments of a once glorious Union. With so many discordant voices, it was no wonder that the old man who was now so eager to leave the White House, did not divine the great silent loyalty of the masses of the people.

Even these loyal masses might well have shrunk from the sacrifices that were before them if they had been able to count the cost in December of 1860.

In the meantime, the demand for secession was gaining headway in the lower South. The few voices that were raised in warning and in protest were listened to with scarcely veiled contempt. Mrs. Chestnut, the wife of the late United States Senator from South Carolina, wrote in her diary: "Charleston, S. C., November 8, 1860. Yesterday on the train, just before we reached Fernandina, a woman called out: 'That settles the hash.' Tanny touched me on the shoulder and said: 'Lincoln is elected.' 'How do you know?' 'That man over there has a telegram.' The excitement was very great. Everybody was talking at the same time. One, a little more moved than the others, stood up and said despondently: 'The die is cast; no more vain regrets; sad forebodings are useless; the stake is life or death.' 'Did you ever!' was the prevailing exclamation, and some one cried out: 'Now that the Black Republicans have the power I suppose they will Brown us all.' No doubt of it." And such scenes were universal in the cotton states.

Contrary to a common theory of the war at the time, both in the North and South, the politicians followed and did not lead. In Georgia, Alexander H. Stephens argued against secession: "I am for maintaining the Union as it is, if possible. I will exhaust every means, thus, to maintain it with an equality in it. My position is for maintenance of the honor, the rights, the equality, the security, and the glory of my native state in the Union, if possible; but if these can not be maintained in the Union, then I am for maintenance, at all hazards out of it. Next to the honor and glory of Georgia, the land of my birth, I hold the honor and the glory of

our common country."[1] But Stephens seemed almost alone.

The publication of such sentiments in the North led to a widespread belief that the situation could be saved now as it had been more than once before by compromise. Congress met in December and after listening to Buchanan's message, proceeded to consider solutions of the grave problems which confronted the nation. Each house appointed a committee. The leading figure in that of the Senate was the venerable Senator Crittenden of Kentucky who now occupied the seat left vacant by the great Compromiser. The men from the border states could see both sides of the quarrel, as was illustrated by the fact that Senator Crittenden later gave two sons to the war, one of whom became a Major General in the Union army while his brother attained similar rank in that of the Confederacy. The essential feature of the Crittenden Compromise was the extension of the old Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific and the virtual guarantee of slavery south of that line. The Southern members of the committee were ready to accept such a solution if it obtained the support of the Republicans without whom no compromise could succeed. William H. Seward was to be the next Secretary of State and most people regarded him as the

[1] On December 10th, Mrs. Chestnut wrote in her diary: "And yet people talk of the politicians leading! Every where that I have been people have been complaining bitterly of slow and lukewarm public leaders." Similarly, W. T. Sherman, at that time the President of a military academy in Louisiana, wrote to his wife describing the popular enthusiasm for the cause of secession. If the movement had been a plot, it would be impossible to account for the length or bitterness of the war. Again, as so frequently, the motives for secession are difficult to give in terms of cold reason, because the movement was an expression of human emotion dominated by groups rather than individuals.

real leader of the new administration which was to assume office in March. In spite of radical statements in some of his speeches he was a conservative and believed in compromise and delay. He was seconded by Charles Francis Adams, the son of the former President, now a member of the House of Representatives from Massachusetts, and by the two leading Republican editors, Thurlow Weed of the Albany *Evening Journal* and Horace Greeley of the all powerful *Tribune.*

Seward was soon to find that under the easy good humor of the President-elect there was a strong will. Abraham Lincoln had taken no part in the canvass for the Presidency and was now biding his time in silence and considering the embarrassing claims of office seekers in his home in Illinois. But back of the question of slavery he saw, as he had from the beginning, the larger problem of the supremacy of the national will. He did not expect secession and war, but he was willing to take the risk rather than to sacrifice the principles on which he had been elected. On December 11th, when the chances of compromise seemed bright, he wrote, "Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery. The instant you do they have us under again: all our labor is lost, and sooner or later must be done over. Douglas is sure to be again trying to bring in his 'popular sovereignty'! Have none of it. The tug has to come, and better now than later. You know I think the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution ought to be enforced—to put it in its mildest form, ought not to be resisted." In February, again, he wrote to Seward: "I say now, as I have all the while said, that on the territorial question—that is, on the question of extending slavery under the national auspices—I am inflexible. I am for no compromise which assists or permits the extension of the institution on soil owned by

the nation." Lincoln was willing to assume the full responsibility for the failure of compromise, and showed thus early that he expected to be the master in his own house, a lesson that Seward had still to learn. If he had foreseen what the next four bitter years held in store his decision might have been different, but it is unlikely. In any case, with Lincoln's veto, the chances of peaceable settlement had come to an end.

The House Committee which had been working on the problem also introduced a plan of compromise which was substantially like that of the Senate. Later in the winter, a Convention met in Washington attended by representatives of twenty-one states and under the Presidency of the venerable John Tyler of Virginia, but by that time the South had gone too far to recede. Indeed the debates in the peace convention became so bitter and displayed such difference of opinion that they probably hastened the result. The eagerness for compromise which existed in Washington as well as in other cities of the North led to the adoption by the necessary two thirds majorities in both houses of a proposed thirteenth amendment to the national constitution: "No amendment shall be made to the constitution which will authorize or give Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of the said state." The contrast between this amendment proposed to the states for their approval just two days before the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln and the Thirteenth Amendment, as it was actually adopted in 1865, constitutes a measure of the immense changes which those years were to bring. To this plan Lincoln gave specific approval since it merely safeguarded slavery where it already existed. It was promptly ratified by three

states, Ohio, Illinois, and Maryland, but the process of amendment was quite too slow for swiftly racing events. Indeed, before the amendment was proposed, much less considered by the various states, the issues had changed and the very question of the safety of slavery had become almost academic. The voice of compromise was lost in the mighty roar of conflict.

It was soon apparent that the people of the cotton states had determined to establish their independence, and that they could not be turned aside by arguments addressed to their immediate interests. Lincoln had said that if the tug had to come it might as well come now. So the South also felt. Stephens in Georgia, and others like him, pointed out the fact that no overt act had been committed against their interests, that even after March fourth, the Democratic party would still retain a majority in both houses of Congress, that the Supreme Court was still under the influence of Taney, that even an unfriendly President might be defeated in four years and in the meantime could do no great harm. A few men who desired independence prophesied a long and costly war, especially Jefferson Davis who never had any illusion on this subject, but most men did not believe that the North would fight to preserve the Union. In this belief they were naturally strengthened by the words of the President who did not support coercion, by the editorials of Horace Greeley who said, "Let the erring sisters depart in peace," and by the obvious desire of Congress to find a suitable compromise.[1]

[1] The editorials in the New York *Tribune* made strange reading in a later time, and must be kept in mind along with other similar evidence to estimate fairly the hesitation with which Buchanan and even Lincoln in the first month of his administration approached the problem of defending Fort Sumter. On November 9th, 1860,

Every mail brought to Washington the news that another state had seceded from the Union. The action of the South Carolina Convention on December 20th was rapidly followed by similar measures in Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, the last state seceding on February first. As each state left the Union, the various governors seized the arsenals and forts of the nation within their territories, thus securing valuable supplies of arms and munitions of war. The Senators and Congressmen usually waited for the decisive action and then withdrew from Washington. The Cabinet of the President was also in constant flux, and rumors of treason were in the air. The aged Secretary of State, General Lewis Cass of Michigan, resigned in protest to what he regarded as the pusillanimous conduct of the President. Two important forts remained in Federal hands, Moultrie in Charleston harbor and Pickens at Pensacola. Commissioners from South Carolina were expected in Washington to negotiate for the transfer of the forts in Charleston harbor. Before they could arrange for an interview with President Buchanan, on December 26th, Major Robert Anderson on his own responsibility withdrew his small garrison from the untenable Moultrie to Fort Sumter which he felt he could defend, as it stood on a small island in the harbor. Buchanan would not have

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Greeley wrote: "The Telegraph informs us that most of the cotton states are meditating a withdrawal from the Union, because of Lincoln's election. . . . We hold, with Jefferson, to the inalienable right of communities to alter or abolish forms of government that have become oppressive or injurious; and if the cotton states shall decide that they can do better outside of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. The right to secede may be a revolutionary one, but it exists nevertheless." Curiously enough, extremes meet, and men as far apart on most questions as Greeley and Buchanan were now standing on the same platform.

ordered this step, but when it had been taken, he refused to disavow the action. The last Southern member of the cabinet, Floyd, Secretary of War, who was already under criticism for some doubtful financial transactions, withdrew on the ground that the removal to Sumter was an overt act of war and a violation of the promise which the President had made in his message to Congress and later to some Southern members of Congress not to apply coercion. The Cabinet was now dominated by Jeremiah S. Black of Pennsylvania as Secretary of State and by Edwin B. Stanton, Attorney-General, later Secretary of War. But a weak attempt to provision the fort was frustrated when the merchant ship, *Star of the West*, was fired on and turned back from the entrance of the harbor. The central group of slave states, Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee, each of which contained a large mountain population devoted to the Union and jealous of the power of the great planters, still hesitated and as late as April definitely refused to consider the election of a Republican President sufficient reason for secession. In the border states, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, public opinion was still more chaotic and the various Governors refused to call conventions.

In the meantime, on February fourth, a convention of the cotton states met at Montgomery, Alabama, adopted a provisional constitution for a new Confederacy, and elected Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia President and Vice-President of a new nation. In these elections, the conservatives gained a victory and passed over men like Yancey of Alabama, Rhett of South Carolina, and Toombs of Georgia who had been more radical advocates of secession. When Virginia finally seceded, the capital of the Confederacy was transferred to Richmond, Virginia, a position much

more exposed from a military point of view and much more difficult to defend. Looking back on the past with the wisdom of experience some Southern writers have argued with much reason, that, if the capital of the Confederacy had been placed in the mountains of the interior instead of on the waters of a navigable stream, the task of Johnston and of Lee would have been greatly lessened and the cause of Southern independence might have triumphed. This argument overlooks the immediate political problem and the essential importance of committing reluctant Virginia irrevocably to the cause.

The Constitution of the Confederate States was substantially copied from the old Constitution which Americans had learned to worship as the supreme embodiment of human wisdom in matters of government, and in part from the articles of Confederation which the Constitution of 1787 had replaced. Under these articles the central government had been found to be not strong enough to maintain national authority or to secure credit for the national treasury. In some respects there were interesting variations from the former instrument. Although the slave trade was prohibited, property in slaves was definitely recognized and protected against unfriendly legislation. The new nation was given the express power to acquire territory, but no new state could be admitted to the Confederacy without a two thirds vote in each house of Congress. No specific provision was made for the creation of a Supreme Court. Protective tariffs and appropriations for internal improvements were prohibited. The term of the President was increased to six years and he was made ineligible to re-election. The President was given the specific power to remove the heads of departments, thus solving the very question which was to arise between

President Johnson and Congress a few years later. The members of the Cabinet might be allowed by Congress to participate in debates on problems connected with their departments. The modern idea of a budget was suggested in provisions which forbade Congress from making appropriations which had not been recommended by the executive, except by two thirds vote of each house. The President was given the power to veto items in appropriation bills. Every bill must contain material on only one subject, thus doing away with the abuse known as the "rider." The process of amendment was made easier. An amendment to the Constitution might be suggested by three states, and required approval in two thirds of the States instead of three fourths, as under the old Constitution.[1]

The first elections under this new Constitution were held in November, 1861, long after the beginning of the war, and the provisional government yielded to the regular officers, with the inauguration of President Davis, for the regular term of six years, in Richmond on February 22nd, 1862. The term was of course never destined to be completed and the inauguration as we shall soon see took place at one of the dark moments in the history of the Confederacy, when the news had

[1] The preamble of the Confederate Constitution reads: "We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character," etc. The convention thus made specific the idea of State Sovereignty which it believed had been the original meaning of the older document. The Constitution of the United States begins, of course, with the well known phrase, "We the people of the United States." On the origin of this phrase see Volume I, 239. President Davis had difficulties with such adherents of state rights as Governors Vance and Brown. But long before the end of the war the idea of state rights had been subordinated, just as the question of slavery had been, to the desire for independence.

just arrived that the lines of defence in the west had been broken by Grant's great victory at Fort Donelson. But the fact that the term of the President was long and that Davis was not called upon in the midst of war to meet such a crisis as came to Lincoln in the election of 1864, undoubtedly made the Southern President more independent of the criticisms of his political opponents. For Davis, though selected unanimously, was not without his severe critics. As the war went on, governors like Vance of North Carolina and Brown of Georgia sought to carry the idea of state sovereignty to its logical conclusion by refusing supplies and men on the ground that these were needed for the defence of the home state. Rhett of South Carolina and Vice President Stephens were ready with constant criticisms of the choice of commanders and of the loss of individual liberty which the war soon brought. The Charleston *Mercury* and the Richmond *Examiner* were always severe critics of the war policy of the administration. In spite of the fact that the writ of *habeas corpus* was suspended in the Confederacy only for brief periods and then by law of Congress, Davis, like Lincoln, was soon compelled by the necessities of war to assume dictatorial powers which were really contrary to the fundamental theory of state rights. As the head of the army, he enforced with rigor the Conscription Laws adopted in the spring of 1862.[1] When money failed, he collected taxes in kind and required farmers to sell their products to the army at fixed prices, often far below the market value. He "commandeered" railroads which were necessary to the success of armies, and established within the limits of the states manufacturing plants for the production of war materials. In both sections, the old idea of local

[1] On Conscription in the South, see Moore, A.B.:—*Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy* (1925).

state rights had to yield to the necessities of national demands.

But all this lay far in the future when the new President was inducted into office as Provisional President on that February day in 1861. In a carefully worded address to Congress, President Davis explained the reasons for secession. In deference to hostile opinion abroad, no reference was made to slavery, and emphasis was laid on the fact that the cornerstone of the new nation was the possibility of securing freedom of trade. Yancey was sent as the head of a mission to gain the friendly assistance of foreign powers, especially of England from which much was at the time expected, and commissioners were despatched to Washington to negotiate with the new government of Abraham Lincoln for the division of the territory and other property of the nation.

William H. Russell, correspondent of the powerful London *Times*, visited Montgomery soon after the inauguration of the government. He has left a pen picture of the chief executive of the Confederacy: "I had an opportunity of observing the President very closely: he did not impress me favorably as I had expected, though he is certainly a very different looking man from Mr. Lincoln. He looks like a gentleman, has a slight, light figure, little exceeding middle height, and holds himself erect and straight. He was dressed in a rustic suit of slate color stuff, with a black silk handkerchief around his neck; his manner is plain and rather reserved and drastic; his head is well formed, with a fine full forehead, square and high, covered with innumerable fine lines and wrinkles, features regular, though the cheek bones too high and the jaws too hollow to be handsome; the lips are thin, flexible, and curved, the chin square, well defined; the nose very regular, with wide nostrils; and the eyes deep set, large and full—one seems nearly

blind, and is covered with a film, owing to excruciating attacks of neuralgia. Wonderful to relate, he does not chew, and is neat and clean looking, with hair trimmed, and boots brushed. The expression of his face is anxious, he has a very haggard, care-worn, and drawn look, though no trace of anything but the utmost confidence and the greatest decision could be detected in his conversation."[1]

Jefferson Davis had exceptional qualifications for the arduous post that he was to occupy. His experience as a West Point man and a former army officer gave him a personal knowledge of many of the officers in high command. His administrative experience as Secretary of War in the cabinet of President Pierce helped him to avoid many errors. No one could doubt his courage or devotion to the task which he had undertaken. But he had none of the humor which lightened the work of his chief antagonist. He could not devolve small duties on others but must make every decision himself. His cabinet officers were often mere clerks, and there was no one whom he consulted freely or trusted fully unless it was Judah P. Benjamin, at first Attorney General, then Secretary of War, finally Secretary of State, and from the beginning virtually chief clerk and advisor to the President. Benjamin was an astute lawyer, but the Southern people never really liked his too ready smile or his Hebrew origin, and he proved a source of political weakness. But his tact and deference to the President never failed and he maintained his position in the confidence of his friend until the end.

In his choice of generals, Davis probably made as few mistakes as any ruler of a democracy in time of war. He selected Robert E. Lee as commander of the army in Virginia at a time when Lee's prestige was greatly

[1] Russell, *My Diary North and South*, 173.

lessened by his failure to recover the lost West Virginia. The fact that Lee and Davis trusted each other and worked together in reasonable harmony was an undoubted element of great strength to the Confederacy. The quarrels between Davis and Johnston and Beauregard did not prevent him from appointing each to high command, and the disastrous removal of Johnston before Atlanta in 1864 and his replacement by the incompetent Hood, seems to have been the result of popular clamor and not of personal feeling. Davis was intensely loyal to his friends, and probably made a mistake in retaining Bragg in command after he had quarreled with all his subordinates, including the capable general Longstreet, though Longstreet was not himself an easy man to control, as even the tactful and self-sacrificing Lee found more than once to his cost. On the whole, the fact that the South found its able generals sooner than the North and held them longer in spite of temporary reverses, was a tribute to the wisdom of President Davis. In general military policy, critics are agreed that Lincoln and Davis made the same mistakes of trying to cover too much territory instead of concentrating their strength against the chief army of the enemy. For example at the time of Chancellorsville, Longstreet was away on a fruitless expedition on the coast with the troops which Lee needed to garner the fruits of victory. Again at Gettysburg, Lee was without service of 60,000 men who were doing garrison duty against possible invasion from the coast. In each case the reasons were largely political, for each Southern state demanded its full share of protection, without duly considering the needs of the chief campaign. But Davis did not make as serious errors of this kind as Stanton, who constantly interfered with military matters until the high command was unified under Grant in the Spring of

1864. The political history of the Confederacy is largely a biography of its Chief Executive, for in the conditions of the time the ablest men were drawn into military life and Congress could do little except carry out the wishes of the President and to grumble at what they regarded as his errors.[1]

The qualities of Abraham Lincoln were in most respects the very opposite of those of his Southern rival. He had had no administrative experience, he knew nothing of military procedure or of munitions of war, he had no acquaintance with army officers, and in his conduct of the war he made or allowed his Secretary of War to make, mistakes which cost the country dear. His choice of commanders in the field was often unfortunate, and he only learned by sad experience the absolute necessity of trained capacity. But Abraham Lincoln was a man who under the seeming uncouthness of his manners had a will of iron, the result of a philosophic grasp of the meaning of events. However much he might yield in details, he never yielded the principle at stake. In his interpretation of the American people to themselves he never failed to strike the very note which welded the confused public opinion of the winter of 1860 into the will to victory that, in spite of all minor errors and discouragements, finally carried to lasting triumph the cause for which he stood. Both Davis and Lincoln were unquestionably men of high sincerity in the principles for which they contended, but Lincoln had the advantage of standing for the future at a time when Davis stood for the past.

Russell pictured the new President to the English public at a time when his figure had not yet gathered the dignity of universal esteem. "Soon afterwards there entered, with a shambling, loose, irregular, almost

[1] See especially W. E. Dodd, *Jefferson Davis* (1907).

unsteady gait a tall, lank, lean man, considerably over six feet in height, with stooping shoulders, long pendulous arms, terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which however were far exceeded in proportion by his feet. He was dressed in an ill fitting, wrinkled suit of black. . . . The impression produced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping and wide projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of kindliness, sagacity, and the awkward bonhommie of his face; the mouth is absolutely prodigious; the eyes, dark, full, and deeply set, are penetrating but full of an expression which almost amounts to tenderness. . . . One would say that although the mouth was made to enjoy a joke, it could also utter the severest sentence which the head could dictate, but that Mr. Lincoln would be ever willing to temper justice with mercy. . . . A person who met Mr. Lincoln in the street would not take him to be what—according to the usages of European society—is called a 'gentleman'—but at the same time, it would not be possible for the most indifferent observer to pass him in the street without notice."[1]

Such was the man who appeared in Washington to take control of the executive department of the American government at the greatest crisis in its history. The speeches which had been delivered to waiting crowds on the journey to the capital had seemed commonplace, and the speaker appeared to many to have no clear plan or appreciation of the full gravity of the issues that he was called on to confront. The anxiety of the country was increased when it was known that the lawyer from Illinois had passed through Baltimore in secrecy after a change of plans which was due to the fear of his friends that he would be assassinated. But the inaugural ceremonies passed without mishap and the address was

[1] Russell, *My Diary North and South*, 38.

fully equal to the occasion. As before in his debates, Lincoln proved himself an artist in the use of words. Taking for his closing paragraph an idea which had come from Seward, he clothed it in words of gold. The inaugural address was as conciliatory in tone as if it had been written by Buchanan or Crittenden. The new President would take the oath of his great office without any mental reservation. He would interfere in no way with slavery in the states. He would without fear or favor protect every state from armed invasion. He would not send obnoxious office holders from North to South. He would not oppose the proposed amendment to the Constitution. But back of all this conciliation there was evidence of unchanged purpose. On the question of the extension of slavery the American people had spoken, and could not recede without yielding the fundamental principle of democratic government. The Union was to be perpetual and could not be broken. On the immediate problem of the use of force Lincoln said: "I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States." "I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

The days which followed were largely given to the arduous duties of filling the offices. Washington swarmed with office seekers. Lincoln said that he felt like a hotel clerk giving out rooms while the roof was

on fire. Anderson still held Fort Sumter, which with Fort Pickens was the only foothold of Federal power in the South. The Virginia convention was considering secession although the Union element was still ascendant in that state as well as in the others of the middle South. Should the forts be relieved and defended? If so war was almost sure to come and Virginia be lost. Or should the forts be allowed to fall into the hands of the Confederate authorities? If so, national power would be abdicated in such a way as to make it difficult ever again to fire the popular heart for a great struggle. This was the immediate unsolved problem which confronted the Lincoln administration as it had for months that of James Buchanan. To Davis in Montgomery the same problem appeared in a different form. Should the forts be seized? If so an overt act would make the South the immediate aggressor in actual war. Or should they be left in Federal hands, at least for the moment? This might be done unless they were strengthened, and for Fort Pickens in far away Pensacola this was a possible solution. But Sumter was in sight of the excited people of Charleston, who could not long be kept in check, and Virginia would not join the Confederacy until war came.

Each side played for position. Old General Scott, thoroughly loyal to the Union, pointed to the small army of sixteen thousand men scattered to watch the Indians in Western posts, and said that it would take three hundred thousand men under a young and vigorous general of the first ability to conquer the South, and even then it might not be done in less than three years. He advocated for the present a mere blockade of the South and a policy of watchful patience. Seward, still believing with an optimism that would not look the dread situation in the face that the people of the South were loyal

at heart, went so far as to promise the Southern commissioners that the forts would not be relieved without due notice. In the meantime he urged a strong foreign policy against England, France, and Spain which were taking advantage of the American quarrel to collect their Mexican debts at the cannon's mouth and were thus challenging the Monroe Doctrine. Even when, on March 29th, he was overruled by the President, he still managed to divert the strongest ship of the proposed expedition to Pickens instead of Sumter, now the symbol of national authority.

Seward believed that the mere danger of foreign war would rekindle the old patriotism which now seemed dead or would at least hold every doubtful state in the Union. If a dictator were needed for the emergency, he neither sought nor avoided the responsibility. All this he said in a paper, entitled "Thoughts for the President's consideration." Lincoln answered with kindly tact that if a leader were required he alone could act under the Constitution. Seward's advice was filed away without publicity, and only came to light long after Lincoln's death. The Secretary who had sought the position of a dictator in the emergency, soon came to realize the full ability of his chief and to serve him with unswerving loyalty. "Lincoln is the wisest of us all," he writes to his wife early in the war.

Lincoln's mind was at length quite clear. Having given the necessary warning to the Governor of South Carolina as Seward had promised, he ordered the relief of both forts. Rather than await the Government ships, General Beauregard, acting under orders from the Confederate cabinet, demanded the immediate surrender of Sumter. When Anderson asked for time, saying that in a few days he would be starved out, Beauregard's young aides, in accordance with the spirit of their

instructions, ordered the commencement of the bombardment. The first shot of the war was fired in the early morning of April 12th, 1861.[1]

After thirty-seven hours, Anderson surrendered. No one had been killed on either side, but the wooden buildings in the fort were on fire, the magazine was in some danger, and the supplies and ammunition were low. In the circumstances, although Sumter had not been defended to the last extremity, Anderson's decision with the small likelihood of prompt and effective relief was probably wise. From a military point of view, as Scott pointed out, the position was untenable from the beginning.

The important fact was not that Sumter was captured, for that was inevitable, but that it had been attacked. The popular mind requires a symbol, a Belgium, a *Lusitania*. The fall of Sumter aroused to the reality of the national danger as nothing else could have done a people who had seemed apathetic. Anderson was made the hero of the hour, Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand volunteers, and the companies were filled with the greatest enthusiasm. Unfortunately, these men, could under the existing law, be called only for the term of three months, and therefore proved almost useless in the struggle which was to come.

From the point of view of the Confederacy, the attack on Sumter was probably a blunder, though one perfectly natural and perhaps inevitable in the inflamed condition of public feeling. The South had everything to gain by a policy of delay which would compel Lincoln to move to carry out the words of his inaugural. Many men who would now support war measures would have hesitated

[1] The full evidence on the difficult question of the direct responsibility for the attack on Sumter is to be found in Dodd, W. E., *Source Problems in United States History*, 441–505.

to aid in direct invasion of the South. Whether by foresight or by good fortune, the cautious policy of Lincoln and Seward had secured for the North a real diplomatic victory. The only gain to the South was the immediate secession of Virginia, which answered Lincoln's call for troops by withdrawing from the Union two days later, to be followed soon by North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas. But this advantage was only one of time for these states were sure to act as soon as the President proceeded to see to it that the laws of the Union were enforced in the South. Sumter as a battle was unimportant. As a political event it bore a relation to the Civil War somewhat analogous to the German invasion of Belgium in 1914. A President who would have found it difficult to raise armies in cold blood even for a cause he saw to be essential now had behind him the aroused feelings of a united people.

The days that followed the bombardment of Sumter were a period of deep anxiety for President Lincoln. The Governor of Maryland was opposed to secession but the state which cut Washington off from the North contained many Southern sympathizers. On April 19th, Lincoln recognized a state of war by proclaiming a blockade of the Southern coast, a blockade that was for the moment largely on paper as the navy had only forty vessels and many of these were widely scattered. On the same day, the first regiment on its way to the capital, the Sixth Massachusetts, made ready for the emergency by the foresight of Governor John A. Andrew, reached Baltimore and was attacked by an angry mob. A number of the soldiers and members of the mob were killed before the troops who had to march through the city reached the train for Washington. The capital was connected with the North and West by a single line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad through Baltimore and

Harper's Ferry. The latter point had already been seized by the troops of Virginia, and the bridges at Baltimore were now broken by the State authorities with the purpose of preventing further bloodshed. The capital was virtually besieged. As the days passed with news of increasing military activity in Virginia, Lincoln paced the floor of the executive office. Thinking himself alone he exclaimed, "Why don't they come? Why don't they come?" On April 24th, John Hay wrote in his diary, "when some soldiers of the Sixth Massachusetts called on the President he fell into a tone of irony to which only intense feeling ever drove him. "I was beginning to believe," he said, "that there was no North. The Seventh Regiment is a myth. Rhode Island is another. You are the only real thing."[1]

In that week if the South had expected war or had been willing to invade the doubtful state of Maryland, the capital could have been seized with all the great political prestige that such a step must have brought. Now as so often later the command of the sea proved decisive and brought relief which compelled Maryland to remain in the Union. On April 25th the first reinforcement had landed and arrived by way of Annapolis and soon later the railroad through Baltimore was again opened. The immediate crisis had been safely passed. Lincoln now recognized that the war was to be long and costly, and before the meeting of Congress which he had called for the Fourth of July, had cast legality to the winds and had increased the army with volunteers for three years. By July first, the North had 186,000 men under arms. The writ of habeas corpus was suspended and disaffected persons in the border states, especially the all important Maryland, were imprisoned by executive order.

[1] Thayer, *The Life of John Hay*, I, 106.

Both Kentucky and Missouri were doubtful states whose Governors had refused to honor the President's call for troops. But during the early summer Missouri was saved to the Union by the energy of Frank P. Blair and Nathaniel Lyon, who arrested at Camp Jackson near St. Louis troops which were friendly to the Confederacy. Missouri was throughout the war a scene of border war in which family was arrayed against family. In Kentucky, a legislature was elected which was friendly to the Union and that nullified the activity of an unfriendly Governor. Kentucky, like Missouri, was a scene of divided allegiance, furnishing almost equal numbers to each side. Above all Ohio troops under George B. McClellan, an army officer of ability who had retired to accept the presidency of a railroad, entered the mountain region of western Virginia, and, gaining an easy victory, helped to lay the foundations of a new Commonwealth.[1]

The special session of Congress which met July Fourth, promptly ratified the measures which had been taken by the President, and authorized further enlistments and loans for the prosecution of the war. To allay the dissatisfaction in the doubtful states, a resolution defining the purpose of the war was introduced by Crittenden and passed almost unanimously. This resolution declared that the war was not waged for conquest or subjugation or in order to overthrow or interfere with the rights or established institutions of the Southern states, but to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union. Both Congress and the people demanded an immediate advance against the troops which the South was gathering under Beauregard at Manassas Junction. The war was to be short

[1] On the division of families by the war, including those of Lincoln and Grant, see Channing, *History of the United States*, VI, 304, 305.

and sharp and was to be won in one great battle. Only experienced soldiers like Scott recognized the immensity of the problem and the need of patience and discipline as well as courage. Even Scott would have been regarded as a madman if he had prophesied that a contest had begun in which more than a hundred and forty battles would be fought, one million lives be lost, in which both sides would spend their treasure like water, and which could end only in the complete exhaustion of one of the two belligerents!

Bibliographical Note:—The literature of the Civil War is, of course, very extensive. This note serves merely as an introduction to the subject and an indication of some of the sources which have been constantly examined in the preparation of the opening chapters of this volume. *Official Documents:*—The official records of the war have been published in three admirable collections, (1) *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (1880–1901), (2) *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, 26 vols. (1894–), (3) *The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion*, 12 vols. (1870–1888). *Reminiscenses:*—The accounts by the leaders in four volumes, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (1887–89), are of great importance and are supplemented by many memoirs of which the most significant is the *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, 2 vols. (1885–86). *Contemporary Letters and Diaries:*—*A Cycle of Adams Letters*, by Charles Francis Adams, Sr., and two of his sons, *The Home Letters of General Sherman*, and Mary B. Chestnut, *A Diary from Dixie*, are excellent examples of an extensive literature. *Secondary Accounts:* J. F. Rhodes, *A History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, 8 vols. (1893–1919), and the *History of the Civil War* (1917), a single volume by the same author, are, of course, indispensable. One of the best accounts in a single volume is Edward Channing, *History of the United States*, Volume VI (1925). For social and economic history, the two volumes by N. W. Stephenson in the *Chronicles of America*, *The Day of the Confederacy*, (1919), and *Abraham Lincoln and the Union*, (1918), are important and contain excellent bibliographies. Other references, especially on diplomatic history, will be found in the footnotes.

CHAPTER II

RESOURCES OF NORTH AND SOUTH

The antagonists that faced each other from across the Potomac were seemingly unequally matched for the contest. In the light of the event the attempt of the South to win its independence even after it was strengthened by the adherence of the four doubtful states may seem to have been madness. Twenty-three states were arrayed against eleven. Twenty-three million people could furnish soldiers against nine million, of whom almost three and a half millions were negro slaves. The population, the wealth, the resources of the North had grown out of all proportion to those of the South. When the Constitution was adopted, Virginia was more wealthy and powerful than New York. Now Virginia was small compared with her Northern rival. Although California and Oregon were still distant and could remain almost neutral in the early days of the war, the great Ohio valley was connected with the East by bonds of steel.

From the point of view of the South, secession took place just ten years too late. In 1847 there was not a single railroad connecting the Ohio River with the lakes or the Mississippi with the eastern railroads. The states of the old Northwest still found their chief outlet by the way of rivers which flowed to the south. Of the one and a quarter million barrels of pork that

went from the Northwest, nearly one million barrels went down the Ohio and the Mississippi. Similarly, most of the corn and the whiskey found its only market in the South. Even wheat and flour which were produced far enough north to find a partial outlet through the avenue of the great lakes, were sent in immense quantities down the rivers. By 1860, a commercial revolution had taken place binding the Ohio valley as closely to the seaports of the East as it had once been connected with those of the South. The railroads of the three great states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois which totalled less than a thousand miles in 1847 had by 1860 been multiplied more than eleven times. There was not a hamlet which did not buy and sell to New York and hardly a house which could not read such papers as the New York *Tribune*. In 1860, only about a half million barrels of pork went South while eight hundred and sixty thousands barrels went eastward. The shipments of wheat and flour to the South had barely held their own while those to the East had been multiplied six times. The Ohio valley, which might have been neutral or even sympathetic to a secession movement in 1850, was now connected with the East by the closest ties of society and business.[1]

Neither section was completely united. But even here the North had an advantage. For the Southern sympathizers who were called "Copperheads" were scattered in many Northern states, and could not offer effective resistance to the will of their more numerous neighbors. They had to limit themselves to the formation of secret societies, which resisted the draft and used political pressure to weaken the administration. The disaffected elements in the South were chiefly mountaineers, in West Virginia, eastern Tennessee,

[1] See Channing, *History of the United States*, VI, 378–381.

and northern Alabama and Georgia. This group was compact and dangerous, and furnished not only constant opposition to the recruiting of Southern armies, but might at any time come into open rebellion against the Confederacy.

The Northern advantage of wealth and numbers showed clearly in the enlistments. Although the South adopted conscription as early as April, 1862, a full year before the North, and though the terms of these laws were made constantly more rigorous until they "robbed the cradle and the grave" by calling for the services of all able bodied men between the ages of seventeen and fifty, the total enlistments in the Southern armies yielded only 1,200,000 men, a figure which certainly reached ninety per cent of what is ordinarily considered the effective military population. The enlistments in the Northern armies are recorded more accurately, and gave a total of 2,898,304 men. But these uncorrected figures are misleading, for most of the enlistments in the South were for comparatively long periods. Many in the North were for short periods especially at the beginning. The chief authority on numbers in the war, Colonel Thomas L. Livermore, estimates that reduced to a common standard of three years of service, the South had a total of 1,082,119 soldiers, while the North had 1,556,778. These figures are perhaps as nearly accurate as any now available. But the Northern preponderance was even greater, for at the end of the war it had called on less than half of its available military population, while the South had exhausted every resource and was even considering the enrollment of the slaves. As Germany was defeated not only by allied preponderance in the field at the end of the war but by the millions which could yet come from America, so the knowledge of the vast unused reserves of strength in the

North was an important element in the final victory of that section. The exact numbers in the field at any one moment in the war can never be stated with accuracy. At the beginning the difference in numbers was very slight; at the time of Gettysburg the North probably had about half a million men actually in the field against three hundred thousand for the South, while at the close of the war, the North had at least seven hundred thousand against less than two hundred thousand for the South.[1]

In spite of the differences in numbers which were obvious the South counted on two essential factors to bring the victory. One of these was geography and the other was foreign intervention. The South had studied closely the history of the War of Independence against England, when the cause had seemed often even more hopeless and when England with her superior resources had been defeated in the end partly by the impossibility of making her conquests permanent over the great distances that had to be traversed and partly by the entrance of France into the war. Both these factors seemed heavily weighted in favor of the South

[1] The best study on this subject is Thomas L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America.*

Three hundred and sixty thousand Northern soldiers died of wounds and disease during the war. The losses on the Southern side are not known, but were probably almost as great. Taking into account those who were partially disabled and died soon after the war and the thousands of civilians who perished, especially in such regions of war as the Shenandoah Valley, it is probably conservative to say that the war caused the loss of a million lives. The deaths in Southern prison camps numbered fifteen per cent, in those of the North, they reached more than twelve and a half per cent. In certain sections of the South it is probable that even today, the population still shows the effects of the ravages of war. See Hosmer, *Outcome of the Civil War*, p. 246.

in 1861. Both these calculations proved to be largely illusory for reasons which we shall now consider.

At a time when the South was limited to the coastal plains, Lord Cornwallis, with well trained British regulars, had found it easy to occupy the cities on the coast, Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington, but had failed to subjugate the regions of the interior. How much greater the problem which confronted the Union armies in 1861! It is true that they had excellent bases for invasion along the lines of the Ohio and the Potomac, and were not compelled to carry troops across the ocean. But the waters of the Gulf lie full eight hundred miles south of Harper's Ferry, and the Rio Grande in Texas is seventeen hundred miles from Charleston. Atlanta, which may be regarded as the heart of the Confederacy, was sixty days' march from the Potomac, the same distance as Vienna from the English Channel, or Moscow from the Niemen. Within this vast region, lay lands of great fertility capable of providing food for a hundred million people. This territory was bound together by only two important trunk lines of railroads from east to west, from Richmond to Atlanta and New Orleans, and from Richmond to Chattanooga and Memphis. From north to south there were only four continuous railroads, in the East from Richmond through Wilmington to Savannah, and in the West from Cairo on the Ohio to Corinth and Mobile, from Cairo to Memphis and New Orleans, and from Louisville, farther east on the same stream, to Chattanooga and Atlanta. Any one of these railroads would require many men to be safe against cavalry raids when used as lines of invasion. Apart from these six chief railroads, communications were almost as primitive as in the eighteenth century, and a few days of rain would turn the best roads into bogs impassable for wagons or artillery. Down into the

heart of the Southern country, extended the great parallel ridges of the Cumberlands in the west, the Alleghanies in the center and the Blue Ridge in the east, flanked by smaller ranges which concealed the movements of bodies of troops and which, in the hands of enterprising defenders, furnished covered ways for counter invasion. The lower lands, especially in Virginia were covered by dense and tangled thickets, or along the Mississippi by impassable swamps, and were everywhere crossed by streams difficult to ford and rising suddenly after rains to the dignity of rivers. Above all the coast extended for three thousand miles. Lincoln might proclaim a blockade but how could he close so vast a line with the paltry navy of forty ships, mostly obsolete, which he could summon for the purpose? Recognizing such difficulties, even dimly, it was no wonder that in the light of the experiences of the Revolution and of Napoleon's later adventures in Spain and Russia, many thoughtful men both in the North and the South regarded the problem of securing control of the Southern territory as one essentially hopeless.

These advantages for defence were, of course, real, but not so great as they appeared at first sight. In the first place, the coast is not, like that of Maine and Scotland deeply indented, but fairly continuous and covered by detached sandy islands which could easily be occupied by the navy. The ports that could be used for blockade runners were comparatively few and those that were in ready communication by lines of railroads with the center of the Confederacy were still fewer. The navy did not really blockade three thousand miles of coast, as has so often been stated, but only seven or eight important ports of entry. Even this task was sufficiently difficult, and the blockade was not completely effective until most of the ports had been cap-

tured. But the resources of the North for this purpose proved overwhelming. The Southern people had always been agricultural and not seafaring, and though able officers of the old navy went with their states, the North had all the common sailors. Even the crew of the famous *Alabama* was recruited from citizens of Great Britain. Above all, the North had more than six hundred ships in commission, and though cannons and munitions of war were imported by the South until the end, the stream of supplies became constantly more thin and precarious. For ordinary articles of commerce and manufacture, the South was from the beginning in the condition of a beleaguered garrison.

Nor could disadvantages of this kind be immediately overcome by a people which had no capital and whose male population was all required for actual service in the field. Although the South possessed immense resources in iron fields, most of these were unknown or at least undeveloped until much later. The only important mills for the production of iron were the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond which continued to the end the chief source of Southern cannon. When rails rusted there was no chance to replace them and when a railroad was broken by an invading army the loss was almost irreparable. The same difficulties applied to rolling stock which could only be made good by captures from Northern railroads like those that Jackson made at the expense of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad in 1861. Prodigious efforts were made to supply the necessary gunpowder and small arms, and in these directions with astonishing success, for until the end the Southern soldiers were quite as well armed as those of the North, and there is no record of a battle lost for lack of ammunition. The South also turned to the manufacture of cloth and clothing on a large scale, and with reasonable

success. At interior points like Jackson, Mississippi, in spite of a dearth of skilled artisans, extensive cotton mills were established. In many a household before the end of the war the old fashioned spinning wheel was brought out and used to supplement the products of the factory. But the South had depended for its shoes on the factories of New England, and never made good this loss. It has been said with pardonable exaggeration that the Southern armies were finally defeated because they could no longer march. In such conditions it became necessary to strip the shoes from the dead upon the battlefield, and captures of shoes such as were made by Jackson at Manassas and Harper's Ferry in 1862, more than once proved almost as important as the winning of a battle. Similarly, the supplies of quinine to combat malaria and of ether for use as an anesthetic could be secured only through the blockade or by the surreptitious exchange of cotton with Northern traders through the military lines. In the stories of war there are none more full of horror than those given by Southern surgeons of wholesale amputations after battle without the use of anesthetics.

As the transportation system broke down with no hope of replacement, the factor of distance became a positive disadvantage. After the march of Sherman to the sea, wheat sold at twelve dollars a bushel in Richmond, and could scarcely be secured even at that price, when in Southern Georgia wheat could not be sold at one dollar even in depreciated Confederate paper money. After Vicksburg and Chattanooga had closed the West, it was small comfort to starving soldiers to be told that there were countless herds on the plains of Texas. In the black belt of plantations food was plentiful until the end, except where the path of an invading army had turned the country into a wilderness.

Curiously enough, at least from the point of view of the abolitionists, the negroes continued to work faithfully, and seemed to take little interest in confiscation acts or emancipation proclamations.[1]

But in the Piedmont regions where each farmer had only one or two negroes, the absence of the white men was more important. Food became scarce and many a family of an absent soldier was reduced to want. The women and children were often seen working in the fields supplementing the labors of the old men and the boys. When money depreciated until it would buy nothing and especially after the Shenandoah Valley was devastated by Hunter and Sheridan in 1864, many a soldier in the lines of Lee was distressed by the knowledge that his family at home was starving. Desertions increased, not so much on account of disloyalty, but from absolute necessity, much as the armies of Washington had tended to disappear at harvest time. In the mountains there were thousands whose sympathies had been from the beginning with the North. In these regions the Conscription laws were difficult to enforce, and in 1864 thousands of deserters and dangerous characters from both armies made life and property unsafe.

The chief factor in breaking down the immense advantage which the South had in the mere element of distance was the presence everywhere of navigable

[1] Mrs. Chestnut wrote in her diary, May 2, 1865, "The fidelity of the negroes is the principal topic. There seems to be not a single case of a negro who betrayed his master, and yet they showed a natural and exultant joy at being free. After we left Winnsboro negroes were seen in the fields plowing and hoeing corn, just as in antebellum times. The fields in that respect looked quite cheerful. We did not pass in the line of Sherman's savages, and so saw some houses standing."

streams that penetrated the heart of the Southern country and furnished safe bases for attack, even when the railroads were cut by the horsemen of Forrest, of Ashby, of Stuart, and of Wheeler. In fact the possibility of collecting supplies on navigable streams and on the coast was unquestionably the decisive factor in the war, without which the task of the North must have been all but hopeless. The Confederacy attempted to control these streams, but after the defeat of the *Merrimac* by the *Monitor* in the East in the early spring of 1862, and especially after the fall of New Orleans in April and the defeat of the Southern River Fleet near Memphis in the same year, the supremacy of the North on the interior waters and on the sea was never seriously threatened. Grant won the first great success of the war with the aid of gunboats and transports on the Tennessee and Cumberland. In the late winter of 1862, he failed to capture Vicksburg when the line of railroad was cut behind him by Forrest and his supplies were seized by Van Dorn. But he succeeded in the next year when he was able to advance by way of the Mississippi. In the East, McClellan saved his army after the failure of the Peninsular Campaign by finding a new base on the James in touch by sea with the immense supplies at Washington. Grant in 1864 was able to turn the left flank of the Confederate position and finally defeat Lee by abandoning the direct line of precarious railroad and seeking new bases first on the Rappahannock, then on the York, and finally, like McClellan, on the James. In only one important Northern advance, that of Sherman from Chattanooga to Atlanta, did a Northern general depend successfully on a railroad as an exclusive line of communications, and even that line had to be abandoned when threatened by the army of Hood. From the strategic point of view

Sherman's march to the sea was a search for another safe base on water. The failure of the Red River campaign by Banks in June, 1864, was largely due to the sudden fall of the waters of the river which made communication difficult. And these illustrations might be greatly multiplied. With their backs to the water the Confederates were in constant danger. When a Northern army reached water, like that of Grant at Haines' Bluff, it was safe. The presence of navigable streams and of the sea in Northern hands made the Confederacy much smaller than it seemed.

In considering the all important element of geography in the Civil War, it has been frequently stated that the Confederacy had the advantage of interior lines of communication and could therefore make smaller forces effective at the point of danger. For limited areas like that in eastern Virginia, and usually in merely defensive campaigns, this was unquestionably true. Richmond lay in the center of converging lines of possible attack. Lee could watch the Peninsula, the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, the Orange and Alexandria railroad near the base of the Blue Ridge, and the well covered Shenandoah from a single post which was like the hub of which the four chief lines of advance were the spokes. But in other campaigns, notably that of Gettysburg, the advantage of interior lines was with the North. And in the general strategy of the war, the North found it more easy to transfer troops from one theater to another than did the South. This was especially true after the breakdown of the Southern railroads. In 1863, Hooker reached Chattanooga from the army of Meade by way of Louisville, with greater ease than Longstreet had reached the same position from Atlanta. In 1862, Bragg transferred his army from western Tennessee to Chattanooga by sending them all

the way to Mobile and back. In 1865, Schofield reached the coast of North Carolina from Nashville in less than three weeks. These interior lines have usually been measured in miles rather than in hours. With every day the advantages of rapid transportation lay with the North and were in the end decisive.

Russia defeated Napoleon because it was so big, the South failed because it was not big enough for the task it had undertaken.

At the time of secession, the second factor that seemed to favor the South was the hope of foreign intervention. This was summed up in the phrase, often heard at the time, "Cotton is King." Russell, visiting the South, in 1861, heard this cry everywhere and stated his view of the reality of the danger: "The dependence of such a large proportion of the English people on this sole article of American cotton is fraught with utmost danger to our honor and prosperity. Here were these Southern Gentlemen exulting in their power to control the policy of Great Britain, and it was small consolation to me to assure them that they were mistaken. In case we did not act as they anticipated, it could not be denied Great Britain would plunge an immense proportion of her people,—a nation of manufacturers—into pauperism, which must leave them dependent on national funds, or more properly on the property and accumulated capital of the district."[1] The Prime Minister, Palmerston, summed up the situation frankly at an early period in the war, when he said to Charles Francis Adams: "We do not like slavery, but we want cotton and we dislike very much your Morrill tariff."

The two decades which preceded the war had seen an immense development of the British cotton industry.

[1] Russell, *My Diary North and South*, 98.

In 1840, England secured most of her supply of raw cotton from India, Egypt, Brazil, and the West Indies. But these sources could not compete with the unrivalled facilities of labor and climate which existed in the United States. By 1860, England imported almost two and a half million bales of cotton, of which two millions came from the United States. One million artisans of Lancashire were entirely dependent on the cotton industry, and the sale of cotton goods was one of the largest factors in British commerce. The effectiveness of the blockade soon reduced the American importations to one hundred thousand bales. Mills were closed and many men and women were reduced to the verge of actual starvation. Early in 1863, when the misery of the cotton spinners in Manchester and in Oldham was at its worst, Minister Adams asked John Bright what America could do to help the operatives. These workers had refused to give their support to the contentions of the *London Times*, and of the Tories generally, in favor of intervention by Great Britain. They were starving and the hope of securing cotton so that the mills could resume was but slight, but the men who were backing Bright and Cobden would not throw the weight of their influence in favor of the breaking up of a friendly Republic and the establishment of a new state recognizing slavery. Bright told Adams that it would be a good thing to send food for the families of these starving operatives, and as a result of the report sent by Adams, a committee was instituted in New York, with branches in Boston and in Philadelphia, and three vessels, loaded with beef, pork and flour, were sent to Liverpool. The food was consigned to Bright's committee and was distributed among the operatives in Manchester and in Oldham.

It seemed at first sight inevitable that in self protection the rulers of England would be compelled to recognize

the Confederacy and break the blockade even at the cost of possible war. It is difficult to imagine, under such conditions, how the North could have succeeded. Intervention was made even more probable by the fact that the government of England was until 1867 a frank aristocracy. Not more than a million persons had the right to vote, and actually only three hundred thousand did vote for members of Parliament. English society feared and distrusted democracy and thought it recognized a certain similarity between the Southern plantation and the English country estate. The failure of the great democratic experiment in America would not only remove a danger which the event showed to be imminent, but would weaken and divide a rival whose growing territory and increasing merchant marine endangered British commercial supremacy. The astute Bismarck, watching events from Germany, with such considerations in mind, said that England had committed the great political blunder of the century when she did not support the cause of the South.

Even English liberals, men like Grote and Freeman, thought they saw in the cause of the South the principle of self determination. They quoted the words of Chatham, who had said, "You cannot conquer three million freemen!", and applied the statement with fresh force to the new situation. As battle succeeded battle and the subjugation of the South seemed as far away as ever, the very cause of humanity seemed to call for intervention to prevent the further effusion of blood. Nearly all the leading newspapers and magazines were favorable to the cause of the South.[1] The most import-

[1] Noteworthy exceptions to the attitude of the great majority of the English papers that were supporting the cause of the South were the *Spectator*, the *Daily News*, the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Newcastle Chronicle*, and most of the Scotch newspapers.

ant of these newspapers, as far as influence not only throughout Great Britain but on the Continent was concerned, was the *London Times*. During the entire four years the *Times* was persistent and emphatic in its support of the Southern cause. It was practically the only English paper that was read on the Continent and the reports of its American correspondents (and after the resignation of Russell these reports were by no means trustworthy) gave to Germany, France, Italy, etc., almost the only information they had about progress of events during the war. John Delane, the editor of the *Times*, was recorded as a large subscriber in the list of those who had purchased Confederate Cotton Bonds. He was in active correspondence with John Slidell, the ambassador in Paris of the Confederacy. Delane was advocating in the *Times* intervention on the part of England and of France. As late as January, 1865, *Blackwoods'* published an article proving conclusively that the attempt to conquer the South was hopeless. The friends of the North, especially the Duke of Argyle, Richard Hargreaves, John Bright and Richard Cobden among the politicians, and Tennyson, Goldwin Smith and Leslie Stephen among the literary men, were in a small minority of the leaders of opinion, and they were thought to be influenced by their desire to see an increase in the British electorate.

In France, the Emperor Louis Napoleon, was eager for intervention. He was already planning his Mexican adventure to which he committed himself definitely in 1862. His motives have usually been described by American historians as entirely selfish and unscrupulous. But Napoleon was something of a dreamer and an idealist. He had aided Italy to win her independence from Austria, and he always regarded himself as a great liberal statesman. He saw an opportunity to replace

the anarchy of Mexico with a strong government which should give security to that country against American aggression and should at the same time increase the prestige of France. When the dearth of cotton had thrown one hundred thousand operatives out of employment in one French province, his friendship for the South and his eagerness for intervention became quite open and unconcealed.

Spain, also, had taken advantage of the American troubles to reannex Santo Domingo, and a war with Peru indicated a hope of re-establishing the lost glories of her ancient empire. But neither France nor Spain had a powerful navy and they could not act without the assistance of England. London was the key to the situation.

The problem of England was not quite so simple and inevitable as it seemed. Seward had protested vigorously against the recognition of the belligerency of the South on May 13th, although it now seems difficult to see how England could have acted otherwise in the light of a blockade which could only be regarded as legal if the South was a public enemy, with all the rights of war. Even though Lincoln softened his Secretary's notes as much as possible and the American minister at the court of St. James, Charles Francis Adams, acted with tact and discretion, Seward made it abundantly clear that any further recognition of the Independence of the South would lead to war. And the memory of the Crimean war was still fresh, a war which had been costly and was now seen to have secured no substantial benefits. The British shipowners were eager for peace, for they saw that war with America would be accompanied by very great losses, at the very time when the distractions of their chief rival were giving them a secure hold on the carrying trade of the world, and

when the depredations of the *Alabama* and the consequent rise in insurance rates were already causing the transfer of the best American ships to the British flag. Russia had not forgotten the Crimean war, her Czar had just freed the serfs, and in her desire to conquer Poland, her rulers could not be expected to have great sympathy for the cause of self-determination, so dear to European liberals. After the climax of the war, in September of 1863, two Russian fleets visited America, one arriving at San Francisco and the other in New York. Such an incident could not be accidental, and it made clear to Americans what England had long known that in case of war the Russians were likely to make American ports the base for raids on British commerce.[1] In Europe, the rising power of Prussia, openly friendly to the North, was a source of danger to France, and perhaps to England.

Nor did the owners of the cotton mills bring the expected pressure to bear on the cabinet of Palmerston and Lord John Russell. The importation of cotton and the production of cotton goods had exceeded the demand. The crop of 1860 had been unusually great and had been largely exported before the beginning of war. The mills had on hand a full three years surplus of cotton goods, and, apart from the American war, would probably have been compelled to work on half time. The owners of cotton found the war an actual boon which soon increased the value of their property six times. During 1862, in

[1] On the visit of the Russian fleet, see Golder, F. A., "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July, 1915. E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War*, I, 227, II, 129, shows that the visit came after Great Britain was committed to neutrality and that its purpose was to seek safety. But in America it was regarded rightly as an evidence of Russian friendship. However selfish the reasons this friendship existed from the beginning.

the height of what is called the cotton famine, large quantities of cotton were actually transported from Liverpool to Boston! By the time when the dearth of cotton had become really serious in 1863, England had found other sources of supply in India and Egypt, and her importations were becoming sufficient to allow the reopening of many of the closed mills.

Nor was the supremacy of cotton so complete as it had seemed. Cotton had a royal rival in wheat, and the only source of surplus wheat was the grain belt of the American Northwest. By one of those curious coincidences of which history is full, in 1860 and the next few years there was a succession of short crops, not only in England but throughout Europe. In 1859, only ninety thousand "quarters" of wheat and flour were imported into Great Britain from the United States; in 1860, there were imported over two million quarters, in 1861 over three and a half million quarters, in 1862 over five million, and in 1863 almost three million. Now these were the decisive years from the point of view of intervention. War could almost certainly destroy or at least greatly reduce these importations and might cause a terrible disaster. Cotton failed because it was, relatively, a luxury, while wheat was a necessity.[1]

But it is not probable that such economic considerations were decisive or controlling in keeping England, and with her France, neutral in the war. The sym-

[1] Channing, *History of the United States*, VI, Chapter XII, contains an interesting discussion of the economic factors which affected intervention. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, Chapters II and VII, describes foreign opinion. E. D. Adams, in his authoritative, *Great Britain and the American Civil War*, minimizes the direct significance of economic motives, especially the need for wheat, on the ground that it was felt too late to count, II, 13, 14.

pathies of the laborers and the lower middle classes were from the beginning with the North. From the point of view of their own problems they saw the war as one for free labor and for democracy, much as Lincoln also saw it. At first there was some doubt or hesitation, for both Congress and the President had said that war was for the Union and not against slavery. But after the preliminary proclamation of emancipation in September of 1862 had time to affect opinion, the tone of public meetings would have made intervention on the part of England unthinkable. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation had little legal consequence in America, since it merely gave Presidential sanction and approval to the policy of confiscation which had been adopted by Congress in the summer of the same year. The slaves did not rise against their masters as some ardent abolitionists had expected, and those who came within the military lines were already being given their freedom under the act of Congress. If the formal declaration won the enthusiastic support of the abolitionists for the war, it also alienated the larger group in the border states, who loved the Union but cared nothing about slavery. The administration lost many seats in Congress in the election of 1862. Legally, the freedom of the negro depended more on the Confiscation Act of 1862 and the later Thirteenth Amendment than it did on Lincoln's delayed proclamation.

But in the foreign policy of the nation it was a measure of supreme importance, in that respect being of the same general nature as the Declaration of Independence, the Monroe Doctrine, and Mr. Wilson's "Fourteen Points."[1]

[1] This result was largely unexpected. Lincoln expected the policy to weaken the South far more than it did, while Seward feared that it would alienate foreign opinion by seeming to invite a terrible servile insurrection. What had been intended chiefly as a

Southern sympathizers pointed out in vain that it failed to free slaves in loyal states where the power existed and only freed them in regions where the federal arm was powerless as yet to aid them. The common people recognized the ultimate meaning of a step which the nation could never retrace. On a Sunday, after the news of the proclamation had reached England, Spurgeon thus prayed before the greatest congregation of his time: "Now, O God, we turn our thoughts across the sea to the terrible conflict of which we know not what to say; but now the voice of freedom shows where is right. We pray thee give success to this glorious proclamation of liberty which comes to us from across the waters. We much feared our brethren were not in earnest and would not come to this. Bondage and the lash can claim no sympathy from us. God bless and strengthen the North, give victory to their arms." And the congregation responded with a deep Amen.

On March 23, 1863, John Bright addressed a meeting of skilled laborers in London, closing his speech with words of prophecy: "Impartial history will tell that, when your statesmen were hostile or coldly neutral, when many of your rich men were corrupt, when your press which ought to have instructed and defended—was mainly written to betray, the fate of a continent and its vast population being in peril, you clung to freedom with an unfaltering trust that God in his infinite mercy will yet make it the heritage of all his children."

In the closing days of the war, Mason approached the Prime Minister with the proposal that the South should itself abolish slavery in return for recognition, but it was then too late and he found Palmerston cold

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military policy became the most important single element in foreign affairs. Adams, E. D., *op. cit.* II, 114, 115.

and non-committal. And it must be said that from the beginning both Palmerston and his foreign minister, Lord John Russell, had favored a policy of neutrality, and had only considered intervention to prevent further bloodshed when, in 1862, the cause of the North seemed to them, as it did to many in the United States itself, absolutely hopeless. But the neutrality of 1862 was on the whole unfriendly, while that of 1863 was friendly and proved a bitter disappointment to the South. From that time Jefferson Davis saw clearly that the South must win its independence by its own unaided efforts. Both the great factors which had brought success to the cause of 1776 had proved to be but broken reeds to that of 1861.

Failing to win an easy victory against the superior numbers and resources of the North by the mere size of their country or by foreign intervention, the South was compelled to rely largely on the character of her soldiers. The hope that the North would not fight, of course, proved to be an illusion, but in the beginning and especially in Virginia, the South could appeal to more direct and immediate motives than the North. While the Northern soldier was fighting for the cause of nationality and democracy, the Southern soldier was fighting for his home and his fireside. Many a man who disliked slavery and had opposed secession, went with his state and served her to the end. Robert E. Lee was regarded as the ablest soldier in the old army. His long experience and the prestige which he had gained in Mexico, made him the natural successor to General Scott. He was offered the chief command under Scott, but when his State seceded he sent his resignation to his old commander and went to offer his sword to Virginia. On the same day he wrote a letter to his sister: "I am grieved at

my inability to see you. I have been waiting for a more convenient season, which has brought to many before me a deep and lasting regret. Now we are in a state of war which will yield to nothing. The whole South is in a state of revolution, into which Virginia, after a long struggle, has been drawn; and though I recognize no necessity for this state of things and would have forborne and pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own person I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native state. With all my devotion to the Union and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home. I have, therefore, resigned my commission in the army and save in defence of my native State, with the sincere hope that my poor services may not be needed, I hope I may never be called on to draw my sword." History will record that Scott's remark that the loss of Robert E. Lee was equivalent to that of twenty thousand men, was probably an underestimate.[1]

When at the beginning of the war, Davis called for one hundred thousand volunteers and Lincoln for seventy-five thousand the people of both sections responded with enthusiasm. Neither group of citizens was accustomed to army discipline. Very few saw that military effectiveness is more a matter of compact organization and of mutual confidence that results from it than it can possibly be of the individual quality of the soldier. Both armies found it difficult during the first year to control their men, and no officer in either had ever commanded as many as ten thousand men in battle.

[1] Quoted in Maurice, *Robert E. Lee, the Soldier*, p. 56. There is no complete and satisfactory life of Lee, but this work by an eminent British soldier is probably the best.

Straggling and disobedience to commands were at first common with regiments on both sides. It is probable that if either army had had in the first months the advantage of a disciplined force of one hundred thousand men the war could have been won. But even here the South had the advantage. Her citizens were in great part an outdoor people, accustomed to horse and gun. The common soldiers could march faster and with less provisions than those of the North. In the beginning, the cavalry, which, in days when modern means of communication were almost as scanty as they had been in the campaigns of Julius Cæsar, served always as the eyes of the commander, was much more efficient on the Southern side.

But as the war went on, these differences, never so great in the West as the East, began to disappear. The Northern soldiers became inured to the hardships of campaigns, and the Southern horsemen became relatively scarce. Sherman believed that the army, comprising about seventy thousand men, that he led from Atlanta to the Sea was the best that the world had ever known.

In their eagerness to secure volunteers, both sides depended on local enthusiasm. When a company or a regiment was depleted, instead of filling the ranks with fresh recruits, the old officers were often discharged, and complete new regiments were created with inexperienced officers who had gained their position by the voluntary election of the men whom they had recruited. So the work of training undisciplined units had to commence again from the ground up.

The South was compelled to give up the system of voluntary enlistments and, in 1862, the government enacted the first effective conscription law in America. There was some discontent because the planters who had to

oversee as many as twenty slaves were exempted. This led to the charge that it was "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight." But these inequalities were soon removed, although there was great criticism of the exemptions that were granted to office-holders by the Governors of the various states.

The North depended on voluntary enlistments for the majority of its soldiers until 1863, at least in form. But when the economic depression that marked the first months of the war had yielded to an era of unprecedented prosperity, and especially when the defeats of 1862 and the Emancipation Proclamation had made the war unpopular in many places, local pressure of a social kind was often used to secure the enlistment of reluctant able-bodied men. After July, 1863, the draft was used to supplement voluntary enlistment. But any locality might evade the draft by filling its quota of volunteers, and any individual might furnish a substitute or pay the sum of three hundred dollars to secure exemption. By this inequitable system, a man with three hundred dollars did not have to go to war unless he wanted to. Both individuals and localities were virtually in the market for soldiers. Bounties for enlistment which would prevent the use of the draft were furnished by the national government, by the state, by the county, and by the city. Agencies were even maintained by individuals in Canada and in Europe to secure soldiers. Agents of Northern counties were to be found in the path of the armies in the South trying to fill the local quota with newly freed slaves, thus avoiding what was regarded as the stigma of the draft. The amounts paid for soldiers in different localities naturally varied with their wealth and their patriotism and were a prolific source of injustice. A new crime developed called "bounty-jumping." A soldier, often recently arrived

from abroad, would enlist, collect the bounty of six hundred or a thousand dollars, desert at the first opportunity, re-enlist and collect a new bounty under an assumed name in a new place. The fact of the bounty, when the economic opportunities of those who stayed at home were considered, was not unjust, but the inequalities and the system of individual exemptions became a scandal. There are records of individuals who collected bounties several times. It is only just to remember that some communities continued to furnish their quotas by voluntary enlistments, and the volunteer remained until the end the backbone of the army. In some places, riots occurred when the draft was enforced, notably in New York in July of 1863, when the Irish workers assumed that the draft was a mere device to break a strike, and Meade was compelled to send to New York soldiers who were needed to pursue Lee after Gettysburg. Both North and South had difficulties with conscientious objectors like the Quakers of the Carolinas and the Mennonites of northern Ohio. Some of these objectors built a fort in the hills of Holmes County, Ohio, to resist the draft, but they dispersed on the approach of troops.

Even more difficult than the task of raising armies was that of supplying the sinews of war. The South issued bonds and at an early period borrowed most of the money actually in the Confederate States. From the very beginning, it was compelled to meet its obligations by the device made familiar in almost every great national emergency, the use of paper money. The amount finally issued was prodigious but no trustworthy record was kept and it is impossible to state the figures with any accuracy. For the first few months, the paper money of the Confederacy was quoted at figures that did not go lower than sixty cents in gold, but after 1863

depreciation went on so rapidly that the money became practically worthless. At the end, the whole country was reduced to a condition of barter and even the government was compelled to refuse its own money and to collect its taxes in kind by a system that was practically an impressment of the articles needed by the army. In 1863, the French banking house of Erlanger attempted to place in the French and English markets fifteen millions of bonds secured by cotton. The proceeds of these bonds proved a total loss to the speculators who had hoped to reap a fortune from the investment.[1]

The administration of Abraham Lincoln found the national treasury practically empty. The business depression which had begun with the panic of 1857 had not yet ended and the revenues did not keep up even with the moderate expenses of the government. In the closing hours of the outgoing administration, Congress had passed the protective Morrill tariff which raised the duties on articles brought from abroad, but this act had not had time to increase the revenues. Buchanan's Secretaries had found it difficult, in the uncertainty of the moment, to borrow funds for the immediate necessities of the government, even at the exorbitant interest of ten per cent.

Lincoln selected as his Secretary of the Treasury one of his rivals for the Republican nomination, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio. Chase was an able lawyer but he had

[1] The course of prices under inflation in Richmond is described in the vivid *Diary of a Rebel War Clerk*, by J. B. Jones. Mrs. Chestnut wrote in her diary for March 6, 1865: "Mrs. Glover gave me some yarn, and I bought five dozen eggs with it from a wagon—eggs for Lent. To show that I have faith yet in humanity, I paid in advance in yarn for something to eat, which they promised to bring tomorrow. Had they rated their eggs at $100 a dozen in 'Confederick' money, I would have paid it as readily as $10. But I haggle in yarn for the millionth part of a thread."

had no experience in finance and accepted the position with some reluctance. Politically, the appointment was wise, for Chase represented the radical wing of the party that desired to make immediate emancipation a prominent factor in the war. His usefulness was impaired by a poorly concealed desire for the Presidency which carried him more than once to the border of actual disloyalty to his chief. In most of the financial policies of the war, the dominant figure was the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of Representatives, Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania. The powers of this committee were very extensive, including not only the raising of funds but their expenditure. The influence of the committee was increased by the unrivalled parliamentary abilities of the chairman, who now commenced at the age of sixty-nine a new career which made him for seven years the most powerful individual in Congress and possibly in the country. Stevens was a radical not only in his attitude to slavery but also in finance, although his measures were to some extent modified by the action of the more conservative Senate. In the House, there was no rival who could meet him in debate, for Stevens had a keen wit and used his sharp tongue to overwhelm with ridicule the measures of his opponent.[1]

The financial system of the country was in the hands of more than sixteen hundred state banks whose innumerable issues of notes, presumably redeemable in gold, were the money of the common people. The banking system was subject to the laws of the various states and was not a matter for federal interference. The value of any note depended on the security of the bank which issued it. Counterfeits were very common.

[1] *The Life of Thaddeus Stevens*, by J. A. Woodburn, is an interesting and sympathetic account.

Though most of the banks were reasonably conservative, having learned their lesson from the panic of 1837, the whole system was evidently unsuited to a great national emergency.

The Congress which met in special session in July of 1861 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow as much as two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, and laid the foundations of the extensive system of taxation which was increased in the following years. The most interesting feature of this plan was an income tax of three per cent on incomes over $800 and ten per cent for those over $5000.

Since these new taxes could not be expected to bring an immediate return, Secretary Chase turned to a group of powerful banks to borrow the necessary funds. He insisted on the payment of the proceeds of these loans in gold which he felt obliged under the law to withdraw at once from the banks and to place in the Treasury. By this measure the gold reserves of the banks, never too great, were so sharply reduced that they were compelled to discontinue specie payments in December of 1861, a step in which they were soon followed by the government. From that time until 1879, the country depended for its currency on bank and government notes.

Secretary Chase proposed the creation of a system of national banks with the right to issue notes secured by government bonds. This measure was opposed by Stevens as too slow for the emergency and as giving the banks the right to make two profits, first the interest on their bonds and then on the notes which were based upon them. As an alternative, the first issue of government money, familiarly called "greenbacks," was authorized in February, 1862, a measure reluctantly accepted by Chase as a necessity. After a long and

bitter debate, these new notes were made legal tender for the payment of private debts. Much to the chagrin of the radical Stevens, Congress refused to go the whole way in committing the government to a paper currency. Only gold should be accepted for customs on imports and the interest on the public debt should be paid in gold. Stevens always believed that the subsequent depreciation of the greenbacks in terms of gold was due to this slur which was cast upon their value by the government itself. It is to be noticed that there was no direct promise at the time that the principal of the debt should be paid in gold when it fell due, a misunderstanding which later became the basis of the so-called greenback movement.

The first issue of legal tender paper was for only one hundred and fifty millions, but the temptation and the necessity were too great, and before the end of the war the amount had been increased to four hundred and fifty millions. These were in turn made the basis of further issues of state bank notes. Prices rose very fast, and critics of the legal tender policy have argued that as the result of an unnecessary inflation, the cost of the war was increased by six hundred millions of dollars. The defenders of the greenbacks said that this cost was not due to the issue of the paper money but to the fact that the debt was finally redeemed in gold. In any case, the greenbacks soon depreciated in terms of the gold which had to be used by every importer of foreign goods, the depreciation being a rough index of the fortunes of the North in the war. The greenbacks were quoted at 98 in March, 1862, reached 39 cents on the dollar in the bitter summer of 1864, and had recovered to 74 when the war closed. The greenback policy made it easy to pay private debts and to finance new ventures and were an element in the rising prosperity of many people.

Though wages rose, they did not rise in proportion to the depreciation of the money, while profits increased abnormally.

The immensity of the financial task which the war involved is clearly seen when we remember that in the years before the war, the American people had been accustomed to the annual expenditure of not more than sixty millions by the federal government. This sum had been secured easily by a low tariff and the sale of public lands. During the four years of war, the government raised the great sum of $2,621,916,786 by loans and taxed the people to the extent of $667,846,136. The cost of the war of course continued after it was over in pensions and in interest charges. In 1879, the direct cost of war to the federal government was estimated at six billions of dollars. To this amount should be added the war expenditures of the states.

After 1862, Secretary Chase no longer depended on the banks to place the huge loans, but went directly to the people. He found an able assistant in Jay Cooke, an enterprising Philadelphia banker, who organized a great national campaign, employing more than two thousand agents. Cooke received a small commission for selling the bonds and, appealing to both patriotism and cupidity, he prophesied that the bonds would finally be redeemed in gold. Bonds were also sold in Germany, Holland, and to a smaller extent proportionately, in England. In England the agent of the Treasury Department for the first two years was Robert J. Walker, the former Governor of "bleeding Kansas." It is curious to remember that as late as May, 1862, Confederate bonds were quoted at a higher figure in London than those of the United States.[1] The methods of Walker were not

[1] After the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, in July, 1863, the price of the Confederate securities fell rapidly. On financial

always entirely scrupulous, but his influence was very great in creating foreign confidence in federal securities.

To foreign observers, one of the strangest features of the war was the alacrity with which the people paid the taxes. For two generations the accumulated resources of a rich country had hardly been touched by taxation. By the laws of July, 1862, at a time of immense military reverses, an entirely new policy was commenced. The principle of these measures was summed up by an astute observer: "Whenever you find an article, a product, a trade, a profession, or a source of income, tax it." Not only was the income tax increased, but excise taxes, essentially sales taxes, of from three to five per cent, were laid on almost every conceivable article. Custom duties were largely increased to counterbalance the effects of internal taxation. A foreign minister remarked to Seward that he was learning something new about the strength of popular government. "I was not surprised," he said, "to see your young men rushing enthusiastically to fight for their flag. I have seen that in other countries. But I have never before seen a country where the people were clamorous for taxation." One unforeseen consequence of this new taxation, especially that on articles of manufacture, was to hasten greatly the already existing tendency to larger business units. Where the old manufacturer had bought from other producers the materials for his engine, he now found it economical to make his own bolts and bars.

The national banking system that Chase had advocated as early as 1861, naturally found great opposition from the state banks and was not adopted until 1863. Even then the new banks found it difficult to compete

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problems, see, Oberholtzer, E. P., *Jay Cooke, the Financier of the Civil War* (1907), an unusually frank biography, and Dewey, D. R., *Financial History of the United States*, a standard authority.

with the state banks with their unlimited issue of notes. Not until the close of the war, when the issues of the state banks were taxed out of existence, did the national banking system come to its own. During the war, it did not aid greatly as Chase had hoped in furnishing a constant demand for federal bonds. The people continued to use ordinary bank notes side by side with greenbacks and other paper money of the government. Only in distant California did any one use specie, except at the custom house. The history of the national banks belongs to the period after 1865.[1]

[1] In addition to authorities already cited, Emerson Fite, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War* (1910), J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America* (1901), and W. E. Dodd, *Jefferson Davis* (1907), have proved especially useful in the preparation of this chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST CAMPAIGNS

When war was clearly seen to be inevitable, the harassed President stated to his private secretary the meaning of the contest: "For my own part," he said, "I consider the central idea pervading this struggle is the necessity that is upon us of proving that popular government is not an absurdity. We must settle this question now, whether, in a free government, the minority have the right to break up the government whenever they choose. If we fail, it will go far to prove the incapability of the people to govern themselves. There may be one consideration used in stay of such final judgment but that is not for us to use in advance: That is that there exists in our case an instance of a vast and far reaching disturbing element, which the history of no other free nation will ever present. That, however, is not for us to say at present. Taking the government as we found it, we will see if the majority can preserve it." Here was evidently the germ of the idea later presented in the Gettysburg address and in the well known letter to Greeley, as well as the explanation of the caution with which Lincoln approached what seemed to him the smaller question of emancipation. As long as emancipation might endanger the Union, he was willing to make enemies to check such men as Fremont, Hunter, and Cameron, who wanted

from the beginning to emphasize the old question of the negro.

General Scott advised a period of delay until the new recruits could be at least partially trained. But the cry of "On to Richmond" was dinned into the President's ears until he finally yielded to the pressure. On the afternoon of July 16th, the "Grand Army of the Potomac," under the immediate command of General Philip McDowell, advanced towards Centerville. McDowell had an army of thirty thousand men, mostly three months' volunteers, with a few hundred regulars. The men did not know how to take care of their rations and insisted on straggling after blackberries as if the campaign had been a huge picnic at government expense. None except the regulars had ever been under fire. Thirty-one miles away, guarding the junction of two railroads, lay the Confederates, twenty-two thousand strong, under Beauregard, the hero of Fort Sumter. In the Valley, another force of nine thousand Confederates, under Joseph E. Johnston, were supposed to be kept fully engaged by a larger force under Patterson. The plan of McDowell was well conceived. Making a feint at the right wing of the Confederate position, strongly posted behind a swift stream called Bull Run, he expected to turn the left wing and, cutting off the communications, win an easy victory. But Patterson, a superannuated veteran of the Mexican war, was no match for the wily Johnston. Patterson was hindered not only by his own caution, but by orders which required him to remain between the Confederates and the capital at Washington. By the aid of the railroad out of the Valley, Johnston made a rapid movement eastward and on the morning of the 20th, he had two-thirds of his army in union with Beauregard.

Thus when McDowell attacked what he believed to be

inferior forces he was already outnumbered, for he had wisely left a strong division in reserve at Centerville. The battle was fought on Sunday, July 21st. At first all went well. The Federals managed to cross Bull Run and to appear on the Confederate flank, according to the plan, and in the first ardor of battle the raw troops fought surprisingly well against soldiers who were little better trained than themselves. When Jefferson Davis, unable to stand the strain of anxiety in his office, arrived on the battlefield, he found so many soldiers fleeing to the rear that he thought that the battle had been lost. But the Valley soldiers under Jackson made a strong defence on a hill, winning for their commander the name of "Stonewall" which describes so poorly his characteristic rapidity of movement. Late in the afternoon, the remainder of the Valley army appeared on the field of battle leaving Patterson and his twenty thousand men to watch the barn after the horse was stolen.

At about three in the afternoon, in a last desperate effort, Beauregard and Johnston threw every available man into a counter charge. The rumor spread that Johnston's army had come, although most of it had been present all day. Before McDowell could make any use of his reserves, a panic spread among the men who had been marching and fighting in the dust and intense heat of the July day. Fear spread from one to another, and in half an hour the right wing of the "Grand Army of the Potomac" was a disorderly rabble eager to gain security behind the fortifications which they had left five days before. For a few hours it is possible that Washington could have been captured. But the Confederates were almost as disorganized by hard fighting and by the unexpected success as the Federals, and before they realized the full extent of their victory, the rain began to fall in torrents and converted the roads into impassable

morasses. The first effort to capture Richmond had ended in dismal failure.

Not the least of the disasters of Bull Run was the loss of an able leader who had to carry the blame for a defeat for which he was not responsible; McDowell could not be used again as a commander. But on the whole, the battle was an advantage to the North, which had learned that the task was long and hard, and which now became ready to make heroic sacrifices to wipe away the stain of defeat and of disgrace. On the other hand, the Confederates became over-confident, and made little use of their opportunities. Most of the generals who had seen the battle advocated an immediate invasion of the North while new Northern levies were still demoralized by defeat. Jackson insisted that Washington and Baltimore could be occupied, communications broken, factories destroyed, and stores secured. But such measures seemed unnecessary to the Confederate President who feared to alienate the expected friendship of doubtful Maryland and who hoped to win the war by defensive measures on the soil of the Old Dominion. So the good autumn days passed to winter, and the South had lost the initiative which they won at Bull Run.

For a new commander, Lincoln turned to the West where George B. McClellan with Ohio troops had made safe for the Union the friendly mountain country of West Virginia. On October 31st, General Scott resigned the nominal command in which he was no longer physically able to continue and McClellan was placed in supreme control. The new general appeared to be well qualified for the particular task that the times required. He was still a young man of only thirty-five, being twenty years younger than his great rival Lee. McClellan had had a brief but brilliant military career.

He had graduated at West Point first in the class of 1846; entering the Engineers, he had served with distinction in the Mexican War, and had acted as the representative of the American army in the Crimean War where he had become familiar with European methods of war and of army organization. In 1857, he had resigned from the army to become a railroad president. He had an attractive personality and was more popular with his soldiers than any other commander of the army of the Potomac.

The energy of the government soon bore fruit. From August first to the end of October, one hundred thousand volunteers poured into Washington, and after manning the defences of the capital, McClellan had an army of seventy-six thousand men, confronting the fifty thousand under Johnston. The Confederates had advanced after Bull Run to Arlington and their fires were plainly visible from the White House. But as the Federal forces increased, Johnston had withdrawn to his old position behind Bull Run, where he also was engaged in drilling and organizing his forces.

McClellan's ability as an organizer was unquestionable. In three months he had changed the rabble of July into an army, and had made the defences of Washington almost impregnable. But the secret service of the War department was imperfect and the civilian spies and the imagination of the Commander magnified the fifty thousand Confederates into at least three times that number. McClellan was personally courageous, but remembering Bull Run, he hesitated to advance until his plans were quite complete. It is probable that from the beginning he had no intention of advancing until the next spring.

From the purely military point of view, the General was probably correct. But Lincoln was between two

fires. A group of radical Senators under the leadership of Senators Wade of Ohio and Chandler of Michigan, whom Lincoln called "the Jacobin Club," were demanding an instant advance, and were becoming suspicious of the Democratic leanings of the General. Many newspapers clamored for prompt measures. The danger of foreign intervention was great, and Lincoln regarded the possibility of defeat as better than inaction.

McClellan had all the soldier's contempt for civilian interference with military policy, and he treated the President with scant respect. On a November evening, the President, Secretary Seward, and John Hay, who recorded the incident in his diary, called at McClellan's house, and were told by the servant at the door that the General was at a wedding and would soon return. "We went in," Hay wrote, "and after we had waited about an hour, McClellan came in, and without paying any particular attention to the porter who told him the President was waiting to see him, went upstairs, passing the door of the room where the President and the Secretary of State were seated. They waited about half an hour, and sent once more a servant to tell the General they were there; an answer came that he had gone to bed." On another occasion, when McClellan had failed to keep an appointment with the President, Lincoln said to his angry young Secretary, "Never mind; I will hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success." In December, McClellan fell seriously ill with typhoid fever, but it was then too late for a campaign.

The Secretary of War in the cabinet of Lincoln was a typical machine politician, Simon Cameron from Pennsylvania, who like Seward and Chase had sought the nomination for the Presidency. Cameron soon proved quite unable to cope with the immense responsibilities of his office, and rumours of graft and extravagance in

the conduct of the department were in the air. When Cameron openly advocated a policy of immediate emancipation, contrary to the cautious policy of the President, he was removed summarily in January, and Lincoln appointed in his stead a war Democrat in the person of Edwin B. Stanton, consoling Cameron, and especially Mrs. Cameron, by the diplomatic mission to Russia.

Stanton was a distinct improvement. He had almost unlimited ability for hard work, and a burning contempt for graft and extravagance. In his dealings with men whose power he respected, like war governors on whom he had to depend for troops, Stanton was usually able to curb his bitter tongue and to act with reasonable tact. But to his subordinates, or with men whose abilities he thought to be less than his own, his manners were often harsh to the point of brutality. For the President, he had little more respect at the beginning than McClellan. But he was undoubtedly patriotic and able, and Lincoln bore with his manners to the end for the sake of the cause. Stanton was a man of excitable temperament and of intense personal and political prejudices, which often blinded his judgment in the choice of commanders and which proved his chief limitation as a war minister.

The Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles of Connecticut, was also a former Democratic politician, who knew nothing of sailors or ships, but who developed quite unexpected abilities for the conduct of his office. Without any showy qualities which might bring him into the public notice, he had almost unerring judgment in the choice of able subordinates. The Assistant Secretary in his department was Captain Gustavus Fox, an officer in the old navy, who proved to possess just the technical qualifications which the head of the

department lacked. Whether by good judgment or good luck, the fact remains that no incompetent officer was appointed to high command, and the strength of the navy was developed with a quiet smoothness which was often overlooked by the public in the din of conflict. In some appointments, Welles displayed characteristic independence and courage. David G. Farragut was an old naval officer, who was already sixty years of age, thus being the oldest man in high command in the war. His antecedents were all Southern. His father was a full blooded Spaniard from the Island of Minorca; his mother was a member of a prominent family in North Carolina; his boyhood had been spent in New Orleans, which he was so soon to be called on to capture, and his wife was a Virginian. At the beginning of the war Farragut was living in Norfolk. But perhaps because his ties were to many Southern communities rather than to one, he made the supreme choice of 1861 in a different manner from Lee, and immediately offered his services to the North. Welles at once recognized the value of his experience and ability, and at the first opportunity gave him the command which he desired, a choice which was to be brilliantly justified by the result. Farragut was the most eminent of those from the South who joined the North, although General George H. Thomas was a Virginian. On the Southern side, Adjutant General Cooper was from New York, and Pemberton the unlucky commander at Vicksburg, lived both before and after the war in Philadelphia. Both sides came to look with suspicion on commanders who had come from the other section, but Farragut emerged from the war a great national hero. The division of families that the war occasioned, especially in the border states, is illustrated by the fact that both Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant had close relatives on the Southern side.

The extent to which Lincoln sought to conciliate divergent interests in the nation and to create a Union party, was shown not only by his four major appointments, Seward, Chase, Stanton, and Welles, but in the minor positions in the cabinet. Edward Bates, the Attorney General, was from Missouri, and Caleb Smith, the Secretary of the Interior, was a well known orator from Indiana. Neither occupied an important post in which he could win outstanding distinction. But the Postmaster General, Montomery Blair, was a man of great administrative ability. Blair's father, Frank P. Blair, of Maryland, had been the editor of the chief Jacksonian organ, the powerful Washington *Globe*, and had been a member of the Kitchen Cabinet of the leader from Tennessee. The new Postmaster General introduced reforms which in times of peace would have been deemed notable, among them the beginnings of free delivery in the cities and the rapid sorting of the mails by clerks on railway cars. But Blair was always an object of suspicion on account of the strong Democratic antecedents of his family and in 1864 he was finally sacrificed to the antagonism of the Jacobins.

While Lincoln was organizing his administration and vainly urging McClellan to advance, the nation was face to face with a crisis in its foreign affairs. The American warship, *San Jacinto*, Captain Wilkes commanding, arrived in an American port on November 15th, 1861, with two distinguished and unwilling passengers, Mason and Slidell. The British mail steamer, *Trent*, on which the Confederate commissioners had embarked in Havana for St. Thomas on their way to Europe had been intercepted in the Bahama Channel a week before, and, in spite of the protests of the Captain of the mail steamer, the persons of the two Confederate commissioners had been seized and they and their private secretaries

had been made prisoners of war. Captain Wilkes had been on his way from a remote position on the African coast with no orders but to reach America as quickly as possible, but hearing of the presence of the two commissioners on board the *Trent*, he had decided to make a name for himself by their capture. Curiously enough, the British precedents were in favor of just such impressments, though in strict legality, the ship should have been sent to port and subjected to judicial adjudication as performing an unneutral service in carrying dispatches contrary to the Queen's proclamation of May 13th. The American precedents, on the contrary, were all favorable to the commercial rights of a neutral, and the similar question of impressments had been one of the causes of the War of 1812.

But popular emotions pay little heed to national consistency. The news of the capture of Mason and Slidell was received with an outburst of popular approval. Wilkes was publicly congratulated by the Secretary of the Navy and was given a vote of thanks by the House of Representatives. Only a few thoughtful men had misgivings. Montgomery Blair said that the act of Wilkes was "unauthorized, irregular and illegal." Senator Sumner, who more than any other American of his day realized the importance of British friendship said, "We shall have to give them up." Lincoln received the news with anxiety: "I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants. We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. We fought Great Britain for insisting by theory and practice on the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done." Secretary Seward bided his time, and simply wrote to Charles Francis Adams to explain that the act had not been commanded by any instructions to Wilkes. In the light of the great popular excitement, Lincoln

hesitated and thus yielded an opportunity to disavow an act which his good sense showed to be foolish, thus losing the good will of acting without compulsion.

In the meantime, the news arrived in England on November 27th. There, popular opinion was quite as unreasonable as in the United States. And though the Prime Minister had in his hands an opinion of his law officers which justified precisely such action as Wilkes had taken, the Cabinet, in spite of their reluctance to weaken the powers of the British navy in time of war by such a precedent, was compelled to send a note which demanded in the most peremptory terms the release of the two envoys. Fortunately the Queen still retained the ancient right to be consulted in questions of foreign policy, and the note was modified by the Prince Consort, Albert, in the interest of courtesy and of wisdom, as Lincoln had modified Seward's early dispatches to England with the same ends in view. Even now the British note required an answer in seven days, and amounted to an ultimatum. Eight thousand soldiers were at once dispatched to Halifax. Charles Francis Adams wrote to Seward: "There can be no shadow of a doubt that the passions of the country are up and that a collision is inevitable if the Government of the United States should sustain Captain Wilkes."

The British note made its slow way across the sea and arrived in Washington on December 18th. The British minister in Washington was Lord Lyons, a wise and cautious man. Instead of presenting the note at once, thus leaving only seven days for a reply, he softened the harshness of this period by revealing the contents of the missive to Seward in an unofficial way, and did not present the actual note officially until December 23rd, thus virtually lengthening the time for consideration by five days. At a momentous cabinet

meeting on the day after Christmas, the anniversary of Anderson's removal to Sumter, the cabinet listened to an able note in which Seward disavowed the act of Wilkes and promised the prompt return of the two envoys. In due time, the terms of the note were carried out and Mason and Slidell reached their posts in London and Paris. It is probable that if there had been at that time a cable such as existed a few years later, if the excitement in England and the United States had been simultaneous, war would have resulted, a war which must have completely changed the history of the world. As it was, the delay from November 15th to December 26th, had given time for sober common sense to reassert itself. Many a man who had thrown up his hat at the news of the brave exploit of Captain Wilkes, now quietly praised the wisdom of Secretary Seward.

So far so good, but a wise and cautious foreign policy is not victory. The Confederacy had been disappointed in the West by the failure to win the adherence of Kentucky and Missouri. Each of these states had attempted to remain neutral in the struggle, but their people were divided and before the close of the year they had been occupied by superior Federal forces. In January of 1862, while McClellan was still perfecting his eastern army, the long Confederate line in the West ran along to the southern boundary of Kentucky and across the Mississippi to the Ozarks in the northeast corner of Arkansas. The Confederate Commander was a celebrated army officer, Albert Sidney Johnston, already fifty-nine years of age, who had seen active service in the West before the war. He was a native of Kentucky, and, like Lee had opposed secession, but when his adopted State of Texas seceded, he offered his services to the Southern side. Whatever his abilities, Johnston unquestionably made the natural mistake of attempting

to defend too long a line, a mistake which was due to the hope of winning the border states. The Federal commander in the West, with headquarters in St. Louis, was an elderly student of the art of war, General Henry Halleck, of whom great hopes were entertained, hopes that were destined to be disappointed. The Union forces in Kentucky were under the command of General Don Carlos Buell, who held a semi-independent command, and who proved to have many qualities similar to those of the commanding general in Washington, General McClellan. Under his care, the western soldiers rapidly acquired the necessary discipline and organization.

In the first ten weeks of the year, the waiting North was encouraged by three important victories along this western line, won by almost unknown subordinates. On January 19th, the Federal forces under General George H. Thomas, attacked the right of the long Confederate line at Mill Springs, in Kentucky, killing the Confederate commander and defeating the force which covered the important Cumberland Gap. Communication was thus opened through the mountains with the Union sympathizing population of the upper Tennessee Valley. Two weeks later, the center of the Confederate line was also broken in a still more important victory. The Confederates had built and garrisoned two forts which lay only twelve miles apart at the point in the extreme north of Tennessee where the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers approached close to one another before separating in their course to the Ohio. Each of these forts lay on the inside of the curves of the rivers, Fort Henry on the Tennessee and the stronger Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. The importance of the position was obvious, for further up the Tennessee lay Chattanooga, and even closer on the Cumberland

was Nashville, the capital and chief city of the state. With adequate naval strength on the two rivers the short line of twelve miles might easily have proved impregnable.

But this naval strength was precisely what the South did not have, and in the circumstances the forces in the forts could be outflanked. Early in February, Halleck accepted a plan which had been made by his subordinate, Ulysses Grant, who commanded near the mouth of the Ohio, and sent a force of seven gunboats under Flag Officer Foote and an army of seventeen thousand men under Grant himself up the Tennessee to attack Fort Henry.

The previous career of this most distinguished of Union commanders had not been calculated to inspire confidence. He had been born in southern Ohio in 1822, and was thus thirty-nine years of age when the war commenced. He had graduated from West Point, in the class of 1843, without distinction. Never studious, he is almost the only example of a great commander who had given little serious attention to the theory of his profession, being in this respect in marked contrast to his contemporaries, Jackson and Lee, or McClellan and Sherman. As a young man, like most of the commanders of the Civil War, he had seen service against Mexico and in the far West, but had fallen into habits of intemperance which he found it very difficult to overcome, and he had resigned from the army in 1854 with the rank of Captain and under somewhat of a cloud. When the war commenced, he was a clerk in his father's leather store in Galena, Illinois, earning for his family a more than precarious living, and regarded by his neighbors as a ne'er-do-well. The opening of the war had given him his opportunity, although at the beginning Grant, with attractive modesty, doubted his ability

to command more than a single regiment. It was to the credit of the usually inefficient Frémont, the first Federal commander of the West, that he seems to have been among the first to recognize the ability and energy of this unpromising officer and to have placed him in command of forces at a strategic point near the mouth of the Ohio.[1]

Commodore Foote advanced up the turbulent waters of the Tennessee with only seven little river gunboats. But Fort Henry stood on a low piece of land and could offer no sufficient resistance, and without waiting for the advance of the army of Grant the Confederates retreated across the isthmus to Fort Donelson, leaving only ninety-eight men to surrender to Grant when he arrived on February 6th, 1862. Fort Donelson, on the sister stream of the Cumberland, twelve miles away, was a much stronger position lying on a hill and guarded by an army of eighteen thousand men. Grant was delayed

[1] The difficulties of Grant in the matter of liquor long continued to endanger his career, but they were largely overcome on account of the constant watchfulness of his old friend, John A. Rawlins, who served on his staff from the beginning, and whom Grant rewarded later on with the post of Secretary of War. More than once, in moments of great strain, especially in 1863 before Vicksburg, and in 1864 after the great defeat at Cold Harbor, Grant seemed likely to succumb, and received letters like the following from Rawlins: "The great solicitude I feel for the safety of this army leads me to mention what I hoped never again to do, the subject of your drinking. . . . Tonight I find you where the wine bottle has just been emptied, in company with those who drink and urge you to do likewise, and the lack of your usual promptness of decision and clearness in expressing yourself in writing tended to confirm my suspicions. . . . Your only salvation depends on your strict adherence to your pledge. You cannot succeed in any other way." That night Rawlins removed the liquor from the tent of his commander. It was to the credit of Grant that he accepted the services of Rawlins in the friendly spirit in which they were meant. See Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, 255, 325.

by the badness of the roads and by the necessity of waiting for the gunboats and reinforcements. The gunboats, which had gone by the way of the Ohio and the Cumberland fifteen times as far as Grant, arrived with more soldiers on the twelfth of February. For some unexplained reason, the totally incompetent Confederate commanders had allowed themselves to be completely invested by an inferior force without going out to give battle, until the arrival of the gunboats and the reinforcements had given Grant a clear numerical superiority.

The position of the Union army was by no means enviable. The weather was cold and raw, and on the first night the soldiers were compelled to sleep under a sleety rain without tents. The gunboats did not find the problem so easy as at Fort Henry, and Foote was forced to withdraw to repair the damages caused by the heavy guns. On the fifteenth, while Grant was away to consult the naval commander, the Confederates determined to cut their way out of a position which must soon prove a death trap. When Grant arrived on the field he found the right wing of his army in confusion. But he noticed that the Confederates had supplies with them, and he heartened his men by calling out, "They are trying to escape." The Union soldiers rallied in time, and a counter charge by the Union left carried the outer defences of the fort. The charge was led by one of the oldest officers in the army, General C. F. Smith, who had been the commandant at West Point when Grant had been a cadet. "I was nearly scared to death," said one of his soldiers afterwards, "but I saw the old man's white mustache over his shoulder, and went on."

That night the senior officers on the Confederate side, Generals Pillow and Floyd, the last of whom was especially wanted in Washington on account of transactions

in which he had been engaged when a member of the cabinet of Buchanan, transferred the command to their subordinate, General Buckner, and escaped on a river steamer. Forrest and his cavalry also managed to escape by a difficult ride over a road almost submerged which lay between the Union army and the river, thus saving to the Southern cause the most able of their great cavalry commanders. At daybreak, Buckner shouldered the unpleasant responsibility which had been left to him and sent a messenger to find what terms would be accepted. "No terms," answered Grant, "but unconditional surrender. I propose to move immediately on your works." That day the Northern people learned that an unknown General, U. S. Grant, had obtained the capitulation of an important fort with fifteen thousand prisoners, seventeen thousand muskets, and sixty-five cannon. It was the greatest military success which the new world had yet known. The inauguration of President Davis took place on February 22nd, and his address showed the unbroken determination of the leader of the Southern people to win independence in spite of defeat.[1]

[1] An important factor in the capture of the Fort was the arrival from Cairo of three schooners carrying mortars. The fortunate circumstance of the arrival of the mortars was due to the foresight of Lincoln and the public spirited service of Abram S. Hewitt, of New York. Grant had, at the beginning of the campaign, made requirement of mortars, sending his message by wire directly to the President. The Ordnance Department had reported to the President that they had mortars, but no mortar beds. Lincoln had been introduced to Hewitt, the iron merchant, and had been told that he was a "man who did things." Lincoln wired to Hewitt asking whether he could make thirty mortar beds and how long it would take. Hewitt reported by wire that he could make thirty mortar beds in thirty days. The task was completed in twenty-eight days and Thomas Scott, who had been President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and who had at large personal sacrifice, taken over the

Early in March, another of Halleck's subordinates, General S. R. Curtis, won an important victory at Pea Ridge in the Ozarks, thus breaking the western end of Johnston's first line of defence, as Thomas and Grant had already broken the right and center. The Confederates now withdrew to their second line along the railroad which ran from Memphis to Chattanooga and the East, abandoning Nashville and central Tennessee to the victorious Northerners.

The most important position on this railroad west of Chattanooga was Corinth in Northern Mississippi, where the line from east to west was cut by one from Mobile. The Confederates had learned from their reverses the important lesson of concentration, and Johnston called every available man from west of the Mississippi, and was joined by Bragg from Mobile with ten thousand men. He had now a brave and well disciplined army of fifty thousand men. In the meantime Grant and his army of forty-five thousand men advanced by the line of the Tennessee, which had been opened to them by the fall of Fort Henry, and posted themselves with their back to the river at the point where it makes a great bend and flows north instead of west. Here he awaited at Pittsburgh Landing the army of the Cumberland under Buell, which would give him overwhelming superiority to break the second Southern line at Corinth, just twenty miles away. The evidence is clear that he

supervision of military transportation, had in readiness a train of flat cars, by which the mortar beds were sent to Cairo. The cars were painted black with the address, *U. S. Grant, Cairo,* and the caution, *Not to be switched under penalty of death.* They arrived just in time to enable Grant to bring his campaign to a successful close.

For this incident, which is a significant indication of the industrial advantages of the North, the author is indebted to Major George Haven Putnam who had the account directly from Mr. Hewitt.

regarded the Southern army as demoralized by their recent misfortunes and that he did not expect attack. Few generals as yet recognized the importance of entrenchments as these were to be used later in the war, and beyond sending out the usual line of pickets, no preparations were made against attack. Johnston's plan was to drive a wedge between the Union army and their base on the river before Buell, who was even then approaching, could unite his army from the east to that on the exposed western bank of the river. In the first attack, the impetuous Confederate charge carried the Union lines back a full mile. But these men were already trained and seasoned soldiers on both sides and there was no second Bull Run. At a very strong position the Confederate attack was halted. During the afternoon the Confederate army lost its commander, who was mortally wounded, and there was some confusion before the command could be assumed by Beauregard. In any case Buell arrived at nightfall, to find the landing crowded with fugitives, but the position still covered by undefeated soldiers. Johnston had been delayed by the bad roads and had attacked one day too late. With Buell present, Grant had a substantial superiority, and on the next day attacked the Confederates and won back all the positions which he had lost the day before. On the two days of battle each side had lost at least ten thousand men wounded and killed, a carnage in proportion to the numbers engaged which far exceeded any other battle that had as yet been fought on the American Continent. The shattered Confederates retired to Corinth, the retreat covered by the troops of Bragg, and Halleck gathered an army of one hundred thousand men at Pittsburgh Landing, assuming the command in person for the measure many hoped would be decisive.

In the meantime, the commanding general in Washington was ready at last to move. On March 8th, 1862, at the very time when the Federal armies in the West were advancing after the triple victories of Thomas, Grant, and Curtis, a crisis was reached in which there seemed for the time to be actual danger that the North would lose the essential command of the sea. Almost at the beginning of the war the Confederates had occupied the important port of Norfolk at the mouth of the James. They found the *Merrimac* in a half sunken condition, but with the aid of the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond they had now managed to cover her sides with rude armor and to equip her with a beak. Thus prepared, the old vessel, now an ironclad and renamed *Virginia*, sallied from her base and attacked the wooden vessels of the old fleet which were blockading the mouth of the James. One was rammed and sunk and another was compelled to run aground and set on fire. The engines of the *Merrimac* were very defective and her ram had been injured by her own impact with the Federal vessel, but when she retired for the night to Norfolk, it seemed inevitable that she would sally forth and complete the work of destruction the next day. On March ninth, Stanton and Lincoln looked anxiously down the Potomac for the arrival of the dreaded iron ship which could overcome any vessel of wood. But in the meantime, a small and powerful ironclad of a different pattern, invented by Ericson and accepted by the navy as an experiment, had been completed, and by a curious coincidence was ready for the emergency. The *Monitor* had a single turret of iron on a hull which was almost entirely submerged. It was not very seaworthy, but in shallow water was more than a match for the heavy and lumbering *Merrimac*. And so it proved, for when the *Merrimac* appeared on that day to complete her work of

destruction, a naval duel took place in which the smaller but more powerful vessel managed to protect the blockading squadron from the *Merrimac* and to drive her back to Norfolk where she was soon destroyed by the Confederates to keep her from falling into Federal hands. The whole incident was immensely important, because it proved what French and English navy engineers were already saying, that the days of the wooden ship of war were numbered. In the immediate strategy of the Civil War, the victory of the *Monitor* also left in Federal hands the eventual control of the interior waters of Virginia.

One week after his control of the sea was assured, McClellan embarked his army for Fortress Monroe at the end of the peninsula between the James and the York, and by the second of April had about ninety-five thousand men ready to advance towards Richmond from the southeast. By this plan he hoped to avoid the difficulty of a direct march across the rivers of Virginia and to keep his army always close to navigable water. The Confederates had retreated towards Richmond to meet this new danger, in some respects similar to the advance of Howe in 1777 on Philadelphia by way of the waters of the Chesapeake. McClellan expected to keep the Confederates busy on the Peninsula while a second army of more than forty thousand men under McDowell should march overland and outflank the Southern positions on the York. But while McClellan was at sea, Robert E. Lee, who was at this time the chief military adviser to President Davis, had ordered Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley to attack the Federal troops there and by threatening Washington along this covered way, to keep reinforcements from reaching McClellan. Although his own force had no more than ten thousand men, Jackson boldly attacked the outposts

of Banks' army of more than twenty thousand at Kernstown, and though he did not win a complete victory, managed to create the impression of superior numbers. In the condition of foreign affairs at the time, the administration could not take the slightest risk of even a temporary Confederate occupation of the capital, which would be almost certain to result in the recognition of the Confederacy by France and perhaps by England, and might also result in the loss of Maryland. Accordingly Stanton retained the army of McDowell to meet danger which was mostly imaginary. With a force of ten thousand men at the strategic point, Lee and Jackson had managed to neutralize the efforts of sixty thousand.

Disappointed in his plan to march up the Peninsula with McDowell covering his flank on the north side of the York, McClellan felt compelled to advance cautiously. The whole month of April was consumed in siege operations against the Confederate lines near Yorktown, occupied by a defensive force of not more than fifty thousand men. Every day was of supreme importance to the Confederacy, for the Congress at Richmond had just passed a conscription law which would soon give Lee and Johnston eighty-five or ninety thousand men for the defence of their capital. McClellan now had about one hundred and five thousand effective men, not too great a force for the defeat of a powerful enemy behind entrenchments. By the middle of May, McClellan was approaching the defences of Richmond, his army divided by the treacherous waters of the Chickahominy, a small stream which was likely to become formidable after rains.

Jackson had not been active after the affair of Kernstown late in March and it was even rumored that he had left the Valley. The danger to the capital from

the direction of Harper's Ferry at the mouth of the Valley seemed over, and McClellan was expecting McDowell for the second time to join his right wing and to help him to invest the capital of the Confederacy and thus to cut it off from the Valley. But the same strategy which had succeeded so brilliantly in March, was used again in May with even more telling effect. Instead of leaving the Valley, Jackson had been reinforced and now had seventeen thousand men. The problem was intricate for a Federal army under Frémont was marching from West Virginia over difficult country, while the northern end of the Valley was protected by Banks. The two Federal armies were together much larger than the force under Jackson, without taking into account the army of McDowell which had not yet joined McClellan and could be thrown into the Valley in case of danger. The tactics of Jackson and the strategy of Lee were equally brilliant. On May 8th, Jackson made a swift march across the Shenandoah and defeated Frémont, and took advantage of his victory to close the western approaches to the Valley. Turning north, he fell upon the unsuspecting Banks on May 25th at Winchester, and routed the main army for the defence of the Valley. The Valley was now open to Harper's Ferry and Jackson had captured valuable stores. For the second time, McDowell was recalled just as he was about to advance from Fredericksburg to join McClellan. Both McDowell and McClellan protested that the best way to protect Washington was to press Lee and Johnston with superior forces and thus compel the withdrawal of the troublesome Jackson from the Valley, but the danger seemed too great and they were over-ruled.

On the last day of May, while McClellan's right wing was extended to the North of the Chickahominy to meet the expected reinforcements of McDowell, Johnston

attacked the part of the army which lay south of the Chickahominy and opposite the frontal defences of Richmond. The river was swollen with rains and there seemed to be a chance to win a great victory. But the success of the movement depended on secrecy and swiftness, and mistakes made by subordinates prevented victory. At Seven Pines Johnston was wounded not to appear again in the field until 1863, and Lee left his post as chief adviser to the President to take the active command of the Army of Virginia. McClellan still waited for reinforcements and Lee watched behind the trenches of Richmond for the expected arrival of Jackson.

In Washington supreme efforts were now being made to catch the elusive Jackson before he could leave the Valley and reach Lee. As Jackson fell back rapidly up the Valley with a wagon train six miles long filled with Federal booty, no less than eighty thousand troops were turning their faces towards the Shenandoah and spreading a great net to cut off his retreat. In the center of the Valley rises the massive detached elevation of the Massanutton Mountain, dividing the river and the valley into two branches. The Federal plan was to have the soldiers of Frémont occupy one valley from West Virginia, while the advance of McDowell's army cut off the retreat along the other, and the reorganized forces under Banks came down from Harper's Ferry at the mouth of the river to destroy Jackson before he could reach the security of Staunton and the railroad out to Richmond. But the soldiers of Jackson, encumbered as they were by a long wagon train, performed prodigies of marching. On June 6th, Jackson's daring cavalry commander, Ashby, was killed in a rear guard action, but on June 8th and 9th Jackson fell upon the two divided groups of Federals who had expected to cut off his retreat and defeated them at Cross Keys and Port

Republic, thus winning his way to the safety of the upper valley. From April 29th to June 5th, Jackson had marched four hundred miles, often twenty-five miles a day. With strategical odds of seven to three in favor of his opponents he had used his men so effectively against a divided enemy that he had fought three battles with the tactical superiority of numbers in the field of four to three. He had routed one army, paralyzed the efforts of another, twice ruined the careful strategy of McClellan, and had managed to escape from the trap which was set for him with trifling losses and with immense stores of captured booty.[1]

It will be remembered that by the middle of May McClellan had reached a point where the signboard read, "Richmond 4½ miles." By the closing days of June, he had some seventy thousand men south of the Chickahominy, the stream which had nearly spelled his ruin on May 31st, and less than half that number on the north, covering his communications to the White House on the upper waters of the York, and was still waiting for the return of McDowell from his reluctant wild goose chase to capture Jackson in the Valley. If McDowell arrived in safety with forty thousand men, the sixty-five thousand Confederates under Lee would be in grave danger and the capital of the Confederacy might fall. The cavalry of Stuart had made a daring ride around the Northern army and brought word to Lee that the right wing of McClellan's army was "in the air." Lee recalled Jackson from the Valley, and, leaving only a few thousand men to defend the entrenchments in front of Richmond, on June 26th threw the bulk of his whole army on the exposed right wing. His plan was to

[1] The best account of the campaign of 1862 in which Jackson was so prominent is in Col. G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War.*

shatter that wing and cutting behind it to seize the all important line of communications to the York. But for once the march of Jackson was slower than had been expected. The Northern soldiers under Fitz-John Porter, though greatly outnumbered on the spot, made a heroic stand at Gaines Mill, a strong position. Under cover of this stand, McClellan was able to transfer his supplies by sea to the James, behind the main army south of the Chickahominy. Lee failed to divine this change of base with his usual swiftness and wasted time pushing on towards a base that was already abandoned. Conducting his retreat with skill, McClellan managed to escape with his whole army to the protection of the James, dominated by Union gunboats. For seven days the fighting was almost continuous, but when the Confederates attacked the retreating army at Malvern Hill, near the James, they found the position impregnable and the courage of the retreating soldiers undiminished. Lee's men were thrown back with heavy losses.

McClellan had been defeated, but his position was far from hopeless. His army was still intact and in good spirits at a point only twenty-five miles from Richmond in perfect safety on navigable water. McClellan now suggested the same plan which Grant afterward found to be necessary. He would carry his army across the river, and by endangering the railroads that brought supplies to Richmond from the south, compel the evacuation of the Southern capital without the necessity of costly attacks against almost impregnable defences north of the James. But the administration had lost confidence in McClellan on account of his dilatory tactics, and had brought Halleck from the West to act as commander in chief. Halleck joined with Stanton in ordering the embarkation of the army and their

recall to the Potomac in the neighborhood of Washington. For several weeks, Lee was freed from all anxiety as to McClellan and could devote his undivided attention to the army of McDowell, who had now been succeeded by a boastful soldier from the West, General John Pope.

This unnecessary recall of McClellan's soldiers was unquestionably one of the greatest blunders of the war both from a political and a military point of view. To foreign nations and to the Northern public it was an acknowledgment of defeat, thus greatly discouraging enlistments and increasing the risk of foreign intervention. From the purely military point of view, it might well be doubted whether McClellan as a field commander was sufficiently aggressive, but Richmond which had been in danger was made for the time perfectly safe, and by the very caution of the move, Lee was in a position to threaten Washington. If McClellan's army gained the Potomac in time to safeguard the capital, it must commence again the long and weary enterprise of reaching Richmond, probably at the very spot which was now abandoned.

Lee and Jackson were not soldiers to neglect the initiative that Halleck had granted them. As soon as they were sure that McClellan was safely at sea, they turned north against Pope, hoping to defeat him before he could be strengthened by the overwhelming forces of McClellan. Late in August, after some preliminary attempts to outflank Pope and to cut him off from his base, Lee and Jackson determined on a measure that is regarded by military critics as the boldest and the most brilliant of the war. Pope had about sixty thousand men against fifty thousand under Lee. The Union commander had reached a position just east of the Bull Run mountains, and, somewhat south of the first battle field of the war; at Manassas Junction, where the first

Confederate army had been trained, he had his base of supplies. Lee determined to divide his army in the presence of a superior enemy and to reunite it on the field of battle. Keeping half his army under his immediate command to watch Pope, he sent the other half under Jackson behind the friendly screen of the low range of mountains back of the stream called the Bull Run, to cut behind the right flank of the Union Army and to capture their base of supplies at Manassas Junction. When Pope turned away to protect his endangered rear, Lee himself would follow with Longstreet's Corps and join Jackson in attacking the flank and rear of the enemy. The dangers of the plan are evident for if Pope could divine the schemes of his opponents in time, he might overwhelm Jackson before Lee could arrive, or he might occupy the passes in the mountain and prevent a junction.

The strategy of the two Confederates was completely successful. The dust of Jackson's advance had been seen, but it was supposed to be made by the movement of a small force bound west towards the Shenandoah Valley. Before Pope realized that Lee's army was divided, Jackson was in his rear, and the Confederates were making merry with his supplies. The Union army first learned of the presence of their enemies by a great conflagration to the northwest. Before Pope could spread the net for what he regarded as the inevitable capture of the isolated force of Jackson, which he persisted in believing to be a mere raiding party, he was surprised the second time by the arrival of the rest of Lee's army through the unguarded passes. Pope stands almost alone among commanders in being deceived twice in a few hours by almost the same means.

The junction of the two parts of Lee's army was made on August 29th. The complete victory that he expected

was prevented by the slowness of Longstreet, who hesitated to attack. But on the next day, although Pope was strengthened by twenty thousand men from McClellan's army, his soldiers were discouraged by conflicting orders. Lee managed to bring overwhelming numbers to decisive points of battle, and the Northern army retreated within the fortifications of Washington, almost as completely demoralized as it had been on the same battlefield more than a year before. No one now had any confidence in Pope. McClellan had never formally retired although he had been virtually replaced by Pope as the active commander in the field. In the supreme emergency that now existed, Lincoln turned to him for a second time and placed him in command of the troops for the defence of the capital.

The gloom which accompanied the failure of McClellan's Peninsular Campaign had been lightened to some extent by continued victories along the rivers of the West. At almost the same moment with the death of Albert Sidney Johnston and the failure of his attack on Grant at Pittsburgh Landing (Shiloh), General Pope aided by the river navy under Foote had isolated and captured a strong Confederate force at Island Number Ten on the upper Mississippi, thus winning laurels that were so soon to wither at Bull Run. Similarly, at the mouth of the great river, on April 24th, Farragut had driven his fleet past the forts which guarded the approach to New Orleans and, by the most brilliant naval victory of the war, had isolated the chief seaport of the Confederacy and compelled its surrender to the troops of Benjamin Butler, who proved to be a better cotton merchant and politician than a soldier. On June 6th, the naval power of the Confederacy on the upper river was destroyed in a river battle near Memphis, thus giving to the North a valuable base at the western

end of the chief railroad from the west to the east. A few days earlier, Halleck had covered with his usual caution the twenty miles between Pittsburgh Landing and Corinth and had occupied without battle the chief junction on the same important railroad from Chattanooga to Memphis.

When Halleck and Pope had been called to Washington to show the eastern soldiers how to fight, the complete conquest of the West had seemed to many newspapers comparatively easy. But with Halleck in chief command in his office chair in Washington, the Western strategy took on the same quality of dangerous caution that was displayed by the recall of the army of McClellan to the Potomac. Instead of keeping his powerful army of more than one hundred thousand men concentrated for a single advance towards Vicksburg on the southwest, Mobile on the south, or Chattanooga on the east, Halleck now made precisely the same mistake of trying to protect too long a line which had cost the Confederates so dearly early in the year. The western army was divided, with Grant at Memphis, Rosecrans in the neighborhood of Corinth, and Buell under orders to repair the almost useless railroad and to advance cautiously towards the mouth of the Valley of East Tennessee at Chattanooga. Since the railroad lay directly along the Confederate front it could be cut almost at will by the enterprising cavalry of Forrest.

The result of this dispersion in the West, a part of which was probably made inevitable by the immensity of the country that had been won, was to give to the smaller Confederate forces in the West the same opportunities for initiative which had been utilized so effectively by Lee and Jackson in Virginia. It was probably the supreme crisis in the war. For if the initiative could be used to penetrate and win the alle-

giance of doubtful Kentucky in the West and of more than doubtful Maryland in the East, the war would seem to be almost won, and foreign intervention would soon complete the work of the Southern invasions.

During this moment of gloom, the increasing bitterness of the war was shown by a Confiscation Act which commanded the President to seize the property of rebels and to liberate their slaves. Lincoln signed the act with hesitation, after it had been modified to suit his view that though in rebellion the South was still protected by an unbroken Constitution. But he himself was considering an executive proclamation of emancipation as an act of war and of diplomacy. As long as the border states were still in doubt, he listened to the wise advice of Seward, and recognizing that a proclamation at such a moment would seem like a cry of despair instead of victory, as futile as the "Pope's Bull against the comet," he withstood all the pressure of men like Greeley who despaired of the Union but would at least destroy slavery in its fall, and waited for victory. At the same time he sought to divide the border states from the rest of the slave states by promising them compensation for voluntary emancipation, a promise that they did not have the foresight to accept.[1]

[1] In August, 1862, Greeley published in the *Tribune* an open letter to the President that he called the "Prayer of Twenty Millions." It charged the President with violating the Confiscation Act of Congress in not declaring the slaves at once free. It promised that emancipation would be followed by a movement among the slaves which would wreck the cause of the South, and at the same time win the friendship of Europe. Although Lincoln had already determined on a proclamation as soon as it could be issued without the loss of the border states, he showed in his reply that the cause of emancipation was secondary to that of the Union: "I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution . . . If there be those who would not save the Union unless they

With the initiative in Southern hands both in the East and the West, the bold attempt to win the border states by military measures that Jackson had urged in vain in the fall of 1861, now commenced in earnest. At almost the same moment that Lee and Jackson turned north against the communications of bewildered Pope, the new Confederate commander in the West, General Braxton Bragg, leaving a comparatively small force under Van Dorn to watch Grant and Rosecrans near Corinth, carried his small army all the way around by Mobile and Chattanooga to invade Tennessee and Kentucky. While a weaker force under Kirby Smith entered Eastern Kentucky from the great valley of the West by way of the Cumberland Gap, Bragg marched past Buell and advanced along the western face of the Cumberlands to join Smith and to win Kentucky. It was a race through the famous Blue Grass for Louisville, for Buell was compelled to leave the railroad he was so industriously repairing under orders from Halleck and to follow Bragg. The Confederates carried with them ample muskets and equipment for the recruits whom they expected to receive. They stopped at Frankfort to establish a Confederate State government, which proved to be short lived. The delay was just sufficient, for

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could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. . . . I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free."

Buell and the Union army reached Louisville and the protection of the Ohio River in time to secure the needed reinforcements which were pouring towards the Ohio from the endangered Northwest. Kentucky had evidently lost faith in the success of the Southern arms and proved apathetic to the appeals of Bragg. The expected recruits did not rise to save the cause of the Confederacy, and Bragg was compelled to retreat to save his long and precarious line of communications, fighting at Perryville on October 8th, 1862, an indecisive battle, and retreating again towards Chattanooga. The escape of Bragg was a disappointment to the administration and Buell was replaced by Rosecrans, who had defeated a Confederate advance against Corinth, and who now established himself in the center of Tennessee at Nashville.

While Bragg was failing to win Kentucky in the West, Lee had crossed the Potomac east of the mountains and northwest of Washington on September 4th, his soldiers singing "Maryland, My Maryland." But the words of the song proved to be a disappointment, for the ragged soldiers of the South did not carry the necessary conviction to the people of that state. What would happen when they retired, as retire they must, and were succeeded by the numerous and well equipped armies of the North? Lee turned west through the northern extension of the Blue Ridge which is here called South Mountain, and divided his army. With one part he pushed up the valley towards Hagerstown, while he sent Jackson south to capture Harper's Ferry where there were stores of which his army stood in greatest need. By a lucky chance, Lee's orders dividing his army were picked up by a Union soldier where they had been dropped by a careless Confederate wrapped around a package of cigars. McClellan now had a unique oppor-

tunity, for if he pushed on rapidly he could seize the passes of the South Mountain, and attacking Lee and Jackson while they were separated would probably complete the destruction of the main Southern army in the East. But McClellan delayed for a vital day, and in the meantime Lee had learned that his plans were known. By the time that McClellan reached the mountain, Lee had turned back, the passes were strongly defended, and Jackson had been given time to complete his capture of Harper's Ferry with its garrison of twelve thousand men and to join Lee for the approaching battle on the banks of the Potomac, where Lee managed to concentrate his whole army behind the stream of the Antietam near the town of Sharpsburg.

On September 17th, McClellan attacked Lee's strong position. The battle fought that day was one of the most bitter of the war, with losses even greater than those of Shiloh in the West. At the end of the long day's fighting each army occupied substantially the same ground that they had held in the morning. After waiting one day in that position, Lee led his men across the Potomac into the friendly shelter of the Shenandoah.

The two invasions of the border states had proved to be only gigantic raids, and not conquering marches. Kentucky and Maryland had each refused to join the South. The moment for which the President had waited had now come, and on September 23rd, Lincoln issued his long delayed preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation. Though few men recognized it at the moment, except perhaps the thoughtful Lee, the supreme crisis of the war was passed. The danger of foreign intervention was almost gone. The South had found her rivers and her institutions too much for her. Every day would strengthen the North, and weaken the South. In spite of defeats which were yet to come, the end could

not be in doubt, if only the people of the North did not retreat appalled at the sacrifices they would yet be called upon to make. In the psychology of the Northern people lay the one doubtful element in the situation.

CHAPTER IV

THE WAR FOR THE UNION

The retreat of Lee and Bragg from the border states in the autumn of 1862 gave the initiative for the third time to the armies of the Union. The administration was disappointed with McClellan for allowing Lee to escape and he was increasingly unpopular with the "Jacobins" on account of his politics.

A second ride by the cavalry of Stuart around the whole Union position on the Potomac gave Lee important information as to the size of the Union army and, though the actual damage was small and quickly repaired, made the pressure on the President for a fighting general too great to be resisted. General Ambrose E. Burnside was appointed to the command of the army in spite of his own objection that he had neither the experience nor the capacity for so great a responsibility. McClellan had expected to proceed against Lee, using the railroad along the eastern face of the Blue Ridge as his chief line of communications. Under the new commander, the army was carried to the east, where at Aquia Creek the Potomac comes within twelve short miles of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. Burnside hoped in this way not only to advance along a railroad, but to have his base always close behind him on navigable water, thus avoiding the difficulties which had cost Pope so dearly a few months before.

Lee would have preferred to await Burnside in the center of Virginia where he would have a greater opportunity for strategy and where a defeat to the Union army might be transformed into a great disaster, but political considerations had weight with the South as they also had with the North. It seemed too great a sacrifice of territory, and he was overruled. Accordingly, he planted himself on the hills south of the Rappahannock and awaited the attack that was sure to come. Nor had he long to wait. Burnside's plan was almost absurdly simple, and on December 13th he threw his whole army across the river in a hopeless frontal attack on an almost impregnable position. The Union army lost ten thousand brave men, and withdrew to the safety of its base with its confidence in its commander, never much greater than his own, completely shattered. The late winter had now set in, and though Burnside led his army again against Lee, the men could accomplish nothing in the sea of mud. Burnside was allowed to resign and was succeeded by one of his severest critics, the handsome and unstable general whom the soldiers delighted to call "Fighting Joe" Hooker.

The results of the Northern advance in the West were equally disappointing. In the center, Rosecrans advanced from Nashville and, on December 31, 1862, encountered the Confederate army of Bragg on Stone River near Murfreesboro, in central Tennessee. The situation was somewhat similar to the campaign of Camden in the Revolution, for each army was marching to outflank and surprise the other. The fighting was bitter, the losses on each side were very heavy, and the results indecisive. Bragg withdrew towards the South but with his army intact and undefeated.

In the far west, the vital position was Vicksburg, standing on a bluff above the Mississippi. Vicksburg

was especially important, for it was almost the last stronghold on the River left to the Confederates and the terminus of railroads from the east and west. If Vicksburg fell, the Confederacy would be cut in two. The city was easy to defend for it was protected on the North by swamps and by the tangled waters of the Yazoo and the Mississippi. It was Grant's plan to outflank Vicksburg by the railroad that runs south from Corinth parallel to the Mississippi on the east, while Sherman reached the city by the Mississippi River and attacked the strong northern defences. But, as Grant advanced, the railroad proved too difficult to keep open against the Southern cavalry. His lines were cut, his base of supplies was seized by the enterprising Van Dorn, and though Grant learned the lesson that an army might depend for food on the rich supplies in the enemies' country, his men were compelled to retreat, leaving Sherman to make a hopeless attack against the whole defending force north of the fortress at Chickasaw Bluffs, (December 29th, 1862). Coming in rapid succession, Fredericksburg, Murfreesboro, and Chickasaw Bluffs made a gloomy New Year's day for the waiting North.

At the moment when the winter campaigns of 1862 ended and the Generals in each of the three theaters of war waited for the Spring, the political situation was almost equally discouraging. The Emancipation Proclamation had not proved as popular as was expected. It seemed to many voters to make a peaceful restoration of the Union more difficult; the Northern Democrats were now committed to the illusion that the Union could be restored by negotiation. Many were even willing to allow the South to have its independence if that section could not be regained without so long and costly a struggle. Consequently, the Congressional

elections of November, 1862, had gone against the Union party, and the narrow majority of the Republicans in Congress was only established by drastic action in the border states, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, now virtually under military control. The great Middle West sent Democrats to replace Republicans in the next Congress. New York elected Horatio Seymour, the Democratic candidate, to the governorship. The danger of foreign intervention reappeared. Napoleon Third, despairing of joint action with England, now felt himself strong enough to offer a mediation between the two contestants, which though friendly in form evidently concealed a hidden threat. Although his offer was, of course, rejected, it might be renewed at any moment.

The whole situation brought to the President the supreme constitutional crisis of the war. As we have seen more than once before and shall see again, the most persistent constitutional question in the Federal government has been the determination of the relative powers of Congress and the President. Now the war had not only brought an immense increase to the powers of the nation, but had also placed the largest and most immediate of those powers in the hands of the Chief Executive, who is also the commander in chief of the army and the navy.

If the difficulties of President Lincoln had been merely with the discouragement and the desire for peace represented by the recent Democratic victories, they would have been sufficiently onerous. But a group of extreme partisans in Congress, members of the same party with the President, under the leadership of Senators Wade and Chandler and Representative Thaddeus Stevens, also looked on the growth of executive power with increasing dislike. To such men it seemed to be all-important to use the war, not only to save the Union, but also, and

perhaps in some cases chiefly, to strengthen the hold of their own party on the government. When they saw the President appointing former Democrats to high military and political office and guarding the feelings of the border states in the matters of state rights and slavery, in spite of the fact that President Lincoln had made many political appointments, they began to feel that the President whom they had chosen was a traitor to the party that had elected him. If his policy had led to immediate victory they might have been silenced. But when they saw military disaster and above all when many of them were defeated in the elections, the previous discontent, which had been half concealed, became quite open. On Friday, December 18th, 1862, a Republican caucus met and demanded a reconstruction of the President's cabinet and a closer control of the Executive by the leaders of Congress and especially by the Senate. Their immediate purpose was to compel the resignation of Secretary Seward whom they believed to be the source of the President's weakness where the advantage of the dominant party was at stake. In the reorganized Cabinet, they hoped to have control through the ambitions of the Secretary of the Treasury, who was expected to become the virtual chieftain.

President Lincoln, however, proved himself to be a larger man than any of his critics; he placed the cause of the Union ahead of party as he had ahead of emancipation. He believed that it was essential to the success of the war to keep the unity of executive control which is the central idea of the Presidential as distinguished from the Cabinet or Parliamentary forms of Constitutional government. He had little reason to trust the tact or the wisdom of the politicians who now meant to make themselves supreme.

The Congressional caucus appointed a committee

to wait upon the President, to advise him that in the number of counsellors there was safety, and to demand the immediate resignation of Secretary Seward. The President listened to the remarks of the committee patiently and took the matter under advisement. When he turned to some members of his cabinet for advice, Secretary Welles told him, in effect, that "a Senatorial combination to dictate to the President in regard to his political family in the height of civil war which threatens the existence of the Republic cannot be permitted to succeed." The President replied that "the whole thing had struck him as it had me, and if carried out as the Senators prescribed, the whole Government must cave in. It could not stand, could not hold water; the bottom would be out."[1] In other words, if the war was to be won, it must have a single head.

The details of the plan by which the President outmaneuvered the Senatorial leaders is probably the supreme example in American history of political shrewdness and sagacity directed to a high patriotic end. Lincoln saw clearly that the issue was not really between Seward and Chase, but between himself and the leaders of a party. If they could drive Seward out and place Chase in control, the man whom the American people had elected would no longer be President except in name, and even Chase himself would be a figurehead. When the Congressional leaders returned for an answer to their ultimatum, they were confronted by a cabinet prepared to give tacit support to the President. Chase was placed in a difficult dilemma between his senatorial friends and his loyalty to his chief, and his resignation was almost inevitable.

When Chase was asked to call on the President the day after the meeting he assured Lincoln that the whole

[1] *The Diary of Gideon Welles*, I, 199, 200.

thing had been a surprise to him, but that he had prepared his resignation. "Where is it?" said the President quickly, his eye lighting up in a moment. "I brought it with me," said Chase, taking the paper from his pocket; "I wrote it this morning." "Let me have it," said the President, reaching his long arms and fingers towards Chase, who held on, seemingly reluctant to part with the letter, which was sealed, and which he apparently hesitated to surrender. Something further he wished to say, but the President was eager and did not perceive it, but took and hastily opened the letter. "This," said he, looking towards Welles, who tells the tale, with a triumphal laugh, "cuts the Gordian knot." An air of satisfaction spread over his countenance such as I have not seen for some time. "I can dispose of this subject now without difficulty," he added, as he turned on his chair; "I see my way clear."[1]

To force the resignation of Seward *and* of Chase was much more than the Senatorial clique desired, for it would leave them without a person to control the cabinet in their interest. Lincoln could now dispense with both Secretaries or keep both, and in each case remain President of the United States. He naturally chose the latter alternative, and to what must have been the immense chagrin of both Chase and his Senatorial friends, refused in gracious terms to accept the resignation of either of his valued Secretaries. The cabinet crisis, much more important than many a battle, had been safely weathered, and the wise, patient leader who had now won the confidence of both his cabinet and the

[1] Welles, *Diary*, I, 202. Recent critical examination of Welles' diary shows that it was edited by the author late in life. It is not, accordingly, a contemporary document in the strict sense, but still gives us our most intimate view of Lincoln's cabinet. See *Am. His. Review*, 1926.

American people, was to remain to the end of the war the commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. The safety of the Union had triumphed over the seeming interests of a party.

The new general of the army of the Potomac, Joseph Hooker, had used the long winter months to reorganize his army and to train the fresh recruits. In the spring he had a well disciplined and equipped army of one hundred and twenty thousand to oppose to Lee. Both armies watched each other across the Rappahannock, but Lee had been weakened by sending Longstreet with his veteran corps to capture an important position on the coast of North Carolina, an enterprise which proved too difficult. Thus on the last day of April of 1863, he had only sixty-two thousand men to oppose to Hooker.

Hooker's plan was well conceived. Leaving a division under Sedgwick to watch the hills of Fredericksburg, the scene of the recent defeat under Burnside, he marched the larger part of his army up the Rappahannock, and crossed safely into the tangled country of the Wilderness near the village of Chancellorsville. Hooker's chief mistake was in sending his cavalry under Stoneman on a long raid behind the lines of Lee. Stoneman carried out his part of the plan and cut the railroad behind Lee, and even caused consternation in Richmond, but the damage which he did was soon repaired and the cavalry of the Union general was absent at the very time when it was needed to serve as the eyes of the commander. It was precisely the same mistake that Lee made a little later in the campaign of Gettysburg.

On the first of May, Hooker might have attacked Lee before he was entrenched, but finding that general before him somewhat sooner than he had expected, and unable to learn of his disposition in the tangled thickets

that covered the ground, he withdrew within his entrenchments and awaited an attack. Lee's position was by no means enviable. In marching west to face Hooker, he had left a mere skeleton of an army under Early in the old trenches at Fredericksburg, and when the Union commander Sedgwick learned of the weakness of those lines, he was sure to advance upon the right flank and rear of Lee's army. Directly in front of Lee was the main Union army, outnumbering his immediate force almost two to one. But it was no part of the strategy of Lee to make the direct frontal attack that Hooker expected.

As Hooker had divided his army, leaving one part behind under Sedgwick, so Lee now also divided his forces with even more telling effect. The movement was concerted between Lee and Jackson, and was essentially similar to the brilliant strategy that had brought disaster to the boastful Pope. Counting on Early on his right to delay Sedgwick, Jackson, on May second, made the last and the most successful of his great marches. While Lee watched the lines of Hooker and, by well conceived attacks, gave the impression of superior numbers, Jackson marched fourteen miles around the rear of the Confederate army and right across the face of the Federal troops. He had found a road hidden in the woods which gave him mobility. Jackson's march was noticed, but Hooker vainly believed that Lee was beginning to retreat to Richmond and that he was starting towards the southwest. In the late afternoon, the unprotected right wing of Hooker's army was startled by seeing the rabbits and wild animals scurrying out of the woods on their flank. Before these unlucky troops of the Eleventh Corps under Howard had time to face about, the Confederate charge was upon them. The great Union army was rolled up from the west, and an

overwhelming disaster was only prevented by the coming of the friendly night. Hooker had shown generalship in his early movements, but had delayed when he might have struck and had given the inestimable advantage of the initiative to his enterprising foes. During the decisive moments of May second, he seemed unable to give orders, dazed partly by the unexpected attack and also by a blow on the head which he had received early in the day from a piece of falling timber. On May fifth, Hooker retreated behind the protection of the river that he had crossed so hopefully less than a week before. He had shown under adversity none of that grim pertinacity which Grant displayed the next year in the same place, and which was possible to him even after his defeat on account of his superior numbers.

The victory at Chancellorsville had been brilliant but very costly to the Southern cause. In the dusk of the evening of May second, 1863, the moment which was to mark the high tide of Confederate success, Jackson rode in front of his position to reconnoitre and plan another attack. As he turned back, the group of officers was mistaken for Union soldiers and were met by a deadly volley. Jackson was wounded in three places, not necessarily fatally. But on the way to the rear the men carrying the litter stumbled over a piece of wood, and the wounded General received injuries which added to his other hurts and with the bungling surgery of the day caused his death.

Even in the anxiety of the undecided moment Lee took time to write to his Lieutenant: "General,—I have just received your note, informing me that you were wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, I should have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled in your stead. I congratulate you upon the victory, which is

due to your skill and energy." "Give him my affectionate regards," he said to an officer who was riding to the hospital; "tell him to make haste and get well, and come back to me as soon as he can. He has lost his left arm but I have lost my right." The generosity of such expressions from a great commander throw a clearer light on the character of Robert E. Lee than pages of description and help to explain the unexampled devotion with which his men followed him to the end.

For a time, Jackson, aided by a magnificent constitution, was expected to recover. When he was told at length that he must die, he said, "Very good, it is all right." As the end neared, the clouded mind of the soldier was again with his charging columns: "Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action. Pass the infantry to the front! Tell Major Hawks—," but the sentence was never ended. Again he lay silent, and then said quietly and clearly, "Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees," and with those words the career of one of the greatest of American soldiers was ended.

The victory secured by Lee at Chancellorsville was great but by no means decisive. Lee was now strengthened by the return of Longstreet, and determined for the second time to try to win a decision on Northern soil. Lee's invading army was a magnificent fighting force, but the reserves upon which it could depend for making good the inevitable losses were very scant. From the military point of view, the invasion might be characterized as unwise. But there were other important considerations. If Lee could draw the army of the Potomac away from its base he might have an opportunity to bring the meaning of war home to the Northern people and perhaps make them willing to grant the South its independence. Such a victory would do much to offset

the Northern advance in the West. Then too, Virginia was swept clean of provisions and at the worst the Confederates would find the barns of Pennsylvania well stored with food. The Confederate commissioner in Paris, John Slidell, was still entertaining hopes of French intervention, based on the vague promises of Morny who claimed to be quoting the views of Louis Napoleon. Although the chances of outside help were much more slender than they had been when Lee invaded Maryland in 1862, they were even now a factor in the situation.

The Northern cavalry had greatly improved since the beginning of the war and was now a serious menace to the plans of Lee. They guarded the fords of the Potomac so closely that he could not cross east of the mountains as he had done in 1862. Accordingly, the Confederate commander transferred his army by a skillful movement through the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah Valley, and without attempting to seize Harper's Ferry marched north through Maryland towards the Susquehanna near Harrisburg. The movement west from Hooker's front on the Rappahannock was dangerous, for Lee's army was strung along a road which lay parallel to the enemy front and might be attacked while it was separated into two parts by the mountains. But Lee wisely counted on the necessity of the Union commander to remain between the Confederates and the capital, and entered Maryland without a check.

In this second invasion of the North, Lee made a mistake that was to be costly and perhaps fatal to his plans. Just as Hooker had detached his cavalry before Chancellorsville, so now Lee allowed Stuart to make an extensive raid around the Union position. As a consequence, he did not know for three days that Hooker

PENNSYLVANIA
AND MARYLAND
Scale of Miles
0 5 10 15 20 25
HARRISBURG
Kingston
Carlisle
Wrightsville
Susquehannah R.
York
Heidlersburg
Chambersburg
Cumberland Valley
Cashtown
GETTYSBURG
Emmetsburg
Marsh Creek
Taneytown
Manchester
Hagerstown
Big Pipe Cr.
Middleburg
Williamsport
Little Pipe Cr.
Monocacy R.
Falling Waters
Boonsborough
Turner's Gap
Middletown
Martinsburg
Sharpsburg
Shepherdstown
Crampton's Gap
Frederick City
BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILWAY
BALTIMORE
HARPERS FERRY
Loudoun Heights
Halltown
Shenandoah R.
Whitesford
Poolesville
Snicker's Gap
Leesburg
Darnestown
Potomac R.
Rockville
Ashby's Gap
Fort Stevens
WASHINGTON
Bull Run Mts.
Alexandria
Chesapeake Bay

Methuen & Co

had crossed the Potomac after him, and remained ignorant of the movements of the Union troops. His cavalry destroyed railroads and supplies but did not seriously hamper the Union movements and arrived on the battlefield of the most decisive contest of the war too late and too weary with hard riding to be of efficient service.

The administration had naturally lost confidence in Hooker after Chancellorsville, and in this moment of peril tried the dangerous expedient that Lincoln later called "swapping horses in the middle of the stream." Hooker, like Burnside, was allowed to retire and was succeeded by a wholly different type of man in the scholarly and careful George C. Meade. Meade with his thick glasses and careworn face was described as looking more like a college professor than a soldier and was a marked contrast to the dashing figure of handsome "Joe" Hooker. But he took control of the situation with ability and had the capacity to win the confidence of his subordinates. He had under his command an army of about ninety thousand to oppose to the seventy thousand veterans of Lee.

The two armies marched on parallel lines towards the northeast. As Meade approached the mountains, behind which lay Lee's long line of communications to the southwest, it became necessary for the Confederates, who had been widely scattered to gather provisions, to concentrate at some point east of the South Mountain, which here forms the northern extension of the Blue Ridge, as the valley behind it does of the Shenandoah. The little town of Gettysburg, in southern Pennsylvania close to the borders of Maryland, is the meeting place of the most important roads from both sides of the mountains. Lee would have preferred to fight a little further west, closer to the mountains and to the all important

passes that he must guard at every risk. Meade had selected as the field of battle a position further south made strong by the ravine of Pipe Creek. But Gettysburg with its converging roads drew both concentrating armies together as by a magnet and so became historic. Curiously for a war between the North and South, the Northern soldiers reached the field of battle from the southeast while those of the South approached from the north and west.

The village of Gettysburg lies in a valley bounded on the west by Seminary Ridge and on the east by the curving heights on which stands the village cemetery. Cemetery Ridge, on which the Union forces were soon to make their stand against the invading tide of the Confederacy has often been described as a fish hook about five miles long. The ridge on the north bends sharply east and south and ends as in a barb in the elevation known as Culp's Hill. The shaft of the ridge is protected on the southern end by two hills called the Round Tops. In plain view from the cemetery lies the peaceful town in the valley below.

The advance guard of the Confederates under Ewell had not been able to make a crossing of the Susquehanna, and had not found in York the supplies of shoes which they were hoping to secure. But Ewell had been told that shoes could be found in Gettysburg, and it was for this reason that his march was now directed southward.

On the first of July, the ridges to the south and west of Gettysburg were occupied by two brigades of Northern cavalry commanded by Buford. Buford had information of the advance of Ewell, and it was his purpose to hold the enemy in check as long as possible, in order that Reynolds might reach the field with the infantry of the First Corps while the Confederates were still on the north of Gettysburg. The dismounted cavalry were driven

back by the larger force of Ewell's advance divisions, but by the middle of the day (July 1, 1863) they were reënforced by the First Corps. The Federals were still outnumbered, but they made a sturdy defence, a defence that was hampered by the death of General Reynolds, the officer then commanding on the field. Just after the fall of Reynolds the divisions of the Eleventh Corps, under General Howard, hurried through the town with the purpose of strengthening and maintaining the line that was being defended by the now much weakened troops of the First Corps. Even with the addition of the regiments of the Eleventh Corps, which itself had been seriously weakened in the battle of Chancellorsville, the Federal force on the field was outnumbered by the troops of Ewell. The Federals were finally pressed off the field and through the streets of Gettysburg. At the suggestion of General Schurz, who when Howard took over the general command was for the time in command of the Eleventh Corps, the retreating Federals made their stand on the line of Cemetery Ridge.

General Meade arrived early on the morning of July second with about two-thirds of the remainder of the army. He gave his approval to the dispositions that had been made by his subordinates. The Confederates, who now occupied the town of Gettysburg, found themselves confronted to the south and east of the town by the veterans of the Army of the Potomac, well placed in a strong position. The weak point in the Union line was on the southwest. General Sickles, who commanded the Third Corps at this point, had personal courage, but had had no army training or experience. His command had been given to him as a political appointment, with the view of lessening the antagonism to the war on the part of the Tammany organization of New York City. Sickles, on his own responsibility, placed

his troops in advance of the position covered by the two Round Tops which formed the natural extension of Meade's line. Lee, who had made his headquarters at the Seminary in the center of the opposing ridge, recognized at once the possibility of an attack on the exposed left wing of the Federal army. If this attack was successful, the Round Tops would be secured and the Union line could be rolled up from south to north. The Confederate commander had planned an attack early in the morning. But Longstreet delayed and hesitated. It was not until the afternoon of the second, that the Third Corps, under Sickles, had been driven back from the dangerous position in the Peach Orchard. The delay of Longstreet gave time for the arrival of reinforcements, and with the aid of these the endangered Union troops succeeded in withdrawing to a new position on the left of the Second Corps. Sickles himself had been wounded and the leadership of his corps came into better hands. The all important position of the Round Tops had, under the wise initiative of General Warren, been occupied by Union forces and the belated attack of Longstreet which continued through the evening was finally repelled.[1]

The fighting throughout the second day had been continuous and did credit to the sturdy veteran character of the troops on both sides. Lee had, however, failed to make any break in the Union lines and at this time it would probably have been a wise policy to give up the attempt and withdraw his army to the valley on the southwest. He refused, however, to yield the hope of forcing the Federal position. A division commanded

[1] Longstreet was later bitterly blamed for his delay. He had advised a strategic turning movement to the south and east, and seems to have obeyed Lee's orders only half-heartedly. The relative wisdom of the two plans has been a matter of controversy.

by Pickett was still fresh, having taken little part in the previous fighting. The attacks on the two ends of the Union line had failed and Lee decided that he must now make his assault on the center.

Under the command of Colonel Alexander, the mass of the Confederate artillery, comprising one hundred and twenty guns in all, was trained on the strong Union position of Cemetery Ridge. The Confederate guns were placed on the outer and larger curve. There was room on Cemetery Ridge for but eighty guns which were under the command of General Hunt, an old-time instructor at West Point of Colonel Alexander. On the third day of the battle, the fire of the Confederate artillery was for about two hours concentrated on the center of the Federal line. The intense bombardment had little effect, for the aim was too high, and the shots passed over the lines of Union soldiers lying face down on the opposite ridge. When Colonel Alexander reported that he had "silenced the Federal artillery," Pickett's force, comprising three brigades in all, was sent, wave on wave, across the fields. The plucky Confederates came up to the very muzzle of the Union guns, which had merely reserved their fire, and were for a time actually entangled with the Federal lines, but they were driven back from the crest shattered and more than decimated. The failure of Pickett's charge practically brought to a close the great contest on which the hopes of the Confederates had been hinged. General Armistead, who led the advance, fell mortally wounded within the Federal lines, and the point that had been reached by Armistead's brigade may be considered as marking the crest of the Confederate attack.

On the morning of July 4th, Lee began his retreat to the Potomac. He succeeded in carrying off not only his artillery and some of the supplies that had been

secured, but even his wounded. Many of the wounded died on the long journey between Gettysburg and the hospitals in Virginia, and the Confederate commander might have been better advised if he had left his wounded soldiers to be cared for in the hospitals at Baltimore and Washington. Meade made hardly any effort to interfere with the retreat of the Confederates. Lee's army had sustained great losses, but those of the Federal forces were equally severe. The country was mountainous and a single mistake might spell ruin. Lee reached the Potomac without hindrance and after holding his army for a few days on the northern bank succeeded in regaining Virginia without a battle. Lincoln wrote to Meade expressing his disappointment and the people of the North, with no good understanding of the military difficulties, were also troubled that the Southern army should have been permitted to escape. To use Cromwell's phrase, Gettysburg had been a "mercy," but not the "crowning mercy" that had been expected by both sides. Lee tendered to President Davis his resignation, recommending the appointment of a "younger and abler man," but even at this time of defeat and discouragement the soldiers realized that though Lee took upon himself the blame for the failure of Gettysburg, there was no other Southern leader who could have given them even a chance for victory, and Davis accepted the opinion of the army, and insisted that Lee should remain in command. From the time of the Gettysburg campaign, the strategy of Lee was directed not by the hope of winning a decisive victory, the chance of which had been passed forever, but to "carry on" until under the sheer weariness of continued effort and continued losses, the North might be willing to recognize the independence of the Confederacy. It was in defence that Lee was finally to win a position of almost univer-


VICKSBURG
Scale of Miles
Federal Lines
Confederate do.
Lake Providence
Yazoo River
Yazoo City
Benton
To Memphis
Canton
Mississippi River
Haines Bluff
Milliken's Bend
Duckport
Young's Pt.
Bridgeport
Bovina
Bolton Sta.
Clinton
Jackson
To Meridian
Pearl River
Edwards Sta.
Raymond
Mississippi Springs
Warrenton
New Carthage
Auburn
Big Black River
Honkinson's Ferry
Grand Gulf
Willow Springs
Ward Times
De Shroon
Pierre
Bruinsburg
Port Gibson
To New Orleans

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sally acknowledged supremacy among the captains of the New World.

On the fourth of July, 1863, the news from the West where the Confederacy was making a last stand to protect its slender hold on the great river, was even better for the North than that from Pennsylvania. For the North was not only winning victories but had found at length the military commander whom the times required. During the winter and the spring after Chickasaw Bluffs, Grant had kept his men busy trying to find an avenue by the tangled bayous of that distant region which would allow him to carry his forces to the high ground near Vicksburg. The most promising plan had been to dig a canal across the bend of the river opposite Vicksburg and so take his transports to the south without having to confront the formidable guns of that position. But all these schemes had ended in failure. Sherman advised a retreat to Memphis and a fresh start along the railroad to the east and south. But that was the very plan for reaching Vicksburg that had already failed. It would require a large army to guard the narrow lines of railroad to the rear and would yield at once the advantage of communications by water. Besides it would be at once described by the Northern newspapers as a defeat. Accordingly, in the late spring when the impassable roads had begun to dry, Grant determined to send some transports and naval vessels past the fortifications at Vicksburg, and to carry his army down a road on the west side of the river to a point some thirty miles south of Vicksburg, where he might cross to the higher ground east of the river and south of the fortress. To the surprise of every one, the naval vessels passed the forts without serious damage, and the rest of the plan worked admirably. On April 30th, the very day on which Hooker made his ill-fated

crossing of the Rappahannock against Lee, Grant found an unprotected road and had his army in comparative safety on the desired east shore. The gunboats had protected the crossing, but his supplies must come some thirty miles by road and then be brought across the river. Grant determined to carry with him his ammunition, and to depend on the country for food and forage. He thus moved north towards Vicksburg without any line of supplies to protect in his rear. It was the lesson which Napoleon had taught long before and which Sherman was to use with such telling effect in his march to the sea.

Grant had with him in his Mississippi campaign an army of forty-five thousand men. The defence of Vicksburg had been entrusted to John C. Pemberton, one of the few Northern men in the service of the South. He had for this purpose forty thousand men, while the commander of the whole region was Joseph Johnston, now partially recovered from his wounds, who had been able by great exertions and by drawing soldiers from the army of Bragg near Chattanooga, to bring twenty thousand men to the defence of the state capital at Jackson, connected with Vicksburg by a line of railroad. It is an evidence of the almost unexampled efforts that the South was making at this decisive moment, that it was able to bring into two successive campaigns, those of Vicksburg and Chickamauga, a distinct superiority of numbers. In that respect, these two campaigns of 1863 stand alone in the Civil War.

For seventeen days the situation of Grant was one of extreme peril. He was in the heart of the enemy country, cut off from the North by forces which outnumbered his own. But fortunately for him he was in a rich section with abundant food, and the Confederate forces which were attempting to defend Vicksburg

and Jackson at the same time were of necessity divided. The campaign was in certain respects similar to that of Jackson in the Valley. By rapid marching, Grant was able to strike each of his opponents before they could unite. Pushing up to the north, he drove the inferior forces of Johnston out of Jackson and destroyed the factories which were producing clothing and other important articles for the Southern armies. It was plainly Pemberton's best plan to leave Vicksburg which had become useless when Grant reached the railroad to the east, and to join Johnston in driving back Grant. But Pemberton managed his campaign with almost incredible fatuity. Vicksburg had become to the South a symbol of their cause and Pemberton probably reckoned that his Northern birth would be remembered if he abandoned without a battle the post he had been sent to defend. He also thought that by turning away from Jackson to the south he would be able to cut Grant's lines of communications, a plan that was in accord with the accepted principles of strategy. But Grant had no lines of communication to protect. Leaving the town of Jackson and destroying the railroad to prevent the advance of Johnston against his rear, he attacked Pemberton, defeated him with ease at Champion's Hill, and forced him within the fortifications of Vicksburg. Just seventeen days after crossing the river Grant stood on the high ground near Vicksburg on almost the very spot which Sherman had failed to carry the year before. He had now abundant supplies by the river and his army was soon increased to more than sixty thousand men. Pemberton was cut off by the river behind him dominated by the Northern fleet and by Grant's superior army in front. Unless Pemberton and Johnston could manage to attack the front and the rear of Grant's army at precisely the same moment, each

would be certain to be defeated in detail. When an assault on the well defended lines of Pemberton had failed with much loss, Grant settled down to a regular siege which could have only one result. The siege brought great hardships to the civilian population as well as to the soldiers, and on the same fourth of July of 1863 in which Lee turned sadly back towards the Potomac after Gettysburg, Pemberton surrendered to the victorious Grant his whole army of more than thirty-seven thousand men. The surrender of Vicksburg was soon followed by that of Port Hudson to Banks, and in the words of Lincoln "the Father of Waters now ran untroubled to the sea."

CHAPTER V

THE DOWNFALL OF THE CONFEDERACY

In the summer of 1863, the Confederacy had been pushed back in both the East and the West, but it still held a central position at Chattanooga. The vital importance of this place in the strategy of the war was quite apparent at the time to both sides in the great struggle. Chattanooga lay on a great bend of the Tennessee River and on the only continuous railroad from the eastern to the western part of the Confederate states. A few miles to the east of the city, the railroad branches, one line going up the valley of the Tennessee to Knoxville and thence across the continental divide to Richmond. The second branch goes south to Atlanta and the heart of Georgia. The army which retained the valleys south of Chattanooga would stand in the gateway of the Confederacy. The city is situated at the mouth of a valley which runs from the southwest and here joins the main valley of the Tennessee. The valley of Chattanooga is flanked on the west by the commanding ridge of Lookout Mountain, from whose summit the whole country is spread in one of the most beautiful panoramas in America. To the east runs the lower but precipitous mountain chain called Missionary Ridge, with a continuous summit broken at the time of which we write by only one or two important roads. Leaving

the city towards the west, the railroad skirts the foot of Lookout Mountain, and a few miles further west, crosses the river and is joined by the line from Louisville which must carry the supplies of any Union army.

It will be remembered that on the last day of 1862 Rosecrans had met Bragg without decisive results in a bloody battle at Murfreesboro in central Tennessee. After that winter battle, the two armies had watched each other and trained their recruits, while the center of interest passed to the Potomac and the Mississippi. But after repeated urgings, Rosecrans was at length ready to advance. Taking advantage of the weakening of Bragg by the detachments sent in vain to Vicksburg, Rosecrans made a feint as if he would cross the river above Chattanooga, and then by swift and very skillful movements that have won praise from all military critics threw his whole army across the river below the city. With Rosecrans to the southeast, Bragg was in grave danger of being besieged in his stronghold and of making Chattanooga another Vicksburg. But the Confederate general was an abler man than Pemberton and was not to be caught in such a trap. Early in September he withdrew along the railroad to the east, and Rosecrans occupied the city without firing a shot. At almost the same moment, a second and smaller Union army under Burnside, the unlucky commander at the battle of Fredericksburg, entered the upper part of the great valley of the West and placed itself in Knoxville, where the Union soldiers found the unusual experience of being in the country of their friends. For the Tennessee Valley in the West was as devoted to the Union as the companion Shenandoah in the East was to the Confederacy.

By the end of the first week in September, the Confederacy seemed destined to be cut in two as it had been

already along the line of the Mississippi. Rosecrans had now command of the railroad to the northeast through the Valley, and if he could also cut the line to the south, the army of Bragg would be doomed. But Bragg had been reinforced by the troops which he had recalled from Vicksburg and Knoxville, and was expecting two divisions under Longstreet comprising some of the best men from Lee's army. These reinforcements would give him sixty-six thousand men to meet the fifty-eight thousand under Rosecrans. The army of the Union general had been pushed beyond Missionary Ridge and was scattered in the wooded country to the east, when on September eighteenth, they unexpectedly encountered the Confederates concentrated in the valley of the Chickamauga. The Union army had pushed so far to the east and south that the single line of communication leading back northwest to Chattanooga through Rossville Gap in Missionary Ridge was only lightly protected. It was Bragg's evident opportunity to attack the left flank of the Union army and to cut them off from their base. If the Confederates under Polk, the soldier-bishop who commanded Bragg's right wing, could win through to Rossville behind the left flank of the Union army under Thomas, the name of Chickamauga would come to rank with Bull Run and Chancellorsville as one of the great Union catastrophes of the war. Not only would Rosecrans be destroyed but Burnside at Knoxville would be in the gravest danger.

The fighting on the nineteenth of September, 1863, was fierce but indecisive, for Longstreet had not yet arrived and the Union army had for the moment the advantage of numbers which they were to lose that night. The tide of battle surged back and forth through the tangled thickets, but when the sun set behind the heights of

Missionary Ridge, the Bishop-general Leonidas Polk, who commanded the right wing of the Confederate army had failed to push his way to the coveted pass behind the thinly protected left flank of the Union army. With the night came the eagerly expected Longstreet who had been sent by Lee on a roundabout route through Atlanta to try to win the decision in the West which he had failed to gain on the slopes of Cemetery Ridge. At the conference which took place at the headquarters of the Union general, it was well understood that the supreme contest would commence early on the morrow. The most picturesque figure was Thomas who was to win on the next day the name by which his soldiers ever after loved to call him, the "Rock of Chickamauga." Worn out by ceaseless exertions on the last two days, he nodded but aroused himself to give his constant advice, "Strengthen the left."

For some reason that is not fully known, though it was the subject of bitter controversy at the time, Polk failed to make the expected attack early on the morning of the twentieth, and Bragg lost his great opportunity just as Lee had failed on the second day at Gettysburg through the slowness of Longstreet. Though Bragg had undoubted strategic ability, he was never able to win the confidence or the prompt obedience of his subordinates. In any case, when the supreme Confederate attack commenced, the sun was already high above the heads of the contending armies and the endangered Union left had been greatly strengthened. Thomas had placed his soldiers on a horseshoe of hills which rose from the valley before the vital road through Rossville and against which the fiercest Confederate attacks beat in vain.

The mistake of a subordinate gave the Confederate general the opportunity on the Union right which he had failed to win on the other flank. In moving troops

towards the left, a gap was left for a few minutes in the Union lines. But those few minutes were enough, for the quick and well trained eye of Longstreet had seen his opportunity. Through the gap he poured with faultless tactics regiment after regiment of the soldiers which had won fame for the Southern cause on distant battlefields. Dana, who was present as the special representative of Stanton, awoke from a nap behind the Union lines to hear what he called "an infernal din" around the headquarters of the Union general and to see that officer, good Catholic that he was, crossing himself; as well he might, for the whole right wing of the Union army was cut in two and was fleeing back to the safety which lay behind the Ridge in Chattanooga, twelve miles away. Rosecrans was carried back by the flight of his men and rode to Chattanooga to prepare a last stand against the victorious Confederates. Dana telegraphed back that the disaster was as complete as that at Bull Run.

In the meantime the Union left under Thomas was isolated and attacked from the right as it had been all day from in front. But it was strongly posted and managed to stand until the lengthening shadows of Missionary Ridge brought the comfort of the night and allowed him to retreat in safety through Rossville to Chattanooga. The Union army which had been so lately pursuing Bragg, was now shut closely within its lines in Chattanooga while the victorious Confederates looked down upon them from the commanding heights of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. In those two days of fighting, more then twenty-seven thousand men had been left dead and wounded on the field. Of that number sixteen thousand were Confederates who had suffered most in their long attacks on the impregnable lines of Thomas, but the Union army had

also lost five thousand prisoners who had been captured after the defeat of their right wing.[1]

For more than two months the Union soldiers were closely besieged, and for the first four weeks were in imminent danger of starvation. The railroad from the north and west enters Chattanooga by skirting the narrow piece of ground between the foot of Lookout and the river. The railroad was of course dominated by the Confederates on the mountain, and the only line of communication for the Union army was the single wagon road which crossed the mountains and brought a thin and precarious line of supplies to the north bank of the river. Forage became so scarce that the road was lined by the dead carcasses of horses and mules which were too weak to pull the heavy loads. When President Davis visited the army and looked down on the beleagured Union garrison from the commanding heights of Pulpit Rock, Bragg confidently promised the eventual capture of the whole army of the Cumberland. A quarrel between Bragg and Longstreet had grown so bitter that it seemed wise to detach the Eastern general and to send him with his well seasoned troops up the valley to attack Burnside in Knoxville. Bragg had no doubt that even with this reduction of troops he would be able to reverse the story of Vicksburg.

But any victory which the Confederates were to win had to be won quickly for time played into the hands of their adversaries. With Lee weakened it became possible for Meade to detach Hooker with a veteran division and to send them by rail towards the besieged city, just as Lee had sent Longstreet in September. On October 16th, the increasing gravity of the situation

[1] A critical account of the Union movements at Chickamauga is in Smith, T. C., *Life and Letters of Garfield*, Chapter x (1925). Garfield was chief of staff to Rosecrans.

in Chattanooga led to the unification of the command in the West and Grant was made commander in chief of the troops in the division of the Mississippi. Sherman succeeded him in command of the army at Vicksburg and Rosecrans was relieved and replaced by Thomas in command of the beleagured army of the Cumberland.

Grant immediately rode over the mountains to take command in person at the point of supreme danger, at the same time urging Sherman to leave the railroad unrepaired and to move east to the same place. When Grant entered Chattanooga on October 23rd, the most serious trouble had been overcome, for the approach of Hooker along the south bank of the river, with his reinforcements from the army of the Potomac, had made it possible for Thomas and his Chief Engineer, General W. F. Smith, to work out a plan to open a road across the bend of the river to a point on the railroad well to the west of the dominating Lookout Mountain. Grant accepted this plan and it was put into operation soon after his arrival. From that time on there was no lack of supplies and the commander in chief had gained greatly in prestige. Just before his arrival, there was starvation, and now there was plenty. It was no wonder that the soldiers looked on the hero of Vicksburg as a real magician.

When Sherman's army arrived from the Mississippi late in November, the situation which had seemed so favorable to the Confederate cause just after Chickamauga had completely changed. Bragg who had possessed the advantage of both position and numbers was now greatly outnumbered, and if he had only known it, the besiegers and the besieged had actually changed rôles. Although his own lines were now too thin to guard even the commanding heights of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, much less the valley between

them against so enterprising a general as Grant, Bragg failed to divine the plan of his opponent and late in November, was actually detaching more of his troops to follow Longstreet on his side expedition against Burnside in Knoxville. Grant felt great anxiety for his subordinate, but saw that the way to relieve him was not to send troops away to follow Longstreet, but to attack Bragg and so gain the mouth of the valley in which Burnside was entrapped.

On November 24th the storm burst on the unsuspecting Bragg. Sherman's army from the west had arrived and marched in the greatest secrecy by a secluded valley where they could not be followed, even from the dominating heights of Lookout Mountain, to a point on the north bank of the river opposite the end of the Confederate right wing on Missionary Ridge, east of the city. In the mist of the early morning, they were carried to the south bank and began their attack on the heights above them defended by the lines of the Confederate General, Hardee. But Sherman met a great disappointment, for the ridge which he was attacking from the north end was not continuous, as it had seemed from the valley, but was broken by a deep ravine. However bravely they attacked, the Union soldiers were unable to win their way across in their effort to sweep the Confederate army down the ridge from north to south into the hands of the approaching Hooker.

Far to the west on the other wing of the Union position, Hooker with his men from the Potomac found the problem easier, for with the withdrawal of Longstreet up the valley, Lookout Mountain had become a mere outpost thinly guarded. Sweeping around the end of the mountain, Hooker compelled the evacuation of the crest, and when the mist broke on the twenty-fifth, the soldiers of the Union center under Thomas and Grant

in the valley in front of Chattanooga saw the stars and stripes flash through the clouds on the very spot on the seemingly impregnable rock from which the President of the Confederacy had so lately looked down on their starving lines. In spite of some delay at the Chattanooga creek, Hooker made his way across the valley and reached the southern end of Missionary Ridge at Rossville Gap, through which, two months before, the weary soldiers of Thomas had retreated after the disastrous defeat of Chickamauga.

Missionary Ridge rises sheer from the plain below and seems impregnable, but the lines of Bragg had been made too thin to guard the long crest. The main Union army was stationed at the foot of the Ridge waiting for Sherman and Hooker to roll the line up from either flank. But as Grant and Thomas waited on Orchard Knob, a slight hill from which they could survey the progress of the battle, they saw the eager soldiers swarming like ants up the steep slopes. Thus, without orders, the men themselves carried what had seemed to be an impregnable position and swept away the army of Bragg from the heights before Chattanooga. Only the sturdy rear guard defence of the soldiers of Hardee prevented the retreat from becoming a rout. As it was, Bragg's army was driven far down the railroad towards Atlanta, and the Confederacy was for the second time cut in two. No one can stand today on Missionary Ridge without wondering how any army could have seized such a position in the face of brave opponents.

In the meantime how did it fare with Burnside and Longstreet? From the first the whole movement of the Confederate army up the valley of the Tennessee had been ill-fated. Dissension with subordinates delayed Longstreet, and Burnside for once conducted the defence of Knoxville with energy and skill. When the un-

expected defeat of Bragg on Missionary Ridge had placed the whole Union army of Grant like a huge stopper in the mouth of the valley, Longstreet's position became one of extreme peril. Cut off from any communication with Bragg in the south, Longstreet was compelled to make his way through the mountains to rejoin Lee for the final campaigns of the war. Although not so celebrated, when compared with Gettysburg and Vicksburg, many military critics place the campaign of Chattanooga as the decisive contest of the war. From that time on the heart of the South was open to the Northern sword. Before the events at Chattanooga, the South could reasonably hope to win a military victory, and then to tire out the North. After that series of events, only a miraculous change in the political situation could save the Confederacy from its doom.

Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Chattanooga completed the tale of Southern catastrophes for 1863, and the winter, unlike that of the year before, passed in comparative quiet. The North had at length, in March, 1863, passed a conscription act and was able to bring its unlimited resources into the struggle. Each side was girding itself for the final effort. The draft had been bitterly opposed especially in New York and the Middle West, and Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio had been arrested for a speech in which he virtually advocated open resistance to its enforcement. Vallandigham had been imprisoned by the orders of Burnside, at that time the military commander in Ohio, had been tried by a military commission, and had been condemned to death. But the penalty had been commuted by President Lincoln to banishment to the lines of the Confederacy, where the Ohio Congressman was received with marked dislike and suspicion. Mak-

ing his way back to Ohio through Canada, he had become the Democratic candidate for Governor, only to meet overwhelming defeat, the natural result of the Union victories of the summer.

Abroad, Napoleon was rapidly developing his plan to conquer Mexico and to place on its throne a European Emperor under French protection, in the person of the ill-fated Maximillian who arrived in Mexico in May, 1864, to take control of his new government. Napoleon was ready now, as he had been since the beginning, to intervene in favor of the Confederacy, but the Government of Palmerston was definitely committed to neutrality for the reasons that we have considered in an earlier chapter. A motion for the recognition of the Confederacy was made, under the influence of Napoleon, by Roebuck, a member of the House of Commons who had visited Paris a few days before the news of Gettysburg, but it was opposed by the government, as well as by independent members who disliked French interference, and it secured but a small vote.

Speedy cruisers had been built in England and had been allowed to escape from British harbors to secure their armaments in obscure ports. The most famous was the *Alabama* under Raphael Semmes which left Liverpool for what purported to be a trial trip in July of 1862, and had been extraordinarily successful in driving the American flag from the seas. In the summer of 1863, while the eyes of the country were turned to the battlefields in Pennsylvania and Mississippi, news arrived from abroad of an even more threatening danger. Every one knew that the defeat of the Confederacy depended on the maintenance of the blockade quite as much as on victories in the field. And now the word came that the Lairds were building two ironclad rams. One had already been launched and was the most powerful

vessel afloat. Similar vessels were beginning to be built in France. "You must stop the Laird rams at all hazards," wrote Captain Fox, the efficient Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to one of his subordinates in England, "as we have no defence against them. Let us have them for our own purposes without any more nonsense and at any price. As to guns, we have not one in the whole country fit to fire at an ironclad. . . . It is a question of life and death." But it proved at the time impossible to buy the rams and no offer was made. Theoretically they were being built for a French firm, but it was an open secret in Liverpool that they were intended to break up the blockade of the Southern coast. One of the vessels was almost ready to sail and yet the protests of the American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, were apparently unheeded. On September 4th, Adams records in his diary: "I clearly foresee that a collision must come of it. I must, however, do nothing to accelerate it: and yet must maintain the honor of my country with proper spirit. The issue must be made upon its merits. The prospect is dark for poor America." And the next day he sent a courteous note to Earl Russell which after recounting the circumstances, ended in the well known phrase: "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war." Russell was an honest, highminded gentleman, somewhat too devoted to legal technicalities that later cost his country dear, but he had no desire to make war against a friendly power in order to increase the profits of a single ship-building firm. Remembering how he had been hoodwinked in the matter of the *Alabama*, he had already decided to detain the vessels.

Adams received no reply to his note of the fifth, but he read the welcome news in the newspapers three days later: "Tuesday, 8th September:—In the *Morning*

Post there was a short article announcing that the government had decided on detaining the vessels, in order to try the merits in court. It had an official aspect; and yet I could scarcely put faith in it, while I had no notice myself. Later in the day, however, a brief notification came from Lord Russell to the effect that orders had been given to prevent their departure. I know not that even in the *Trent* case I felt a greater relief."[1]

Lincoln and Stanton had learned the importance of the unified command that had succeeded so well in the West and as the long winter wore to spring and a new campaign had to be commenced Lincoln appointed the victor of Chattanooga commander-in-chief of all the armies with the title of Lieutenant-General. Grant left at once for Washington where he decided to remain with the army of the Potomac of which Meade continued to be the nominal head. Sherman succeeded Grant in command of the Western armies. The new commander-in-chief brought Sheridan with him to Virginia to be commander of the cavalry.

It was Grant's plan to commence a simultaneous offensive on all fronts. Banks was to advance from New Orleans towards Mobile, Sherman was to move south towards Atlanta, while Grant himself engaged the full attention of Lee in Virginia. But during March, and before Grant had assumed full command, Banks had been sent in an effort to win Louisiana and Northern

[1] For this incident see especially, *Charles Francis Adams*, a biography by his son, Charles Francis Adams, Chapter xvii. Adams, E. D., has shown that the detention of the rams was not due to Adams' ultimatum but to a policy of friendly neutrality which had been adopted much earlier. See his *Great Britain and the American Civil War*, II, 141, 142. In view of the escape of the *Alabama* in 1862, the fears of the American minister were natural.

Texas. The expedition failed disastrously and weakened the general offensive that had been planned, but the two other parts of the plan worked out according to schedule. On May 4th, Grant and Sherman advanced against Lee and Johnston. Sherman wrote to his wife: "All that has gone before is mere skirmishing. The war now begins, and with heavy well disciplined masses the issue must be settled in hard fought battles. I think we can whip them in Alabama and maybe in Georgia. . . . No amount of poverty or adversity seems to shake their faith: niggers gone, wealth and luxury gone, money worthless, starvation in view within a period of two or three years, and causes enough to make the bravest tremble. Yet I see no signs of let up—some few deserters, plenty tired of war, but the masses determined to fight it out."[1]

Grant had an army of about one hundred and ten thousand against sixty-five thousand under Lee. But Lee was on the defensive with a long series of carefully planned entrenchments and the superiority of numbers proved none too great. It was Grant's plan to cross the Rappahannock near the scene of Hooker's defeat and to advance by his left flank. In this way he would always approach the navigable portions of the various streams that cross Virginia, and would never have a long line of railroad to defend in his rear. Butler was to move his army along the south bank of the James and to threaten Richmond in the rear, thus preventing important reënforcements from being detached to the aid of the hard pressed Lee. Sherman in the West must advance from Chattanooga towards Atlanta, one hundred and thirty-seven miles through mountainous country, rebuilding the single line of railroad as he went. His line of communications went back through Chattanooga

[1] *The Home Letters of General Sherman*, 287.

to Nashville and Louisville. Sherman at the beginning of the campaign had about eighty thousand men confronted by fifty thousand under the astute Joseph E. Johnston who had replaced Bragg.

The fighting that now began in Virginia, just as Sherman had foreseen, made the previous losses of the war seem like child's play. In the six weeks that followed the crossing of the Rappahannock, Grant lost almost as many men as were comprised in Lee's whole army. Lee's losses are not fully known, but they probably reached twenty-five thousand men, and the Southern commander had no unused reservoirs of human materials on which to draw. Grant received constant reënforcements but the quality became poorer as volunteers were killed and replaced by the more half-hearted products of the draft. The war had become fierce and relentless with the South playing for time and the North determined to win a final decision.

No sooner had Grant crossed into the tangled thickets of the Wilderness than Lee attacked seeking to confuse and destroy his enemy in that almost impassable region. For two days, on May 5th and 6th, men who could scarcely see their neighbors through the trees fought hand to hand. The sufferings of the wounded were increased by a forest fire which made the scene one of the most terrible in the annals of war. But Lee had failed to drive a wedge between the Union commander and the river, and, knowing well his own strength and the weakness of the numbers of his adversary, Grant was appalled by no tale of losses. As he reported to Lincoln, he was determined "to fight it out on this line if it took all summer." Even he could not have foreseen that the fighting would last all summer and autumn and winter and well into the spring before Richmond fell.

When Grant withdrew from his first encounter with

Lee, he did not carry his soldiers to the safety of the north bank of the river as Hooker had before him, but marched straight on into the very heart of Virginia. At Spottsylvania Court House he found Lee again before him. Lee arranged his army with a faultless eye for the advantages of the country and both armies had learned by hard experience the advantages of log entrenchments for which the heavily wooded country provided ample resources. Lee adopted the tactics which afterwards proved as useful in the war with Germany and kept a mobile force behind his first defences. Thus when Hancock broke through the Confederate position at the "Bloody Angle" he was met by fresh troops which threw the Union soldiers back after heavy losses. The devotion of the men of Lee to the great commander who foresaw and checked every move of his opponent never wavered. More than once at a point of supreme danger, Lee came forward to lead a charge but the lines rang with the shout, "General Lee, to the rear!" and the men would charge as if their general himself were leading them.

So the fighting went on week after week with little intermission, Grant constantly seeking to interpose his army between Lee and his base in Richmond and Lee moving to his right to face his opponents. Early in the campaign Lee's great cavalry leader, J. E. B. Stuart, was killed before the defences of Richmond, and Lee found it increasingly difficult to follow the movements of his enemy. But Grant had his disappointments too, for Butler proved quite incompetent and allowed himself to be securely bottled up in a narrow peninsula on the south bank of the James at Bermuda Hundred, where he could be easily watched by the inferior forces of Beauregard. For the time, Petersburg and Richmond were safe so far as the army of the James

was concerned. On the North Anna, Grant led his army into a dangerous position where the two wings were separated by a great bend in the stream within which lay the army of Lee. The temporary illness of the Confederate commander prevented him from taking advantage of the opportunity. As it was Grant extricated his men from their position only with difficulty, and again commenced his series of marches past the right flank of his opponents.

On the first of June, more than three weeks after the beginning of the campaign, Grant had reached the old battlefield north of the Chickahominy where Lee had attacked McClellan two years before. But this time the situation had changed and Lee did not have the men to take the initiative. Almost at the spot of the old battlefield of Gaines' Mill where Porter had made his gallant stand against the soldiers of Lee, Grant threw his whole army on an almost impregnable position. The task was hopeless and the attack was badly managed, and in a few minutes the best soldiers of the army of the Potomac lay dead by the hundreds before the Confederate entrenchments. Human endurance could bear no more and Grant's subordinates discouraged him from making still another hopeless charge. The morale of the army had been distinctly weakened. Solid advantages had been gained, for the policy of attrition had inflicted losses on the Confederate commander that he could not make good, but the waiting North began to ask whether the game were worth the candle, for the gains were not visible and on the surface it appeared that Grant had simply failed to solve the same problem that had proved too much for previous Union commanders. The rumor spread that the Union general was drinking again, a rumor for which the letters of Rawlins show there was some basis. On June 12th,

Grant gave up the attempt to fight it out on the line on which he had started, for the summer was well advanced and the goal was still distant. The superiority of the Northern cavalry made it possible for Grant to carry his army south to the James, where the navy was ready to transport them to the south bank. Grant was now to try the very plan that, two years before, Halleck had vetoed in the case of McClellan.

Grant conducted his movement with skill, and Lee lost touch with his opponent until Grant's army was reunited on the south bank, thus losing his last opportunity to win a military decision. But on the south shore of the James, Grant's problem was still difficult enough, for the slowness of Butler gave Lee time to send his regiments to the defence of Petersburg, the railroad junction which was the key to Richmond and to the railroads by which the armies of Lee were fed. Petersburg was thinly defended at the beginning but by the time that Grant arrived it was well manned and though Grant attacked again and again, he failed as he had at Cold Harbor a few days before. It was apparent that the capital of the Confederacy would yield only to a long siege. From the point of view of many in the North it was the darkest moment of the war. Greenbacks had depreciated until they were worth less than forty cents on the dollar. Lincoln had been renominated by a Union convention, but some of his closest friends advised him to withdraw from the canvass. The New York *Tribune* began to urge the ending of the war by a process of negotiation. Even Lincoln himself almost lost heart and acknowledged that the chances of election on a policy of fighting the war to the end were very slender. The tale of losses was appalling and victory seemed still remote.

Lee had been unable to prevent the crossing of the

James by the defeated army of Grant, but the next day he detached Early with some of his best soldiers to sweep down the Shenandoah and to relieve the pressure on Richmond by threatening Washington, just as Jackson had done two years before. But this time the administration had learned their lesson and were not to be frightened into withdrawing the soldiers of Grant. Although Early crossed the Potomac and after defeating the militia which had been hastily gathered for the defence of the capital entered the suburbs of Washington, Grant continued his pressure on the lines of Lee detaching only a small force for the defence of the well protected city. By the middle of July, Early was back in the Shenandoah which continued to be the granary of the Southern cause.

In the meantime, Sherman was advancing from Chattanooga with the army of the West. His methods were more careful than Grant's, for the relative numbers of the two forces were not so favorable to the Union army. Johnston was outnumbered, but he had prepared, with care and with the experience of a skilled engineer, a series of strong positions to which he retired through the mountainous country of north Georgia when he was outflanked by the greater numbers of his antagonist. As Johnston fell back towards the south he naturally destroyed the railroad on which Sherman must depend for his communications. But the resources and engineering skill of Sherman's staff were equal to the occasion, and the Confederates had barely completed their work of destruction when they heard the advancing sound of the locomotive carrying over the reconstructed track supplies to the Union army. The fighting was severe enough, but, except at Kenesaw Mountain on June 27th, Sherman did not attempt the direct frontal attacks that had cost Grant so dearly,

and the campaign resembled rather the careful moves of two skillful chess players. Sherman acknowledged in his letters to his wife that his victories were barren, for though he was advancing into the heart of the enemies' country, his own lines of communication were growing longer and longer and more and more difficult to defend against the enterprising cavalry of Forrest. Even when the Union army had crossed the Chattahootchie in sight of the goal at Atlanta, the Confederates were still in good spirits and full of confidence in the Fabian tactics of their commander.

Sherman expressed his fears when he wrote: "I hardly think Johnston will give me a chance to fight a decisive battle, unless at such a disadvantage that I ought not to accept, and he is so situated that when threatened or pressed too hard he draws off leaving us a barren victory. He will thus act all summer, unless he gains a great advantage in position or succeeds in breaking our roads." But the military point of view was not easy for the Southern people who saw the Union soldiers advancing and their fields devastated. On June 26th Sherman wrote: "I am now 105 miles from Chattanooga, and all our provisions have come over that single road, which is almost daily broken somewhere, but thus far our supplies have been ample. We have devoured the land and our animals eat up the wheat and corn close. All the people retire before us and desolation is behind. To realize what war is one should follow in our tracks."[1]

The defensive policy of Johnston and Lee was unquestionably the best that could have been devised, for it was now apparent that the only hope lay in keeping their armies intact and prolonging the war without any defeat until after the elections in the fall. General Gordon records that after Grant had carried his army

[1] *The Home Letters of General Sherman*, 298.


GEORGIA AND THE CAROLINAS
50 40 30 20 10 0 20 40 60 80 100 MILES
CLEVELAND
CHATTANOOGA
CHICKAMAUGA
LAFAYETTE
SHIPS GAP
DALTON
SNAKE CR GAP
ELLIJAY
RESACA
CALHOUN
LANDER
ADAIRSVILLE
ROME
KINGSTON
CANTON
COOSA R.
ALLATOONA
ACKWORTH
BURNT HICKORY
BRUSH MT.
DALLAS
MARIETTA
POWDER SPRINGS
VININGS ST
ATLANTA
CHATTAHOOCHEE R.
FAIRBURN
LOVEJOY
ATHENS
UNION
AUGUSTA
SAVANNAH R.
MILLEDGEVILLE
GORDON
MACON
COLUMBUS
OCMULGEE R.
OCONEE R.
ALBANY
WAYNESBORO
LOUISVILLE
BRIAR CR.
MILLEN
OGEECHEE R.
SISTERS FERRY
SAVANNAH
BELTON
SPARTANBURG
ALSTON
COLUMBIA
ORANGEBURG
SANTEE R.
MIDWAY
RADISTO R.
CHARLESTON
FORT SUMPTER
SULLIVAN ISL.
MORRIS ISL.
BEAUFORT
PORT ROYAL ENTRANCE
GREENSBORO
CHARLOTTE
CHERAW
FLORENCE
GREAT PEDEE R.
CARTHAGE
RALEIGH
SOUTHFIELD
AVERASBORO
FAYETTEVILLE
CAPE FEAR R.
WILMINGTON

in safety to the south bank of the James, no officer in Lee's army expected military victory. But the people of Georgia were suffering the terrible ravages of war and were in dread of still more bitter calamities that were to follow, and the pressure on the harassed President of the Confederacy became so great that he played directly into the hands of his opponents. In the action taken, he probably contributed to the reëlection of Abraham Lincoln and hastened the termination of the war. Davis did not like Johnston, but there is no evidence that personal feelings entered into the fateful decision which he now made. Johnston had been given the task of defending Georgia, and in the estimation of the President he had failed.

On July 17th, Johnston was removed to the infinite disgust of his soldiers and replaced by General J. B. Hood, known as a fighting general. Hood had become something of a hero as a result of his numerous wounds, but he was decidedly inferior to his celebrated predecessor in intellectual and strategic quality. Like all men who do not think straight through their problems, Hood was a man of moods, alternately overrash and overcautious. It seemed to his subordinates that he attacked when he should have held back and held back when an attack might have yielded fruit.

Hood had been appointed to fight and fight he did. On July 20th and again on the 22nd in the battle known as Peach Tree Orchard, he threw his whole army against the lines of Sherman. His men fought with supreme courage and for a moment the Union lines reeled under the shock of the attack. In this battle the gallant General McPherson, who had been the right arm of Sherman, was killed. But the Union lines before Atlanta were too strong to be broken, and Hood withdrew his army shaken and decimated, incapable of making

Atlanta a second Richmond. After a siege of one month, Sherman succeeded in placing a force south of the city and, to avoid the risk of capture, Hood was compelled to abandon his positions. On September 2d, Sherman was able to telegraph the anxiously waiting President in Washington: "Atlanta is ours and fairly won."

The Democrats had held their convention very late and at Chicago had nominated General George B. McClellan on a platform written by Vallandigham during the gloom of the summer declaring the war a failure. The delegates were met on their way home by the news from Atlanta, which made their platform a palpable absurdity, and though McClellan repudiated the platform, the reëlection of Lincoln had become a virtual certainty. The majority of the American people had come to agree with Seward who said after the election: "Henceforth all men will come to see him as you and I have seen him—a true, loyal, patient, patriotic and benevolent man. . . . Detraction will cease and Abraham Lincoln will take his place with Washington, Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin, among the benefactors of the country and of the human race."

In the presidential election of November, 1864, McClellan carried but three of the loyal states, New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky, with 21 electoral votes; while Lincoln carried 22 states with 212 electoral votes. The Republicans also elected two thirds of the new House of Representatives. But the election was much closer than these figures would indicate for the Democrats polled 46 per cent of the popular vote. At the beginning of the year Chase had been an active candidate for the nomination. When he failed to secure this he presented his resignation which was accepted by Lincoln in June. Frémont was running

as an independent Republican on a platform that called for a policy of confiscation in the South. To secure the withdrawal of Frémont and the unity of the party, Lincoln had been compelled to sacrifice his Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blair, who was obnoxious to the radical wing of the party. In August, Raymond, Lincoln's compaign manager, had written: "The tide is setting strongly against us." The two leading newspaper editors, Weed and Greeley, advocated negotiations with the South, and Lincoln allowed them to make the attempt, but Greeley found that the Southern commissioners had no authority to make peace on any other terms except independence. The failure of Greeley's effort to make peace strengthened the war party, and the result was made certain by Sherman's victory at Atlanta. The newly elected vice-President was Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, a former Democrat who had been nominated in place of Hamlin of Maine in order to give a national character to the ticket.

The tide of success that had seemed so distant now began to run strongly in favor of the North. Late in June, the news arrived that the troublesome cruiser *Alabama* had been sunk off the Port of Cherbourg after a naval duel with the *Kearsarge*. On August 5th, Farragut had succeeded in carrying his fleet past the forts at Mobile. The port was now closed to the Confederacy in the same fashion in which two years earlier Farragut had captured New Orleans.

On the 19th of September, Sheridan, who had been placed in the command of the Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley, defeated the Confederates under Early at Winchester and, four days later, the rear-guard of Early's army was driven from its lines on Fisher's Hill.

On the 19th of October, Early received reënforcements from Lee's army in a division of veterans commanded by

Kershaw. Early had told Lee that Sheridan was absent and that part of Sheridan's army had been sent off, and it was Early's belief that he was now in a position to crush the troops that remained. Sheridan had been called to Washington for a conference with Grant. Kershaw's forces had been guided over the slopes of Massanutton Mountain and with its ranks added to by the men from Early's camp, they had, in the dim dawn of the early morning, fallen on the troops of the 8th Corps, which constituted the left wing of Sheridan's army.

The Northern troops were driven back from Cedar Creek six miles to Middletown, and for a time the Confederate victory seemed complete, but at two o'clock, General Wright, who was in command in Sheridan's absence, had succeeded in re-constituting his lines and in placing his left wing across the turnpike. The plan of Early's attack was to push the Federal forces westward of the pike and into the Mountains. The Union right and center made a strong stand and by two o'clock Sheridan himself arrived after a ride from Winchester which has become famous in song and story.

The retreat had ceased and the line across the pike and westward was firmly held. Sheridan decided that there was still time to win a victory before darkness came. The troops took fresh enthusiasm from the presence of their leader, and, during the remaining hours of daylight, succeeded in driving the Confederates from the field. On the following day the pursuit was pressed, and the Confederate forces were swept for the last time from the Valley which had been the scene of the exploits of Stonewall Jackson. Under orders received from Grant, the stores of food remaining in the Valley were destroyed or carried off, and one of the important nearby sources of the supplies for Lee's army was closed. There need be no further fears for expeditions along this covered

way against the capital at Washington. The valley had been left so bare that Sheridan could report that even a crow would have to carry its own supplies. It was not to recover its former smiling prosperity for many years.[1]

Atlanta had been fairly won by Sherman, but it proved to be something of a white elephant. The country had been devastated and all supplies and even forage had to be brought almost five hundred miles from Louisville. Sherman required all civilians to leave the city, an order that led to an acrimonious correspondence with Hood. Sherman wrote: "You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty and you cannot refine it." Hood's army had been driven from Atlanta, but, though greatly weakened, it was still hovering intact on the line of the railroad to Chattanooga and during October, while Sheridan was winning his victories in the Valley, Sherman had great difficulties in keeping the line to the rear open. He must either advance or retreat. In these circumstances he won the

[1] To write the story of any war without emphasizing devastation and waste is to leave Hamlet out of the play. Sheridan wrote to Grant on October 7, 1864:—"I have destroyed over 2000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over 70 mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3000 sheep. . . . Lieut. John B. Meigs, my engineer officer, was murdered. . . . For this atrocious act all the houses within an area of five miles were burned. . . . From the vicinity of Harrisonburg over 400 wagonloads of refugees have been sent back to Martinsburg; most of these people were Dunkers and had been conscripted. The people here are getting sick of the war; heretofore they have had no reason to complain, because they have been living in great abundance. . . . Tomorrow I will continue the destruction of wheat, forage, etc. down to Fisher's Hill. When this is completed, the Valley from Winchester up to Staunton, ninety-two miles, will have but little in it for man or beast." *Official Records*, Series I, Vol. XLIII, Part I, p. 30.

reluctant consent of Grant to his plan of operations. Sending back some of his veterans and all his recruits, on November 15th he burned Atlanta to the ground, and with sixty thousand picked and well trained men commenced a march across Georgia to the sea. His remaining troops were sent back to Thomas at Nashville to watch the movements of Hood.

From the point of view of the Union soldiers the march through Georgia proved to be a huge picnic. Sherman, having no base of supplies, had ordered them to "forage liberally on the country," an order that they were not slow to carry out. The militia in the country were quite too weak to try conclusions with Sherman's army. The only possible defence was the one that Wellington used in Portugal against the French, to devastate the country in front of the invaders, but even the heroism of the South was not equal to so desperate a remedy. The army found sufficient food, and while the soldiers of Lee starved in the lines at Richmond, the Northern soldiers grew fat on the pork and sweet potatoes of the Southern country. Through the very heart of Georgia, Sherman cut his way, destroying the railroads beyond the hope of redemption, and carrying away all the provisions and burning many of the buildings along a strip from forty to sixty miles in width. In twenty-four days, he had reached the safety of the sea, and after a short siege, Savannah fell into his hands on December 21st.

In the meantime less spectacular but equally important events were taking place in the north. Hood had been well advised in not attempting the hopeless task of following in the wake of Sherman's march. Instead, he turned north to meet the smaller and less efficient army of Thomas who was making desperate efforts to train his men at Nashville. Thomas threw some of his veterans forward as a screen under Schofield, while he himself

remained in Nashville to receive and organize the raw recruits who were arriving from the North. With his movements well screened by the brilliant cavalry of Forrest, Hood crossed the Tennessee and approached Nashville on the Cumberland. If he could overwhelm Thomas, the march of Sherman would be shown to have been a huge mistake and victory might even yet be garnered from defeat. But Hood proved to be quite unequal to the emergency. As Schofield retreated before him, he failed to order an attack at a point where his enemy was scattered along the roads, and then attacked him at Franklin when he was concentrated in a position of great strength. The Confederate troops attacked with fury and some of Hood's best lieutenants, stung by his taunts that they were allowing the enemy to escape, fell uselessly in front of the Union position (November 30th). Schofield withdrew his army and joined Thomas in Nashville, on the great bend of the Cumberland. Thomas had now sixty thousand men against less than forty under Hood, and yet the Southern commander persisted in his attempt to besiege the Northern forces in Nashville. The country was covered by a sheet of ice, and Thomas was biding his time until the conditions would make his victory complete. Grant at Richmond, not recognizing the sound reasons for delay, grew impatient and had sent orders to remove Thomas from his command, when that general at length attacked on December 15th. The situation was somewhat similar to that when Grant led his troops out of Chattanooga to break the siege by Bragg, one year before. Hood's army was strongly posted in the hills south of Nashville and for one day it stood its ground. But the numbers were too small to protect their positions and on the sixteenth they were outflanked and driven from the field in hopeless rout. No single victory in the

war had been so complete and Hood's army disappeared from the contest as an organized force.

The victory of Thomas at Nashville had justified Sherman's march to the sea, and on the first of February his men were ready to make the long and perilous journey of more than four hundred miles northward from Savannah across the country made famous three-quarters of a century before by the campaigns of Greene and Cornwallis. The men regarded South Carolina as chiefly responsible for the war. As Sherman entered her borders, he wrote, "God pity South Carolina!", and there were unquestionably more cases of wanton cruelty and destruction than had characterized the march through Georgia. As Sherman marched north through the interior, the cities were cut off one by one and were stripped of their defenders to provide an army for Johnston who had again been given the now hopeless task of stopping Sherman. Altogether the Southern general had about thirty-five thousand men against eighty thousand under Sherman. The rains were falling in a cold drizzle and the roads were impassable morasses. But in spite of every difficulty Sherman carried the meaning of the war to the very heart of the State. Columbia the capital was occupied and burned to the ground, probably by drunken soldiers and without orders from the commander. On February 18th, Charleston, regarded as the cradle of the rebellion, denuded of defenders to meet Sherman in the interior, fell, and four days later the capture of Wilmington deprived the armies of Lee of their last gateway from the sea. The days of the blockade runners were ended. Sherman was justified in the belief that the march through the Carolinas was not only longer and more difficult but also more important and decisive than the more celebrated march through Georgia which had preceded it.

Long before Sherman had reached a point only one hundred and fifty miles south of Richmond, where Lee still stood within his lines, it must have been apparent to the bravest that the end was not far off. Early in February, Lincoln met the commissioners of the Confederate government under the leadership of Alexander H. Stephens on a ship near Norfolk to consider terms of peace, but though Lincoln promised generous treatment to the South in the matter of reconstruction, the Southern leaders required an armistice as a preliminary to serious discussion and nothing came of it. On February 9th, to meet the bitter discontent of Congress, Davis appointed Lee commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces. A measure was even introduced looking to the arming and the freeing of the slaves. But it was now too late even for so desperate expedients. Grant, with growing confidence and strength, reached out around the southern outposts of Lee's entrenchments towards the vital railroads to the south of Petersburg and Richmond, and when on April 2nd, his right wing was defeated at Five Forks by Sheridan, Lee was compelled to evacuate the city. On April 9, 1865, Lee met Grant at Appomattox Courthouse. His army was virtually surrounded and there was no choice but surrender. The men were to be paroled and allowed to keep their horses "for the spring plowing." The army of Northern Virginia had passed into history.

When the news arrived of the surrender of Lee, Johnston saw that further fighting was both useless and wicked. On April 17th he indicated his willingness to meet his opponent to arrange terms of surrender. In spite of devastations which he had regarded as military necessities, Sherman had lived long in the South and had a genuine kindly feeling for its people. He had had a recent conference with Lincoln in Virginia and had

been impressed by the total absence of any vindictive feeling on the part of the President. Lincoln had given a broad hint that he would welcome the escape of Davis and the other Southern leaders. Sherman saw that organized resistance was over, but he believed that there was grave danger of a period of anarchy which would destroy what was left in the stricken South. He had the characteristic realism of the soldier who looked to the future rather than the past, and sympathized fully with Lincoln's evident desire to let bygones be bygones. He was nothing of a lawyer or politician and in these circumstances made terms with Johnston that undoubtedly went far beyond his military authority.

All the remaining Southern forces were to be disbanded and their arms were to be placed in their state capitals. The governments of the Southern states were to be carried on much as they had been before. Since slavery was now the subject of a constitutional amendment which had passed both houses of Congress and was likely to be ratified by the requisite majority of states, nothing was said on that subject.

Unfortunately for Sherman's hopes, as he went to his conference with Johnston the news arrived that, three days before, the kindly man who might have given some support to the general principle of his plan had been assassinated in Washington. However wise such a solution as Sherman proposed may seem to a later generation, it was in such circumstances quite too much for human nature. Men remembered the words of the second inaugural with which the great President had died: "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphans, to

do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations." But Lincoln was dead, and even he would have found it difficult to secure terms as generous as he desired. For the moment, Stanton seemed to be supreme in the councils of the nation, and he felt, and no doubt sincerely, that the destinies of the negro, of the nation, and above all of the party to which he now belonged, could not well be left to the tender mercies of a self-governing South. Sherman's terms were rejected with harsh publicity, and Johnston surrendered on the same non-political terms that had been granted to Lee.

Though Lincoln's plans miscarried and were long postponed by the bitter political contests of the Reconstruction period, his spirit remained to enrich the heritage of a nation that he had done so much to save. Not without reason, he is regarded by many today as the first of Americans. The assassination of Lincoln at so dramatic a moment called forth tributes from many lands, but none nobler than the famous elegy from Whitman's pen:

"O Captain! My Captain! our fearful trip is done,
The ship has weathered every rack, the prize we sought is won,
The port is near, the bells I hear, the people all exulting,
While follow eyes the steady keel, the vessel grim and daring;
But O heart! heart! heart!
O the bleeding drops of red,
Where on the deck my Captain lies,
Fallen cold and dead!

"O Captain! my Captain! rise up and hear the bells;
Rise up—for you the flag is flung—for you the bugle trills,
For you bouquets and ribboned wreaths—for you the shores a-crowding,
For you they call, the swaying mass, their eager faces turning;
Here Captain! dear father!
This arm beneath your head!
It is some dream that on the deck,
You've fallen cold and dead.

"My Captain does not answer, his lips are pale and still,
My father does not feel my arm, he has no pulse nor will,
The ship is anchored safe and sound, its voyage closed and done,
From fearful trip the victor ship comes in with object won;
Exult O shores and ring O bells!
But I with mournful tread,
Walk the deck my Captain lies,
Fallen cold and dead."

CHAPTER VI

EXTREMISTS IN CONTROL (1865–1867)

THE war was over, secession had failed, and slavery was to be abolished. All that was clear when Andrew Johnson, a war Democrat from the mountains of eastern Tennessee, who had been nominated to strengthen the Union ticket in 1864, unexpectedly succeeded to the place of the dead Lincoln. Only the difficult problem remained that Lincoln had described as "binding up the nation's wounds," but which the radicals in Congress regarded rather as "insuring the legitimate consequences of the war." One of them has recorded that "aside from Mr. Lincoln's policy of tenderness to rebels, which now so jarred upon the feelings of the hour, his well known views on reconstruction were as distasteful as possible to radical Republicans." Accordingly the death of Lincoln was not regarded as an unmixed evil. Senator Wade said to the new President, "Johnson, we have faith in you. By the gods, there will be no trouble now in running the Government." To which Johnson replied, "Treason is a crime and crime must be punished. Treason must be made infamous and traitors must be impoverished." Conservative men like wise Governor Andrew of Massachusetts feared that the President was an ill-educated and narrow minded zealot who would act on impulse and not on principle.

Superficially, the careers of Abraham Lincoln and of

Andrew Johnson were very much alike. Each had been born in poverty, the one in Kentucky and the other in North Carolina, and each had risen by his own exertions to very high position. But while Lincoln had been disciplined and trained by his study of law, Johnson's early life as a village tailor in the mountains of eastern Tennessee had lasted too long to give him a real chance for an education. In spite of these handicaps, Johnson had won his way by a natural courage and readiness in speech and had been promoted by his neighbors from one local position to another until he reached Congress and had been elected Governor of Tennessee. When the war came, Johnson was a Senator from Tennessee, and had remained loyal to the Union. When Grant's victories had won back a part of Johnson's adopted state, Lincoln made him military governor, a position in which he showed enterprise and ability. He had been rewarded by the office of Vice-President, from which fate now as unexpectedly raised him to the highest and the most difficult post in the nation.

Those who knew him best had a high admiration for Johnson's qualities although they recognized certain limitations which were to cost the South very dear. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln, continued to serve until the end of Johnson's administration. The two men parted with definite regret. After four years of intimate acquaintance, Welles thus described his chief: "He has sound and correct views, is honest and patriotic; but he has not the tact, skill, and talent to wield the administrative power of the government to advantage in times like these, with a factious majority in Congress against him." With this estimate, history is in substantial accord. Johnson had great industry, and he based his policy towards the South on a most painstaking and laborious study of actual condi-

tions. From the reports of his many agents, the President undoubtedly knew far more about the region with which he was dealing than any of the radical leaders of Congress. His state papers were able, and though he depended on political friends like the historian Bancroft to give form to his idea, the policy and the arguments were his own. From those who were friendly to him, Johnson was constantly on the lookout for facts and for opinions. He won the loyalty of men like Hugh McCulloch, his able Secretary of the Treasury, of Seward, of Welles, and of Stanberry, as completely as Lincoln himself might have done. Many times, on questions of great importance, he yielded to the arguments of his advisers. He labored so constantly in his office that his health was permanently impaired. The picture of the man as he emerges from the diary of Welles, is one of a childlike, pathetic figure whose labors and contests were unrelieved by the saving sense of humor which was the basis of the supreme tact of Lincoln. Like many another uneducated and self made man, Johnson frequently said more than he meant, as in the interview with Wade which we have quoted. His success on the hustings in Tennessee had given him confidence in his abilities as a public speaker, and when he was bitterly attacked he replied in a similar vein, without regard to the dignified restraint which the American people had become accustomed to expect in his high office. When interrupted by a crowd, he interjected ill considered remarks that caused his friends grave embarrassment. Once convinced of the wisdom of a policy, Johnson was unable to compromise in details to win the necessary support. His lack of dignity in personal encounters made constantly more difficult the position of a man, who, in spite of his sacrifices for the Union, was under suspicion from the beginning, as Stevens put it, "Because

he came from one of those damned rebel provinces." In the excited condition of the public mind at the close of so long and so bitter a contest, the wise and conciliatory policy of Lincoln would have been very difficult even in the hands of the acknowledged leader of the North. Three days before his death, Lincoln had been compelled to give up his plan of leaving the reconstruction of Virginia to her own legislature. "What can I do when they are all against me?" Lincoln had said sadly. In the hands of Johnson, such a plan was probably hopeless from the beginning, and whatever hopes it had were wrecked by his own mistakes.

In April of 1865, Congress was not in session, a circumstance for which Lincoln had already expressed his gratitude, for he saw that a wise solution was not likely to emerge from the bitterness of a political debate. One well informed man representing the whole American people was better fitted to arrive at a wise decision, than several hundred Congressmen representing individual districts and intent on the practical problem of maintaining their precarious political power. So also thought Johnson, and whether wisely or not in the changed circumstances, he determined to solve the problem for himself in the ten months which remained to him until Congress should meet in December. In spite of the opposition of the radical members of Congress, Lincoln had already begun the reconstruction of four states, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia. In each of these states he had authorized the voters under the existing state laws to form a new Constitution. Each voter was required to acknowledge the results of the war by taking an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. Whenever the number of such voters should reach ten per cent of the number in 1860, the new government should go into effect. A comparatively

small number of the leaders in the war were disfranchised but even these might soon hope for a Presidential pardon. Obviously such a plan virtually nullified the Confiscation Act of 1862, by which the radicals hoped to gain the great plantations of the South for division among the Southern loyalists and negroes. For Presidential amnesty and pardon removed the Southern people from the dread of so great a calamity.

On May 29th, 1865, President Johnson, to the bitter disappointment of the radicals who had heard his early threats, announced his complete conversion to the plan of Lincoln. An immediate amnesty was extended to the great majority of the Southern white people, and though the list of exceptions was longer than Lincoln's and included those who owned more than twenty thousand acres of land, Johnson's words were again harsher than his acts, for he issued pardons by the hundreds to almost all those who applied. Though the late President of the Confederacy was kept in prison for almost two years, the other leaders in the great rebellion were now quite safe as to the ordinary rights of freedom and of property. The power of pardon belongs so clearly to the President, that though as late as 1867 Stevens introduced a new Confiscation Act, it was never seriously considered. The two Presidents had stolen a march on the extreme radicals, which made quite impossible the negroes' dream of "forty acres of land and a mule." It has not been generally recognized that though so much of the President's reconstruction plan was overturned, his conservative action in the all important matter of confiscation was never successfully impeached. The negro remained a homeless, landless class.[1]

[1] On the radical plan of confiscating the plantations and dividing them among the negroes see, Fleming, *Documentary History of Reconstruction*, I, 150, 151. Thaddeus Stevens said on March 10,

During the summer and autumn, the Johnson plan of reconstruction was put rapidly into effect by the provisional military governors in the Southern states. Before Congress met in December, military government had yielded to regular civil authority in every state recently in rebellion with the exception of Texas, which did not elect state officers until March, 1866. The Southern states consisted then as they still do of three relatively equal regions, the black belt of rich plantations in which the negroes outnumbered the whites, a second belt in which the land was poor and the whites and negroes were approximately equal, and the poorest sections in the hills and pine barrens where the whites greatly outnumbered the negroes. By Johnson's plan, especially before the wealthy leaders had been pardoned, political power passed from the black belt where it had remained in the days of slavery to the white regions. The most interesting aspect of these elections was the reappearance of the old party divisions between the Southern whites which had been largely forgotten during the war. Men now remembered that they had been Whigs and Democrats before the war, and the Presidential Conventions in the various states were dominated by former Whigs and Douglas Democrats who had for a long time opposed secession. When the radical policy of Congress later destroyed these governments, it also tended to solidify all the whites into a single party,

1866, "I have never desired bloody punishments to any great extent. But there are punishments quite as appalling, and longer remembered than death. They are more advisable because they would reach a greater number. Strip a proud nobility of their bloated estates; reduce them to a level with plain republicans; send them forth to labor, and teach their children to enter the workshops or handle the plow, and you will thus humble the proud traitors. Conspirators are bred among the rich and vain, the ambitious aristocrats. I trust yet to see our confiscation laws fully executed."

giving rise to the Solid South of later days. Even after this process of solidification into a single party had begun, the whites called themselves the Conservative party, not to give offence to the many who disliked the name Democrat. In many regions, a Democrat of the extreme type was regarded with disfavor in 1865 as the author of many of the evils of the war. The state of public opinion in 1865 indicates clearly that the Republican leaders who advocated negro suffrage as necessary to the continued success of what Stevens and Sumner and Wade called "the party of the Union" were sacrificing an ultimate addition to their political strength for the sake of an immediate gain. But it must be remembered that a Congressman must think in terms of two years rather than of decades.

The Presidential conventions of 1865 in the Southern states were made up of men who to a large extent had not been the political leaders of the old régime, but they contained enough experienced citizens to carry their business to a prompt and successful conclusion. Nor was their immediate problem difficult, for it was only necessary to readopt their former Constitution with an amendment abolishing slavery and repudiating the debts incurred in furtherance of the rebellion, as they were required to do by the President. That the South had accepted the results of the war, not cheerfully, but in good faith, was indicated by the readiness with which it received these terms and proceeded to the organization of the state governments.

The legislatures which were immediately elected by a franchise somewhat enlarged under the terms of the new Constitutions and the President's pardons, had a more difficult task to perform. Since slavery had been abolished by their own Constitutions, it was easy to perform the last task which had been laid on them by

the President in the ratification of the proposed thirteenth amendment to the Constitution. The process of emancipation had gone so rapidly that when this amendment was declared ratified by the aid of the newly reconstructed South in December, 1865, it is doubtful whether it had any legal effect outside of Kentucky and Delaware. Even in Kentucky, the freedom of the blacks had followed the invasion of the Northern armies, and had been tacitly acknowledged, before the adoption of the first of the Reconstruction amendments. The negro was free. But what were the implications of freedom? This was the immediate problem which confronted every legislature as it proceeded to the revision of the body of laws which had grown up in the South in slavery days and which were an embodiment of the social conditions which had now passed away.

The great black belt had been the heart of the Confederacy and until the closing months had been little touched by the ravages of war. The slaves had remained on the plantations and had protected the women and children when the men were far away. When the war was nearly over, the news of freedom came to the negroes through the army and later by means of the Freedmen's Bureau, established by the act of March 3, 1865. When the average man in the North thought of the Emancipation Proclamation he thought of freedom as a legal device which might soon give the negroes the ordinary rights of contract to which the farmers of the West and the artisans of the East were then accustomed. The negro should no longer be subject to sale; he should support his family by earning wages. The immediate benefits of such a change with all the responsibilities for the care of the young and the aged which it entailed seemed to the average plantation negro a doubtful blessing. This freedom for which he was told that a long

war had been fought and so many lives sacrificed must surely bring some more immediate and tangible advantages. One Mississippi negro expressed the common feeling when he said that "he considered no man free who had to work for a living." Freedom was to be one long holiday. The Northern concept of freedom may be termed legal, that of the negroes, so far as they understood the change at all, was distinctly Utopian, only possible in a kind of Alice in Wonderland world. Freedom must be magic, and Father Abraham and General Sherman were the magicians.

In these circumstances, it was no wonder that the negroes who had often remained for generations on a single plot of ground near the master's plantation became restless and determined to put their freedom to the test. Many planters called their slaves together and announced to them their new condition. Some continued to work the crops in return for wages which were substantially similar to the old plantation privileges. But when the hours of labor and the food and clothing remained much what they had always been, it was no wonder that many began to wonder whether they had not somehow been defrauded of the very substance of this long-expected freedom. The war which had compelled the transfer of slaves from places of danger had taught them the joys of travel and many crowded into the towns where they became a vagrant and wretched proletariat. Some were rescued by the kindly ministrations of the government and were gathered into huge camps where they were served army stores by the omnipresent agents of the Freedmen's Bureau. The death rate in the first year was appalling. The most authoritative student of the subject, Professor Fleming, has estimated that the deaths among the negro population in the single year 1865 from disease and starvation

probably equalled the total losses of the Southern armies on the battle field in four years of war.

General Carl Schurz visited the South in the early summer of 1865 and reported among other things the problem which confronted the returning Confederate veteran: "It is difficult to imagine circumstances more unfavorable for the development of calm and unprejudiced public opinion than those under which the Southern people are at present laboring. The war has not only defeated their political aspirations, but it has broken up their whole social organization. When the rebellion was put down, they found themselves not only conquered in a political and military sense but economically ruined. . . . The Southern soldiers, when returning from the war, did not, like the Northern soldiers, find a prosperous community which merely waited for their arrival to give them remunerative employment. They found, in many cases, their homesteads destroyed, their farms devastated, their families in distress; and those that were less unfortunate found, at all events, an impoverished and exhausted community which had but little to offer them."

The testimony of Schurz on the consequences of the war were corroborated by many witnesses. A citizen of Virginia testified before a Congressional Committee: "From Harper's Ferry to New Market, which is about eighty miles, the country is almost a desert. There were no fences. . . . We could cultivate grain without fences, as we had no cattle, hogs, sheep, or horses or anything else. . . . The barns were all burned; a great many of the private buildings were burned; chimneys standing without houses and houses standing without roof, or door, or window; a most desolate state of affairs; bridges all destroyed, roads badly cut up." Whitelaw Reid, at that time a young newspaper correspondent, gave testimony to the effectiveness of the blockade:

"Everything has been mended, and generally in the rudest style. Window glass has given away to thin boards, and these are in use in railway carriages and in cities. Furniture is marred and broken, and none has been replaced for four years. Dishes are cemented in various styles, and half the pitchers have tin handles. A complete set of crockery is never seen, and in very few families is there enough to set a table. . . . Clocks and watches have all stopped." The ready capital of the South had gone into paper money and equally worthless bonds. The factories which in 1860 had been able to supply ten per cent of the total manufactures of the nation were unable to reach a like percentage until 1899. The railroads were without rolling stock. Not only had the chief form of Southern property disappeared, but the land itself remained for many years under heavy mortgages. Money had wholly disappeared and commerce had returned to a state of barter. Many of the most vigorous men had been killed and others returned with permanent injuries which made still more difficult the task of making a living. The schools and colleges had been closed and many of the buildings had been destroyed. Even the churches had sometimes been turned over to missionaries from the North. Much of the cotton was claimed by unscrupulous agents of the Treasury Department as property of the Confederacy and had been confiscated. Not one-tenth of the proceeds ever reached Washington, and the only results were to add to the uncertainty of property and to make fortunes for the first group of the men whom the South came to know so well in later years as the carpetbaggers. Even the new crop of cotton which was harvested, under the gravest difficulties, in 1865, was subject to a special Federal tax of three cents a pound which was sometimes collected two or three times.

As the year went on, the negroes who had remained faithful began to hear rumors which were clearly echoes of the speeches of Thaddeus Stevens, and renewed their dreams of "forty acres of land and a mule." They refused to work for their old masters and began to invest in the painted pegs which were sold to them by unscrupulous self-styled philanthropists against the day when they would be called upon to stake off their claims on the plantations. They thus added to their own misery and to the difficulties of the white men. The Freedmen's Bureau, at first a huge charitable society under government auspices, furnished food and relieved some of the suffering among both races, but also raised hopes which were never destined to be fulfilled, and thus delayed the process of a sane economic reconstruction. From the beginning, the South bore its own losses, relieved its own veterans, and paid heavy taxes to meet the national expenses which had been made necessary by the war. In the case of the cotton tax which was unrepealed until 1868 it also bore a special discriminating burden, from which other parts of the now reunited nation were of course exempt.[1]

Face to face with all these difficulties of poverty and exhaustion, complicated by special taxes and negro restlessness, with a virtual failure of crops in 1865, and with rapacity and dishonesty already appearing among the special agents of the Treasury and the subordinate members of the new Freedmen's Bureau, it was no wonder that the Governors of the reconstructed states and the new legislatures interpreted freedom in terms that were in marked contrast to the Northern legal theory and especially to the Utopian dreams of the newly emancipated blacks. A problem which from the Northern

[1] For conditions in the South during the reconstruction period, see especially W. L. Fleming, *Documentary History of Reconstruction.*

point of view was largely political, represented to the Southern men who made up these legislatures an immediate and pressing social and economic necessity. They developed another interpretation of the meaning of freedom which, in contrast with the two others may be termed realistic. In working out this problem, they did not take sufficiently into account the prejudices which had been aroused by a long war or perhaps the ultimate social consequences of the laws that they passed.

The documents of the period fully attest that these legislatures were, on the whole, actuated by a sincere and kindly feeling to the negro race. Governor D. S. Walker of Florida, for example, said in his inaugural address: "I think we are bound by every consideration of duty, gratitude and interest, to make these people as enlightened, prosperous and happy as their new situation will admit. . . . They have been attached to our persons and our fortunes, sharing with us all our feelings —rejoicing with us in our prosperity, mourning with us in our adversity. . . . Not only in peace, but in war, they have been faithful to us. . . . They are now a discontented and unhappy people, many of them houseless and homeless, roaming about in gangs over the land, not knowing one day where the supplies for the next are to come from; exposed to the ravages of disease and famine; exposed to the temptations of theft and robbery. . . . We ought to protect them in all their rights, both of person and property, as fully as we do the whites." And such sentiments were echoed in every state. Some, like General Wade Hampton, were even willing to consider a qualified suffrage, based on property and education, such as had been suggested first by Lincoln and now by Johnson.

But the Southern legislator had no idea of treating the negro exactly like the white. All the circumstances

seemed to him to be different. Accordingly the old slave codes were amended, leaving out all references to slavery, but retaining many of the provisions that had been common for free negroes under the old régime. In some cases these new laws made no distinction between the two races, but since the negro was the only laborer they applied substantially to him. Frequently, the laws were more lenient to the negroes than to the whites; in Mississippi, for example, fines for crimes and misdemeanors were distinctly lighter for negroes than for whites. Everywhere their former marriages were given legal recognition and the negro father was made responsible for his family. Where two or more spouses were living a choice had to be made by a given time. In every state the negro was given his day in court and allowed to testify in cases in which members of his own race were involved. But the old laws which had been common for all laborers in the colonial period regulating vagrancy and the apprenticeship of minors were now applied to the negroes and they were to be compelled to find a master under agreements that were to be enforced by the courts. The master was laid under special obligations for the protection of the negroes on the plantations and could not eject his freedmen from their houses without adequate reason. Many of these provisions had already been adopted substantially by the military commanders and by the Freedmen's Bureau, but their enforcement was now to fall to the new governments. These so-called "black codes" differed in details and were especially stringent in the two states where the negroes greatly outnumbered the whites, Mississippi and South Carolina. Actually, they were never enforced for, in spite of the President's efforts to reëstablish local self government, the Freedmen's Bureau continued to consider labor contracts and to enforce them in special courts

that were at once judicial and administrative in their nature. Since the agents of this organization were required by law to take the so-called iron-clad oath of 1862 that they had not given aid or comfort to the Confederacy, these agents were necessarily carpetbaggers who constituted a government within a government and who seemed to the South to encourage economic and political hopes in the negro race which it would be madness to fulfil. In all the codes the intermarriage of the two races was stringently prohibited.

When Congress met, in December of 1865, to consider the President's summer work, these codes, with their provisions often greatly exaggerated, were a subject of discussion. The results of emancipation were a grave disappointment to the comparatively small but influential group of former abolitionists led by Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. These leaders now spoke with special reverence of the Constitution when they were really thinking, as the context often shows, of literal obedience to the radical phrases of the Declaration of Independence. They were not the first or the last Americans to confuse two documents so essentially different. Many men had expected magical and immediate results from the policy of emancipation which were not humanly possible, just as in a later day other men expected too great immediate results from the League of Nations.

This spirit of disillusionment and disappointment found many voices. The leader of the free negroes of the North, Frederick Douglass, said later of this period: "The government had left the freedman in a bad condition. . . . It felt it had done enough for him. It had made him free, and henceforth, he must make his own way in the world. Yet he had none of the conditions of self-preservation or self-protection. He was free

from the individual master, but the slave of society. He had neither money, property, nor friends. He was free from the old plantation but he had nothing but the dusty road under his feet. He was free from the old quarter that once gave him shelter, but a slave to the rains of summer and the frosts of winter. He was . . . turned loose, naked, and hungry to the open sky." Carl Schurz, a typical radical of the idealistic type, whose report on Southern conditions had great influence in the North, expressed the same disappointment and suggested the remedy which was afterward attempted and which became the chief element in the Congressional plan: "Although the freedman is no longer considered the property of the individual master, he is held to be the slave of society, and all independent State legislation will share the tendency to make him such. . . . The solution of the problem would be very much facilitated by enabling all the loyal and free labor elements in the South to exercise a healthy influence upon legislation." The extreme radicals were determined to delay reconstruction until the negro had been given the vote, and some, like Thaddeus Stevens, desired also to supply him with a farm at the expense of his former master. In the meantime, the States which the President had so laboriously reëstablished were to be treated either as conquered provinces protected only by the tenuous limitations of public law or as territories, according to the degree of radicalism. The first was the theory of Stevens in the House while the second was the idea of Sumner in the Senate which was substantially adopted by Congress. Even before Congress met, the leaders had decided to refuse to recognize the representatives of the new States. The issue had been sharply drawn.

The great debate which followed between the President and Congress and which brought such incalculable

evils to the South and the nation, has sometimes been treated as if it were essentially a lawyers' dispute as to the legal status of the Southern states. Were the States indestructible, as the Supreme Court later held? Or were they now as the result of war mere territories, at best, to be readmitted at the will of Congress? But the leaders on each side felt no doubt as to the practical policies on which they differed and the results they desired to achieve. The leaders of the radical party in Congress said again and again that they wanted to insure the permanent supremacy of the Republican party, whose achievements made it to them synonymous with the nation. The President wanted to leave the control of its own social and economic institutions to the white people of the South. It was because men differed about these very concrete and immediate problems that they evolved all the elaborate shades of Constitutional theory which have been so generally emphasized. In this respect the whole Reconstruction debate was similar to the old debate over nullification in which important concrete differences of policy lurked behind the legal phrases. Behind the policy of the Congressional leaders, there was a certain element of humanitarian idealism, but there were also other motives of a distinctly lower order. There was still something of the inevitable rancor which could not but be stimulated by the war, and above all there was the fear of the time when the South should come into the electoral college and the halls of Congress with the enlarged representation that was the automatic though indirect result of emancipation. In the old days a negro had counted only as three fifths, now he would count in the apportionment as a whole man. This incidental condition proved a great misfortune to the South. For fear that it might control national policy and national offices, the

states of the South were, for a series of years, deprived of local self government.

Such motives can in December of 1865 be fairly ascribed only to a few of the more astute Congressional leaders. Only six states and of those only one that contained a substantial number of negroes had given that race the vote. No Northern community had any idea, in 1865, of giving the negro anything like social equality with the whites. The spirit of local self-government, in spite of the integrating tendencies of the war, was still very strong among the masses of the Northern people. At that time the President had behind him, in the view of most competent observers, not only a majority of the Northern people but, with regard to the chief elements of his policy, a very large section of Congress. At the beginning, the majority in Congress that delayed the process of reconstruction was probably bent on reducing what they regarded as the undue powers of the executive rather than on doing anything radically different from what the President had already done. The situation was in some respects strikingly similar to the later one between the Senate and President Wilson. Powers which had been given to the President in time of war were now to be curtailed.

As the contest went on with little dignity on either side, the President lost supporters by lack of tact. But the fundamental reason for radical success was the fact that the radicals had the machinery of the only strong party and were admirably led by one of the most astute of American Congressional leaders, while the friends of the President, at first the more numerous, were divided and to some extent discredited by their attitude in the war. In the propaganda before the American people, the radicals used very effective argu-

ments. The reconstruction of the South would soon lead to Democratic victory in a national election. Such a victory would result in a lowering of the war tariffs and might even bring a partial repudiation of the war debt. The alliance between the Republicans and the protected interests had begun, and such arguments won to the radical cause many a holder of government bonds and many dwellers in manufacturing regions, who were quite lukewarm about the rights of the negro, so dear to the hearts of Sumner and Schurz. As news came from the South of grave disturbances in which negroes were killed, these were exaggerated and men who were disappointed with the results of the war and who must have a scapegoat began to blame the President for every weakness in the governments that he had established. Even with all these advantages, the radicals could not have remained so long in control without using all the prestige and popularity of the great military figure whom they won to their side. After 1868 it is doubtful whether any policy was adopted on its own merits or even seriously considered by the voters in comparison with the immense debt of gratitude and admiration which they felt that they owed to the hero of Appomattox. By 1870, a people which had hesitated about the Thirteenth Amendment conferring freedom on the slaves were ready to adopt the Fifteenth Amendment which made it impossible to restrict the suffrage on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Only in the matter of property rights did the early policy of the President maintain itself, aided by American conservatism in such matters, against the rising tide of radicalism.

The story of the contest between the President and Congress can be briefly told. The message of the President to Congress in 1865 was a well written document

for which the credit belonged to the historian, George Bancroft. But the secret was well kept and the President's prestige before the country was enhanced. The opening gun was the passage of an act which prolonged indefinitely the activities of the Freedmen's Bureau and provided places in the South for an army of as many as twelve thousand agents. This measure was vetoed by the President on the ground that it was wasteful of the public funds and that it created an impossible condition of dual government in every Southern state. The President's arguments were so sound and temperate in tone that his enemies were unable to pass the measure over his veto. On the day when he won this important success, the President delivered an impromptu address to a crowd at the White House in which he charged his enemies with a lack of patriotism and even questioned the legislative authority of a Congress from which the Southern states were excluded. Such a charge might be used to throw doubt on the validity of bonds issued after the war and gave a powerful weapon to his enemies both in the financial centers and in Congress. The whole speech was an undignified performance. With this added strength, Congress passed a Civil Rights Bill, giving the negro the right to be treated as a citizen in all legal matters such as testifying before the courts and making valid contracts. Since most of these rights had already been conceded even in the South, the President might well have signed the bill, leaving the question of its constitutionality to the courts. But the President sent in another veto, and thus lost the support of men like Trumbull of Illinois, later a Democrat and opponent of the radicals, who was the chief author of the bill. For the first time in American history, an important measure was passed over the President's veto. The radicals were now also

able to pass the Freedmen's Bureau Act, previously rejected, over Johnson's veto.

To remove any doubts as to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill, Congress now proposed an amendment the acceptance of which by the South they made prerequisite to readmission to representation in Congress. The proposed Fourteenth Amendment defined citizenship in terms broad enough to include the negro, and so set at rest the old question that had been at stake in the Dred Scott decision. No State should abridge any of the privileges or immunities of citizenship or deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.[1] Negro suffrage was not definitely required, but Congress was given the power to reduce the representation of the states which failed to grant the franchise to all men over twenty-one years of age. Federal bonds were placed beyond the reach of repudiation, and the leaders of the Confederacy were prohibited from holding either state or federal office without special amnesty from Congress. The amendment was shrewdly worded to appeal at once to the old animosities which had been aroused by the Dred Scott decision and to the newer business interests which were becoming prominent after the war. As an example of what they intended to do, Congress allowed Tennessee, in which the radicals had gained a temporary ascendancy, to ratify the amendment and to send good Repub-

[1] In this familiar provision, according to the later testimony of Senator Conkling, the committee which framed the amendment was probably intending from the beginning to protect railroad rates and other corporate interests as well as the liberties of the negro against unfriendly legislation. This phase of the matter was not emphasized at the time, but it is an interesting example of the double appeal of the radical program to humanitarian idealism and to business interests. On this point, see Beard, *Contemporary American History*, p. 54 ff.

lican representatives to Congress. Congress then adjourned to make its appeal to the country with the Fourteenth Amendment as a platform.

The election of 1866, although it did not involve the Presidency, was unquestionably one of the most important in the history of the country, ranking in that respect with such contests as those of 1860 and 1896. The fate of the South was at stake. The task of the President who had had a majority in his favor one year before seemed comparatively easy, for the radicals must carry two-thirds of the seats to be able to win their way against the Presidential veto. But Andrew Johnson was unequal even to such a degree of success against his now thoroughly organized opponents. His friends lost him votes, his speeches weakened him still further, and the news of mob violence in Memphis and New Orleans added weight to the arguments of the Republicans for the proposed Congressional policy. The President was overwhelmingly defeated and the South was at the mercy of Thaddeus Stevens.

The Congressional leaders had been astute enough to propose to the country a comparatively mild policy embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. But they regarded the election as giving them a free hand for at least two years, and taking advantage of the fact that the Southern legislatures refused to ratify their amendment, and against the half hearted protests of a few conservatives who regarded fresh conditions as a virtual breach of contract, they rapidly pushed through even before the newly elected Congress could take its seat in March of 1867, the policy of Thorough which Stevens and Butler and Sumner had advocated from the beginning. As Stevens put the matter: "These states shall never be recognized as capable of acting in the Union . . . until the Constitution shall have been so amended

as to make it what the makers intended, and so as to secure perpetual ascendancy to the party of the Union."

By the Tenure of Office Act, the President was now deprived of the power of removing officers without the consent of the Senate. Thus his control over his own administration was weakened at the same time that his pardoning power was attacked in the Fourteenth Amendment. By another bill, all orders to army officers were to go through General Grant, the commanding general. By the Reconstruction Acts as twice amended and strengthened after the meeting of the newly elected Congress, the whole South except Tennessee was to be divided into five military districts and placed under the government of army officers. These officers were to supersede the governments of 1865, and to provide for the election of Constitutional conventions in the various states. These Constitutional conventions were to be elected on the basis of universal suffrage, including the negro and excluding the leaders of the white people. The constitutions adopted by these conventions should then be referred to the same electorate that had chosen the members and, if ratified by a majority of the registered white and negro voters, should be declared adopted and become the basis of "reconstructed" states. To prevent any interference by the courts, the decisions of military tribunals were made final and not subject to review by civil courts. The President vetoed the Reconstruction measures, but when they were passed over his veto he appointed the Generals to the five Southern districts and attempted to carry out the new law in good faith.

One of the purposes of the Tenure of Office Act was not only to protect radical office holders but to tempt the President into a violation of its provisions. Such violation was called in the act "a high misdemeanor"

and was an obvious threat of impeachment. The new President had retained in office most of the members of Lincoln's cabinet, and among them Edwin B. Stanton, Secretary of War. Stanton was an advocate of a radical policy towards the South and had rejected Sherman's terms with Johnston in 1865 with unnecessary harshness. As time went on, his relations with the President became more and more strained. He was obviously out of sympathy with the whole policy of Johnson and was believed by fellow members of the cabinet to be engaged in helping to frame the very laws to which the President was attaching his impotent vetoes. To all practical intents and purposes he was a Radical representative in confidential relations to a Conservative President.

For some reason that is very difficult to fathom, he refused to resign, as good taste and all the precedents of the government required. It is hard to believe that he found his position attractive, and it is probable that he actually believed Johnson capable of some dangerous act which he might thwart. In any case he remained. Partly to get rid of an undesirable subordinate and also to test the meaning and constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act, Johnson determined to suspend Stanton during the recess of Congress, as he had a right to do even under the Act in question. Until the question of his right permanently to remove Stanton should be settled, he persuaded General Grant to act as Secretary of War, *ad interim*. When Congress reassembled in December of 1867, the Senate, as might have been expected, refused to concur in the removal of Stanton. President Johnson then notified his former Secretary that he was now dismissed from office. This was the definite test of the act which Johnson desired to make. The constitutional issue at stake was evidently of the gravest importance, for if Congress could retain members

of the Cabinet against the will of the President, a precedent would be established precisely similar to the one which made the President of the French Republic an impotent figurehead. As in the days of Andrew Jackson, the issue was between the Parliamentary and the Presidential forms of government.

When Stanton applied at the War Department and demanded the control of his old office, General Grant, who had been acting as Secretary for several months under the President's orders, immediately yielded the place and afterward protected Stanton by the use of soldiers. Although Johnson promptly designated General Alonzo Thomas, a somewhat garrulous old soldier, to take the place which the President regarded as vacant, Stanton had the nine points advantage of possession. A somewhat amusing interview took place between Thomas and the barricaded Stanton, from which the former withdrew discomfited. The more astute radicals barely prevented the arrest of Thomas by Stanton, a step which would have carried the whole matter to the courts where the President would have been quite certain of victory.

The attitude of Grant at this time became an additional source of bitter controversy, which in the light of future events had important historical consequences. It will be remembered that in 1865 Grant had shown a generous attitude to the defeated Confederates and had even made a report on Southern conditions, which, in contrast to that of Schurz, emphasized the completeness with which the leaders of the South had accepted the results of the war. Grant's report was of great assistance to the President in carrying out his early policy of immediate reconstruction on a basis of local self government. In 1866, Grant and Farragut had even accompanied the President in his speech making

trip which came to be called "the swing around the circle." Even as late as 1867, Grant as we have seen, accepted, though with reluctance, the temporary post of Secretary of War, in circumstances which aided the President in getting rid of Stanton. His name was one to conjure with, and the faction which gained the prestige of his great popularity was likely to win. The attempt to explain the difference between the conservative Grant of 1865 and the radical Grant of 1867 is one of the most difficult psychological puzzles in the whole story, and one for the solution of which the evidence is as yet incomplete.[1] But we do know that as early as 1866 Grant had been approached by radical leaders with offers of the next nomination to the Presidency. In 1867, he had no desire to disobey a law which carried heavy personal penalties, for the assistance of a President who had no strong party behind him. When the President and five members of the cabinet now charged him with giving up the office too quickly, without consulting the President and without regard to a previous promise, Grant indignantly denied the charge. It was probably one of those occasions when men remember differently words that have passed under different circumstances. In any case, General Grant, who had

[1] Welles recorded in his diary, December 15th, 1865: "A sudden change of weather. Intensely cold. General Grant was in the council room at the executive mansion today, and stated the results of his observations and conclusions during his journey South. He says the people are more loyal and better disposed than he expected to find them, and every consideration calls for the early reëstablishment of the Union. His views are sensible, patriotic, wise. I expressed a wish that he would make a written report, and that he communicate also freely with the members of Congress." While this diary was edited after the events recorded and cannot be used as freely as was once supposed, this entry is amply supported by independent evidence.

been a Douglas Democrat in 1860 and a conservative in 1865, now became one of the most bitter of the enemies of the President and an eager advocate of his impeachment. From this time on Grant fell increasingly under the influence of General Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts, the very man whom he had painted in 1865 as utterly incompetent, and was to be regarded as a consistent radical. The radicals had won the one man who was essential to the perpetuation of their plan.

With the attempt to remove Stanton against the will of the Senate the stage was now set for the last step in the long controversy.

The President had been defeated and weakened and now he was to be removed and replaced by one of the most bitter of the radical leaders, Senator Ben Wade of Ohio, the President *pro tempore* of the Senate. By the necessary Constitutional majority, the House of Representatives brought articles of impeachment against the President to be tried before the Senate under the presidency of Chief Justice Chase, as provided by the Constitution. The charges were enumerated under eleven heads, but they included many repetitions and amounted to two offences. The President had made intemperate speeches and he had violated the terms of the Tenure of Office Act. No one claimed that these were "high crimes and misdemeanors" in a judicial sense, and the question at issue was whether an American President may be removed by his political opponents when these have a sufficient majority in the two houses of Congress. The implications of such a precedent were obviously of the highest moment.

The trial, which dragged on for two months in the spring of 1868, was, of course a highly dramatic occasion. Following precedents that had been established at an early date by Burr and Marshall, Chief Justice

Chase insisted on treating the Senate as a Court rather than a political assembly, and this attitude was in itself of great advantage to the President. Thaddeus Stevens was now old and dying, and like Calhoun on a very different occasion, was too weak to deliver his own invective against the President, leaving it to be read by one of his colleagues. The other managers of the impeachment under the leadership of Benjamin F. Butler were quite unequal in ability or astuteness to the very able lawyers who represented the President. Curtis, Evarts, Stanbery, Nelson, and Groesbeck made up a formidable array of the best legal talent in the country. The Senate refused to listen to testimony to prove that the only purpose of the President had been to test the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act. But the President's lawyers were able to show that even those who had voted for the law had not all understood it to apply to cabinet officers. The charge as to the President's speeches was brought into ridicule by the very bitterness of the speeches of those who now claimed to be his judges. There were only twelve Democrats in the Senate, but seven Republicans of whom Fessenden of Maine, Grimes of Iowa, and Henderson of Missouri were the most prominent, were unable to bring themselves to vote with the majority for so revolutionary a measure of political proscription. Though they had no sympathy for Johnson and gave their reasons in constitutional terms, the wisdom of which has convinced posterity, it is a sad commentary on the workings of partisanship within a democracy that each of the seven had practically signed his political death warrant. After the first test vote which indicated the acquittal of the President by the narrow majority of one vote, every form of pressure was brought to bear on the seven to change the vote of one, but, fortunately,

without result. It is now known that two or three other men of less courage stood ready to vote for acquittal if it had been necessary. The final vote stood, thirty-six for conviction and nineteen against. Charles Sumner expressed his disappointment in a paper of the most bitter personal invective. Johnson was allowed to complete his term and to retire to Tennessee which sent him back to the Senate for a few months in the closing days of his life. He had thus for a short time the satisfaction, such as it was, of becoming the colleague of many of his late judges.

Immediately after the trial, the Republicans nominated unanimously and with great enthusiasm General Ulysses Grant for the Presidency. The Democrats after some hesitation named Horatio Seymour, the Governor of New York in the closing years of the war. A curious feature of the Democratic convention was the evident eagerness of both President Johnson and Chief Justice Chase to be nominated on the Democratic ticket. A movement for inflating the currency by the issue of greenbacks was a minor element in the campaign, but since the leaders of the two parties were divided among themselves on this question, and since both Grant and Seymour were regarded as "hard money men" the chief difference was the question of reconstruction. In spite of the popularity of Grant, Seymour made a good candidate and did much to rebuild his shattered party.

At first sight, the victory of Grant seemed overwhelming. He received 214 electoral votes to only 80 for Seymour. But even with the aid of seven hundred thousand negro votes in the South, Grant's plurality in the popular vote was only three hundred thousand. If all the Southern states had been allowed to vote and had gone Democratic as they were soon to do under the name of the "solid South," the popular majority would

have been entirely reversed and Seymour would have been elected by a vote of 164 to 161.[1] Seymour had been aided by some corruption in New York City, but even apart from that he had carried Louisiana and Georgia in spite of the negro votes. There was evidently no clear popular mandate for the policy of Congress towards the South and the warnings of the danger of a Democratic victory had become embarrassingly real. Grant had said in his campaign, "Let us have peace," but the very circumstances of his own election had shown how important it was to maintain the precarious supremacy of the Republican party in the South, and, it must be confessed, such supremacy seemed to the radicals synonymous with justice and patriotism. They had won their victory, they had elected their leader, and now they must maintain both.

[1] These figures may be conveniently verified from the tables in Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency*, I, 328. Few historians have recognized the closeness of the election, although the frank speeches of radical leaders show that it was an important element in determining their policy.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION (1867–1877)

AFTER the arrival of the five Major Generals in the South in the early summer of 1867, Congressional Reconstruction went on almost as rapidly as the Presidential plan just two years before. The clock had been turned back and the same thing was to be done again under conditions vastly changed. In the doubt and uncertainty that had existed, economic and social conditions had grown on the whole worse instead of better, and the natural disappointment that had followed the war was now bitterness. The years that were to follow were to add still more to that bitterness and to leave marks that even today are still visible.

The conventions of 1867 were to be elected by the negroes and those whites who had not been disfranchised. When universal suffrage had first been suggested many persons in both sections had expected that the negroes would vote with their old masters. Such might easily have been the result in 1865. But, two years later, the situation had greatly changed. The Freedmen's Bureau and the other officers of the Federal government had become one of the most efficient political machines in the history of the country. Under the leadership of the agents of the Bureau, the negroes had been gathered rapidly into a great secret society called the Union League of America. This organization, the importance of which has been sometimes overlooked, was created in

1862 at a dark moment in the history of the war to combat the influence of the extreme opponents of the war in certain Northern communities. It had performed a useful purpose in combating the "Copperheads" in 1862 and in aiding in the reëlection of Lincoln in 1864. After the war, its various local units tended to disappear or to be changed into merely social clubs for members of the same political faith, as in the case of the well known Union League Club of New York. The similar club in Philadelphia issued hundreds of thousands of pamphlets urging a strict policy towards the South, and this organization had substantial influence in promoting the Congressional policy regarding reconstruction.

In the South, the society had been used to unite the negroes into a coherent political group, dominated by the two classes of leaders who were distinguished according to their birth, as "Scalawags" or "Carpetbaggers." A distinguished authority on the Negro race has pointed out the immense influence of secret organizations even among the negroes of Africa. To this very day the Southern negro belongs almost without exception to some lodge or secret society to which he is pathetically faithful. However poor, he will not willingly be absent from a meeting or fail to pay his dues. The leaders of the Union League, for the most part white men, were able to take advantage of one of the finer qualities of the negro, his faithfulness to his solemn pledge, and were aided by the negroes' superstition and fears. The initiation was held at night among ghostly lights, and after an address in which the initiates were taught that the Democrats were sure to reënslave them, the oath of secrecy and of allegiance was administered. The negro of 1867 believed firmly that the Union League was the right arm of a government which would never leave him in the lurch. When persuasion was not enough,

methods were used which were afterwards copied by the Ku Klux Klan and other similar organizations. When a group of negroes were likely to be too greatly influenced by their old masters, they were sometimes required to go to another section of the county. "De word done sent to the League we got to go." It is credibly estimated that as many as three-fourths of all the negroes belonged to the Union League, certainly more than enough to dominate the situation.[1]

The conventions chosen by the new electorate were called "black and tan" on account of their racial composition. The members were so interested in voting large salaries to themselves that the Major Generals had difficulty in holding them to the work in hand. The Constitutions which were to be submitted to the people were notable in providing for negro suffrage, in disfranchising even the Confederate privates who had previously been allowed to vote, and in greatly increasing the numbers of State officers.

Tennessee had been readmitted to the Union, under a radical régime, as early as 1866. Seven more States completed their process of making new Constitutions and were recognized in 1868, barely in time to take part in the Presidential election. These States were Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Alabama. The new government in Alabama was recognized by Congress in spite of the fact that the Constitution had not been adopted by a majority of the registered voters as required by the reconstruction acts. Mississippi had rejected her proposed constitution on account of the disfranchising provisions, the process in Texas had been delayed, and in Virginia, General Schofield, in command of the district, a good

[1] For the Union League, see Fleming, *Documentary History of Reconstruction*, Chap. VII.

friend of the state, had been so disgusted with the proposed Constitution that he had found an excuse not to submit it to the people at all. These three states accordingly remained under military government for one more year. In 1869, they also were readmitted, without the disfranchising provisions, but only after being required to ratify a new amendment, the Fifteenth, which was expected to make permanent the policy of negro suffrage. The other states had ratified only the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, but a condition had been attached to their readmission that they should never deprive any person of the vote who was entitled to it under the new constitution. The lawyers in Congress knew well enough that such a condition would have little binding power after the State had been admitted and were compelled relucantly to find a more effective weapon in the Fifteenth Amendment.

To the great disgust of the leaders in Congress, Virginia elected a Conservative governor and legislature, and so passed at once from military control to the same kind of government which had been created in 1865 under the plan of the President. In the same year, the radicals in Tennessee lost the precarious hold that they had held for almost three years and that state was "redeemed." In 1870, general disgust with the corruption and extravagance of the carpetbag régime produced a revolution in North Carolina and Georgia, where the negroes were outnumbered by the whites; but the inevitable change was postponed in six states until the movement called "the rising of the whites" in 1874, and in the last three, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida, until the withdrawal of the Federal troops as one of the compromises resulting from the disputed election of 1876. Thus for periods which varied from two to eight years, nine of the eleven former members of the Confederacy were subjected to

this revolutionary political experiment. It is of this period, rather than of the military government which had preceded it and that had been by comparison mild and efficient, that the South learned to think when it recounted the horrors of reconstruction. After the first year, the evidence is abundant that not one of these governments could have survived without the constant sympathy and military assistance that they freely received from the President under the Force Acts of 1870 and 1871. By these acts, in order to prevent intimidation of negro voters, elections in the Southern states were placed under Federal protection.

It is only fair to remember that a burden had been imposed on the Southern negro that he had not sought and which it is by no means certain that he desired. Stories are told of negroes who came to the polls in 1867 with sacks to carry back the "franchise," and such tales certainly give a fair picture of the spirit of the new régime. As might have been foreseen by anyone who had studied the results of the attempts to carry democracy to its logical extremes by granting the franchise to newly arrived immigrants in such Northern cities as New York, the new voters were mere pawns in a political game in which the chief prizes both in offices and in corrupt contracts went to their white leaders. A few negroes were allowed to hold minor state offices, many more held local positions, and fourteen in all were sent to Congress including the able mulatto preacher, Revels, who succeeded to the place in the Senate which had once been held by Jefferson Davis. But the negro race as a whole gained no substantial advantages, and was sunk deeper and deeper into the prevailing poverty and degradation of the whole community. On paper, the appropriations for negro schools were generous, but the money was wasted and stolen by rapacious officials.

The Governors of the various states were all white men. Two or three of these, like Governor Chamberlain of South Carolina, were personally honest men but even these few were unwilling or unable to check the rising tide of corruption around them. When quarrels arose and President Grant had a choice to make, in too many cases he selected the most radical and corrupt. In those few years, the bonded debt of the reconstructed states rose by one hundred and fifty millions. In 1876, many counties and cities were quite bankrupt. And all this without any public improvements to show for the expense. In spite of the fact that these Southern debts were finally scaled down and partially repudiated under the protection of the Eleventh Amendment, many communities are laboring still under debts which were originally incurred in this period. By the attempt to force mixed schools and colleges, the educational system, poor as it had been in 1860, was so completely wrecked that it did not recover for twenty years. In spite of the fact that the prices of cotton and other farm products were good during these years and that certain white counties prospered, the very heavy weight of taxes, which were increased seven or eight times, resulted in a general decrease in the value of property.

The most lasting social results were a deepening of racial animosities, a growing dislike of outside criticism and interference, and a distinct lowering of the tone of political morality due both to the corruption of the negro governments and to the methods which were finally used to win freedom. The political solidarity of the South is, of course, today the most evident mark of the reconstruction period. Since similar conditions have resulted from the presence of an uneducated and economically weak electorate in many places, American cities, Mexico, and the South American Republics, it

does not necessarily follow that the failure of the experiment of 1867 was due to the inherent qualities of the negro race, but it was inevitable in the conditions which existed at that time and which must continue for many years. With increasing education and wealth, it is perhaps possible that the experiment might be repeated with different results.

The leaders of the carpetbag régime were the Tweeds of the South, perhaps somewhat more crude in their methods and more ruthless than the famous boss who was flourishing during the same period in a great city of the North. The governments were naturally at their worst where the proportion of the new voters was the largest, as in Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. A Northern visitor has left a description of the legislature of the latter state which may be regarded as roughly typical of conditions in other states: "In place of this old aristocratic society, stands the rude form of the most ignorant democracy that mankind ever saw, invested with the functions of government. It is the dregs of the population, habilitated in the robes of their intelligent predecessors, and asserting over them the rule of ignorance and corruption. . . . We will enter the House of Representatives. Here sit one hundred and twenty-four members. Of these, twenty-three are white men representing the remains of the old civilization. These are good looking substantial citizens. They are men of weight and standing in the communities they represent. They are all from the hill country. The frosts of sixty and seventy winters whiten the heads of some among them. There they sit grim and silent. They feel themselves to be but loose stones, thrown in to partially obstruct a current they are powerless to resist. . . ."

"The speaker is black, the clerk is black, the door

keepers are black, the little pages are black, the chairman of the Ways and Means is black, and the chaplain is coal black. At some of the desks sit colored men whose types it would be hard to find outside of Congo; whose costumes, visages, attitudes, and expression, only befit the forecastle of a buccaneer. It must be remembered, also, that these men with not half a dozen exceptions, have been themselves slaves, and that their ancestors were slaves for generations. . . . The whole thing is a wonderful novelty to them as well as to observers. Seven years ago these men were raising corn and cotton under the whip of the overseer. Today, they are raising points of order and questions of privilege. . . . It is the sunshine of their lives. It is their day of jubilee. It is their long promised vision of the Lord God Almighty."[1]

The white leaders were willing to leave the smaller perquisites to the negro members. A restaurant was provided in the capitol which served a continuous free lunch. Purchases of carpets, beds, coffins, and choice wines were charged to "legislative expenses." The printing bill of the state rose to an unheard of figure. But when it came to railroad contracts and bond issues, the carpetbagger and the scalawag shielded the negro member from the intricacies of high finance. It was well known that no bill could secure even a hearing without the necessary lubrication of the machinery of legislation. Bribery was quite open and shameless. The political morality of the whole country had been temporarily weakened by the industrial changes which had accompanied and followed the war. The legislature of New York, under the manipulations of such men as Gould and Fisk, was notoriously corrupt. Railroad scandals were not uncommon even in the halls of the

[1] Pike, *Prostrate State*, page 12.

national Congress, and one member of the President's cabinet and even his confidential Secretary were charged with bribery under conditions that carried conviction. Tweed was only the most unlucky of the new type of city bosses. But only in the South did corruption go so far that it left little more to steal. Only there did the government give up the task of protecting life and property and become the open friend of thieves. These governments were kept in power against the rising tide of opposition, in ordinary times by negro militia by whose offices the leaders managed to satisfy the claims of their constituents, and in years of Congressional or Presidential elections, by the use of small numbers of Federal soldiers, who brought to their assistance not so much military strength, for that was negligible, but the whole prestige of the Federal government and the renewed threat of civil war.

Theft was common not only in the halls of the legislature but throughout the country. No crop was worth raising except cotton, for roasting ears and poultry were too inviting. In some communities society degenerated into a state of anarchy. No white woman was safe without armed protection. Murders were common, quite as frequently of negroes by other negroes in brawls as by white desperadoes. All were charged by certain newspapers to the account of the Southern hatred of the negro. The propaganda was politically useful, and in its later stages was called "waving the bloody shirt."

How did the South finally win its freedom? The credit or the blame of this result, depending on the point of view of the observer, has usually been given to the secret organizations, of which the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of the White Camelia are the best known. But this is the natural overemphasis of a movement which was certainly highly dramatic and picturesque.

Both of these organizations were developed on a large scale in 1867 and remained prominent for the next three years. The Knights was largely a Louisiana society and in its ritual laid larger emphasis than did the Klan on white social supremacy. Each had an elaborate organization and a secret ritual, not very different from that of the Union League. These societies and others like them are probably to be regarded as the successors of the private police patrols that had been used to keep the negroes on the plantations and to prevent thefts. In 1868, they were joined by some of the leading whites, General Forrest, of cavalry fame, becoming the Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan and General John B. Gordon being the local leader in Georgia. In the beginning, the Klan served a useful purpose in preserving order and furnishing a necessary form of extra-legal government. As time went on, it fell more and more into the control of unscrupulous subordinates, and atrocities were committed in its name which disgusted the more conservative men. The Klan was formally dissolved by General Forrest in 1869, though seemingly without success. Its methods were made familiar by the publication in 1872 of the elaborate Ku Klux Report of Congress,[1] which remains to this day the chief source for information on conditions in the South under Reconstruction, and by a long series of novels of which the first was *A Fool's Errand*, by Judge A. W. Tourgee, an able and honest leader of the "carpetbaggers."

General Gordon testified as follows regarding the organization in 1868: "The organization was simply this—nothing more or nothing less: it was . . . a brotherhood of property holders, the peaceable, law abiding citizens of the State, for self-protection. The instinct of self-protection prompted that organization;

[1] 42 Cong. 2 Sess., Senate Reports II,, No. 41 (13 pts.).

the sense of insecurity and danger, particularly in those neighborhoods where the negro population largely predominated. We were afraid to have public organization; because we supposed that it would be construed at once, by the authorities at Washington, as an organization antagonistic to the Government of the United States. . . . This organization, I think, extended nearly all over the State. . . . This society was purely a police organization, to keep the peace, to prevent disturbance in our State."

Besides protecting property and keeping the negroes at work, the chief significance of the Ku Klux movement was in nullifying the influence of the Union League. Many a negro returning home from a meeting of the League was met by a band of white robed figures who told him that they were the ghosts of men who had died at Shiloh. The zeal of such a negro for politics was at once abated. Sometimes negroes and whites were taken from their beds and whipped. The danger of such measures was soon evident to men of the type of General Gordon, a high minded gentleman, who saw that they gave an excuse to the very lawless elements whom it was desired to control. After the Klan was abandoned in 1869 by men of real influence, and especially after the passage of a stringent Federal Law in 1871, the importance of the secret orders rapidly declined and we hear little about them. Since the carpetbag governments were not overthrown in most States until 1874, and in three until 1876, it is evident that the political significance of the Ku Klux movement has been greatly overestimated by those who say that these secret orders were the chief agents of the regeneration of the South.

The real reasons for the overthrow of the carpetbag governments were more fundamental and were strikingly

similar to the causes that led at the same time to the unmasking and overthrow of the Tweed régime in New York City. These causes may be summarized by saying that the carpetbag governments broke down under their own weight of corruption. The more able leaders were playing for large stakes. After 1871, the various communities of the Southern states were so nearly bankrupt that it was no longer possible to float any large issues of bonds. The class of Southern born leaders of the radical movement known as Scalawags had never enjoyed their close proximity with the negro element in their constituency. They were subjected to the most galling social ostracism, and having often made fortunes from the wreckage of the States, they now withdrew their important support, and, sometimes in new homes, became ardent Democrats who forgot as soon as possible their former political affiliations. The few honest men among the carpetbaggers also tended to withdraw with others who were also satisfied to let well enough alone. The remaining leaders often quarrelled and thus gave opportunities to their opponents. To these quarrels, as in the case with the Tweed ring, we are indebted for the most intimate details of the corruption and bribery that had existed. Above all, many of the negroes saw that they were gaining no substantial benefits and under the leadership of men like Wallace in Florida, withdrew from the useless political contest.

In the meantime, the official investigations, which had been intended to have a quite different result, began to open the eyes of the North to the real situation. The Democrats gained votes and even in the once solidly united Republican party an insurgent movement arose in 1872 under the leadership of Carl Schurz, an honest and idealistic reformer, whose report of 1865 had been used to do the South so much harm. Although Grant

was rather easily reëlected in 1872 against the strange candidacy of Horace Greeley, it was evident that the tide had turned and that the people had voted its admiration for a great military hero rather than an approval of his policy. Congress obeyed the new spirit by removing most of the disabilities which had been created by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus strengthened the now thoroughly organized and aroused white people of the South. Secret methods were abandoned and "White Leagues" were instituted whose operations were open. It must be remembered that the negroes had a clear numerical superiority in only two states. Many negroes were undoubtedly more than willing to acquiesce in the situation and even to vote the Democratic ticket. Where such considerations did not control, the significant presence of armed white men near the places of election and threats of discharge from employment were quite sufficient to account for the series of Conservative victories that marked the rising of the whites in 1874. In the same year, for the first time since the war, the open sympathy of the North was shown in the election of a Democratic House of Representatives. With the election machinery in Conservative hands, even the presence of Federal marshals and soldiers, under the election laws of 1871, could not prevent the counting of enough Democratic votes to nullify any tendency of the now leaderless negroes to regain political control. In only three states was the power of the national administration sufficient to maintain for two years more the tenure of the old organizations. The Fifteenth Amendment had been subjected to a process of very effective though indirect nullification. Such a process seemed at the time necessary, but it had its unfortunate consequences in weakening everywhere the old respect for the sanctity of the Constitution.

To understand the final step in the regeneration of the South, it is necessary to review some of the incidents of the administration of President Grant. Grant as a General had shown great wisdom in the selection of military subordinates. He knew the army and was a shrewd judge of soldierly qualities. But in the more complex field of civil administration he was often misled. The civil service had been unduly swollen by the necessities of war, and when the war was over a reaction set in. The patriotic fervor of four years seemed to have spent itself and many divisions of the government were actuated more by the greed for private gain than by the spirit of public service. Unfortunately, the President regarded his office as a reward for his very great services, corresponding to some of the dignities that England had gratefully bestowed on the victorious Wellington. Some of his original cabinet appointments had commended themselves to the judgment of the country and he retained throughout his two administrations the services of a very able Secretary of State in the person of Hamilton Fish of New York. Other important appointments went to personal friends, especially to those who had aided in the raising of funds for the expression of the gratitude of local communities. Some of the appointees were members of the Grant family. Many of these officers proved quite incompetent and others were corrupt. Grant prided himself on his loyalty to his friends, and supported men after charges had been made against them which obviously destroyed their public usefulness. When members of the cabinet sought to improve matters in their departments, they were allowed or compelled to resign, and it was well known that the three chief political advisers of the President, Butler, Morton, and Conkling, were frankly opposed to any measures of reform. On account of the rising tide of criticism,

brought to a focus in 1871 by the exposure of Tammany Hall and the Tweed Ring in New York, Congress passed an act in that year that allowed the President to select some of the minor officers of government by a system of examinations. But the President gave only half-hearted support to this measure and when a later Congress failed to pass the necessary appropriation for the expense of the examinations, the whole system was discontinued in 1875.

The personal example of the President did not strengthen the cause of political honesty. In 1869, at the very beginning of his administration, when the notorious stock manipulators, Jay Gould and "Jim" Fisk, were seeking to "corner" the gold which was necessary to the payment of import dues, the President publicly accepted the hospitality of the two men and thus helped to create the impression that the government would not interfere with their operations by selling gold. Although he had made no promise, and gold was afterwards issued from the Treasury in sufficient amount to break the corner, a panic in the gold market had been created in which enough men were ruined to cause it to be remembered as "Black Friday." During his second administration, the President appeared in St. Louis with, and even accepted a beautiful team of horses from, one of the leaders of the so-called "Whiskey Ring" which later proved to have defrauded the government of millions of dollars. When Babcock, his private Secretary, was indicted for conspiracy in these frauds, the President went out of his way to secure his acquittal. The climax was reached when Belknap, the Secretary of War, was proven to have accepted bribes for the sale of an Indian agency. Belknap was impeached by the House of Representatives, and although the evidence was quite overwhelming, the President accepted his resignation

"with regret" and thus relieved him from almost certain conviction by the Senate.

And these were only a few of the scandals of these dark years, which involved not only state legislatures and city governments, but prominent members of both parties in the national legislature, until the citizens might almost despair for the future of democracy. The Treasury Department was in the habit of farming out the taxes and allowing those that were difficult to collect to be gathered under "fifty-fifty" contracts which gave to the contractor half the proceeds. In one case, at least, the collection of ordinary taxes which were certain to come into the Treasury in any case was assigned to one Sanborn, with the result of the retirement, in disgrace, of the Secretary of Treasury, Richardson. In the "Salary Grab" incident of 1873, Congress at the last moment of the session, voted a general increase of salaries that was made retroactive to the beginning of their terms two years before. In the same session there came to light the incident of the "Credit Mobilier." It was proved that this was a contracting company which expected to build the Union Pacific railroad at a great profit and at the expense of the public and the railroad itself. To prevent any unfriendly legislation, blocks of stock were sold to members of Congress at figures ridiculously below their real value. The lobbyist for the Company was a prominent member of the House, Oakes Ames from Massachusetts. Some Congressmen who were too cautious or honest to accept the virtual gifts of stock that were offered, did not hesitate to borrow money which the generous Ames never expected them to repay. In the investigation, the retiring Vice-President of the United States, Schuyler Colfax, was caught in a network of falsehoods which wrecked what had seemed to be a brilliant political career. When

Ames and one other member of Congress were expelled, it seemed to many that they had been made the scapegoats for the relief of others who were equally guilty. The most important diplomatic agent of the government, General Schenck, U. S. Minister in London, brought disgrace to himself and to his country, by allowing his name to be used in the promotion of a more than dubious mining venture.

The truth of the matter was that the monetary inflation which had accompanied the war, and the unparalleled opportunities in the years immediately following to make great fortunes had turned the heads of many men and had weakened their ordinary standards of business prudence and public honesty. The wild orgies of finance of the carpetbaggers and the scalawags were simply the most extreme symptoms of a general though fortunately an only temporary disease. These national scandals have to be considered in order to keep in its true perspective the picture of the times.

Nor must it be supposed that the feverish eagerness to make easy fortunes was limited to the halls of Congress and to the members of legislatures. The great bond issues of the Civil War had taught the American people, and, for that matter many foreigners, to invest their savings in securities. These investments had called out the meager hoards of thousands who had felt that they were risking their fortunes at the call of patriotism. And they had had their reward, for bonds that had been quoted at a great discount in 1864, soon reached par in gold after the news of Appomattox. When the war was over and government bonds were no longer available, the same bankers who had financed the government enterprises and whose names were as solid as the Republic itself, turned to the financing of railroad and mining enterprises. Men borrowed money

to buy stocks that would soon bring fortune. When some of the greenbacks were retired by Secretary McCulloch in the administration of Andrew Johnson, "business" seemed to be less prosperous and a movement gained headway for the issue of further paper money which had enough support in both parties to put a stop to the unwelcome process of monetary deflation. Whether deflation after war came too soon and went too far, or whether it did not come soon enough and was checked before it could bring beneficent results, is a question which is still mooted by economists when a similar situation has arisen in many countries after another and a greater war. In any case, in the years immediately following the Civil War it did not serve more than to check for a moment the rising spirit of speculation.

The reaction was bound to come. Many enterprises which had been entered upon with high hopes proved immensely more expensive than had been foreseen by the bankers. Dishonesty was not limited to public life, and railroads were looted quite as cheerfully and with as little regard for public interest as had been the case with cities and States.[1] Other enterprises which were not in themselves dishonest, could not possibly begin to pay for many years. In 1873, it was announced that the great banking house of Jay Cooke and Company of Philadelphia, which had acted as the chief agent of the Treasury during the war and had introduced modern methods of advertising in the sale of government securities, a house whose name had been one to conjure with in every village of the nation, and which was now staking its fortunes in the completion of a second great railroad into the West, had been compelled to close its doors. Men realized that the "good times" were over.

[1] See especially, Adams, C. F. & H., *A Chapter of Erie.*

The panic spread from one business to another. Creditors demanded payments which debtors could not meet. The immediate crisis of the financial panic soon passed but this was followed by years of depression which called for honesty instead of carelessness and for the most severe retrenchment in public and private expenditures. The demand of the hour was the punishment of the guilty and the reform of abuses. In this spirit the country elected the Democratic Congress of 1874, and looked for "reform" candidates in the election of 1876. In a philosophical view of the matter, the crisis of 1873 probably proved that the people were now to pay for the war which they thought they had left quite behind them, but the people were not philosophers and sought an immediate remedy.

President Grant did not find it easy to yield the office that he had occupied for eight years. But although the scandals of his last term were due to deep-seated causes over which in many cases he had little control, the demand of the hour was for a new leader who could appear before the people as a reformer. The traditional opposition to a third term was strong and a resolution passed by the House opposing his renomination made clear even to his closest friends that the President could not hope for another term.

The most prominent leader in the Republican party was the Speaker of the House of Representatives, James G. Blaine of Maine. Blaine was an orator with a magnetic personality who reminded the older generation of the great leader of the Whigs, Henry Clay of Kentucky. In a bitter debate with Senator Conkling he had used ridicule which the powerful and conceited Senator from New York had never forgiven or forgotten. In the beginning, Blaine was acceptable to the reform element in the party which was especially interested in selecting

the minor officers by a system of competitive examinations. Unfortunately for him, a new scandal was unearthed at this moment when the delegates were being chosen to the national nominating conventions. It appeared that some years before Blaine had combined with his duties as Speaker of the House, active participation in the promotion of one of the railroads in the Southwest which was looking to Congress for favors in the form of credit and public lands. Such a connection was in itself of doubtful propriety for a reform candidate. A broker's clerk named Mulligan had secured the possession of private letters written by Blaine to the managers of the undertaking. When he announced in a casual fashion to a Committee of the House that he had such letters in his possession, Blaine, who was present, secured an adjournment and visiting Mulligan gained possession of the letters which he never afterwards relinquished. The most damaging statement in the letters was a phrase in which Blaine said that if he were retained, he would not "prove a deadhead in the enterprise." Rising to a question of personal privilege, Blaine made an impassioned defence against the charges, reading from the letters extracts which afterward were shown to have been carefully selected. Taking advantage of the prejudice which existed against members of the House who had served in the Confederate army, Blaine sought to show that the whole matter was a partisan attack in the interests of the South.

Blaine had undoubtedly won one of the greatest histrionic and oratorical contests in the history of the House, and Ingersoll, who placed his name in nomination at the Republican convention, likened him to a plumed knight who "marched down the halls of the American Congress and threw his shining lance full and

fair against the brazen forehead of every traitor to his country and every maligner of his fair reputation." But even in the heated political atmosphere of the time, many men who were eager for reform suspected the truth of the judgment which an eminent American historian later expressed as the result of a careful study of the evidence: "The facts developed put Mr. Blaine under grave suspicion of just that sort of questionable wealth getting, if nothing worse, which had ruined his colleagues in the 'Credit Mobilier.' Thus, one more exalted reputation was left tainted and tottering, and the episode fits harmoniously into that general scheme of malodorousness in which Grantism had involved the Republican party and the republic itself."[1]

Some sympathy was created for Blaine by an illness that came just at this time and which prevented any further inquiry into the incident, but it was not enough to win the necessary votes, and on the seventh ballot the Republican convention selected Governor Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio, a "dark horse" who had made an excellent record in the army and in his executive position and whose personal and political reputation was beyond reproach. From the point of view of the South the selection was most fortunate, for Blaine had recently committed himself to the point of view of the extreme radicals. Hayes had been educated at the little college of Kenyon at a time when it had many students from the South. As a young man, he had visited his old college chum, Guy M. Bryan, in Texas and had continued his Southern friendships in spite of all the animosities that had followed the war.[2] The platform was a typ-

[1] W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction*, p. 293. For a similar judgment see Rhodes, J. F., *History of the United States*, VII, 205.

[2] The correspondence between Hayes and Bryan is printed in *S.W. Hist. Quarterly*, 1925 and 1926.

ical radical document which had been framed for Blaine to stand on, but the unexpected candidate proclaimed in his letter of acceptance his dislike of the spoils system and promised to do all that he could to bring it to an end. He pledged himself not to accept a renomination, and announced in respect to Southern affairs his intention "to wipe out forever the distinction between North and South in our common country." There can be little doubt of the honesty with which Hayes when elected attempted in the face of great difficulties to carry out every part of his pledge.

The Democrats chose as their candidate their strongest man, Samuel J. Tilden of New York, who had made a national reputation by his activity in helping to drive Tweed out of control in New York City, and who as Governor of the State had added to that reputation by the shrewdness and courage with which he had attacked similar types of dishonesty in the management of state funds. His announced policy was substantially the same as that of his opponent. The two men came from the same social class and represented the same social and political tendencies. Accordingly, the election had something of the appearance of a sham battle, a choice between "Tweedledee" and "Tweedledum," in which the probable results to the nation were to be the same whichever candidate won. In that respect it was not so much exceptional as characteristic of the common effort of the two great political parties to catch the drift of popular sentiment and to supply candidates who fitted into the feelings of the hour. Only when the people themselves are divided in their desires and ideas, is it possible for an election to rise to the significance of a great political contest, and in 1876, the American people undoubtedly had come to learn what they wanted. But that did not mean that they did not watch for the

outcome with the eagerness which such a contest is sure to arouse.

Early in the evening of November 7, 1876, election night, it was definitely learned that Tilden had carried every doubtful Northern state, that he had a clear popular majority of almost three hundred thousand, and that he had 184 electoral votes, within one of the necessary majority. Most of the metropolitan dailies conceded the election of the Democratic ticket. Three Southern states were in doubt, but it was almost inconceivable that all three would go Republican. It soon appeared that Hayes had carried South Carolina, but that on the face of the returns Florida and Louisiana belonged to Tilden. It will be remembered that each of these states was still under the dominion of the carpet-bag governments supported by Federal troops. Each of them had adopted a peculiarly effective political device known as a "returning board," dominated by members of the radical party and having authority to review the local returns and to throw out the votes that they chose to regard as fraudulent. The results in Florida were very close, and the returning board of that State had a comparatively simple task in changing a majority of 90 for Tilden into one of 925 for Hayes. But the problem in Louisiana was much more difficult for the Tilden electors had majorities that ranged from 6300 to 8957. The evidence made it clear that there had been intimidation on the Democratic side and colossal frauds in registration of imaginary voters on that of the Republicans. Although the Democrats claimed one elector in Oregon on purely technical grounds it was soon evident that the result depended on the way in which the Louisiana vote was counted.

The Louisiana Returning Board was composed of two white men and two negroes, all Republicans. The chair-

man was a certain James Madison Wells whom General Sheridan had officially characterized, with complete accuracy, as a "political trickster and a dishonest man." On this occasion, he lived up to his reputation by offering the vote of Louisiana to Tilden for $200,000. The decisive factor in the view of fair-minded observers was the presence of a group of "visiting statesmen" designated for the purpose by President Grant and under the leadership of John Sherman of Ohio. It must not be supposed that any direct offers were made, but the very presence of men of such influence was an indication that valiant party service would not be forgotten. The later arrival of a similar group of Democrats was evidently not considered so promising, for, as early as November 17th, Pitkin the United States Marshal in New Orleans, telegraphed to Washington: "Louisiana is safe. Our Northern friends stand safely by us. The returning board will hold its own." And it did hold its own and more. When the votes had been carefully examined, apparent pluralities of more than six thousand for Tilden had been changed to more than four thousand for every Hayes elector. Evidently Wells and his friends did not do things by halves. After the election, not only every member of the returning board, but every minor clerk in the office was given a lucrative post in the Treasury Department. The whole incident was merely the most typical and shameful of the many like it which had marked the dark period of national degradation. The evils of the spoils system had never been thrown into such marked relief.[1]

The electoral colleges of the various states met on the 6th of December. In four states, Oregon, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida two sets of electors

[1] For the activities of the Returning Board, see Rhodes, VII, 230–235.

met, and sent in conflicting returns. The Republicans had the advantage of having each of their returns certified to by the proper state officer, in the case of Louisiana by the Republican Governor Kellogg. Who should count the votes and determine the four disputes? Feeling ran high and there were even those who saw possibilities of renewed Civil War though such a result was probably quite remote. The Constitution is quite vague on the new question that had arisen. The returns from the various states should be transmitted sealed to the President of the Senate who should "in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted." The Senate was Republican and the House was Democratic. What the authors of the Constitution had foreseen as a merely ceremonial occasion had become the storm center of a political contest. The Republican contention was that the Constitution had intended the President of the Senate, an office at that time held by a strong Republican, to count the votes that he regarded as valid. In that case there was little doubt that Hayes would be elected. The Democrats maintained that recent precedents required a doubtful case to be referred to the two Houses. If these disagreed, as they were quite certain to do at this time, the doubtful votes would not be counted. Since Tilden had a large majority of the undisputed votes it is evident that such a procedure would lead to his election.

Northern Democrats were much more interested in the outcome of the election than those from the South, whose chief ambition was to attain home rule, if possible under a Democratic President, but if necessary under a Republican. The Southerners threw their influence in which they were seconded by the close friends of President Grant, notably Senator Conkling,

in favor of a compromise. Accordingly, the whole question in dispute was referred to an arbitration committee, to be composed of five Senators, five Congressmen, and four members of the Supreme Court. It was clearly understood that these fourteen men should be equally divided among the two parties. The two Republican judges and the two Democrats should select a fifteenth man from the same Court. It was expected that the fifteenth man on whom the real decision depended would be Judge David Davis of Illinois, a close friend of Lincoln who had lately shown some sympathy for the Democratic party and who might be regarded as impartial. But Davis was by no means anxious to assume the burden of so difficult a task, and when he was elected to the Senate by the legislature of Illinois, he accepted with alacrity and thus found welcome relief. The four judges then chose Judge Bradley, a Republican of the liberal type and the most nearly unprejudiced member whom they could select.

The electoral commission was thus composed of eight Republicans and seven Democrats. With the curious elasticity which often characterizes the ideas of politicians on questions of Constitutional theory, the Republicans all insisted on the right of each State to count its own votes, while the Democrats were anxious to have the Commission which represented national power go behind the returns and examine the action of such State bodies as the Louisiana Returning Board. On strict State Rights grounds which would have done credit to Calhoun himself and with entire consistency, the eight Republicans cast their votes in favor of the Hayes returns. There was still some danger that the Democrats in Congress might delay the counting of the votes by a process of filibustering, but when they received specific promises from close friends of the new Presi-

dent that his policy towards the South would carry out the letter of his letter of acceptance and were convinced that he would at once remove the troops from the South, the Southern Democrats joined with the Republicans in accepting the results of the Electoral Commission. The count was thus finally completed in the early morning of March second and Rutherford B. Hayes was inaugurated without the necessity of an interregnum which had seemed so imminent. Not only through his own personal views but by the strange circumstances of his election, the South had won the last step in their process of regeneration even more completely than if it had been able to bring about the election of Tilden.[1]

The conservative victory in the South had now been won. It was made secure when the Supreme Court held, in the Slaughter House Cases, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not impair the old police power of the State under which each State legislates for the health, morals, and safety of the community. In later equally conservative decisions, the same tribunal held that the negro must look for the protection of his suffrage against private intimidation not to the nation but to the State and that the national legislature had no right to legislate to confer upon the negro any social rights which he did not possess under State law.[2] By these three important decisions, the meaning of the Reconstruction

[1] See Haworth, P. L., *The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Presidential Election of 1876* (1906).

[2] (1) *The Slaughter House Cases* (1873), 16 Wallace 36; (2) *U. S. vs. Reese* (1876), 92 U. S. 214 (3) *Civil Rights Cases* (1883), 109 U. S. 3. The Supreme Court had at first bowed to the storm and had refused to interfere with the Congressional Plan. After 1873, its influence was a potent factor in reëstablishing in a new form the idea of States' rights. The whole story is a good illustration of Lincoln's dictum that judicial decisions are not made *in vacuo*.

amendments from which men like Sumner had expected a social as well as a political revolution, were defined in the narrowest terms, and the rights of the negro were left for the most part to the legislature of each State, now dominated by conservative white men. As far as the negro was concerned the practical result was much the same as if the Thirteenth Amendment alone had been adopted and if the other two had never been written. The Supreme Court had given judicial expression to a conservative reaction which had won the approval of the whole people, North as well as South.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NEW SOUTH (1877–1926)

THE South as it emerged from the period of the carpet-baggers in the spring of 1877, was already a very different region from the old South of 1860 and even from the South to which the discouraged Southern soldier had returned in 1865. The twelve long years of political and social experiments had left marks that were even deeper than those of four years of war. Many had expected that the old plantations could not survive the abolition of slavery and that the larger holdings would be divided up either by legal confiscations or by economic pressure into small farms. Such had not been the immediate result. Stevens' plan for the confiscations had been too radical to win approval, and even in the moment of victory he had been compelled to accept what he regarded as a poor political substitute for his social revolution. The political device of negro suffrage, unsupported by the necessary economic power, had proved a failure and was in the course of being swept away. It was true, that as taxes had become higher and more ruinous, many of the older families, especially in Virginia, had been compelled to sell holdings which had come to them increased or at least unbroken for generations. But, at first, these sales had merely created a new class of landowners, and the size of many estates had increased rather than the reverse.

The change in Virginia was perhaps analogous to the transfer in the England of Henry the Eighth of the great monastic estates with their easy hospitality and paternalistic ways to a new class of country gentlemen, more intent on gain. The black belt of the South was still a land of great farms, although they bore little resemblance to the plantations of the old régime.[1]

At the beginning of the Reconstruction Period, many of the planters had attempted to reconcile the old plantation system with the new system of wages. Each negro family was allowed a cabin and a small plot of land for a garden, and was expected to work for wages under the close supervision of the master on the smaller plantations or of negro foremen elsewhere. To this day there are a few sections of the South where one can see men working on large plantations under the old gang system. But these gangs are likely to be composed of convicts under contract and for anything resembling the organized activity of the pre-war plantation one would have to go to the Mexican labor of the far Southwest or to California. The free negro resented

[1] The aristocratic features of the old South were never as marked as was believed in the North at the time or as one would suppose from reading recent novels. They were largely limited to the tobacco, rice, and sugar districts of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Louisiana. In the newer cotton districts of the Southwest, the dominant class before the war may better be described as farmers than as planters. Not only were the holdings of land smaller than has been supposed, but few cotton planters had lived on their estates for more than one or two generations. They had come with little capital, had owned a few slaves, and had not had time or wealth to develop the characteristic features of an aristocracy. On this point see especially B. B. Kendrick, *Agrarian Discontent in the South, 1880–1900*, Am. Association Reports, 1920, p. 267. The history of the South since Reconstruction has as yet not been fully studied. The best general account is Holland Thompson, *The New South* (1920).

the old supervision, and he was unable to understand the responsibilities of work for wages. If the wages were paid weekly, the negro was likely to move just at the time when, to prevent ruinous loss, the crop had to be gathered. On the other hand, he was too poor to wait for payment until the end of the crop year. The result was the development of a tenant system for both the negroes and the poorer whites. The estates were not rapidly subdivided in ownership, but they were for all purposes of cultivation. The tenant worked on a plot of ground which depended in size on the number of his family which the father exploited and called, in imitation of his betters, his "labor force." When the crop was sold, the tenant received his share, ranging from one third to three fourths, depending on whether he supplied his own tools and bought the necessary seed and fertilizer. The common system today gives the tenant one half of the crop. When the proceeds had been spent, the tenant frequently moved in the vain hope of finding a better plot of ground, and the landlord made arrangements with new tenants for the next crop.

This cropping system, solved only part of the difficulty. It was a rare tenant who had been able to lay by any of the proceeds of the last season. To be sure, he had his cabin and his garden, but the one was dilapidated and the other was frequently overrum with weeds. During the spring and summer, the tenant had to be supplied on credit with food and clothing for himself and his family. To secure repayment, the landlord had a lien on the growing crop under laws which were passed for the purpose in the various cotton-growing states. But the whole South at the end of the Reconstruction period was a debtor community, and these credit accounts with their securities were transferred to the village merchant, who was himself often in debt for his

merchandise to the nearest bank, and this bank in turn was being carried by one of the greater banks in the North and East. Many landlords found the system unprofitable, and kept only a small area for themselves, which they could cultivate with little hired labor, and transferred to the banker-merchant the larger part of their unwieldy holdings with their shifting population of white or negro tenants. Many of these failed, for the price of cotton which had averaged as high as eleven cents a pound in the seventies declined with the increasing crops to nine cents in the next decade, and to six cents in the hard times of the nineties. Others prospered and increased their holdings, some exceptional individuals becoming the owners of whole counties. The merchant, under the inevitable credit system, did not charge formal interest on his advances, but he expected to supply all the goods used by the tenants. Sometimes the prices charged were exorbitant, and unscrupulous merchants gave too little for the completed crop. At best, friction and antagonism arose between the white tenant class and the creditors, an antagonism that accounts for the growing influence of Populism in the South after 1891. The center of economic power in the black belt had passed to a new class.

The credit and tenant system had some curious social results. The old plantation districts had been increasingly self-sufficing, and under strict discipline, any plantation had produced not only cotton but the food stuffs known as "hog and hominy." The well managed plantation usually had skilled negro artisans, carefully selected and trained by the masters for this purpose. The tenants were compelled by the new conditions to devote themselves almost exclusively to the cultivation of the one staple crop that could be sold readily and that was not likely to be stolen in small driblets. The mer-

chants, themselves debtors, encouraged the tendency to the single crop system and, during the eighties and nineties, did not favor the use of expensive fertilizers. Land was cheap, some of the best land in Alabama bringing, as late as 1900, only ten dollars an acre. The tenants bought everything, food, clothing, furniture, and produced cotton. The result was the rapid growth of villages and small towns that became quite as characteristic of the new South as the large farm and plantation houses had been of the old régime. The duties of the artisan were now taken up by the white men in the villages, or were made unnecessary by the sale at the village store of cheap goods from the North. The negro became even more than he had been before a strictly agricultural laborer. Some found opportunities in the growing cities and bettered their condition. Others, usually the more lazy and shiftless, drifted to the same cities and became a pauper class. One careful observer estimated, thirty years after the war, that perhaps ten per cent of the negroes had made use of their opportunities and by acquiring a little land of their own or in new positions in the city were distinctly better off than they had been before. Another ten per cent were sunk into deeper degradation, and the remainder, perhaps eighty per cent of the whole, except for the gradual decline of illiteracy, remained in about the same condition. In what had been the richest counties of the South, social and political power turned to the merchants and the professional classes. Few white men of influence were to be found in the country. In these counties the production of cotton per acre sharply declined.

In the so-called white counties, where the whites outnumbered the negroes, although the land was naturally poorer, the white farmer found an opportunity in the removal of the active competition of the plantation.

The tenant system was often a stepping-stone to ownership, and great areas were cultivated by their owners with little help. The negroes remained in these counties what they had been in slavery days, farm hands working side by side with the white owner or tenant. Fertilizers and improved cultivation added to the crop and more than made up for the loss from the black belt. After 1900, the white tenant system with average holdings of about eighty acres instead of thirty in the hands of the negroes tended to increase and to spread into the black belt. Some of the displaced negroes became farm hands instead of tenants, others moved away to the towns to supply the growing demand for unskilled labor. In 1910, sixty-five per cent of the agricultural area of the South was cultivated by owners, less than five per cent of whom were negroes, twenty per cent by negro tenants, and twenty per cent by white tenants. White tenancy and ownership were on the increase. The negro had passed from slavery through a form of serfdom into the condition of a wage-earning class. After the war with Germany, the high price of cotton and the increase in the value of land gave many sections of the South the appearance of prosperous communities of small farmers, to which the new inventions, especially the automobile, had given comforts undreamed of twenty years before. Another and a newer and more hopeful South began to emerge from the discouragements of the eighties and nineties.[1]

[1] The agricultural changes in the South from the plantation to tenant holdings were clearly shown in the statistics of the Census. In 1860, the average number of acres in the Southern farm was 335, in 1870, 214, in 1900, 138, and in 1910, only 114. During the same half century, the area of the farms had decreased to some extent in the older states of the Northeast where a tenant system somewhat similar to that of the South had been introduced with recent Italian, German, Finnish, and French Canadian immigrants occupying

The industrial commission of 1902 thus described conditions under the tenant system: "It is stated, on apparently good authority, that in the cotton counties around Dallas, Waco, and the bottoms of the Brazos River, Texas, seventy-five per cent of the best cotton land is owned by men who live in large towns, and is farmed by a poor and shiftless class of whites and negroes who, under the strict and unceasing supervision of the owner, or his agent, generally make for the owner a handsome profit upon the present valuation. The cotton planter with, say, 2000 acres of fertile land divides it into tracts varying from 50 to 100 acres each. Each tract is fenced and improved to the extent of a house, barn, and corncrib. This tract is leased for a year, beginning with January 1. Although the planters prefer that the tenants should furnish their own stock, implements, and seed, it is difficult to find renters who are sufficiently well equipped or have enough capital to take the land on such terms. In nearly every case the landlord is expected to furnish everything, including food and clothing for the family, until such time as the crop is harvested and sold."

The same authority also describes vividly the results of the system as it stood at the opening of a new century: "The tenant system or crop sharing system, which seems to be the prevailing feature of land tenure throughout the cotton belt, is not regarded as an advantageous arrangement between the tenants and the land-

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somewhat the position of the negro and poor white tenants of the South. But the new and comparatively large holdings of the far West somewhat obscured this tendency towards tenancy and the rise of a true peasant class. For the whole North and West, the average farm had 126 acres in 1860 and 143 in 1910. For Foreigners in American Agriculture, see *Final Report of the Industrial Commission*, Washington, 1902, XIX, 49–54.

lords, but, on the contrary, would be gladly gotten rid of for a better system if the conditions permitted it. Where the tenant system prevails, the tenant is furnished with a house, water, fuel, pasturage for his stock, a share of the fruit on the place, a garden, a shelter for stock, and storage for crops. The crop is in some cases divided as follows: One fourth of the cotton, one third of the corn, and one half of the small grain goes to the landlord, the balance to the tenant, the landlord furnishing the land and stock and his share of the fertilizers. Under this system, the crop, to a great extent, and the land, generally, are apt to be neglected. The tenant is desirous of expending as little labor as possible and the landlord of getting the largest crop return. The permanent value of the land is apt to be sacrificed for lack of competent supervision, and deterioration of the property in general is quite certain to grow at a more rapid rate than under a different system of occupancy. The renter has little or no interest in the maintenance of permanent improvements. This is especially true when the contract is made for a year at a time, admitting of frequent changes of tenants and enabling them to evade the responsibilities of careful management and methods of cultivation. Consequently, both the permanent improvements and the soil deteriorate under this system. The tenant is, furthermore, at a disadvantage in exchanging his crop for family supplies. He sells his corn at the lowest price to the country merchant from whom he gets his provisions in exchange, paying the highest price the country merchant sees fit to demand. This same corn which is sold early in the fall may have to be bought back from the country merchant by the tenant late in the winter at from fifty to one hundred per cent advance. The economic effects of such a system are to the disadvantage of the tenant in both trans-

actions, both as a producer and consumer, and no system of such a character has in the history of agriculture ever led, if uncorrected, to anything but failure."[1] Such was the social and economic background of the populism and discontent of the nineties. Since that time, conditions have improved and, in many communities, a movement to land ownership by the workers seems definitely to have commenced.

Side by side with the agricultural revolution which we have sketched, came the beginnings of an industrial revolution, that lagged twenty years or more behind the similar movement in the North. In 1860, the South had begun the building of small factories and textile mills, and had gone further in promoting such ventures than was usually recognized at the time. These small factories helped to prolong the resistance to the waxing pressure of the blockade. When the war was over, all these forms of fixed capital had been worn out or destroyed and there was no new capital with which to replace them. About 1880, the presence of water power and the nearness of an abundant supply of cheap labor in the foothills of the Carolinas and Northern Georgia, and the abundance of coal in Alabama, led to the building of small mills, many of which proved immensely profitable. A number of these mills were financed as community enterprises, the stock being widely held by many persons in the immediate neighborhood. The poorer white people moved into the new mill towns which

[1] Industrial Commission, 1902, XIX, 97–99. For a somber but suggestive picture of social and economic conditions in the present South, see Tannenbaum, *Darker Phases of the South* (1924). This author's picture of the Southern tenant and mill hand is not always fair, but his account of the prisons and the convict systems needs to be seriously considered.

became a characteristic feature of these regions, and whole families, men, women, and children, labored together in the factories. The machinery was new and the labor force was undisturbed by strikes, and many a New England mill owner began to look to his laurels. The nearness of the raw materials was not so great a benefit as might be supposed, for transportation to Massachusetts by sea was almost as cheap as overland to the Southern mills. But the other advantages were very great. Wages were almost always by the piece rather than by the day. The evils of long hours and child labor, which had accompanied the Industrial Revolution in England one hundred years before, and that in New England fifty years before, now appeared in the South and were sometimes described as if they were new and unusual phenomena. The fathers of these families were accustomed to have their children work with them in the fields and did not object to having the whole family work in the new conditions. In 1880, there were only six hundred thousand spindles in Southern mills; in 1915 the number was thirteen millions in comparison with nineteen millions in the rest of the nation, and the South manufactured more raw cotton than it shipped to the North. Very recently, half-hearted attempts have been made to prevent by law the use of children in the mills. The rise of the tobacco industry in North Carolina, of steel mills in Northern Alabama, of lumbering on a large scale in Arkansas, and of the oil industry in Texas and Oklahoma, have helped to sweep away many of the differences that once distinguished the old South from the rest of the nation.

The two decades that saw the beginnings of the factory system also witnessed the transformation of the Southern railroads into prosperous and efficient trunk lines under the early leadership of Calvin Brice in the

eighties and of J. P. Morgan and E. H. Harriman after the panic of 1893. Colleges which had been closed were reëstablished. By 1900 a new and more hopeful South had come into being in which the chief marks of war and reconstruction were the continued sectional division of some of the churches and the political solidarity of the States which, in spite of differences of opinion on national issues, regularly voted the Democratic ticket.

The governments that were everywhere reëstablished in the three years from 1874 to 1877 were dominated, as might have been expected, by old Confederate soldiers. The Southern people had, in their time of distress, turned to their natural leaders. An army record was almost essential to political preferment in the eighties and the nineties, and with few exceptions Senators and Congressmen had held high office in the Confederate forces. In contrast with the idea of the rotation of offices which prevailed in the West, many of these leaders were continued in office as long as they were willing to serve, and in the case of such men as the eloquent John B. Gordon of Georgia, politics gained as in England the dignity and the permanence of a profession. Such men often had little direct influence on national legislation, but by their old-fashioned courtesy and ready humor they soon broke down whatever prejudices remained after the war. A literature sprang up, especially of novels that had a wide public in the North, which glorified, sometimes unduly, the old days that were passed, and gave to the Old South the romantic associations which Sir Walter Scott had once attached to the Highlands of Scotland. When the Old South had passed away, it came to be admired as it had never been in the height of its power and influence.

The new governments, in the hands of the "Confeder-

ate Brigadiers," found the various States on the verge of public bankruptcy and were perforce compelled to practice the utmost frugality and economy, which in certain directions, especially the promotion of public education, came to seem to some sections of the community, to verge on parsimony. Debts were scaled down or even repudiated. State offices and functions were reduced to a minimum, except that in spite of all theories of local self government, the control of the central state government was extended over local counties and municipalities to prevent the recurrence of negro domination. In the States where the negroes were in the majority, and particularly in South Carolina, local institutions were in this way severely restricted. Once the Carpetbaggers and the Scalawags had gone away or changed their politics, the negroes showed surprising willingness without any great changes in the laws, to abandon their new found political privileges. For fifteen or twenty years, the rights which had been expected to accrue to them from the Fifteenth Amendment were in a state of suspended animation. In a few communities, the old Republican organization, which had been so powerful, continued to exist. The Quakers of North Carolina, some German communities in Texas, and above all the mountain whites, divided among six of the Southern States, continued to vote the Republican ticket. But even in the Republican party the negro was not always welcomed, and committee meetings were often held in hotels from which the negro was excluded. One district in North Carolina elected an occasional negro to Congress, but frequently the few negroes that voted found that there was likely to be a "hole in the ballot box." For the most part, the Republican party in the South came to be composed of federal office holders, appointed to repay party debts in other regions, and its

chief function was to furnish delegates to national conventions in which the fiction was still maintained that every State had an interest in the "grand old party." Such Southern delegates were always a source of strength to a President who desired a second term, and at times came to be the property of especially astute political leaders like John Sherman, and later Mark A. Hanna. When Hanna was grooming McKinley for the Presidency, he had his friend spend a few weeks in the South where his charm of manner is said to have won him many delegates. In later elections, Republican candidates were to be seen in the South during the preconvention campaign but never, of course, during the actual election, when efforts are so largely concentrated on the doubtful states.

Such political conditions might have lasted indefinitely, if it had not been for the rise of agrarian discontent in the later eighties and early nineties. The Granger movement of the seventies which had been so important in the Middle West did not attain great headway in the South, but in the eighties an organization called the Farmers' Alliance made its appearance in various states. It was composed for the most part of small debtor farmers, who found themselves in increasing difficulties as the price of cotton continued to decline. The new society was in many ways similar to the group that had been the mainstay of the old Jeffersonian Democracy. The fundamental ideas of the farmers were the salvation of the farmer from his plight by such measures as the creation of public warehouses in which the cotton could be held for a better market, the free coinage of silver to increase prices, and the regulation of railroad rates to decrease the expenses of marketing the crop. Above all, it was directed against the old leaders who had been in control for some twenty years and who were

charged with refusing in the interests of the larger taxpayers to establish schools and public improvements.

In the Middle West, where conditions were somewhat similar to those in the South, the Alliances became merged in a new political party, the Populists of 1891. In some Southern States, particularly North Carolina, the Populists combined with the small Republican minority and gained elections. In contests of this kind between two elements of the white community, the old legal rights of the negro voters were sometimes used as a pawn and many a negro was encouraged to vote who had forgotten that he had such a legal right. But in other States, the memories of the Reconstruction period were still too vivid to allow such expedients even in the heat of a great political and social conflict. The result was a series of bitter contests at the Democratic primaries and conventions, in which in many cases the victory was won by the new leaders of the people. As a single example, in 1890, at the very beginning of the movement, Benjamin R. Tillman won the nomination for Governor of South Carolina on a platform which called for the reduction of appropriations to the State University, which he regarded as an aristocratic institution, and an increase in those for local schools. Opposed by the representative of the Conservative Democrats, Tillman, who was neither ignorant nor uneducated, was elected after a campaign in which he appealed to the deepest social prejudices in the community. At the end of his term, he was elected to the Senate, where for many years his radical utterances made good copy. And Tillman was only the best known of the new leaders who came into prominence in six or seven States about the same time and whose success made clear that the old era of Democratic good will had come to an end. Primaries and conventions which had been mere

gatherings of the faithful to praise good public servants and to ratify their acts in laudatory resolutions, became the storm centers of bitter controversies.

On one matter at least the new and the old leaders were at one. The division of opinion in the Democratic ranks must not lead to negro suffrage, as would be almost inevitable if two definite political parties were now created. Accordingly, by common consent, laws began to be passed and constitutional amendments created which would guard against this danger. The safety of the community had lain for fifteen years in the strength and unity of the white men of the South, and in the willingness to follow their leaders without serious contests, but those times were evidently at an end. The methods that were now devised to insure white supremacy in new conditions were much more subtle than the old. In the first place, a definite attempt was made to keep all divisions a family matter within the party from which the negro could easily be excluded. At the primaries men might vote as they pleased, but, having voted, a pledge was required, backed by general sentiment rather than by law, that the successful candidates should also be supported at the following general election without a contest. These pledges of party regularity became the new basis of party solidarity, and many a man voted for a candidate whose views on such questions as free silver he profoundly disliked because that candidate had been regularly chosen to represent the Democratic party.

When such pledges did not seem likely to be sufficient, without definite laws disfranchising the negro which might have been declared void by the Supreme Court, a system of registration in which each voter was required to pay a small poll tax some months in advance of an election was widely extended. Voters who were not supplied with poll tax receipts were not allowed to vote.

The negro was never urged to pay his tax and usually neglected to do it, and it was a bold politician who would incur the penalties of the law to advance poll tax money to a group who could, at best, deliver the desired votes only six or eight months later. Residence qualifications were also made more stringent, and since many of the negroes were an essentially migratory people, these often acted to prevent any possible tendency to call them back to politics. In most sections of the South, the exclusion of the negro from the Democratic primaries and the requirement of poll tax receipts have proved quite sufficient to prevent any recurrence of negro suffrage. In a few states, educational qualifications have been imposed in which the power to read and to interpret some section of the Constitution to the satisfaction of the registering officer is required. As may easily be imagined, such a test is quite difficult for the average negro. Some of the states, under the leadership of Louisiana, passed laws which exempted illiterate whites for a term of years from the requirements of the educational tests if their grandfathers had been voters. Such discriminations were declared void by the Supreme Court in 1915 in an Oklahoma test case. Occasionally, as in Texas in 1924, the regular nominee of the party is so strongly disliked as to lead many Democrats to vote the Republican ticket, in spite of primary pledges, but such divisions do not bring to the fore the old question of negro suffrage, for the negro is almost as unwelcome in one party as in the other, and is disfranchised by common consent and by the strength of social feeling much more surely than by any possible devices of the law.

The opening years of the twentieth century found the South with the rest of the nation rapidly paying off its debts and increasing in prosperity. The movement to

the city which had commenced on a great scale in the North twenty years before now set in definitely in the South, and was greatly accelerated after the opening of the European war in 1914. Especially after the American entrance into the war, the presence of army camps in Southern states tended to advertise the possibilities of the South for business and residence, and led to large investments of Northern capital in Southern enterprises. A boom in lands in Florida began which reached its climax in 1925. Southern cities grew from communities which a few years before had been small towns. Side by side with these changes, came a migration of negroes to Northern cities where they settled by the hundreds of thousands. In St. Louis, New York, and Chicago, occurred riots and disturbances which proved that the color line was no longer geographical but racial. The return of some of these negroes to their Southern homes, and of others from France, with new ideas and a new restlessness, was one of the factors that led to the establishment of a secret society, called in imitation of the older organization, the Ku Klux Klan, This grew with surprising rapidity for a few years after 1920 and was established also in Northern states where the negro problem did not enter definitely into its policy. Its secrecy, its desire to secure the supremacy, not only of the whites but of those sections of the population which were native born and Protestant, created intense opposition and caused divisions in politics which were reminiscent of the days of the Populist upheaval in the nineties; but within five years the whole movement seems to have lost much of its political significance. The Ku Klux movement is probably to be interpreted as an extreme expression of a new and self-conscious nationalism, like Fascism in Italy, which constitutes a reaction against the international coöperation and idealism of

1917. But it is as yet too early to estimate its full significance.

The great spiritual changes that have come to the South in the years since 1860, are of course not capable of the exactness of statement that applies to the outward economic and political conditions. But they may be felt by any one who reads the literature of the South in this period. The literature of the Old South was permeated by the romantic spirit of Sir Walter Scott, with its idealized knights and ladies who furnished conscious models to the planters of the nineteenth century. If we except Poe, the few poets were often musical but given to sentiments that lacked sincerity and vigor. Indeed, similar generalizations may be made not unfairly for much of the literature of all parts of America in the period before the war.

As seen in poems and orations, the South, since 1860, has changed more than once. There was first, the eager, buoyant South of the war songs, *Maryland* and *Dixie*. The war did not produce much lasting literature, but a knowledge of these songs and others like them, North and South, is necessary to any social study of the period. The burden of these songs is the justice of a cause which must triumph. As the war went on and the long expected day was constantly postponed, a more bitter note appears in the songs of the South, and also some hint of the hopelessness of the long struggle. So the once gentle Henry Timrod was kindled with a fire of almost Hebraic rage:

"Oh, help us Lord! to roll the crimson flood
Back on its course, and while our banners wing
Northward, strike with us! till the Goth shall cling
To his own altar stones, and crave
Mercy; and we shall grant it, and dictate

The lenient future of his fate
There, where some rotting ships and crumbling quays
Shall one day mark the port which ruled the Western seas."

The poems of Paul Hamilton Hayne and of other lesser poets during the war revealed the same transition.

With Appomattox and the surrender of the armies, and face to face with the immense difficulties of binding up the wounds of the community, a new South was born, a South of gentle pessimism, with its eyes on the glories of the past. It is hard to realize that the Henry Timrod who wrote in 1867 what is perhaps the most musical of American lyrics, the *Ode at Magnolia Cemetery*, was the same man who had called on Almighty Power to crush the foe.

"Sleep sweetly in your humble graves,
Sleep, martyrs of a fallen cause;
Though yet no marble column craves
The pilgrim here to pause."

Even in this ode, written at so dark a moment, there is the gleam of hope for a better and a larger day, when the deeds of "defeated valor" shall have proved after all not quite in vain.

"In seeds of laurel in the earth
The blossom of your fame is blown,
And somewhere, waiting for its birth,
The shaft is in the stone!"

In the next decade, this melancholy note, rising to a greater hope, is evident in the work of Sidney Lanier, whose life was as short as Timrod's. His early death cut off a career of great promise for his last poems, "The Marshes of Glynn" and "Sunrise" were clearly the best:

"Oh, what is abroad in the marsh and the terminal sea?
Somehow my soul seems suddenly free
From the weighing of fate and the sad discussions of sin,
By the length and the breadth and the sweep of the marshes of Glynn."

Two orations mark the transition to the new, hopeful, wealthy South of today. The first was the *Eulogy on Sumner*, delivered in the House of Representatives on April 28, 1874, in praise of the Senator from Massachusetts who had died the month before. The speaker was Lucius Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi whose presence in Congress was itself a symbol of the probable failure of much for which Sumner had stood. Considering all the circumstances of the case, the constituency that Lamar represented, and the audience that he addressed, the "Eulogy" was certainly one of the most remarkable speeches in American history, remarkable as much for its tact and reticence as for its eloquence. But in spite of its title, Lamar's speech was not so much a eulogy as a plea for reunion of spirit.

The speech was read everywhere and by the very boldness of its theme produced effects that made eventually impossible the continuance of the carpetbag governments in the South.

In some respects even more memorable than Lamar's eulogy on Sumner was the speech of Henry W. Grady, the editor of the Atlanta *Constitution*, before the New England Society of New York, on December 22, 1886. In the twelve years that had passed since the address of Lamar had surprised the country, many of the wounds had been healed and most of the bitterness of the past had disappeared. Again the occasion required tact, for the country was listening and one of the guests on the same platform was General W. T. Sherman, long remembered in Georgia. Without apology for the past,

Grady frankly expressed the attitude of the New South to the old problems: "In my native town of Athens is a monument that crowns its central hill—a plain white shaft. Deep cut into its shining side is a name dear to me above the names of men, that of a brave and simple man who died in a brave and simple faith. Not for all the glories of New England, from Plymouth Rock all the way, would I exchange the heritage he left me in his soldier's death. . . . But, sir, speaking from the shadow of that memory which I honor as I do nothing else on earth, I say that the cause for which he suffered and for which he gave his life was adjudged by higher and fuller wisdom than his or mine, and I am glad that omniscient God held the balance of battle in his Almighty hand and that human slavery was swept forever from American soil and the American Union was saved from the wreck of war." Grady's oration was significant, not merely in recording but in helping to create the spirit of the new South. The South had learned how to reconcile her memories with the new patriotism that had begun to grow. In politics, in economics, in spirit, the South of the eighties was already what Grady called it, another and a new South.

The new South has lost much of its individuality. It has been caught, to a large extent, in the industrial changes of the nation. Its cities, its schools, its churches, even its politics have become astonishingly similar to those of other sections of the country. Only in the most distant villages can one today get some glimpse of those special qualities which constituted the old South of ante-bellum days.

CHAPTER IX

THE FAR WEST (1860–1924)

DURING the momentous years in which the chief attention of the nation was turned towards the South, the movement to the West was continuing unabated and the political map of the United States was being completed. The history of the West in these years can be written in terms of five characteristic institutions that succeeded each other with great rapidity, the mining camp, the railroad town, the cow town, the ranch, and the farm. Each of these except the last rose and disappeared and left its mark on the industrial and social history of the American people.

The wide stretch of country between the Missouri and the Pacific slope had long been regarded as a mere barrier, just as the whole continent had once seemed to European eyes. By the policy of Monroe and Calhoun adopted about 1825 and carried out by their successors up to 1841, this region had been dedicated to the Indian as a vast reservation, which was promised to them perpetually by solemn treaties. These dreams had come to naught when the Pacific slope was acquired as one of the results of the Mexican war, and when the plains and mountains had become the familiar scene of the travels of the Conestoga wagons. As a by-product of the westward movement of the railways, the Indian country had been definitely invaded with the creation

in 1854 of Kansas and Nebraska as organized territories.

Events now followed with great rapidity on the agricultural edges of the last frontier. In spite of the panic of 1857 which closed the first stage of the new westward movement, Minnesota had received enough people to demand Statehood in 1858, and Oregon, in the Far West was admitted the following year. At the same time, the country to the north became the organized Territory of Washington. These were the last efforts at political map-making before the storm of the Civil War.

The two edges of the last frontier were separated by a vast distance. In 1860, it was estimated that as many as eighteen thousand wagons were engaged in the freighting business on the plains, but it was regarded as a great achievement when John Butterfield, on September 15, 1858, started his semi-weekly stages, under a contract with the postoffice department, to carry the mails by a southern route for six hundred thousand dollars a year. The distance as the route ran from San Francisco to Tipton, Missouri, at that time the rail terminus from St. Louis, was 2795 miles. The first stage made the journey in twenty-four days, eighteen hours and twenty-five minutes. Butterfield had been at work for a year to provide relay stations at distances that varied from five to nine miles. Each stage had place for fourteen passengers as well as for the mail. At convenient distances were home stations where meals were served. But no beds were provided, for the contracts called for speed, and the passengers rode night and day and slept as they might. The trip across the plains gave rise to a classical description by the young Secretary of the new territory of Nevada, when "Mark Twain" added, in 1872, a new chapter to American social history in *Roughing It*, as he had already

immortalized another phase of an earlier West in his *Life on the Mississippi.*

"Twenty-four mortal days and nights," wrote a traveller, "twenty-five being schedule time, must be spent in that ambulance; passengers becoming crazy with whisky, mixed with want of sleep, are often obliged to be strapped to their seats; their meals dispatched during ten minute halts, are simply abominable, the heats are excessive, the climate malarious; lamps may not be used at night for fear of non-existent Indians; briefly, there is no end to this Via Mala's miseries."[1]

Senator Gwin of California, who had been the father of Butterfield's contract, was not satisfied with the twenty-five days that it took the mails to cross the plains. He persuaded the freighting firm of Russell, Majors, and Waddell, already famous for its enterprise, to create a rival in the form of the pony express. The riders followed a more northerly route and had relays at an average distance of about ten miles. The horses were blooded, and the riders were boys, trained to ride unarmed and to depend on their speed to escape from the dangers of the Indian country. The minimum rate for a small tissue letter was five dollars. The pony express started from each end of the long trail in April, 1860, and completed the ride with a saving of a full two weeks over the official mails. The most famous exploit of the pony express was to carry the news of Lincoln's inauguration to Sacramento from St. Joseph, Missouri, in seven days and seventeen hours. But the service did not pay, and it met a ruinous rival with the completion of the transcontinental telegraph in October of 1861. The close contact with the East probably had

[1] For a description of the Overland Route, see Paxson, *History of the American Frontier*, Chapter XLIX. This book is also indispensable to an understanding of the development of the Far West.

an important effect in binding the Pacific Coast to the Union. In the meantime, the regular mail route had been transferred to the north by the effects of the war and had come to follow the old Platte route which had been familiar to the forty-niners, and which was to be the scene of the first of the great transcontinental railroads.

Even at the time of the mail coaches and the pony express, and some years before the telegraph had been built, the western barrier was beginning to be the scene of an active life of its own. On Christmas Day of 1858, word reached the settlements in Kansas that gold had been discovered near Pike's Peak, seven hundred miles from the bend of the Missouri River. The same kind of a movement set in which ten years before had brought thousands to California. The slogan of the "fifty-niners" was "Pike's Peak or Bust," although the difficulties of the new venture were not to be compared with those of the old. The finds were not so rich and it became evident that they required ample capital for their exploitation; but in spite of discouragements, enough people were soon present to establish an unauthorized "Territory of Jefferson." When, in 1861, the name was changed and the territory of Colorado was organized, there were more than thirty-four thousand people in this new mining community that inaugurated a new period in national development. The miners were like quicksilver, and as they passed from one venture to another, they at first appointed committees for their own protection and then demanded a more formal government. In spite of the preoccupation of the war, the course of western development went on in such a way that the story can be written almost as if nothing of moment had been taking place farther east. Within seven years after the creation of Colorado, what had

been an uncharted wilderness had been divided by the political lines which are today the familiar boundaries of the Western states.

Many of the early miners were draft dodgers or even deserters from both armies, and political loyalties rested easily on both sides. But on the whole the spirit of the mining camps was favorable to the Union. With the discovery of the rich Comstock lode in 1859, the foundations for a new community were laid in Nevada, which became a territory in the same year as Colorado, and which in spite of the sparsity of its population, was hurried on to statehood before the close of the war. As one of her new Senators reported the conversation, Lincoln shook him warmly by the hand and said, "Stewart, we are glad to see you, we need all the loyal states we can get." Dakota, as yet undivided but composed of two distinct germs of farming communities, was organized in the same year (1861) on the northwestern frontier of the spreading agricultural area.

As the miners dropped into the various valleys where the ground gave promise of rich discoveries, they broke up into individual globules, to use the striking figure of the historian of the West, H. H. Bancroft, and ran off after any atom of gold in their vicinity. Everywhere, government resulted from the necessities of the hour by a process that was essentially similar to the one that had led long before to the signing of the compact on the little *Mayflower*. In each case the steps followed in much the same order. Congress often had little to do except to accept the results. So Idaho and Arizona became the territorial by-products of the mines in 1863 and Montana the next year. With the creation of Wyoming, in 1868, the lines of the American political map had been almost completely drawn. In each of these mining communities, economic power was soon in

the hands of powerful corporations which were themselves typical of new conditions. This was especially true of Arizona, where the mining towns and the workers were often corporation towns and workers, much like the mill towns of the later South. The days of the individual miner washing the sand for gold were gone.

In politics, the territorial form of government was the new expression of the ideas of the old Ordinance of 1787. It allowed to each community a very considerable freedom in the selection of its own local officers and in the making of laws. Thus interesting experiments were worked out, Wyoming allowing women to vote on equal terms with men from the very beginning. During the quarter century in which the chief Western states remained territories, the governors and other high officials were sometimes honest and even public spirited, but whether honest or not, they were all essentially carpetbaggers, politicians with a small stake in the community and ready recipients of the favors of the spoils system. That the scandals were smaller than those of the South, was largely due to the higher quality of the electorate and to the further fact that these thinly populated regions did not offer such a rich field to the ingenuity of many unscrupulous appointees. In spite of much discontent with outside rulers, the population was so small and often so shifting in character, that the few taxpayers feared rather than coveted the expensive boon of complete self-government as states, and rested easily under the territorial form. Colorado rejected in 1864 the offer of Statehood and waited twelve years to be admitted in 1876 as the "Centennial State" in time to cast its three votes for Hayes and thus determine the close and disputed election of that year. Nebraska had been admitted at least in part as a weapon against Johnson and over his veto in 1867. The other

Western communities waited without evident impatience until the movement for their admission as full States in the Union gained political headway in the eighties. Even then it is difficult to determine how much of the sentiment was genuine, and how much owed its origin to the activities of a ring of territorial politicians, eager to gain the dignity of places in the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States.

The age of the mining camp soon merged into that of the railroad town. The desirability of a transcontinental railroad had long been recognized. But it was also seen that such an enterprise could not be carried into the wilderness of plains and mountains without the aid of the government, and such assistance was long delayed by the bitter sectional controversy of the fifties. If it had been possible to build the railway when it was first planned it would doubtless have been a government enterprise, a fact that would certainly have had momentous consequences on the economic policy of the nation. But when the project was made possible by the withdrawal of the South from Congress, the decision was in favor of a private road to be built with government subsidies of lands and bonds. It thus happened that the Union Pacific Railroad in one continent and the Suez Canal between two others were the unforeseen by-products in the field of transportation of a great civil war, and it was no accident that the two were brought to completion at almost the same moment.[1]

[1] It is well known that the prosperity which the high price of cotton brought to Egypt made possible the building of the canal at the close of the war. Both enterprises were completed in 1869.

For political conditions in California at this time, see, Earle, J. J. *California and the Civil War*, Reports Am. Hist. Ass'n, 1907, 125. For the effects of the railroads on the frontier, see Paxson, *The Pacific Railroads* and *The Disappearance of the Frontier*, ibid., 107.

The Union Pacific Railway was first chartered in 1862, with the promise of ten sections of public land and a loan of sixteen thousand dollars to the mile. But even these generous terms were not sufficient to bring out the necessary private capital. In 1864, the amount of land was doubled and the loan was to be based on a second mortgage allowing the railroad to issue its own first mortgage bonds to a like amount. In the semi-mountainous sections the subsidy from the government was to be doubled and in the actual mountains trebled. The energies of the nation were so completely absorbed by the war and the industrial revolution that was taking place in the East, that by the end of 1865 the Union Pacific had built only forty miles west from Omaha. In the meantime the rival western road, the Central Pacific, under the leadership of a group of men who had made fortunes in the gold mines and especially of Colis P. Huntington and Leland Stanford, had accepted the terms of Congress and had built sixty miles east from Sacramento to meet the Union Pacific. Real building did not begin until 1866 when an executive order placed the relatively flat table land of Nevada in the mountainous class and the two railroads pushed east and west to secure the bountiful government loan of forty-eight thousand dollars to the mile. In the next few months the rivalry increased and the miles of railroad grew with feverish activity. The chief profits of the enterprise fell to the construction companies, which were paid for the use of their capital not only in the bonds and stock of the railroads but in the loaned securities of the government. The efforts of one of these to gain the good will of Congress and to prevent unfriendly legislation led to the "Credit Mobilier" scandals and brought to Washington something of the same sinister contact between business and politics which had long been

familiar in the legislatures of the States. The financial result was to leave the railroads under a load of obligations that they could not hope to repay for many years. The last spike was driven and the two railroads joined at Ogden, Utah, on May 10th, 1869. Bret Harte caught the spirit of the moment in his poem:

> "What was it the Engines said,
> Pilots, touching, head to head
> Facing on a single track,
> Half a world behind each back?"

The Eastern engine could boast of cities and farms, to which the engine from the West replied:

> "You brag of the East, you do?
>
> Why, I bring the East to you!
> All the Orient, all Cathay,
> Find through me the shortest way;
> And the sun you follow here
> Rises in my hemisphere."

In the exuberance of national reunion after war Congress had chartered as many as three other transcontinental railroads, with even more generous grants of land but without the bond subsidies that had made possible the rapid completion of the Union and the Central Pacific. One of these lay far to the north where Jay Cooke, the financier of the war, was the eager advocate of the claims of the Northern Pacific to reach from Lake Superior to the new town of Tacoma of which Cooke was the founder. In spite of the fact that there was little promise of immediate returns, Cooke showed his faith in his enterprise by buying heavily of his own securities, which he also offered to an eager public in Europe and America. When his house was caught in

the disastrous panic of 1873, he had built three hundred miles out from Lake Superior, beyond the Red River of the North into the prairies of North Dakota. The two Southern roads also pushed out into the West. The Texas Pacific had reached a point near Dallas, Texas, and the Atlantic and Pacific ended in the Indian Territory where the two enterprises like their rival to the north were to stop until the springs of credit which were dried up by the panic should flow again. In the same period a fifth road, the Santa Fé, building under a local grant of land, had covered the length of Kansas and had reached the boundaries of Colorado.

As each of the five railroads extended their tracks into the west, the thousands of men who were engaged in the work, for the most part recent Irish immigrants except in the case of the Central Pacific which imported large numbers of Chinese coolies for the task, lived in temporary quarters even more transient than the mining camps. Each morning the whole town would move out to work on the road, many of the workers armed and ready for a sudden foray from the Indians. At night the tired workers found solace in the dance halls and the saloons. When forty or fifty miles had been built, the whole town of ten or twelve thousand was loaded on the trains and a new town would be built a few miles farther into the wilderness. It was a life which was not unlike that of the army camps to which many had become accustomed a few years before. This movement, incredibly more rapid than those by wagon and flat boat which had preceded it, came to an untimely end in 1873, with one road completed and four others dangling in the air.

Side by side with the building of the railroads, another movement had been going on which cut across their lines and depended partly on them for its success. From

early Spanish days, the plains of Texas had been the prolific breeding ground for thousands of long horned and hardy steers, which had roamed almost without a master, valued only for their hides. The plains to the north of Texas had been dedicated to the Indian and the buffalo. The herds of buffalo in almost countless numbers had wintered in the southern part of the open range and in the spring had wandered north where they supplied the necessary food and clothing of the Indians of the plains. These annual migrations had doubtless gone on for many hundreds of years. The coming of the western settlers of the forties, followed by the miners of the sixties, and the railroad men of the seventies and eighties, spelled the doom of the buffalo. Within a few years they had been slaughtered for buffalo robes with a waste so prodigal that the early railroads found freight for their east bound trains in gathering up for fertilizer the heaps of whitening bones.

About 1865 it occurred to some one that if the buffalo could thrive so well on the soft spring grasses of the northern plains, cattle might do equally well. The result was the long drive with all the picturesque concomitants of the cowboy and the cow town. The purpose of the long drive was to fatten the cattle and to get them to market. The plains of Texas were an ideal breeding ground but a poor place in which to condition cattle during the summer. Until the completion of the southwestern roads in 1882 and 1883, they were also practically cut off from communication with the growing slaughter houses of the East. The route of the long drive was through the pan handle of Texas, at first to Ogallala in western Kansas, which happened to be the railhead of the Union Pacific, and thus gained fame as the first of the cow towns, with all the temporary splendor of the dance hall and the gambling saloon in which

the cowboys spent their wages. With each advancing line of railroad, other cow towns grew up at convenient points, and the drive sometimes went as far as Montana where it met the Northern Pacific or even, occasionally, across the line to a station on the new Canadian Pacific.

The plains of Texas continued to be the breeding ground. But with the increasing demand for good beef, the scrub bulls were soon eliminated and the importation of Hereford and other improved breeds soon raised the fattening qualities of the steers. In May the season began with the round up, the time of the greatest activity for the cowboy. The older cattle had of course been branded by their owners in previous years, but they were all brought together from areas that sometimes covered hundreds of square miles. The young calves were identified by the mothers they followed and branded by the marks of the owner. The yearling steers were separated and started on the long drive, and the rest were turned loose until the time of the next round up. The whole operation required patience and remarkable skill and horsemanship, and since many owners were involved, proved an invaluable training in community enterprise. The common notion that the spirit of the Far West is individualistic is not true in the sense that it had been of the older frontiers. Every stage in the development of the West and every industry required the common enterprise of many men to accomplish a common result. It is true that these communities, whether of miners or cowboys, were themselves self-reliant, that they built up their own standards of morals, that they meted out prompt if somewhat rough and sometimes undiscriminating justice on offenders, that they did not count on outside help, but the individuals acted together. All these things have left their per-

manent mark, and it is doubtful whether in any part of the world, the sense of the unity and dominance of the community as such is any stronger whether for good or evil than in the American Far West, unless it be in certain portions of the South where the events of the Civil War and Reconstruction have had somewhat similar effects in modifying the natural individualism of an agricultural community.

The two decades from 1865 to 1885 saw the rise and fall of the cow country. In that time a social institution had arisen, more temporary than the plantation, but that captured the imagination of the people and which lives today in the circus and the moving picture show as a characteristic expression of frontier life. At a time when other lines of communication were from east to west, the lines of travel in the cattle country were from north to south, and the plains had something of the same effects in destroying sectionalism in a new age that the first great melting pot in the Shenandoah Valley had had a hundred years before. Many a future state to the north of Mason's and Dixon's line became familiar with the Southern accent and Southern social customs. The basis had also been laid for the revolutionary changes in the food supply of a people which had subsisted largely on pork. With the invention of the refrigerating car to meet the new demands and the introduction of tin cans, a great industry was established in Chicago; and Kansas City, Chicago, and St. Louis grew more rapidly than ever into metropolitan centers. In this contest for supremacy, Chicago had the distinct advantage. In 1860, St. Louis had 160,000 people to only 100,000 in her northern rival. Ten years later St. Louis had doubled and Chicago had trebled. By 1880, Chicago had the clear lead of 150,000 which she never lost. The cow country had borne its part in

the lessening importance of the river traffic and in the supremacy of the railroads.[1]

The open range was an institution that in the very nature of things could not be permanent. The surprising fact was that it lasted for two decades. The truth of the matter was that the Texas country could breed more animals than the northern plains could support. Then, too, the introduction of barbed wire fences on a large scale in the late seventies, which at first had seemed a boon to the cowboys, proved in the long run their undoing. The cowboys at the end of the long drive were at the mercy of an overstocked market and had to sell when they reached the railhead without much regard to the price. A new type of business men arose, sometimes individuals and often companies, that acquired some of the best lands in the neighborhood of necessary water, and in spite of the land laws, fenced in great areas with the new wire. They had the advantage of being able to hold their cattle in the ranch until the price was more satisfactory. The cowboys found the open range broken up by these fences. Within these ranches the cattle were raised for the market without the necessity of the long drive. The railroads which had stopped building in 1873, waited six years for good times and when the long depression was over in 1879, began to push their way across the plains. In 1882, the Southern Pacific, dominated by the same California interests that had built the old Central Pacific, had completed its lines through South Texas, and at El Paso joined the Texas Pacific from Fort Worth. At the same time, the Santa

[1] For the social institutions of the open range see especially, Paxson, *The Cow Country*, in *American Historical Review*, Vol. 22, Clara M. Love, *History of the Cattle Industry in the Southwest*, in *S. W. Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 19, Hough, *The Story of the Cowboy*, and Rollins, P. A., *The Cowboy*.

Fé was also carried to the Colorado River in the Southwest. With the completion of these roads, the ranch took the place of the open range, and cattle were shipped directly to the slaughter houses or were sent to be fattened in small groups on the smaller farms of the Middle West. The last blow was dealt to the open range when some of the states on the path of the long drive, notably Kansas and Colorado, passed severe quarantine regulations against the introduction of Texas cattle, laws which seemed to the old-fashioned cowboys to prove the influence of the cattle king and the small farmer, whom they called in derision a nester, rather than fear of Texas fever. Ten years later, the days of the old frontier were numbered with the completion, in 1893, of another northern railroad, the Great Northern, under the leadership of James J. Hill of St. Paul. In the same year, the Santa Fé carried its lines to the Pacific. With the passing of the frontier, and the completion of six through lines to the Pacific, the time for the building of railroads on a large scale had ended. From that time on the prospector and the engineer became less important than the railroad financier and magnate.

The completion of the railroads had made possible the rapid extension of the agricultural frontier into all the remaining lands that were suitable for cultivation and even to some that could produce crops only in unusually favorable years. In 1869, when the first railroad was completed, there were still available what seemed an almost unlimited number of farms. In 1893, when the period of railroad building had come to an end, the lands that remained awaited the magic touch of irrigation to be of use to the small farmer. An ambitious farmer might gain land in one of three usual ways. He might select his own piece of land under the old, unrepealed preëmption act of 1841, and when the lands were

opened for settlement, he might buy what he needed at a minimum price of a dollar and a quarter an acre. Or he might buy land at a reasonable price from the railroads to which by the beginning of the seventies a vast empire of one hundred and fifty millions of acres, a larger area than New York and New England combined, had been granted by a bountiful government. But the easiest way of all was to take advantage of the provisions of the Homestead Law that had been signed by President Lincoln in 1862 in fulfilment of the hopes of the old party of the Free Soilers. By the terms of this act, anyone who was a citizen or an alien who had declared his intention of becoming a citizen, and who had not taken part in the rebellion, might acquire a farm of one hundred and sixty acres which would become his own in fee simple after five years of actual residence. By later laws, larger areas might be acquired in regions that were not suitable for farming and were only useful for grazing. But even in the beginning many of the entries were collusive, and intended to build up ranches rather than farms. In twenty years after the passing of this act, more than six hundred thousand farms had been assigned without charge. The orators loved to dwell on the picture of more than half a million families provided for in the national domain. But the figures, while impressive enough, were somewhat misleading, for only one third of those who had acquired preliminary rights had had the courage and the hardihood to brave the heats of five summers or the loneliness of five winters to make their claims finally good. The most significant addition to the agricultural domain was the settlement of the incredibly rich wheat country of the Red River of the North, where the reaper and the railroad made possible the raising and the marketing of surprising crops in a region that at the beginning of the

Civil War had been on the furthest fringes of civilization.

As may easily be imagined, the coming of the miners and the cowboys and the farmers had not left the Indians unmoved. The rapid disappearance of the buffalo brought the Red Men face to face with starvation. A period of Indian wars began with an uprising of the Sioux in Minnesota in 1862 and from that time the wars went on intermittently for fourteen years. The Indians committed outrages against the settlers and were in turn punished by the army with a cruelty at least equal to their own. In the Minnesota rising four hundred of the settlers were killed, and after the rising had been suppressed, thirty-eight of the Indians were hanged on a single scaffold at Mankato, Minnesota. In the summer and fall of 1864, a rising of the Indians of Colorado cut off communication with the Missouri River. The trains crossing the plains provided themselves with large escorts for protection. When the Indians finally agreed to come together for a conference on their grievances with the governor of the territory, Colonel Chivington in charge of the militia received a telegram from the commander of the military department, "I want no peace till the Indians suffer more." On the strength of this message, Chivington attacked the camp of Indians without warning, killing indiscriminately braves, squaws, and children. The army called it a punitive campaign, and throughout they held to the theory that the Indian could not be kept in order except by the sternest measures. Many of the men felt sincerely that the only good Indian was a dead Indian. On the other hand the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Washington described the affair as "a massacre in which Black Kettle's people were butchered in cold blood by troops in the service of

the United States." More than once soldiers that ventured too far from their garrisons did not return and their mutilated bodies were afterwards found lying in the ambush where they fell. Sometimes the Indians won a real battle. The best known incident of this kind was the defeat and death of General Custer and his men in Dakota in 1876.[1]

Largely as a result of the Chivington massacre, Congress appointed a commission which published in 1867 an elaborate and illuminating *Report on the Condition of the Indian Tribes*. A few years later the interest of the nation in the Indian problem was again aroused by the publication of Helen Hunt Jackson's *A Century of Dishonor* (1881). From these studies it was made evident that the old policy of allowing the Indians to roam the plains as wild tribes and of conciliating them by gifts and dealing with them as independent nations through treaties, had been made obsolete as the cow country was in turn to be soon outworn. The wild life of the Indian and the settlement of the West by farmers could not be reconciled. The purpose of the government at Washington had been uniformly kind, but its methods had been utterly inadequate to the occasion. The agents that visited the Indians of the plains and mountains and sought to explain to them the imperative reasons that made necessary the curtailment of their once unlimited domain, were sometimes corrupt spoilsmen who had bought their places by political services or even by gifts of money. They cheated the Indians without mercy, charging the government for immense quantities of blankets and other goods that never reached the outraged warriors. The few honest agents were likely to look on every question from the Indian's point of

[1] One of the best books on the Indian Wars is Col. W. A. Graham, *The Story of the Little Big Horn* (1926).

view and to allow the savages the use of improved firearms that made them dangerous enemies to the best trained soldiers. The little army of some thirty thousand men was honest and untouched by the rascality of the agents. Its officers and men were almost always ready to undergo dangers and discomforts to protect the frontier. But the soldiers were unable to make any constructive contribution to the Indian problem. At all times, responsibility was hopelessly divided between Indian agents, army officers, and territorial officials.

After 1877, the process of concentrating the Indians in comparatively small reservations, where they could be educated to the advantages of agriculture and gradually made self-supporting once more within a smaller area, went rapidly forward. The whole problem was that of abruptly changing about a quarter of a million people from the hunting stage of economic life to that of agriculture. Results that for most races have been gradually brought about through centuries under the economic pressure of increasing population and limited land were here attained in part, and not without ruinous mistakes, in the course of a single generation.

By the Dawes Act of 1887, the new policy received its legal charter. By that time, the Indians of the plains had been placed on reservations and the Indian population which had been decreasing or at best holding its own, began to grow. The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to divide the lands among individual Indians, on the basis of one hundred and sixty acres of agricultural lands to the head of each family and of forty acres to each child. The Indians were at the same time placed under the laws of the territories and states in which they lived and were promised citizenship when they had adopted civilized modes of life and had given up

their tribal governments. The farms of the Indians were not to be alienated for twenty-five years. The lands that remained from the Indian reservations after division, were to be bought by the government and made the basis of new farms under the Homestead Act. By decisions of the Courts, it had been held that the Indians were not citizens under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the old practice of dealing with them as independent nations by treaties had been given up as early as 1871, and from the time of the passage of the Dawes Act, they were rapidly granted citizenship and treated as individuals. The law did not apply to the five civilized tribes which had already adopted, in the eastern part of the future State of Oklahoma, an agricultural form of life, but the process of allotment and purchase opened up to white settlers some very rich lands in the central and western parts of this region. Many years later, in 1924, the last of the Indians had been made citizens with the ordinary rights and obligations of other individuals and a process which had begun with the first arrival of white men in North America was complete. The discovery of rich oil fields in Oklahoma after 1900 had in the meantime made many individual Indians prosperous beyond the fondest dreams of those who had planned the policy.[1]

The eager settlers had long been looking with covetous eyes on the surplus lands within the Indian country, now reduced to a mere fraction of the vast area it had covered only twenty years before. It required all the authority of Presidential Proclamations and the strength of the army to hold back the crowds until the changes contemplated by the Dawes Act had been completed. To the honor of the national government, it must be recorded that these duties were at last faithfully per-

[1] For the Dawes Act of 1887, see Macdonald, *Select Statutes*, 372.

formed and the Indians were protected in their final rights as they had never been before. When legal title had been acquired, the barriers were let down by the proclamation of President Harrison in April of 1889, and the settlers and land speculators surged out over the rich lands of Oklahoma, establishing claims and plotting future towns within a week. It was the last dramatic movement of the American people into the West. Population grew with surprising rapidity and in 1890, Oklahoma, including the old Indian reservations, was made an organized territory and in 1907 became a State, with the shortest history and the longest Constitution that had yet been recorded.

In the meantime, the movement for statehood had been gathering strength in the mining and agricultural communities of the last American frontier. It will be remembered that after 1874, for many years, no single party was in absolute control of the national government, the Senate being regularly Republican and the House Democratic. These Western states were expected to be Republican, a belief that has not been entirely justified by the later results. Remembering how the admission of Colorado had turned the tide against them in 1876, the Democrats were naturally wary about new admissions. But when the political control of the nation had been lost to the Republicans in the election of President Harrison, the Democrats yielded to the inevitable and allowed an "omnibus" bill to pass, authorizing the creation of four Western states, Washington, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The bill was signed by President Cleveland in the closing days of his administration and the omnibus states were admitted by the proclamation of his successor (1889). Not to be outdone, the two mountain regions that had been left

out proceeded to make constitutions without formal sanction from Congress, and Republican votes in the House having proved of great advantage, Idaho and Wyoming were admitted in 1890, in spite of the fact that neither had at the time the population of a small city in the East. In these ways, small communities in the West gained power in the Senate quite equal to that of the oldest and wealthiest industrial states of the Atlantic seacoast. These six Western states were admitted under preliminary conditions, a practice that had been first attempted in connection with Missouri and which had become common with the readmission of the Southern states. The most important of these conditions was that they should not claim authority over the national public lands within their domain or tax the lands of aliens at a higher rate than those of their own citizens. On account of the presence of these unallotted lands, some of the Western states, in contrast with Texas which has always owned its own public lands, are scenes of a divided jurisdiction in which the national government continued to control areas greater than those that came under the local laws. This circumstance became of importance after the rise of the conservation movement in the twentieth century, for the West has usually been anxious to promote the rapid settlement of its lands, and has been quite willing to let tomorrow look after itself.

After 1890, the old agricultural frontier was closed, and could not hope to be extended except by the increase of irrigation in the dryer regions of what had once been called "the great American desert." Since that time, with the rush of people to the city and to Canada, the frontier area with a population of less than six to the square mile has tended to increase rather than diminish. The population of the mountain states has not grown

as rapidly as their founders prophesied or as their political strength would properly warrant.

With the admission of the omnibus states and the closing of the frontier, three communities and only three remained for the exercise of the old and brilliantly conceived colonial plan of 1787. One of these, New Mexico, with its capital at Santa Fé, was among the oldest of American communities and was the one in which the institutions of old Spain have left their most permanent marks. Santa Fé dated back at least to 1605, before the establishment of Jamestown or Quebec. The other two were more recent: Utah, where the exiled Mormons had found what they expected to be an independent home in 1846, and the new mining community of Arizona. Each of these had a marked individuality of its own. Utah had long had sufficient people, according to the practice of the times, to claim statehood, but such a measure was postponed for many years partly on political grounds and also on account of the dislike of the polygamous teachings of the Mormon church. Utah had had a troubled history, marked by a revolt against national authority in 1857 and by the temporary sequestration, in the eighties, of the property of the church in the effort to enforce a national law against polygamy. The church at length capitulated and in 1890 officially repudiated polygamy. The admission of Utah as a State was sanctioned in 1894 and consummated two years later.

Arizona and New Mexico refused common statehood in 1906 because they wanted to be separate communities and were not finally received into the full privileges of this status until 1912. Even then, Arizona was compelled to wait by the reluctance of President Taft to accept a provision of the Constitution which contained among many other radical ideas a plan for the recall of


THE FAR WEST
(1900)
Lines which have received Government aid
PACIFIC OCEAN
DOMINION
WASHINGTON
MONTANA
OREGON
IDAHO
WYOMING
NEVADA
UTAH
COLORADO
ARIZONA
NEW MEXICO
MEXICO
VANCOUVER
TACOMA
PORTLAND
COLUMBIA R.
SALMON R.
HELENA
BILLINGS
YELLOWSTONE R.
MISSOURI R.
YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK
BOISE
SNAKE R.
GRANGER
CHEYENNE
GREAT SALT L.
OGDEN
SALT LAKE CITY
CARSON
SACRAMENTO
SAN FRANCISCO
SIERRA NEVADA
COAST RANGE
DENVER
COLORADO SPRINGS
PUEBLO
GRAND R.
TRINIDAD
SANTE FE
ALBUQUERQUE
PRESCOTT
LOS ANGELES
COLORADO
YUMA
BENSON
EL PASO
PECOS R.
RIO
125
120
115
110
105
45
40
35
30
LONGITUDE WEST FROM

judges. To secure admission, Arizona cancelled this section and then readopted it after it had become a State. The binding quality of the various promises and conditions which have been attached to statehood especially since the Civil War, is a curious and unsettled question of American Constitutional Law. The political significance of the organized West was made evident, when in 1916, it made possible the selection of Wilson over Hughes in the very close election of that year.

Largely as a result of the Western movement, in the half century from 1850, the area of farm land increased from 293,000,000 acres to more than 840,000,000 acres. The new land opened to agricultural uses was almost twice as much as that converted from the wilderness in the whole period since the first coming of the white man. The area of improved land increased even more rapidly, being three times as great in 1900 as in 1850. The new farms represented at the close of the century one fourth of the total area of the continental United States. But in spite of the lavish generosity of its land policy after 1841 and especially 1862, the amount of public land in the hands of the government at the close of the century was still almost six hundred millions of acres, besides the vast domains in the Indian reservations and in public parks. Twenty-five years later, the public domain was still almost four hundred millions of acres. The presence of great areas of government land in all the Western states has made their relations to the national government essentially more intimate than that of the older states and has been a factor in breaking down the older idea of states' rights.

A large part of the public domain is unfit for cultivation. In more than two fifths of the continental United States, from the Mississippi to the mountains and beyond, the annual rainfall is less than twenty inches.

Many settlers have been lured into these regions by a few good years of exceptional rainfall and have raised astonishing crops on the fertile and virgin soil, only to meet with the discouragement of more typical years which follow. Such failures have promoted agricultural discontent and created a demand for radical remedies. Populism may be described in the West in terms of rainfall.

The demand for irrigation created by these conditions seems likely to bring in a new West, as distinctive in its social and economic life as the earlier West of the miner and the cowboy. Irrigation was first used on a large scale by the industrious and thrifty Mormons in Utah who, under the wise and paternalistic government of Brigham Young, literally made the desert to blossom as the rose. In 1850, when the average farm in California held more than three thousand acres, those in Utah had only fifty. The attention of the nation was turned to the possibilities of irrigation during the good times of the later nineties by the reports of government engineers who estimated, probably too optimistically, that as much as one hundred millions of acres, an area much larger than the greatest of the eastern states, could be made immensely fertile by irrigation. By an act passed in 1902 under the influence of President Roosevelt, the national government began to aid in the promotion of great works of irrigation, the public advances to be repaid on easy terms by actual settlers. By 1919, through the joint action of private and public capital, nineteen million acres had been irrigated and were raising crops that soon repaid the outlay. While the area was disappointingly small when compared with the early prophecies which undoubtedly overestimated the amount of available water, some of the works are notable both from an engineering and a social point of

view.[1] In no places are farmers more closely bound by the ties of the community than in the colonies that depend on irrigation for their sustenance. The new West seems likely to have many of the social characteristics of the urban areas.

[1] The areas reclaimed from swamps were much more extensive and now total about sixty millions of acres. For early views of irrigation, see *Year Book of the Department of Agriculture*, 1898, 325–349.

CHAPTER X

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1860–1890)

THE period of the Civil War inaugurated changes in the life of the people in the more thickly settled sections of the Northeast that were quite as complete as those that took place in the South and the West. These changes taken together constituted a social and industrial revolution. Most of these movements were already in the air and were merely hastened rather than caused by the great national catastrophe.

To appreciate the extent of these changes it is only necessary to remember some of the conditions of life in the year 1860. The nation that went to war was still essentially agricultural. In spite of the growth of towns that had taken place since the Revolution, eighty-six per cent of the people lived either on the farm or in villages of less than eight thousand inhabitants. Only fourteen per cent lived in towns and cities, and of these only two or three had attained metropolitan dimensions. A building of ten stories was regarded as a curiosity.

The first "elevator" or "lift" had been installed in 1855, and the number of stories was limited by the absence of steel. Horse cars were in their infancy and more rapid means of communication were still in the future. People were compelled by the necessities of the case to live near their work. Knowledge of antiseptics and of preventive medicine had as yet made little

headway and a death rate of twenty-five or thirty in the thousand was regarded as "normal."[1] Typhoid fever was one of the more common diseases. A family with five children was regarded as small. In many communities divorce was practically unknown and a divorced person was looked upon as under a cloud. In a typical town and everywhere in the country the church was still the social as well as the religious center of the community and the minister had something of the influence that he had had in colonial New England and that he had lost in the early part of the national period. It was estimated that in 1840 there were only twenty men in the whole country worth as much as a million of dollars and the number in 1860 was still small.

Common schools had increased rapidly in number, but the proportion of students who went to college had not kept pace with the population. The only important engineering college in the United States was the military Academy at West Point. A college of three hundred students was very large, and the college was regarded as essentially a source for future clergymen. Not even the law or medicine required any preliminary college degree. In the whole United States there were no graduate students in the modern sense. The sciences were quite generally lumped together as natural philosophy and taught by a single individual. Experiments were conducted in the presence of the class by the professor, but the students were not encouraged to touch the expensive chemicals or other apparatus. The few men, like Henry at Princeton and Silliman at Yale, who did advanced scientific work carried on their researches largely in spite of the college and not by its organized aid. The classics were still the backbone of the college course and were ably taught by the only

[1] Today the death rate is about 12 per thousand.

members of the staff who could be regarded as specialists. History was frequently taught as a side line by the Professor of Moral Philosophy who also added to his other duties a short course in Economics. The chief method of instruction was the exact recitation of sections from prescribed textbooks. The colleges were largely maintained by tuition fees and by occasional gifts to make up deficits. Coeducation had had its beginnings in the West in such institutions as Oberlin and Antioch, both in Ohio, but colleges for women were still unknown. It was regarded as an axiom that "woman's place is in the home." But the educational system did not pretend to do anything directly to prepare her even for this vocation.

For a generation, immigration had been an important factor in American life. The immigrants came almost exclusively from Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany. An Italian, a Bulgarian, a Russian Jew would have been regarded on the streets of the average American town or city with something of the curiosity which might today apply to a Chinaman. In spite of the native American movement and the later Know-nothing party of the early fifties, movements which had been based on religious motives rather than social or economic considerations, the immigrant had been generally welcomed. The Irish had borne a large part in the building of the canals and railroads and the Germans had contributed greatly to the rapid development of the Middle West. The control of immigration had been left largely to the states. The only important federal laws had tended to increase the tide of immigration by requiring better facilities in the crowded sailing packets. Until the middle of the period of the war, the majority of the immigrants came on sailing vessels whose competition tended to create an artificial stimulus to

the movement. The first years of the war reduced the number of incoming immigrants at a time when common labor was in great demand. The first federal law on the subject was passed in 1864 and was significant of the older attitude to the subject. It provided for the enforcement of contracts made by the immigrants in Europe and for the collection of the amounts due to the importers from their wages. The general consequences were somewhat similar to the old colonial system of indentured service. Under the provisions of this law a company was incorporated under the laws of Connecticut frankly devoted to securing contract labor and its capital stock of a million dollars was subscribed by men of prominence in politics and business. At the same time, the importation of Chinese, especially by the railroads of California, became increasingly important. With the rise of a self-conscious group of laborers, the contract labor law of 1864 was repealed in 1868, and a movement began to prevent the importation of Chinese.

The decade from 1850 to 1860 had been remarkable for the rapid rise of immigration. The number of arrivals had numbered more than two and a half millions. In spite of the war, the sixties had brought almost the same number. In the seventies, even with the severe industrial depression after 1873, the number was two millions eight hundred thousand. But the banner decade of the century came during the eighties when more than five millions reached American ports. From an early period in the nineteenth century small groups had arrived from Scandinavian countries which had created agricultural communities in various sections of the country. But they had been an inconsiderable part of the whole number until after the war. During the seventies and the eighties, Swedish immigrants, to the consternation of many in the old country, came by the

hundreds and the thousands, and settled largely in the rich agricultural lands of the northwest, especially Minnesota, where they had an influence similar to that of the Germans in Wisconsin.[1] The importance of economic considerations is apparent, for the tide of immigration rose and fell with industrial prosperity or depression. But with abundant western lands, the immigrant did not seem to press on the American standard of living as long as the surplus could be easily accommodated on farms in the West.

The year 1882 marks an important transition in American social history and especially in that of the astonishing movement of population which we are now considering. In that year the most important of the western railroads were nearing completion and the best of the once illimitable regions in the West had been taken up. Factories, corporations, and cities grew rapidly in size and in importance. America was passing from agriculture and commercial towns to the age of the metropolis. An immigration of almost eight hundred thousand in one year was not to be exceeded during the remainder of the century. More persons arrived from the countries of western Europe, especially from Germany, than were to come in any year thereafter. Above all, new streams of immigration from the less developed countries of eastern and southern Europe now became large enough to attract general attention. That year (1882) accordingly marks the transition from what has been called the old to the new immigration. In the years from 1819 to 1883, the old immigration, substantially similar in racial stock and in social institutions to the

[1] There is a striking similarity between the reasons for the immigration of the Swedes and that of the English Puritans two hundred years before. See Stephenson, G. M., *The Beginnings of Swedish Immigration*, *Am. Hist. Review*, 1926.

various groups that had come in the colonial period, had made up fully ninety-five per cent of the total. In 1882, the old immigration still constituted eighty-seven per cent of the whole. In 1907, it had fallen to nineteen per cent and in the meantime the new immigration had risen to more than eighty per cent, precisely reversing the situation at the beginning of the period.

The most important sources of the new immigration were southern Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. The reasons for this change were many and complex, and lay partly in Europe as well as in America. With the rapid closing of the American frontier, the kinds of opportunity that had appealed to the English, the Germans, the Swedes, and to a less extent the Irish immigrants, had largely disappeared. In the meantime, the rapid commercial and industrial development of the countries of western Europe had created new opportunities at home, and though wages and the standard of living were still higher in America than in western Europe, the relative advantage of America had greatly decreased. In the meantime, new opportunities of the old kind had developed in Australia, in Canada, in Argentina, and in Brazil, and many who would once have come to the United States now went to newer countries. The situation was illustrated by the fact that the northern Italians, with their larger proportion of Teutonic blood and their higher standards of living went to Argentina, while the southern Italian peasants came to the United States. During the period when the relative advantages of America were sharply decreasing in northern and western Europe, the rapid growth of European railroads and the development of steam navigation to Mediterranean ports brought close to New York and Boston regions that had once been isolated from America. Many a village that for centuries had lain

forgotten in central Europe now found itself on the highways of the world's commerce, almost as fully as Liverpool or Glasgow themselves. To the people of these regions as to the isolated French Canadians who were soon to come in large numbers to the manufacturing cities of old Puritan New England, the opportunities of high wages in American factories were pictured in glowing colors by steamship agents and by returning immigrants who had no desire to lessen the value of their own adventures. A story, half legend half fact, of America as the land of boundless wealth was soon a familiar subject of conversation in many a village tavern. So a mere trickle became a steady and swiftly flowing stream which was to transform both the old world and the new.

In addition to the opportunities in the rising American industries for unskilled labor without capital, there were also special reasons for each of the three chief types of the new immigration which became so prominent in the last two decades of the century. Austria-Hungary was not a nation but a strangely compounded empire in which the dominant elements were the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary. Subject to these dominant races, were submerged groups largely of Slavic race who bore a disproportionate burden of taxation in a state to which their allegiance contained little of fundamental loyalty. Many of these peasants were really serfs working on large estates under conditions which gave them a bare subsistence. In southern Italy, political motives for emigration were smaller, for Italy had won nationality and independence. But the very glories of her victory over Austria had brought an intense and costly nationalism. Italy felt that she must support an army and navy which would give her the respect of her neighbors, and independence had proved expen-

sive. Land in southern Italy, and especially in Sicily, was divided into huge estates, many of the landlords living in Rome or Naples. The birth rate was abnormally high and, in spite of a high death rate, the landlords found little difficulty in supplying themselves with very cheap labor. The reasons for emigration were much the same as those that had brought the earlier groups from Ireland. It was no wonder that whole districts were depopulated by the eager agents of the steamship lines. The third important element came from Russia, especially Russian Poland, but contained very few native Russian peasants. For reasons that were partly religious and partly economic and social, the Jews who had come to these regions during the period of persecutions and expulsions of the later middle ages, were now bitterly hated. In 1881, a series of massacres occurred that shocked a world that had not treated the Jews any too well at an earlier period. In 1882, laws were passed, largely by the influence of the Greek Church, which placed the Jews of Russia under very heavy burdens that in many cases made it almost impossible for them to make a living in their old vocations. Many of them found a way of escape by taking ship in a German port for the wonderland across the sea.

The new immigration was in many ways in marked contrast to the old. For reasons which were largely beyond their control, the new immigrants settled in the large cities of the northeast and increased greatly a change which had already begun. This was as largely true of the Slavs and the Italians who had been peasants for untold generations as for the town-dwelling Jews. Among the Slavs and the Italians the number of unmarried men was very large in proportion to the whole. Where the old immigration had been of whole families, the new immigrants were young men who did not expect

to learn the language or to seek naturalization, but who often returned to live in their native village after they had made a competence. With every period of industrial depression, emigration from America became almost as important as immigration. As a single example of this condition, more than ninety per cent of the Bulgarians were unmarried young men. In other cases the proportions were nearly as high. In this as in other respects the Jews were in marked contrast, for they had no desire to return to Russia, and the number of women and children was even higher than that of men.

In America, one of the most marked consequences of the new immigration was an increased stratification of society which gave opportunity for the unfortunate appearance of racial and social prejudice. On the other hand, the presence of this large number of vigorous young men at their best productive period was unquestionably a factor of great importance in the rise of great industries and the creation of very large fortunes. By the close of the century, the great cities were made up of actual majorities of foreign-born inhabitants or of those who had lived in America for only one generation. The laborers in almost all the greatest industries were predominantly foreign born, and this statement was especially true of iron and steel manufacturing, slaughtering and meat packing, coal mining, all the textile industries, where the immigrant had replaced the earlier labor of women and children, leather tanning, oil refining and sugar refining, the percentages of foreign born labor ranging in these occupations from sixty to eighty-five per cent. Such a statement is in itself clear evidence of the importance of immigration, for better or worse, in the industrial revolution of the last half of the century.

Side by side with increase of immigration which continued until the period of restriction that belongs to a

later chapter in connection with the world war, there was a marked decrease in the American birth rate and in the size of families. Some writers went so far as to connect the two causally and to argue that immigration was simply a substitution of one stock for another. But later studies have shown that the decrease had begun as early as 1810 when immigration was still small and that it is characteristic of many countries with rising standards of living in which immigration has played a small part. It now seems probable that one of the most important consequences of the immigration movement was to allow the continuance of the traditional increase of more than twenty per cent in the numbers of the American people in every decade at a time when without it the numbers of persons would have grown more slowly.[1]

Side by side with the important changes in the character and direction of immigration of which we have spoken came industrial changes of which immigration was at once a symptom and a cause. Three events have been often emphasized as the beginnings of the factory system in America. In the year after the establishment of the government under the Constitution (1790), Samuel Slater, an English spinner, arrived with the fundamental ideas of the new machines which were to create a revolution in methods of spinning.

[1] For an opposite view of this difficult and much debated subject as well as for a careful account of the whole subject, see Fairchild, H. P., *Immigration. The Report of the Immigration Commission of 1907* is the chief source for the study of this subject in its various aspects. See also Dublin, L. I., *Population Problems*, and G. M. Stephenson, *A History of American Immigration.* The year 1882 not only saw the beginnings of the new immigration but also the first federal restrictive laws, especially against the importation of the Chinese. The real period of restriction comes after 1914.

But Slater's factory at Pawtucket was, from the modern point of view, only a shop. It was not until 1814 that Francis C. Lowell established at Waltham the first real factory in which the whole process of making cloth was carried on in a single establishment under centralized control and with the use of machinery which put a premium on unskilled labor. And it was not until the year when Andrew Jackson became President (1829) that the wealthy merchants, Amos and Abbot Lawrence, invested in Lowell's endangered enterprise the capital that would once have gone exclusively to ships and so helped to mark the transformation of commercial into manufacturing New England, a transformation that had notable consequences in the views of such a typical New Englander as Daniel Webster on the mooted question of protection and free trade. By 1840, the factory system was quite firmly established in a single section of the country and in a single industry, the production of textiles.

In spite of these familiar beginnings, in the early sixties industry in the United States taken as a whole still belonged to the age of tools and skilled labor rather than of machines and unskilled labor. In many kinds of labor and in many industries there were still at that time vestiges of the industrial stages that had preceded and which had not been entirely replaced. The earliest American producer had been the travelling artisan of the early colonial period who had gone from farm to farm and made the shoes for the family, taking his own tools and skill and using the materials and to some extent the labor of the persons for whom he worked. In this early stage it is evident that the worker was at once a producer and a merchant and that the price bargain for shoes and the wage bargain for labor were merged in a single transaction. With an almost com-

plete lack of good roads, the market was of the narrowest and articles were consumed at the place of production. In 1860, examples of such home industries were by no means uncommon in communities which had not been made fully accessible by better means of communication.

Taking the fundamental shoe industry as typical for the sake of simplicity, a second stage had been reached late in the seventeenth century when the artisan had established himself in a little shop in the village and the farmers had come to him to have their shoes made to order, sometimes using his own materials and sometimes the leather that was brought to him by the farmer. In this stage the master artisan, distinguished largely by greater age and experience rather than by the possession of capital, began to employ and train younger men who became his apprentices. The artisans sometimes organized to prevent the competition of the unskilled and to keep prices at a customary level. Towns and villages passed laws to encourage industry and more often to make prices low. Strikes occurred but, like those of European guilds, they were directed by the artisans and journeymen against the consumer. Even as late as 1860, examples of this custom order stage of industry made possible by a widening market were still to be found and there are men still living who remember the village shoemaker and his shoes made to measure. In this second stage it is evident that the modern problem of capital and labor had not yet arisen. The interests, the point of view, and the methods of masters, journeymen, and apprentices were substantially the same.[1]

[1] There is an illuminating paper by J. R. Commons, *American Shoemakers, 1648–1895*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1909.

With a widening market, changes, the full significance of which was not recognized at the time, came with bewildering rapidity about the beginning of the national period. With better means of communication, strangers began to come to town who had not ordered shoes in advance, and the masters began to use the leisure of their journeymen and apprentices to make extra shoes for sale at retail. Thus "shop" work began to appear side by side with the older "bespoke" work and the functions of the master as merchant and an employer began to crystallize out from his earlier functions. And this long before anyone had thought of changing the tools or the forms of production, the awl, the last, and the other implements that had been common for many centuries.

The increasing importance of the merchant in American life became apparent when an enterprising master made a journey to the South and took orders for his surplus goods. This was the beginning of a wholesale order stage in industry which was destined to have momentous social consequences. We find one retail merchant and master, John Bedfore, describing in 1799 the way in which he branched out: "Some time afterward, my little capital being laid out in stock, and no way of mending it at home, an idea struck me of going to the southward, and endeavor to force a sale. I went to Charleston at the risque of my life, for the vessel in which I went had like to have been lost at sea. I put my articles at an extremely low price, by which I had but little profit, in order to induce people to deal with me. I got two customers at Charleston; from there I went to Norfolk, Petersburg, Richmond and Alexandria. . . . I returned with two or three small orders . . . business became a little brisk and the journeymen turned out again; on which account I was forced to

raise the price of the work I had stipulated to perform."[1]

With the building of the national highway, the canals, and the early railroads the wholesale order stage passed into one in which goods were made for a speculative wholesale market without previous orders. Such a stage evidently required larger capital and the manufacturer became dependent on short loans from the local bank. It was no longer possible to pass on to local consumers advances in wages, and the views of the manufacturer and the laborer began to show points of increasing conflict. Having a distant market to study and to nourish, the older type of merchant manufacturer who had himself developed from the master artisan, began to disappear and the capitalist began to specialize as a wholesale merchant who bought his goods from smaller producers who were essentially small contractors. In the competition between various merchants, "goodwill," trade marks, trade names, began to have value as articles of property, and the American "drummer" became a familiar figure at the village retail store, much as book agents compete today. For the workers, the tools of the trade had not yet greatly changed, but instead of each man making a whole pair of shoes, methods of team work were introduced to secure the advantages of the division of labor. The parts of the task that required less skill were often contracted out to be made in the houses of the workers, under conditions that later came to be stigmatized as sweat shops. The small contractor had to keep wages down to meet his contracts. The worker was now separated from the consumer by at least three stages. Specialists had arisen in the wage bargain, the wholesale bargain, and the retail bargain. In many industries, this was the stage which was familiar to the people that emerged from the war. With the

[1] *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, III, 121.

introduction of team work in shops and homes as contrasted with the old skilled labor of the individual, and with the larger demands of an increasing market, the industry was ready for the introduction of the more efficient methods of the machine driven by some form of power, in other words for the coming of the factory. This stage of production did not become common until the decade of the eighties.

During the period of the war, the jobber and the commission merchant were the dominant industrial class. In this period John D. Rockefeller as a commission merchant in Cleveland, and many another man, laid the foundations of the great fortunes of today. The demands of the federal government were unceasing and amounted to a great and artificial widening of a market which was already very broad. Under the protection of war tariffs and by making shrewd contracts, a "shoddy" aristocracy arose to take the place of the generation of the merchant princes who had gone down to the sea in ships. The middleman was in the saddle, and even in the field of transportation, the express companies such as Wells Fargo and the grain elevator companies of the West were essentially middlemen buying transportation at wholesale from small competing railroads and selling it to the public at retail. The Pullman Company, with its through sleepers at a time when the day passengers had to change trains, was another example of the same tendency. So were the packers with their through refrigerating cars of a little later date. A conflict of interests began to appear between the producers and the middlemen, especially the farmers and the grain elevator companies, which expressed itself in the Granger laws and the Greenback movement of the seventies.[1]

[1] See especially, Fite, E. D., *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War*, N. Y., 1910.

In the industries that required capital, changes began which soon glorified the rôle of the manufacturer and placed the old commission merchant and jobber in a subordinate position. These changes were partly the result of the wider market and partly of technical improvements which demanded larger capital for the producer than for the merchant. By 1869, under the leadership of such men as Cornelius Vanderbilt the shorter lines of railroads had been consolidated and four great systems, the New York Central, the Pennsylvania, the Baltimore and Ohio, and the Erie, had standardized their conflicting gauges and had created through connections to the very edges of the western country in Chicago and St. Louis.

The now accessible internal market for goods created the demand for increased efficiency of production and that demand was met by new technical devices and the improvement of methods already known in growing factories where hundreds and thousands of partly skilled laborers were brought together under one roof. Of the important inventions those which had transformed communication and production in the earlier period had been of English origin. The steam engine, the railroad locomotive, and the various devices for the spinning and weaving of cotton had been adopted in American factories. But the scarcity of labor in America had greatly stimulated the passion for invention and in the single year before the war more than four thousand patents were issued. Of these thousands of early inventions the only ones which could be said to have profoundly affected American life were Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793, the application of steam to navigation beginning with Robert Fulton's *Clermont* of 1807, and the electric telegraph based on the researches of Joseph Henry and brought into practical use with the

completion of the first line in 1844 by S. F. B. Morse. Even very important inventions like the binder of Cyrus McCormick of 1834 were not manufactured on a large scale until the opening of the Chicago factory in 1848 and did not come into general use until the new westward movement and the scarcity of labor during the war had made some device for cutting wheat more rapid than the old-fashioned cradle essential to the farmers of the prairies. Although Elias Howe had invented a practicable sewing machine as early as 1846, the real history of the new device commences with the Civil War, and especially with the application, in 1862, of the machine to the making of shoes by Gordon McKay. The full significance of Goodyear's pitiful persistence through unnumbered discouragements in hardening rubber was to wait for realization until the coming of the automobile in the twentieth century. Even more striking was the case of the most important of all practical devices in the field of electricity, the dynamo, the principles of which had been fully worked out by Faraday in England as early as 1831, but which was not used on any large scale for more than half a century. The first commercial hydro-electric station was not built in the United States until 1891.

The truth of the matter was that invention had to wait until increased population, easier means of communication, and above all a cheap material had set the stage. When these conditions were ripe, the factory rapidly replaced the shop and the home as a center of industry and the masters of capital were factory owners first and merchants second. The transition is fully seen in the typical Cleveland commission merchant of the sixties, John D. Rockefeller, who became in the seventies the greatest of oil refiners and in the eighties the founder of the first great American trust. Immigration and a

high birth rate had brought the necessary population, the railroads furnished communication out of all proportion to the initial need, and the new material was steel. With brittle iron the possibilities of machinery had been greatly limited. With steel it was possible not only to build machines but tools with which to make other machines.



THE IRON AND STEEL FAMILY-TREE.

(Reproduced from *A Popular History of American Invention*, Vol. II., by the courtesy of Charles Scribner's Sons)

The new age which was to begin was essentially the age of steel. Men had long known the possibilities of iron with a small percentage of carbon, but the only method for its production had been the expensive purification of pig iron in crucibles. Such a product could only be used for the finest tools and cutlery. Sir Henry Bessemer in England had invented in 1856 a new and cheap process for the production of steel which must rank with that of the steam engine as one of the two greatest discoveries of modern times. The Bessemer process was first used in the United States in 1867 and the open hearth process two years later, the very years in which the country saw the consolidation of its small railroads and the completion of the first great railroad to

the Pacific. Which of the two sets of factors was cause and which effect it would puzzle the wisest to decide. In any case the transformation in life was more complete than anything that had gone before. In 1860 the United States produced less than twelve thousand tons of steel; in 1890 when the revolution was virtually complete, the production reached five million tons and even the country in which the inventions had first been made had been left far behind.

No invention needed now to wait for half a century and the list of those which soon came into common use is bewildering in length. Cyrus W. Field had laid his first transatlantic cable in 1858 with the financial aid of Peter Cooper and undismayed by the failure, after a short and flickering life, of that first cable and of other attempts which followed, had finally made his dreams come true in 1866. It is hard to imagine any future improvement in communication which can rival the thrill of that first cable in uniting distant parts of the globe. Men in America to whom Europe had seemed strangely distant now could read the news of the day in Paris or London in their American papers almost as promptly as if they had lived in France or England. The advantages of Field's personal achievement, for before reaching success he had sunk his whole fortune in the enterprise, was marred to some extent by the high rates. In 1866 the rate was one hundred dollars for a message of twenty words. When Secretary Seward used the cable officially for the first time in sending a demand for the withdrawal of French soldiers from Mexico, the cost to the government of the United States was twenty-five thousand dollars. Fortunately, in a year it had been found practicable to reduce the rate to a dollar and a quarter a word.[1]

[1] Oberholtzer, E. P., *A History of the United States Since the Civil War*, I, 211. The three volumes of this history contain voluminous

No one can read the history of modern invention without being impressed with the fact, that, like the history of literature and scholarship, and to an even greater extent, it is international rather than national. The human mind refuses to be shut within narrow political boundaries. Few important inventions have been entirely due to the genius of a single country and fewer still to the ability of a single individual. Important foreign inventions, like the steam engine, and the fundamental process for the manufacture of steel, and much later the automobile, were merely naturalized in America. Even so the list of American inventions and discoveries that had important social consequences in the last four decades of the nineteenth century is impressive.

The most prolific of American inventors was undoubtedly Thomas Alva Edison who had been born in comparative poverty, at the little town of Milan, Ohio, in 1847. While still a telegraph operator, at the age of twenty-one, he invented a stock ticker, in itself a symbol of the new age in which he lived. In 1876, he had established himself at Menlo Park, to astonish two generations with his discoveries and to win for himself the name of wizard. The phonograph of 1877 did not become practicable for some years, but the incandescent lamp of 1879 was perfected the next year in time to light the dome of the Capitol for the inauguration of President Garfield. In the early eighties, we find Edison working on the problem of the electric railway to give more rapid communication to the growing cities.

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and interesting materials for the social history of the United States after the war. On inventions, Kaempffert, W. (Editor). *A Popular History of American Inventions* (1924) should be consulted. Before 1860 less than 36,000 patents were granted. From 1860 to the end of the century the number was 640,000.

In 1887 the first American electric railway was built in Richmond, Virginia, and was extensively imitated, soon replacing the rather recent cable cars even before these had had time to banish the horse cars of the seventies. By the time that electric cars were widely introduced in 1890 the cities of the United States had absorbed one third of the people. The process went on with accelerated speed until in 1925 fifty-four per cent of the people were living in cities. Today more than half the American people live on one fifth of one per cent of the national territory. Four cities have passed the million mark and there are twenty-nine metropolitan areas, which though containing separate political units, constitute as many distinct urban communities of more than a million apiece. Much of this process of urbanization was due to the changes of which the electric railway was one of the heralds.

Among the discoveries which in the period immediately following 1860 so greatly transformed business and life, none was more significant than the discovery of the commercial possibilities of petroleum. In spite of the general introduction of systems of gas lighting for the streets of the larger cities somewhat earlier, private persons still depended on methods of illumination that had not changed substantially from the days of the Greeks and Romans. The candle with its mellow if uncertain light was still universal, as it had been for centuries, supplemented by crude lamps using whale oil or more recently expensive oil extracted from coal. Boys who went to war were still familiar with the use of flint and steel. Friction matches for ignition had been made practicable and placed on the market by an ingenious druggist in Vienna in 1833, but had not become common in the United States for some years later. Safety matches from Sweden were an even more recent curios-

ity. Laborers were hired to work "from candlelight to candlelight," a phrase that had a literal significance.

Petroleum had of course long been known as a disagreeable liquid to be found floating on the waters of western Pennsylvania. Its medicinal properties had been highly regarded by the Indians. But its modern history begins with one Samuel Kier who hit upon the idea of bottling and selling the natural medicine. By 1850, Kier had built up a flourishing trade, and Kier's oil could be bought in any drug store. Oil was sometimes secured in large quantities as a by-product of salt wells. Coal oil was known to be a good illuminant. Putting two and two together, George H. Bissell, a graduate of Dartmouth, sent a bottle for expert analysis to the best chemist in the United States, Professor Benjamin Silliman, Jr., of Yale. Silliman's report on petroleum in 1855 is one of the landmarks of applied science in the United States.[1] Silliman studied not only the possibilities of petroleum for illumination, but also suggested some of the other uses and the by-products which the years were to make increasingly important. In that sense he can justly claim the right to be called the true discoverer. The Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company was promptly organized to drill for oil. In August of 1859, a productive oil well was opened at a depth of sixty-nine and a half feet at a point in northwestern Pennsylvania about a hundred miles from Pittsburgh. To a region that had been a wilderness, the oil drillers now flocked as they were soon to do to the mining camps of the far West. Crude refineries were built in Pittsburgh and Cleveland and before the end of the period of the

[1] Silliman's epoch making report may be found in the appendix of volume one of Tarbell, Ida M., *History of the Standard Oil Company*, a book which is also the most complete account of the early history of an American trust.

war a far-sighted young commission merchant of the latter city, John D. Rockefeller, invested the savings of the last few years in the new business. The oil was at first transported down the Allegheny to Pittsburgh in barrels loaded on flat boats, but these were soon succeeded by railroads and after a few years by pipe lines. By 1870 the new illuminant was becoming common in distant countries and fifteen years later the tin oil cans of the Standard Oil Company had become to foreign eyes a more familiar symbol of the new nation across the seas than its starry flag.

Less conspicuous but in some cases more fundamental than some of the inventions which could be used directly were the various lathes, drills, grinding machines and other machine tools which were invented with great rapidity after 1865. Such tools made it possible to manufacture parts in large quantities. With interchangeable parts many implements, especially the reaper, could be repaired cheaply on the spot. Whitney's dream of interchangeable parts and quantity production which he had been able to apply duirng his lifetime only to firearms became the most characteristic feature of American as contrasted with European industries, although the full social significance of such methods were not apparent until after 1900 when they were applied to the cheap automobile.

When Jethro Wood, the Quaker farmer of Scipio, New York, had started about 1819 his experiments with the iron plow, farmers still used a wooden plow which was often nothing but a crooked stick. Such plows may still be seen in the valleys of the Nile and the Ganges, but it is difficult to realize how recently similar implements were used by American pioneers engaged in the conquest of a continent. When Wood died in 1834, the iron plow was becoming universal. In 1868,

James Oliver made the next significant change when he introduced the chilled plow, a plow with a hard steel surface, the use of which came to save the American farmer a labor cost of more than thirty millions in a single year. When Oliver died forty years later, in contrast with many other inventors, he was reputed to be the richest man in Indiana. In the same period, other agricultural implements were introduced, notably planters for wheat and corn, and in 1881 the McCormicks began to manufacture a combined reaper and binder using twine, the result of the inventions of many men and in some respects the most ingenious and revolutionary of American machines. Although the cities were growing so much more rapidly than the country, the production of food did not decline. It was estimated in 1900 that a farmer with the new machines could do the work which had required four men in 1860. What had happened was a transfer of a substantial amount of the work of the farm to the factory. Such cities as Chicago and Springfield, Ohio, grew largely as adjuncts to wide agricultural areas. Each separate invention was an item in a correlated process. The iron plow and the prairie made possible the reaper, just as the chilled plow, the machine tool, and the western railroad called forth the magical binder of the eighties.

The importance of labor-saving machinery is indicated by the fact that the value of American manufactures quintupled between 1860 and 1890 while the number of workers only multiplied by three. In quantity the increase was even greater and objects became common and cheap that had been articles of luxury. Side by side with these changes and making them possible came changes in methods of communication. The chief railroads were completed in much the form that they have today. A railroad mileage of thirty thousand

miles in 1860 rose to more than one hundred and sixty thousand miles in 1890. The Pullman car and the Westinghouse air brake made travel more easy and safe. As early as the period of the Civil War the small disjointed telegraph lines were rapidly consolidated under the control of the Western Union Company, the first of the national monopolies. During the eighties the number of messages to be sent over a single wire was doubled and then quadrupled and later multiplied by eight or more.

Three inventions were notable in adding to the growing rapidity and complexity of modern life. The first of these was the typewriter invented by Cristopher Sholes and first placed on the market by the Remingtons in 1873. In the centennial year of 1876, the telephone was made practicable by the simultaneous though independent work of two inventors, Elisha Gray and Alexander Graham Bell. The development of the telephone was delayed by the long and bitter law suit that followed. The victory of Bell was fully capitalized by the business genius of Theodore N. Vail, who more than any other man, made the telephone a universal necessity throughout the United States. As early as 1845, Richard Hoe, a member of a distinguished family of inventors, had made his first rotary press, but most of the newspapers were printed page by page on old-fashioned presses until the eve of the Civil War. The immense demand for news during the war increased enormously the circulation of newspapers. After the war the rapidly growing cities and improvements in communication continued the demand. Cheaper paper, better presses, and the invention of the linotype by Ottmar Mergenthaler in 1884, soon made it possible to print newspapers by the mile instead of by the page.

A new type of journalism arose in which the desires



From the Cleveland Trust Company's *Business Bulletin*

A STUDY IN SATURATION POINTS

All of a sudden in the 'nineties the country found it had enough railroad mileage. Will the same thing happen some time to the demand for automobiles, which so far shows no sign of slowing down? Of course, the parallel may be spoiled by gradual substitution of foreign for domestic markets.

of a wider public were satisfied by news that had direct human interest rather than intrinsic importance. By 1890 the old Associated Press had become a great national institution with immense power and with a clientele that included many of the greatest newspapers. No region was too distant, no public man was too difficult to reach to escape the scrutiny of the daily press. Notable in the newer group of editors were Charles A. Dana, who became the editor of the New York *Sun* in 1868 and Joseph Pulitzer, who took over the St. Louis *Post Dispatch* ten years later and made it a vehicle for social and economic reforms. Pulitzer was a brilliant journalist of Hungarian birth. When he assumed control of the New York *World* he soon made it the most profitable and widely copied of American newspapers. In many newspapers large headlines and stories of scandal and crime became increasingly common.[1]

The increase of manufactures, as yet in a highly competitive stage, had made the business of advertising very important. Newspapers became more and more, towards the close of the century, great business enterprises largely dominated by the more powerful advertisers. The influence of the individual editor became less marked and that of the business manager more prominent. In subtle and half recognized ways, there was often a decrease in the real liberty of the press which was now threatened not by kings and governments but by powerful individuals. Towards the end of the century, the weekly and monthly magazines gained a greater and greater public. The habit of reading books de-

[1] Other editors, of the older type, whose opinions carried weight not only in their own communities, but throughout the country, were E. L. Godkin, of the *N. Y. Evening Post*, Henry J. Raymond, of the *N. Y. Times*, Samuel Bowles, of the *Springfield Republican*, Horace White and Joseph Medill, of the *Chicago Tribune*.

clined relatively. Some time later a foreign observer could make the jibe that American literature was a by-product of the automobile industry.

In spite of new inventions and immense changes in the decades that were to follow, the generation that followed the Civil War had seen the foundations laid for a different industrial America. In the thirty years from 1860 to 1890, the frontier had virtually disappeared. The jobber and the merchant capitalist had been displaced by the manufacturing corporation. The tide of population was running strong, no longer to the West as it had done from the earliest times, but to the City. The central fact in American social and economic life was no longer the old fact of free land but the new and complex possibilities of a metropolitan age of existence. Democracy itself came to have new meanings and to involve strange and unexpected problems. The changes of two and a half centuries had not been greater than those of three short decades.

The industrial revolution was accompanied by changes in the organization of both capital and labor even more remarkable than those in the methods of production. Under the shop system and in the days of the dominance of the merchant-capitalist, wealth was tied up for short periods in credits and stocks of goods on their way to market. For the ownership and control of these forms of capital the individual or the partnership had been quite adequate. When investments were made in permanent machinery business began to look beyond the lifetime of the individual. The law had created in the form of the corporation chartered under the laws of the state an artificial person who did not die. With its permanence and the exact division of the capital in the forms of shares of stock and bonds, it was possible not only

to divide minutely the holdings of any single person, but to provide for the transfer of small portions of capital without winding up the whole business. By selecting between the various types of common and preferred stock as well as bonds, the individual could make a qualitative as well as a quantitative selection among the three chief elements of business ownership, security, profits, and control. Within the limits of a single business it was now possible to vary almost infinitely in both amount and kind the relations of the individual investor to the whole enterprise. The widow or the trustee might invest in well secured bonds, while the more venturesome might take the larger risks and opportunities as well as the larger responsibilities of owning stock.

Before the time of the Civil War, the only important corporate enterprises whose securities were open to general investment were the railroads. Indeed for many years, when one spoke of a corporation, the public generally understood the term to mean a railroad. Until that time the typical industry even where the factory had been introduced was owned by a small number of persons closely bound together by the ties of friendly association or of family. Business generally expanded by the reinvestment of profits. But the investment in government bonds during the war had created new habits in the body of the small producers and had taught business managers the importance of a great and almost untapped source of capital in the savings of the people. Instead of waiting a generation for a small business to grow into a large one, it was now possible to establish a great concern almost over night. Once founded, it might grow by a rapid process of accretion. In the seventies and the eighties corporations were created with astonishing rapidity and were extended into fields that

had once been dominated by single individuals. The corporation with its capital often widely scattered and with its representative form of government offered a rich field to the manipulations of such modern pirates of finance as Jay Gould, "Jim" Fiske, "Uncle" Daniel Drew, and many others. When the public had become better informed as the result of many bitter lessons, it managed to protect itself more wisely and such predatory tactics became less profitable and less common.

Now that shares could be easily bought on the exchange, the small class of persons interested in business became almost indefinitely enlarged. Many a farmer and professional man had his stake in business as important to him as the great holdings of a Vanderbilt or a Rockefeller. This increasing diffusion of business interests was a factor of great importance in American society and politics after the decade of the seventies.

Similarly, the corporate form of organization could be used in many ingenious ways to promote the consolidation of small business enterprises into larger ones. A competing business could now be controlled by the ownership of a small part of the common stock which had been issued. Stocks of competing companies could be held by trustees and the various enterprises managed as a whole, or if that failed, a new company could be formed to own and exercise the voting privileges of stocks that represented the capital of what had once been a score of competing units.

The old personal relations and the community of economic interest that had once subsisted in the days of the master workman and his journeymen and apprentices, had, as we have seen, been greatly weakened by every extension of the market and by the rise of specialists in the wage and the various price bargains. They now tended to disappear entirely in an age when the

employer had become impersonal. In the larger industries, which were rapidly passing into the factory stage, the workers found it difficult to organize or to make a collective bargain with the new employer. In these occupations labor was often unskilled and could be readily recruited from the tide of immigration. But, beginning with 1863, the more skilled workers on the fringes of the factory, especially the railroad workers and those in the building trades and the printers, began to make national organizations most of which have endured until today. The workers developed a distinct philosophy of wages. The first truly national strike occurred in 1877 on the Baltimore and Ohio and on the Pennsylvania lines and was suppressed by the use of Federal troops. It was to be followed by many others and was to inaugurate in its modern form a new and serious problem of capital and labor.

CHAPTER XI

THE CHURCHES AND RELIGION SINCE 1850

The record of their religious opinions and church organizations is a large and important part of the story of the American people. In the colonial days, the part that religion played was so direct and has been so completely reported that this influence is unmistakable. The separation that has been achieved between the state and the church has made it easier in the later history to disregard this force, but it is still there and underlies and explains much in American life. The biography of such an industrial leader as Elbert H. Gary, finds the explanation of many of his acts as corporation head in his upbringing in a pious Methodist home and his experience as a Sunday School teacher. The same connection could be pointed out for many men and women who have been making America what it is.

On the surface, this record of religion lacks unity. The census of 1916 contains returns from two hundred and two religious bodies. The conditions of American life have favored the multiplication of denominations. Pioneers opening up new country have brought with them from other sections of the country and from across the seas their religious institutions and have clung to these with the greater tenacity, because they constituted the last tie with their forefathers. New denominations have sprung up easily on frontiers out of touch

with the general currents of thought. Religious leaders have been bold to make new beginnings, because in this new land, even the smallest beginnings might hold unlimited possibilities. America is "the sanctuary of small sects." Religious freedom came to mean freedom to divide.

Nevertheless, there is a real unity to the story of American religion. It is the story of the adjustment of the churches to the changing conditions of American life. They have been meeting the same problems, facing the same difficulties, engaging in similar tasks by methods that tend to assume more and more uniformity. There is no American church, but there is an American spirit in all the churches. With but few exceptions, the story of each church has been that of its effort to adjust itself to new conditions and problems equally affecting all the churches.

Especially in the latter part of our history is this growing similarity noticeable. This is true even in periods of controversy. When we take up the story about 1850 we find that there had been for twenty years constant debate within the churches resulting in the division of several of these. Theological differences between separate groups which had formerly seemed important had given place to strain and stress within the denominations themselves.

The divisive question of the fifties was that of slavery. While the nation was still seeking a compromise solution, the Methodists and Baptists had come to the parting of the ways over the issue. To the Northern churches, slavery seemed to be a moral question permitting no compromise. If the holding of slaves was wrong, it was a sin, and every slave-holder was a sinner. The Southern churches resented this summary treatment of a complex problem. They regarded the

matter as a political and economic question and suspected the North of having become secularized and worldly in turning aside from the concerns of personal piety to this social problem. When there came to Congress a mammoth memorial, two hundred feet long, bearing the signatures of three thousand and fifty New England clergymen, protesting "in the name of Almighty God" against the proposed extension of slave territory, Stephen A. Douglas characterized the appeal as "monstrous" and Senator Butler of South Carolina poured out his invective against the "political parsons." Charles Sumner defended the ministers for their interposition, saying, "In the days of the Revolution, John Adams yearning for independence, said, 'Let the pulpits thunder against oppression,' and the pulpits thundered. The time has come for the pulpits to thunder again." Most of the Northern pulpits did thunder. The Presbyterian Church, already suffering from division into the Old School and New School branches, tried to avoid the danger of furthering division and suffered losses in consequence. When the trustees of Lane Seminary prohibited the discussion of slavery, four fifths of the students withdrew from the institution. More than one Congregational Church in Presbyterian regions began as a split from a church that had tried to avoid taking sides on this problem. The final cleavage, however, did not come until the conflict had actually begun, and then the division was made on the issue of supporting the Federal Government. The Episcopal Church maintained its unity North and South, until the Church in the Confederate states came into being, quietly and without rancor, on the assumption that a new nation had been born which called for a new national church. The division disappeared as quietly when the war was ended. Behind the slavery

issue during this decade of the fifties, was the larger question of the part that the church should play in national life and its right to exert influence directly on questions of a political nature. This difference remains after all these years and still helps to divide the churches North and South.

The struggle of the churches to keep abreast of their task in an expanding frontier region went on without interruption, while the nation was girding itself for the war. Indeed, the motive of patriotism, which has always played a large part in the American missionary enterprise, became more compelling because of the national situation. The struggle to make Kansas a free state became a "Crusade" and may be described as the last American migration which was the result of a definite religious impulse. Companies were recruited in the churches and went out singing:

> "We cross the prairies as of old
> Our fathers crossed the sea,
> To make the West, as they the East,
> The empire of the free."

An appeal for men and money declared: "We live at the forming period of this great nation. This is a work on whose success depends, to a great extent, the future character of this vast country, the success of our free institutions, the fate of our own children and the millions who are to dwell here, and the nature of our national influence over the world." New England Congregationalism had set before it a definite ideal: "Within the limits of a single generation, a large portion of these Western states must become what New England now is (and if so much, then more) a land of churches, and schools, and charities, of pious homes and great religious enterprises." In response to such calls, not only did

the East contribute its money, but sent men singly and in bands, who were willing to face with apostolic zeal pioneer conditions. Side by side with founding of churches, went the growth of schools and colleges, which have crowded the Middle West with denominational institutions. Not only was this a period of large home missionary activity, but along with it and growing out of the same causes, came a large expansion of foreign missionary undertakings. It was a day of enlarged boundaries and tremendous hopes.

While the Protestant churches were endeavoring to move into the West as fast as the population, the Roman Catholic Church had to provide for the masses of its people coming from Ireland and Germany. The Catholic Church was not altogether unprepared. During the first seventy-five years of our national life, far-sighted leaders, such as Bishop Carroll and later Bishop England, had foreseen that Roman Catholicism might not always form an insignificant minority in the land. The scaffolding at least of the Diocesan system had been set up and the church fully organized. The struggle against "trusteeism," by which the laity would have captured control of the church buildings and the appointment of priests, had been fought out to its conclusion. The Roman Church was not thus to be Americanized. The church was ready for its task, but no one had foreseen its magnitude or the rapidity with which the undertaking would become critical. From an average increase before 1850 of 30,000 a year, the Church was, during the two succeeding decades, to add each year nearly 150,000. In a single year one diocese, Boston, doubled its constituency. The 1245 church buildings that had in 1850 supplied the needs of the Catholics had, by 1860, become 2519 and these were more crowded.

Certain favorable factors did much to make the task

possible. The Irish were preëminently loyal to their church. Denied national existence their patriotism had for generations found expression in their church loyalty. The newcomers found the American Church already largely manned by and in the control of men of Irish blood. Instead of the scattered populations of the frontier, for which Protestant home missions had to provide, most of this new immigration settled in a few large centers within reach of already existing agencies. The immigration from Germany and other European countries scattered more widely and the other factors were not so favorable to holding them true in the midst of a predominantly Protestant population to the church of their fathers. As in the case of the Protestants in the West, it was, not without great losses that the Roman Catholics carried forward their tremendous task.

The good-natured toleration, with which most Americans had come to regard Roman Catholics, rapidly changed to alarm under these new conditions. From less than one per cent of the population at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the Catholics had by 1850 grown to six per cent, and they were rapidly increasing. The Catholics on their part, naturally enough, were looking for more than toleration. They wanted equal recognition and their share in national power. The controversy which now began centered in the question of school instruction. The reading of the Authorized version of the Bible in the public schools made the Catholics uneasy. Bishop Hughes in New York went further and subjected to criticism the text books for reading and history as "replete with sneers and libels against the Catholic Church." The Catholics were looking forward to the establishment of parochial schools and hoped to win for them not only the needed support from the parents of the Catholic children but a share in

the tax money. The alarm of the Protestants led in the early fifties to riots in Philadelphia and other centers. The great cry was, "The Bible is in danger; save it from the priests." There were sections of the East, as in New York City, where, on the eve of the Civil War, the peril of the increase of Catholic power seemed to be more pressing than the question of slavery. The formation of Native American and later of the Know Nothing parties were the beginnings of an almost continuous effort to deal with a religious problem by political methods.

A better preparation for the agony of war that lay ahead, was the revival that spread among the Northern churches in the years 1857 and 1858. A time of business depression and the uncertainty of the future led to an astonishing spread of a plan of business men's meetings. Without preaching or outstanding leaders, these meetings added to the churches perhaps a million members. It was largely a laymen's movement and was an indication of the larger place laymen's activities were to take in the church. One great American evangelist, Charles G. Finney, conducted his last general meetings in this revival and another, Dwight L. Moody, found in this movement the call to his life work. The weekday prayer meeting became a fixed part of the program of Protestant churches. The Young Men's Christian Association, which had been brought to this country from England in 1851, became prominent in connection with this revival and greatly extended its influence.

During the war, the church people were exceedingly busy. The women were sewing garments and rolling bandages for the Sanitary Commission and nearly five thousand churchmen, both ministers and laymen, were in the service of the Christian Commission. The

task of the latter was to distribute Bibles and tracts and hold inspirational meetings for the soldiers, as well as to minister to the comfort of men in the hospitals and camps. The $11,215,155 expended by these agencies set a new record for organized beneficence. The South had less silver and gold to give, but what they had, they gave freely. Religion was a prominent factor in their armies. A great revival was under way in Vicksburg, while Grant was drawing in on the city. Despite these activities, the church suffered great losses as a result of the war. In some sections, in the path of the marching armies, the loss was in membership, but all over the country there was a decline of religious loyalty and an increase of indifference and immorality. Few church leaders were able to rise above the bitterness of the days of conflict and reconstruction. With the exception of the Episcopal Church, none of the Protestant churches were able to realize the expectation that the settlement of the question of slavery would make it possible to reunite divided denominations. Few leaders were able to say as calmly as did the Bishop of Georgia: "We appealed to the God of Battles and He has given His decision against us. We accept the result as the work, not of men, but of God."

New causes of separation had arisen, which, despite all efforts, persist in our own day. One of these questions was that of the religious needs of the newly emancipated colored people. The war put an end to the old Southern custom of the church gallery for slaves. Southern families, who had felt their responsibility to share their faith with their slaves, found it less easy and natural to give religious help to free men, some of whom expected full recognition as equals. The Northern churches, specially the Congregational, continued their interest in the race by establishing mission work among

them under the name of Freedmen's Bureaus or Boards. It was not always easy to avoid the irritating suspicion that the North regarded the whole South as a non-Christian mission field. The South was more ready to accept assistance for the education of the colored people, especially when it took the form of industrial and vocational instruction, as at Hampton under General Armstrong, and at Tuskegee, under the vigorous leadership of Booker T. Washington. For the most part, however, the negroes proceeded to organize their own denominations under their own leadership. Unexpectedly, perhaps, they have shown little tendency to depart from either the customs or beliefs of the evangelical churches around them. The majority of the colored churches are of the Baptist or Methodist types. The church has become the social center of negro life.

The challenge of the frontier to missionary effort was still present after the Civil War. That frontier was then in the Rocky Mountain States. Typical of the conditions in that region was the fact that seventy of the first eighty burials in the cemetery in Cheyenne, Wyoming, had been from violent deaths, "shot, stabbed, poisoned, or hung." To establish churches under these conditions required organized effort. One of the results of the missionary enterprise was to develop great centralized agencies for carrying forward this work. Even the denominations, which had been most careful to avoid all danger of ecclesiastical domination, had to adjust themselves to the need. It introduced a new element, Home Mission Superintendents, with large power and influence in churches, such as the Baptist, Congregational, and Disciples. Home missionary work, moreover, since it was a work in which every local church was cooperating with the other churches of the denomination and with them alone, had the result of increasing

denominational consciousness and pride. This, in turn, led to denominational competition with the result that many centers, which were regarded as strategic, were overchurched and other sections neglected. The effort of each denomination to do its part and of denominational superintendents to make a good record has in many places led to overlapping and definite loss.

The Sunday School, which had begun as a nondenominational enterprise and had been looked on with some suspicion by the churches, had by this time become an integral part of the church program. It now extended its usefulness by being used as a method in missionary work in this frontier. The further west one goes, the more likely it is that any particular church, now large and prosperous, was originally established as a Sunday School and with denominational aid. The frontier evangelist, such as Peter Cartwright, of the Illinois of Lincoln's young manhood, gave place to the Sunday School teacher and the denominational representative.

The Sunday School was only the first of several developments of the program of the Protestant churches which considerably modified the simple and austere preaching services of the Puritan days. In 1881, Rev. Francis E. Clark organized the first Young People's Society, and such societies rapidly became an essential part of church life. The women's organizations increased in number and power. The first "Female Cent Societies," became Missionary Societies, supporting a large work organized under Women's Boards. "Dorcas Sewing Circles" became "Ladies' Aid Societies," ready to serve in the support of the church and good works. A cooking stove became as essential a piece of church equipment as a pulpit. Women's crusades in western towns to fight the liquor traffic, led to the Women's Christian Temperance Union, which has had a large

part in promoting the adoption of prohibition as a national policy. The Young Men's Christian Association was rapidly increasing in influence and was soon followed by the similar organization for women. The need for trained teachers in the Sunday School led Bishop John H. Vincent to establish a summer school on Lake Chautauqua, which soon expanded into a great semi-secular institution and is the mother of the multitude of similar "Chautauquas" and conferences. Men's "Brotherhoods" in the churches are somewhat more recent.

One result of these expansions of the program has been to emphasize the social character of the church. They added greatly to the power and influence of the churches, but brought the problem of uniting in social activities socially diverse people. Theological distinctions between the churches became less prominent, but the distinction between rich churches and poor churches, churches of employers and business men and churches of working men, intellectual churches and popular churches, farmers' churches and city churches became more common. In many communities the various denominations represent social groups rather than theological differences.

The conception of the ministry has been profoundly affected by the conditions of American life. It is a far cry from the days of the Puritans when ministers walked the streets in gowns and bands and were accepted as the authoritative rulers of their communities. The churches began to demand men who would mingle sympathetically with their fellows. The sermon became a less important part of the church service. Theological discussions were more uncommon, and lacking oftentimes a formal theological education, the ministry as well as the pew, began to distrust careful theological

thinking. Sermons became less theological or expository and more hortatory. Even in the Calvinistic churches, the dominant mood ceased to be that of the Puritans with their keenness for theology and represented the pietism of the Methodists with their emphasis on personal experience.

For more than a decade after the Civil War, hardly a ripple appeared on the placid surface of evangelical orthodoxy. So complete was the agreement, that the churches could unite in their most vital function, that of evangelism. Dwight L. Moody was preaching with general acceptance a simple message of personal piety, which combined churches in great non-denominational meetings held in public halls. His singing comrade, Ira D. Sankey, was popularizing "Gospel Hymns," which expressed in song the theology of the preacher.

The times were favorable for the appearance of text books of theology covering the whole subject in a comprehensive manner. Several such appeared in this generation, one of the most important being a treatise in three volumes by Dr. Charles Hodge, published in 1876. Whatever differences there were between the theologians of the different schools there was a general agreement as to the viewpoint and method. "Systematic theology" was taken to be merely the orderly statement of the teachings of the Bible. The authority of the great Reformation and post-Reformation leaders was accepted without much question.

The disruptive element was present, but its meaning was hardly recognized. The discussion of the doctrine of evolution had been going on abroad, while America was engrossed in the immediate problems of the war and reconstruction and the great tasks of home missions. Whatever alarm was aroused in this country, was stilled by the conclusion of men like Dr. Hodge,

that this new teaching was merely a scientific hypothesis, which, when the facts were known, would in no vital way affect the accepted theology. "Under these circumstances," he wrote, "it is very clear that the friends of the Bible have no occasion for uneasiness." "As the Bible is of God, it is certain that there can be no conflict between the teachings of Scripture and the facts of science." In a few quarters, however, men began to study evolution not as a biological or anthropological fact, but to use it as a guiding principle to be applied to social problems. The doctrine of development was accepted as to the method in which everything has come into being. There was instituted the historical study of the development of theology, the creeds, and the Bible itself.

Teachers of evangelical orthodoxy, oftentimes without realizing the source of the change, began to be aware that there were wide differences between men in the same church. Long before this, there had been liberals in some of the churches. The Congregationalists especially, had produced individual leaders who claimed the right to remain in the evangelical church, while striking out more or less boldly along lines of their own. Henry Ward Beecher, whose voice had been as the voice of a prophet of the North during the war, preached a modified Calvinism that found many followers. Horace Bushnell had been ahead of his day in applying the new method in his books, *Christian Nurture* and *God in Christ*. Now it was evident that there was rising a new school of thought and a new method in theology. The denominations one after the other became involved about 1880 in sharp controversy over theological questions which lasted for twenty years.

The Congregational Church faced the issue when Secretary Alden of the American Board refused on the

ground of theological laxity, to commission certain candidates for work in the field of Foreign Missions. The particular question raised was the acceptance by these candidates of the teaching of Edwards A. Park, a Professor in Andover Seminary, concerning the fate of the heathen who died without the gospel. The right of the Board to set up theological tests was successfully challenged, but there was wide discussion and condemnation of the "second probation" doctrine, and dissatisfaction over the evidence of the departure of this conservative seminary from the strict standards of Calvinistic orthodoxy.

In the closely related Presbyterian Church, the attack that had been made in connection with this discussion on certain phrases in the Westminster Confession, and the action taken by the Scotch and English Presbyterian Churches, led to a very general demand that the whole confession be either amended or reinterpreted. The Liberals and conservatives, however, were not able to agree on the extent of these changes. The matter was dropped for a time, but not until the position had been strengthened of those who maintained that in a modern church any historical creed must be examined in the light of modern research and great freedom given in its interpretation and application. The number, too, of persons who look with suspicion on all formal creeds also largely increased.

A more generally divisive question came to the front in the early nineties. The Protestantism of America rested on the Bible, rather than on the church or the creeds of any church. So general was the interest of the American people in every question affecting the Bible, that the results of the work of the joint committee, British and American, that, in 1881, had been revising the text of the Authorized Version, were cabled to this

country as fast as the proof sheets were released from the Oxford Press. The trial of Robertson Smith in Scotland, from 1876 to 1881, was followed with great interest. The people became aware for the first time of the results of the work of scholars known as "Higher Critics," who were studying the Bible as a series of historical and literary documents and arranging its books in the order of their composition and determining their authorship and approximate dates. It was seen that the traditional answers to these questions, especially as to the writings of the Prophet Isaiah, and the books attributed to Moses, were being sharply challenged in responsible quarters. The discussion came to its climax, when Dr. Charles Briggs of Union Seminary in his inaugural address in 1891, on taking a new chair in the Seminary expressed his acceptance of the new historical views. After three years of bitter controversy, this professor, after being acquitted by the Presbytery of New York, was excommunicated by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and Professor Henry Preserved Smith of Lane Seminary was on similar grounds expelled from the ministry.[1] The discord in the Presbyterian church became threatening and had its reverberations in all the others. The struggle to

[1] The charges against Briggs were as follows: that he had taught that reason and the Church are each a "fountain of divine authority which apart from Holy Scripture may and does savingly enlighten men"; that "errors may have existed in the original text of the Holy Scripture"; that "many of the Old Testament predictions have been reversed by history" and that "the great body of Messianic Prediction has not and can not be fulfilled"; that "Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch," and that "Isaiah is not the author of half of the book which bears his name"; that the "processes of redemption extend to the world to come"—he had considered it a fault of Protestant theology that it limits redemption to this world—and that "sanctification is not complete at death."

get rid of these so-called heretics, however, had been difficult and impatience over theological controversy finally won the day and stopped, for the time, further action. Men who held similar liberal views were allowed to stay in the church unmolested and, until recently, the tendency has been to minimize and overlook the undoubted differences of opinion which exist in most of the churches.

Large sections of the American Church, however, hardly felt the impact of these theological controversies of the eighties and the nineties. The Methodists were developing their powerful organization in which the controversy was over lay representation at its quarterly conferences, and the power to be given its Bishops. The Episcopal Church had a special problem of its own. As far back as 1837, under Bishop Hobart in central New York, emphasis was being laid on the sacramental character of the church offices. This tendency had received strength from an agreement to let the "High Church" party take charge of home missionary work, while the "Low Church" group developed the foreign mission work. The church as it grew was thus bound to become more and more strongly of the "High Church" type. The Oxford movement in England was followed with great interest by the Episcopalians in this country. Efforts began to be made to re-establish practices and beliefs and modes of argument which Protestantism had dropped. The opponents of the movement withdrew in 1873 to form the Reformed Episcopal Church. More important than the separation of this small group was the opposition of strong leaders, of whom Phillips Brooks of Boston was the most prominent. Brooks took a position which made him the spokesman for all liberal Protestantism. As in England, the two parties exist within the church to this day with more or less harmony.

The Roman Catholic Church celebrated the close of the Civil War by a great Plenary Council in Baltimore, emphasizing the unity of the church in a divided country. The two generations since have seen the church pass from the days when its Bishops held office, "in partibus infidelium," to the days when it is the largest single church in the country, comprising about one-sixth of the total population, and taking rank as among the largest and most faithful body of Catholics in the world. This increase in power has come chiefly by immigration from Catholic lands. This fact has meant for the Church a double task. It has been obliged not only to expand the organization to care for greater numbers, but it has also had to adjust its policy and the attitude of its members to the spirit and institutions of American life.

The point where this adjustment first became critical, was the question of the public school system. The Council of 1866 reiterated the belief that "religious teaching and religious education should form part of every system of school education." The settled policy was put forward in establishing parochial schools in every parish and for every Catholic pupil. On the other hand, the American people as a whole have become more enthusiastic about education as a public function than concerning any other governmental activity, except perhaps the waging of war. What was a plank in the platform of the Know Nothing party in 1856, has become the settled conviction of the nation: "The education of the youth of our country in schools provided by the state, which schools shall be common to all, without distinction of creed or party, and free from any influence or direction of a denominational or partisan character." Violent opposition was made to every effort to secure aid from the taxes for the support of parochial schools.

Even where these were supported separately, they were attacked as a divisive and injurious influence in a democracy. The conflict which was sharp during the decade of the seventies, especially in New York, ended in a compromise. The parochial schools were denied any share in the school money, although given full recognition for the purpose of the school law. The public schools were secularized and freed from Protestant influence. Neither side has been satisfied with the compromise and the result has been latent irritation. Despite constant pressure, the Catholics have found it impossible without public aid to extend their parochial schools rapidly enough to take care of their children. Many Protestants, too, have become dissatisfied with the results of the elimination of religion as a subject of study anywhere in the school system. They believe that, as a result of this controversy, it is not only the school, but the American life that has been secularized, and there has been some tendency lately to reopen the question along new lines.

A more subtle question has been the interpretation of loyalty to the Roman Church, side by side with loyalty to the spirit of American life. The great achievement of the Church during the last two generations has been not only its rapid increase in numbers, but its success in establishing itself as an American church. This task was not without difficulty in a dominantly Protestant country. Suspicions were aroused by the Pope's Syllabus of 1864, condemning certain "damnable errors," which to Protestants seemed to be an attack on American convictions and institutions. Anti-Catholicism has always been on the alert with its fear that a church, having a central authority outside the country, might mean foreign control and that this power was being exercised to influence the ballot and politics. Not the least of

the services of such men as Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland was their staunch Americanism and the sturdy fashion in which they met these suspicions. The former was justifiably proud of the fact that when he went to Rome in 1877, he not only obtained the red hat of a Cardinal for himself but was able to persuade the authorities that it would be a mistake to condemn the American Knights of Labor as they had those of Canada. Ever since, the American Catholic Church has taken a position of leadership in its attitude toward industrial and social problems. Cardinal Gibbons was the author of *Faith of Our Fathers*, an interpretation of Catholicism that achieved a circulation of over 2,000,000 copies.

Pope Leo XIII, speaking in 1899, expressed the "suspicion that there are some among you that conceive of and desire a church in America, different from what it is in the rest of the world." That American life has profoundly affected the Roman Church in America, can hardly be questioned. It has had to train those of its people who come from countries where the church receives state aid, to support the work of the Church here by voluntary contributions. It has had to consult the prejudice against ornate public religious ceremonials. It has had to learn, sometimes with difficulty, how sensitive America is to anything that savors of ecclesiastical dictation on public questions. It has had to provide for a larger number of literate and educated people than Catholicism has been responsible for in any other country. At the same time and especially in the years since 1890, the Church has had to deal with people coming from many different lands and using different languages. Above all, its people have been increasingly mingling with Protestants on terms of friendship, and absorbing common viewpoints.

There has been, however, no serious question of the loyalty of American Catholicism to Rome. Anti-clericalism, such as the Church has had to deal with in Europe and South America, has here been all but absent. The Catholic Modernist movement has had no representatives in this country. The American tendency for the laity to assume a large and important part in church affairs has not taken the form of the early days, when the struggle known as "trusteeism" was prominent, but has found expression in the organization and growing power of such thoroughly loyal movements as "The Knights of Columbus," the "Daughters of Isabella," and "The Holy Name Society." The one controversial proposal of the early nineties, that of setting up separate parishes and dioceses for the different languages and races, was easily and completely defeated.

The increase of immigration from Eastern Europe, which began toward the close of the last century, made Judaism for the first time a major power in American life. There had been a few Jews among the early colonists. A larger number came with the German immigration near the middle of the century. Since 1880, the tide set in so rapidly that over a fifth of the Jews of the world are now in America (1926). The German Jews brought with them the influence of the Hamburg Prayer Book and the Reformed movement of German Judaism. Rabbi Isaac M. Wise was the organizer and Rabbi Samuel Hirsch was the philosopher of a Reformed type of Judaism, which easily adapted itself to the conditions of American life. Several causes have made the problem of orthodox Judaism difficult in this country. It lacked any central organization, such as the Catholics had and the Protestants developed, to raise funds and to send leaders where they were needed to promote religion. The Jews had not for centuries carried on

active missionary undertakings and their representatives lacked the experience and organization to care for their own missionary problem, when the requirement came. Their people were coming at the rate of a hundred thousand a year. Great efforts were put forward along philanthropic lines, but the newcomers received little help and encouragement in founding synagogues. These immigrants came from different countries with diverse customs that erected barriers between them. The newer Jews coming straight from the ghettos of Europe, looked with suspicion on the type of Judaism they found in America. Social and economic conditions made difficult attention to some of the traditional observances of Jewish life. The single question of the Sabbath was a heart-breaking and unsolvable problem to Jews who were working in stores and factories. The younger generation, growing up in America became increasingly estranged from their parents and looked upon their religious observances with indifference which, sometimes, became contempt, as representative of a past from which they would be free. Because of these facts, the Jewish people have contributed in the later generations an unusual proportion of the groups in whose lives religion plays but little part and they have produced many leaders among those actively opposed to the domination of the creeds. The Reformed Jews early developed an organization and similar steps are now being taken by the orthodox Rabbis.

The divergent currents in American religious life became more complex in the closing quarter of the century. The large number of persons who failed to find a spiritual home in any of the older forms of religion and the theological confusion of the period, led to new departures. The older movements, such as Mormonism, Spiritualism, and Universalism, continued

though not growing with any rapidity. Ethical Culture, a movement under Jewish leadership and appealing especially to the unsynagogued Jew, has grown in centers of Jewish population. New Thought, emphasizing the "infinite possibilities through the creative power of constructive thinking," organized its first society in 1894, and has grown rapidly, especially on the western coast. The World Congress of Religions, in connection with the Chicago World's Fair in 1892, increased the interest in Oriental thought and gave impetus to Theosophy and to efforts to find a least common denominator for all religions. The most widespread of these new departures, however, is Christian Science. Mrs. Baker Eddy published the first edition of *Science and Health* in 1875 and the "Mother Church" in Boston was organized four years later. It promotes through carefully regulated "practitioners" a complete method of dealing with evil and especially with sickness. "God is All-in-All. From this it follows that nothing possesses reality nor existence except the divine Mind and His ideas. . . . The notion that both good and ill are real is a delusion of the material sense which Science annihilates." With a powerful centralized organization in the "Mother Church" in Boston and wide use of printed literature, Christian Science is now solidly established in many communities. One of its outstanding achievements has been the publication of the *Christian Science Monitor*, the only national daily under church auspices.

As the century closed, the Protestant churches were greatly affected by social and economic changes. The electric street-car and other methods of local transportation, which made much larger cities possible, carried the population out into the suburbs. To supply churches for growing suburbs, themselves as large as cities, has

been one of the major achievements of the last quarter of a century. There has been an amazing amount of church building. The down-town churches, which were weakened by the scattering of their constituency, found the character of their neighborhoods completely changed. The old homes of their people had given place to business establishments or to a floating boarding house and hotel population and to immigrant colonies. In many cases the down-town churches were abandoned and rebuilt further out. Other churches, however, took a lesson from the success of the social settlement and changed the character of their work so as to meet the new situation. Leaders such as Dr. Russell Conwell in the Baptist Temple of Philadelphia and Dr. W. S. Rainsford of St. George's Episcopal Church in New York City developed the institutional church with a wide diversity in its program of clubs and clinics and of social and recreational work. The success of this method led to its widespread use. Produced by a definite need, it has pointed the way for other churches, where the same circumstances do not exist. The "Boy Scouts" and similar organizations are now part of the work of churches even in small villages. The growth of cities has also made more important the place of the non-denominational agencies, such as the Young Men's and Young Women's Associations, the Salvation Army, and the Rescue Missions.

In country life, also, changes began, which have had an immediate effect on the church. Relatively at least, the farm population was decreased by the wider use of labor-saving machinery. The greater social and economic advantages of town and city life have weakened the country church by the withdrawal of ambitious young people. The outlook and the social customs of town and country people became so different that it was hard

even in small villages for the two to unite in common activities. Village churches that had maintained large "hitching sheds" and whose congregation had come for miles from the surrounding regions, are, despite the automobile, more closely limited to their immediate village population. The prosperity of the country church has been lessened by the abandonment of farms in many regions in the East and by the coming in of a new class of renters and of immigrant people. The farm home is no longer what it once was, the mainstay of the Protestant Church.

As a consequence of such changes, the Home Missionary problem altered its character. Its task in the last generation was to build the church on the frontier in the West and to minister to special groups, such as Indians and Negroes. Now, its most important purpose is to help the weakened country church and to keep abreast of the opportunities in the city. It has become a national, rather than a Western problem. Its center is back East where it started. The conditions are as difficult in New England and New York as they were in Kansas in the fifties, or Wyoming in the seventies of the last century. Churches, which once gave, are now receiving aid, and others built by outside help, are now returning the service.

About the time of President Roosevelt's first administration, the church conscience became aroused as it had not been before, by social problems. This new interest found expression along two lines. To some it meant what amounted to a new interpretation of Christianity, with a new application as a social gospel rather than as one exclusively individual. It was sought to make religious ideals a powerful, if not a determining factor in the involved social and industrial problems that had arisen. Among the leaders in the early days of this movement

were Josiah Strong, Washington Gladden, Lyman Abbot and especially Walter Rauschenbusch. The movement had on the theological side a new emphasis and interpretation of the "Kingdom of God as the achievement of God's plan for human life." It drew greatly on the historical studies of the life of Christ, which have been prominent in the religious literature of the last generation. The churches of all faiths began to draw up "social creeds" and to make clear their position on social problems. The Federation of Churches, representing a great majority of the Protestant churches, came into being in 1908 largely to give to this movement common expression and leadership. The churches were taking a more prominent part in shaping the public conscience than they had since the days of the Puritans.

Another line, however, in which this aroused church conscience found expression, was in the effort to secure the enactment of restrictive legislation on certain moral problems such as gambling, divorce, Sabbath observance and the liquor traffic. The European conception of the Sabbath, natural to the great masses of immigrants, together with changed social conditions and city life, has gone far, despite these efforts, to break down the older Puritan standards of Sabbath observance. The movement for the adoption of prohibition as a national policy rapidly became a political and economic question but it relied largely on the church conscience. The organizations which have been supporting restrictive legislation along these lines have been of a non-denominational character, but they have obtained their funds largely from church people and sometimes as church collections.

The churches were tremendously stirred by the world war. The church conscience, which at first was troubled and uncertain, was captured by the call to a "war to

end war." The war activities of the churches were on a large scale. The troops were served not only by their chaplains but by camp pastors representing the different denominations. There was a greater measure of co-operation between Protestant bodies than ever before and the Young Men's Christian Association did a large work as their agent. It built "huts" wherever the troops were concentrated and served them in various ways as well as acting as the canteen agency for the government. The Knights of Columbus did a similar service for the Catholic Church. The Salvation Army won for itself a warm place in the hearts of the troops.

During the armistice and since, the churches have taken a position of leadership in the movement to make world peace by international organization. War was condemned more unconditionally than ever before. A well-defined movement was inaugurated to have the church give notice that it would never again bless a war. The exact form and extent of these anti-war resolutions have been one of the controversial questions in recent church assemblies.

The idealism of the war days and the readiness of the people to give on a larger scale than ever before for philanthropic purposes, led to the adoption of organized campaigns to promote church objects. These lifted the level of giving to a height it had never before attained. The inevitable reaction followed. The dismal failure of the great Inter-Church Campaign, which was intended to appeal to all the people irrespective of their church connection and finally to supply all the gaps and needs of the church as a whole, was the sign that the altruistic spirit of the war period had passed.

During the war and immediately afterwards, the liberal elements in the Protestant churches were more outspoken than they had ever been. The social gospel

was advocated with a degree of concreteness which it had lacked before. Competitive denominationalism was generally being denounced and the emphasis placed on those elements of Christianity, which churches shared in common. It was felt that the separate creeds and standards of the various churches should not stand in the way of a general reunion of Protestantism and a better fellowship with other religious men.

Other tendencies had been at work, which now began to make themselves felt. The Ku Klux Klan was organized and spread over a large section of the country securing in certain states great political and social power. It borrowed its name and some of its methods from the secret order of that name in the days of the Southern reconstruction. Its platform, however, revives many of the ideas of the Know Nothing party of the days before the Civil War. Its campaign for "a hundred per cent Americanism" led to a renewed attack on the Roman Catholic Church. For a time, the older ideal of religious toleration seemed to be in danger.

During the war "prophetic conferences" had been held, which saw in the conflict a sign of the rapid approach of the coming of Christ to rule the world in bodily form. Among these signs was that of "heresy" in the church. The effort to define the true essentials led to the laying down of certain "fundamentals" and to the organization of groups in the churches to see that these were enforced. The controversy became hot, especially in the Northern Presbyterian, the Baptist, and the Disciples' churches. The discussion speedily passed from a consideration of the theological problems involved, into a question as to the nature of the loyalty required for positions of trust in the churches under their several standards. The question for each of these churches became whether men of divergent theological

positions could or should stay in the same denomination. The fundamentalists found themselves opposed not only by the liberals, who would not be bound by their list of "essentials," but also by the larger group, the members of which deplored theological controversy and believed that there was no reason to divide further an already over-divided Christendom.

One part, and that an important part, of this theological debate was carried into legislative bodies by the proposal made in some of the Southern states, that the teachings of evolution should be prohibited in public schools. A leader in this effort was W. J. Bryan, who had been only less prominent as a churchman than as a national politician. He had great influence when he announced that his study of the causes of the world war led him to believe that the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution had played a large part. It was condemned as not only a contradiction of the letter of the Genesis account of creation but as leading directly to atheism and a materialistic philosophy of life. This campaign has been the occasion of a more outspoken declaration on the part of liberals of their acceptance of the scientific methods of studying, not only the facts of nature but the Bible and religion. The effort of the religious leaders of Europe to adjust themselves to the new doctrine at the time of the publication of the *Origin of Species* has, for many Americans, been postponed through two generations and is but now being faced.

The world war marks the end of the greatest century of Christian foreign mission activity the world has seen since Europe was converted. Despite the necessities of her own religious tasks, America has from an early time taken an important part in missionary undertakings. The beginnings in the Protestant churches were small. A little group of Williams College students caught in a

storm took refuge a century ago under a haystack and there completed their dedication to the missionary life; there were in 1926 more than eleven thousand American men and women scattered over the world as missionaries of the Protestant churches. The gifts of money kept pace with the increase in prosperity. In the decade of the fifties, the foreign mission contribution averaged $850,000 a year; in 1920 it was $37,869,638. The foreign mission enterprise captured the imaginations and won the loyalty of the churches to a remarkable degree. The lives of the great missionaries, Judson, Livingstone, Morrison, Paton, Verbeck and others, became new Acts of the Apostles, repeated until they became part of the tradition of American Protestantism. The returned missionary on furlough was the hero of many a village church and the model of what a Christian should be. For a century many Americans knew more of the political and social life of India and China than they did of France and Germany.

The whole movement was almost Utopian in its idealism and concrete results were often disappointing. In 1850, there were less than a thousand Chinese Christians. During the last half of the century, the effects of the sacrifices and faith of the pioneers who had reduced languages to writing, translated the Bible and gathered the first converts, began to appear. All over the world in non-Christian lands, there are solidly established native Christian churches, and in a few cases, there have been mass movements with converts flocking in by the thousands. We read of African churches at whose communion services 15,000 blacks participate. Great expansions were also made in the methods employed. The missionary schools and colleges under American Boards enroll nearly 600,000 pupils. Medical work was soon made an important part of the enterprise and more

recently there has been the establishment of industrial and agricultural schools, intended to help solve the pressing economic problems of these countries. The world war has affected this work by increasing national consciousness and distrust of foreign influences. There arose a fear, especially in China, that the missionary stations might be a part of the imperialism of the western nations. The missionary was attacked as an exponent of a purely foreign culture. The pioneer days of foreign missions are ended and large adjustments of policy and method are in the process of being made.

The statistics indicate that the various churches of America enroll a larger percentage of the total population than ever before in our history and that their rate of growth is greater than that of the country as a whole. The church membership since 1891 has increased 130 per cent, while the population of the nation has grown only 80 per cent. In 1850, hardly one person in six was a church member; in 1926 the number is one in three. But it is doubtful whether the churches have retained their old leadership. In part, these gains represent the more thorough organization of the church. In part, too, they are the result of a simplification, if not a lowering of the standards of church membership. Behind all statistics lies the fact that there are many Americans with little if any vital connection with the church. To these groups, all faiths, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish have contributed, the Jews in somewhat larger proportion than the others. But even among Americans outside of the churches, there is little positive irreligion. Fraternal bodies reach out among the people with rituals which possess a large religious element. Luncheon service clubs adopt the "Golden Rule" as part of their "code of ethics." Some tendency is beginning to appear to distinguish between the church and religion and there

are occasional expressions of antagonism to the church as an organized body. In University circles the new deterministic psychology has sometimes assumed an anti-religious emphasis. The American people who have tended heretofore to identify religion with immediate practical tasks, are beginning to face the necessity of finding its intellectual meaning.

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CHAPTER XII

THE RÔLE OF THE PARTIES (1876–1893)

By the time of the exciting and bitterly contested election of 1876, the two major parties had become stabilized and contained essentially the elements from which they were to derive their permanent characteristics. Each of the parties was a social unit composed of individuals who had frequently inherited their party loyalty or who were attracted to one of the parties by the prevailing sentiment of their neighbors. Neither party was an artificial corporation distinguished from the other by certain clear differences of principle. Traditional allegiance, the neighborhood, these were the fundamental bonds of union. Sometimes the neighborhood which could ordinarily be expected to vote the Democratic or the Republican ticket contained only a few city blocks. In the same or a nearby city another neighborhood made up of people of the same race or social class voted just as consistently for the opposite party. Again, the neighborhood included several counties making what was called a safe district, in which a nomination was equivalent to election. In special cases the safe district was as wide as a state. Thus Pennsylvania was normally Republican, without much regard to the personalities or the questions at issue. The solid South, with its steady Democratic

allegiance, was merely the largest of these safe districts. But there were other areas almost as large in New England that voted the Republican ticket. The explanation of such party allegiance involves almost as many distinct and fascinating historical problems as there were districts. In each such district the element of safety was often due to the organizing genius of some forgotten party leader or boss, whose "machine" had often continued to live after he had passed from the scene. Where two strong leaders had arisen and two organizations had been formed, the district was likely to be closely contested. The basis of each of the parties was, thus, social and historical rather than logical. In that respect American political parties were not very different from parties in other countries or from other large institutions, particularly religious denominations. For these reasons any attempt to explain parties in America in terms of abstract ideas rather than of personality and community sentiment is likely to be very baffling.

In a general way, the South, the regions in the West in which the old Jacksonian tradition had survived, and some of the greater cities of the East were apt to be Democratic. The Democrats were able to make an increasing appeal to the classes that were dissatisfied with their economic status, especially to the debtor farmers and in many cases to the more recent immigrants. Similarly and with increasing clearness the Republicans appealed to the business interests that had arisen since the war. The more prosperous farmers in the West, the regions that still remembered the free soil movement, and almost all the old soldiers, usually voted the Republican ticket. To these statements there were many exceptions, and some of the great corporations made equal contributions to the campaign

expenses of each party, contributions that they doubtless regarded as a form of insurance. Thus, too, the older generation of Germans that had gone to the Middle West was usually Republican, while the newer Germans were as frequently Democratic. The Irish had come when the contest for an increased franchise was led by the Democrats and they were predominantly Democrats. But in a few cities the Irish vote was as consistently Republican.

The twenty-two years from the election of 1874 to that of 1896 is a distinct and clearly marked period in American politics. After the election of a Democratic House of Representatives that closed the period of the domination of the radical Republicans, for almost a quarter of a century, the political control of the government was divided. During the whole of that period the Republicans managed to hold a majority of the Supreme Court, a control that was less significant on account of the essential similarity in intellectual background and traditions of both Republican and Democratic judges. For only four years, did the Republicans manage at the same time to hold the Presidency, the House, and the Senate. The Democrats had a similar advantage for only two years, from 1893 to 1895, and even at that time were weakened by fatal internal dissensions. It was accordingly impossible to carry out any consistent partisan policy. Every important measure was necessarily either non-partisan or bi-partisan.

During the whole of this period, and substantially afterward, approximately one-third of the Congressional districts were safely Democratic, one-third equally safely Republican, and only one-third doubtful and therefore worthy of the serious attention of the party managers. The problem of the party manager was to frame a pro-

gram and to nominate a candidate that would appeal to the independent voters of these doubtful districts without losing any large part of the traditional strength of the party. Each party was more interested in harmonizing differences within its own organization than in making a clear cut issue with its opponent. The platforms of the two parties tended to sound very much alike. The injection of a new issue was always dangerous and was left to minor groups, so called third parties, which could not hope to win an election but that might be able finally to convert one or usually both of the major parties to their views. The curious result is that each significant issue about which large numbers of persons differed strongly was discussed largely outside of the councils of the party. Both the major parties had too much at stake to adopt lightly a policy that had not won large popular support. When one party was finally converted the other was not likely to be far behind. If the special issue had failed to convert any large proportion of the independent voters who stood on the fringes of the major parties, a disastrous mistake was avoided. If the issue gained in popularity it was finally adopted.

Many problems that in Europe would have fallen under the control of the national government were in the United States either left to the states or more frequently were not subject to governmental decision. Questions of religion, of education, of race, even the general subject of the relations of capital and labor and the control of business, were largely outside the field of national action. The greenback inflation movement, prohibition, civil service reform, the national regulation of railroads, the control of trusts, the single tax, and free silver, had advocates and strong opponents in each of the major parties, and were left largely to the initial

advocacy of smaller groups that did not manage to poll as much as ten percent of the vote in any national election. For the managers to take an early and clear cut stand on any such question at a time when the special issue was sure to arouse more opposition than friendship would only serve to disrupt their own organization. For the vagueness of their attitude, the parties are of course not to be condemned. Their platforms merely recorded the state of mind of a people naturally cautious and conservative, still predominantly rural, and representing wide varieties of economic interest scattered over an imperial domain.

Some of these "causes" were finally outgrown and discarded, notably the idea of an issue by the National Treasury of a large amount of greenbacks; some won the allegiance of enough members of both parties to pass into non-partisan legislation, as happened in 1887 in the case of the Interstate Commerce Law and in 1890 in the Sherman anti-trust Law; others, like Prohibition, continued for many years to knock at the doors of practical policy. The only time when the parties divided on a clear issue and appealed to the voters after the fashion of a British general election was when Cleveland adopted the policy of revenue tariffs and appealed to the country. Even when he had been elected largely on this issue in 1892, he was unable to carry his party members in Congress with him, and a tariff law was passed by a combination of protectionist Republicans and Democrats that did not differ in fundamental principles from those that had gone before and that Cleveland was compelled to allow to become a law even though he marked his displeasure by withholding his signature. It is reasonably clear that if the major parties had accepted at an early date any two or three of these doubtful but significant policies, the two party

system would have been disrupted and have been followed by as many discordant groups as there were issues. Usually the American people knew what they wanted to do about some things and about others they were willing to wait. In the meantime a close election was a huge sport, of immense practical interest to the office holders, and furnishing every two years and especially every four years the most dramatic and exciting of the national diversions.

To regard Congressional and Presidential elections as seriously as has often been done by historians is to exaggerate unduly the dramatic quality of these interesting episodes. The campaign of 1860 that elected Lincoln and the one in 1864 between Lincoln and McClellan had a significance that was due to the political revolution through which the nation was passing at the time. The Congressional election of 1874 was the herald of a new policy towards the South. But in spite of the bitterness and dramatic quality of the contested election of 1876 the two candidates were after all not far apart in their ideas of policy. For another equally significant contest between the major parties one would have to wait twenty years until the time when the agrarian discontent of the early nineties culminated in the free silver campaign of 1896. At other times the platforms sounded strangely alike, considering the intensity of the campaign speeches, and even the personalities of the candidates were not so far apart as one would have expected. The questions that divided the nation, the changes through which it was passing, and the various policies advocated were often important, but they divided the parties as well as the nation and did not enter into the policy of politics. Intense and passionate feeling on a new issue has often been the harbinger of the disintegration and the reorganization of at least one of the

parties, and no one was more ready to recognize this danger than the politician.[1]

When Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio was inaugurated on the fourth of March of 1877, the method of his election was still the subject of heated controversy while the fact of his selection was accepted with equanimity. Both Hayes and Tilden were justly regarded as honest men, with a good reputation for political morality, both were committed to the idea of hard money and of specie payments, neither had any purpose to maintain carpet-bag governments in the South by military force, and these were the only great issues before the people.[2]

Hayes was one of the few American Presidents who have been definitely and sincerely committed to the doctrine of a single term. The well known fact that he would not be a candidate for reëlection was at once a source of strength and weakness. The President could afford to be independent and patriotic in his actions, but the politicians who knew that they had nothing to hope or fear after the four years were done were likely to listen to other voices and to disregard the wishes of the President unless these were backed up by the voice of public opinion. The power of public opinion was illustrated in the reluctant acquiescence of the Senate in the right of the President to select his own intimate advisers, thus reëstablishing the independence of the

[1] A discriminating and suggestive study of the historical rôle of the parties, under a somewhat misleading title, is A. N. Holcombe, *The Political Parties of Today* (1924.) See also Merriam, C., *The American Party System.*

[2] The cheerful acquiescence of many Southern leaders in the election of Hayes appears clearly in the letters of the President to his lifelong friend, Judge Bryan of Texas. See *S. W. Historical Quarterly*, 1926.

executive that had been threatened in the days of Andrew Johnson. In this way a strong cabinet was secured. The Secretary of State was the able William M. Evarts of New York, who had come into national prominence as one of the lawyers in the impeachment of President Johnson, and as the leading counsel of the United States in the Geneva arbitration. The Secretary of the Treasury was John Sherman of Ohio who joined with the President in carrying through the law for the resumption of specie payments and laying at rest any serious discussion of the inflation of the currency by the further issue of greenbacks. Months before the redemption of paper in gold had been resumed on the first of January of 1879, the greenbacks had come to parity with gold. A firm policy aided by gradual recovery from panic had given point to the aphorism of Horace Greeley that "the way to resume is to resume." The Secretary of the Interior was the brilliant German-American orator, Carl Schurz, whose name was intimately connected with the cause of Civil Service Reform. By executive proclamations, the office holders were prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions or taking an active part in politics, and when one of them, Chester A. Arthur, refused to obey he was removed from the important and lucrative office of Collector of Customs at the port of New York, in spite of the bitter outcry that such a step would be sure to destroy the party. As a symbol of his desire to reunite the country, Hayes appointed to the cabinet an ex-Confederate and a Democrat in the person of Senator David M. Key of Tennessee. As had been virtually promised before the inauguration, the soldiers were removed from the last strongholds of Republican strength in the South. In spite of this action in the South, Hayes did not hesitate to send Federal soldiers to help put down the great

railroad strike of 1877, when the situation was clearly beyond the powers of the State governors.

Such a President with such advisers was certain not to appeal to the more partisan members of Congress. With the House Democratic and the Senate Republican, legislation was impossible even if it had been necessary. The only important Federal law marked a defeat for the President and was enacted over his veto. With the passing of the greenback movement inherited from the war and even before the time had come for resumption, the advocates of inflation had turned to a new device made possible by the immense and unexpected increase in the production of silver from the western mines. From 1853 to 1873, the silver dollar had been worth more than gold and had, of course, not been presented for coinage at the existing ratio. Although free coinage at the ratio of sixteen to one had continued to exist in theory it had not existed in fact and the coinage of the nation was based on gold, in so far as it was not wholly displaced by the paper issues of the war. In 1873 the situation was frankly recognized and the coinage of silver dollars was quietly discontinued. Almost at the same moment, the great new floods of silver reduced the price of that metal while other prices were rapidly dropping. The policy of paying for both national bonds and greenbacks in gold seemed to many to contribute to the lower prices that undoubtedly bore heavily on the debtor and the farmer. Joined by the silver miners, the advocates of inflation now discovered what was called "the crime of 1873" and demanded the return to "the silver dollar of the fathers." In the name of conservatism, a radical monetary policy was strongly urged. This movement was placated for a few years by the passage in 1878 of a compromise between the advocates of free coinage and of a gold standard. By a

bipartisan combination that proved too strong for the President's veto, the Bland-Allison law was passed which compelled the purchase and coinage of not less than two million silver dollars every month. These silver dollars, virtually a form of subsidy and protection to the silver interests, proved to be unpopular and were stored in the Treasury without increasing the actual monetary resources of the country. Like other compromises of questions of fundamental principle, and as Hayes prophesied at the time, the new law pleased neither side.[1]

As the election of 1880 approached, the contest for the Republican nomination narrowed down to the ambitions of ex-president Grant and those of James G. Blaine of Maine, who had so narrowly failed of securing the nomination in 1876. Grant had recently returned from a trip around the world and his reception in other countries had strongly confirmed his own confidence in his importance to the Republic. His nomination was eagerly urged by certain Republican leaders of whom the chief was Senator Conkling of New York. Many citizens throughout the country, and particularly those who were not partisans, emphasized the undesirability of electing an ex-president to a third term, even after an interval of four years. There was also strong opposition in certain states to the continued control of the Republican party by the group of leaders who were pressing for Grant's nomination.

These Independents called attention to the large amount of corruption and misuse of office that had obtained during Grant's administration, and particularly during the second term. In the state of New York a

[1] For the administration of Hayes, see Burgess, J. W., *The Administration of President Hayes*, and Williams, *Life and Letters of Rutherford B. Hayes.*

group of Independents who had, in connection with a preceding state election received the name of "Young Scratchers," and who now came to be described as "Mugwumps," brought into print a series of contentions opposing the renomination of Grant.[1] These "Mugwumps" sent to Chicago a group of representatives who were able to convince certain of the Negro delegates from the South that the nomination of Grant would mean the election of a Democratic president. The Negroes were apprehensive that if the Democrats again came into power, there would be risk of government policies adverse to their interests. Some of the more ignorant among them even dreaded a return to the condition of slavery. Grant came at one time within eight votes of securing the nomination and if he could

[1] The use in American politics of the term "Mugwump" dates from 1879. The voters to whom the name was applied were not, as has sometimes been stated, citizens who were indifferent to the political issues of the day. On the contrary, they were keenly interested in these issues and they laid more stress upon the rightful determination of a question than upon party allegiance. They took the ground that certain things, such as the return to honest money, the modification of the tariff policy, the reform of the Civil Service, etc., ought to be brought about and they were prepared, irrespective of party allegiance, to give their votes at any particular election to candidates who were most likely to further the causes that the Mugwumps had at heart. In a state like New York, in which the national parties were closely divided, the Mugwumps, though not many in numbers, held during certain elections the balance of power. The threat by the Mugwump group that their vote would be thrown to one side or the other had not infrequently the result of securing from nominating conventions candidates representing a better standard of citizenship and of political action than would otherwise have been possible.

For this note, the author is indebted to Major Geo. Haven Putnam, who had an important part in the early stages of the movement.

have held the Negro delegates from Mississippi, or South Carolina, he would have succeeded.

In the convention, Secretary Sherman had a strong following, and it was his hope that a compromise might bring about his nomination. Sherman's manager on the floor was James A. Garfield of Ohio. Garfield spoke with much eloquence and showed exceptional tact to the opponents of Grant, and when the members of the convention found themselves unable to agree upon either Grant or Blaine, they unexpectedly turned to Garfield and made him the nominee for the Presidency.

The election of 1880 was close, and its speeches were characteristic of the period to which it belonged. The Democrats had nominated Major General Winfield Scott Hancock who had won distinction as a corps commander in the Civil War. Garfield had also an experience as a Union General in command of a brigade. Both men had attractive personalities and Garfield was a speaker of ability. Garfield expressed his belief in the desirability of a moderate reduction of the tariff, looking towards a tariff for revenue. Hancock's advisers persuaded him to evade the rising demand for tariff reform and he took the ground that "the tariff was a local issue." This statement, although it was received with ridicule, did contain a substantial element of truth. Tariffs have generally been shaped by combinations of Congressmen each of whom represented local interests, and it has, as a rule, as Cleveland and Taft found to their cost, not been within the power of a president to modify or improve the provisions of a tariff act. Both Garfield and Hancock expressed their belief in the desirability of Civil Service Reform, although they couched their support in rather vague and indefinite terms. The chances of Garfield were greatly aided by the improvement in the conditions of business and by the wholesome

reputation that had been secured by the administration of his predecessor. When Garfield was elected, however, only the most violent of partisans could argue that any serious question had been actually decided in the campaign by the American people.[1]

The new President, James A. Garfield, had had a varied career as a Disciple preacher, a college President, a general in the Union army, and for many years as the leader of the Republicans in the house of Representatives. Both his friends and enemies feared that he would be entangled by his many friendships whose claims he might be unable to deny. His close friend, John Hay, had written to him: "You go into the Presidency with the best equipment possible. Besides the qualities that are personal to you, you know more of the past and present of government, more history and more politics than any man since the younger Adams. . . .'One thing thou lackest yet'; and that is a slight ossification of the heart. I woefully fear you will try too hard to make everybody happy—an office which is outside your constitutional powers."

The President soon found that his friends had not exaggerated the difficulties of his position under the spoils system. On June sixth, returning to Washington after three days, he wrote, "The stream of callers which was dammed up by my absence became a torrent and swept away my day." Two days later, he said, "My day in the office was very like its predecessors. Once or twice I felt like crying out in the agony of my soul against the greed for office and its consumption of my time. My services ought to be worth more to the government than to be spent thus." And again, "I am feeling greatly dissatisfied for my lack of opportunity

[1] For Garfield's career, see *The Life and Letters of Garfield* by T. C. Smith (1925).

for study. My day is frittered away by the personal seeking of people, when it ought to be given to the great problems which concern the whole country. . . . What might not a vigorous thinker do, if he could be allowed to use the opportunities of a Presidential term in vital, useful activity! Some Civil Service Reform will come by necessity after the wearisome years of wasted Presidents have paved the way for it."

Under the existing system of appointments the President had lost much of his original freedom. In making any appointment he was supposed to follow the advice of the members of his party in the district and in important cases, by a system of so-called "Senatorial Courtesy," the Senate refused to ratify a Presidential nomination that was distasteful to the Senators from the State in which the office was located. Garfield determined to free the executive from the limitations of this extraconstitutional plan. In New York, the Republican machine was controlled by Senators Conkling and Platt. This group was called the "Stalwarts" and had supported Grant against Blaine for the Presidential nomination. The leader of Garfield's cabinet was Blaine to whom the President was bound by close ties of personal and political friendship and whose assistance had been essential to his own nomination. The Stalwarts in New York were opposed by a group of Blaine men called "Independents" whose leader was a certain Judge Robertson. Robertson had won the particular animosity of Conkling and Platt when he had insisted on voting for Blaine and had thus broken what would otherwise have been a solid delegation to the national nominating convention of 1880 which had finally turned from both of the leaders to choose Garfield.

Without consulting Conkling, Garfield nominated Robertson for the most coveted post in New York, that

of collector of the custom house. In spite of recent precedents, the President had sufficient control of public opinion to secure the ratification of his choice. Conkling resigned from the Senate and was followed by Platt. Both Senators sought reëlection, aided by the Vice-President, a member of their own faction, Chester A. Arthur. But, to their chagrin, the legislature of New York refused to reëlect them as they desired in vindication of the principle of "Senatorial courtesy" and the principle itself was weakened though not destroyed.

The attention of the nation was further centered on the necessity of administrative and civil service reform, when the Postmaster General in Garfield's cabinet discovered grave irregularities in the service of his department. It appeared that for many years, certain postal routes in the South and the far West had been designated as "Star Routes" and had been assigned at exorbitant and highly remunerative rates to corrupt contractors for the benefit of a ring at the center of which a prominent political leader, Senator Dorsey, of Arkansas, was supposed to sit. These contractors, who were defrauding the public of millions of dollars, were in turn expected to contribute generously to the campaign funds of the party. When one of the leaders of the plot, the Assistant-Postmaster-General Brady, was implicated and compelled to resign, he had his revenge, as he had promised, by publishing a letter that Garfield had himself written in the campaign. It ran, "My dear Hubbell. . . . Please say to Brady that I hope he will give us all the assistance he can. I think he can help effectively. Please tell me generally how the Departments are doing."

But the lesson of the Conkling episode, the Star Route frauds, and the Hubbell letter was impressed still more deeply by the tragic conclusion of a brief administra-

tion. On July 2nd, as Garfield was leaving Washington to attend the commencement exercises of his college in New England, the President was shot down by a disappointed office seeker, Guiteau, who had shouted, "I am a Stalwart. Now Arthur is President." After a lingering illness in which Garfield gained the pity and admiration of the country by his unquestioned fortitude, on the 19th of September, the anniversary of the great battle of Chickamauga, in which he had borne a leading part, the President was dead.

No one could suppose for a moment that his political enemies had anything to do with the tragedy, but the death of Garfield, thus so clearly wasting the life of a President, in a manner so much more literal than he had himself prophesied, convinced even the most hardened politicians of the necessity of making at least a beginning of taking the heavy task of minor appointments from the shoulders of an overburdened man.

On the day before his death the dying President had wistfully asked, "Do you think my name will have a place in history?" The answer came in the Pendleton Bill of 1883 of which the author was a Democratic Senator from Ohio and of which the immediate sponsors were not such veteran advocates of Civil Service Reform as Curtis, Eaton, and Schurz, but the new President, Chester A. Arthur. For the great office had given dignity to a man from whose political antecedents many had expected a worse result. Hayes had done what he could without the aid of law to apply the principle of merit to minor appointments and to the surprise of those who were familiar with the politics of New York, Arthur took up the task in the same spirit even at the cost of losing friends. The newly promoted Vice-President proved an excellent administrator under whose guidance the affairs of the government ran smoothly with-

out the shadow of scandal. But even the great influence of his office might have proved insufficient without the aid which came from the memory of the short and bitter tragedy of the administration of James A. Garfield.

By the terms of the new law, about twelve per cent of the one hundred thousand federal offices were placed under the control of a nonpartisan Civil Service Commission and appointments were made by a system of examinations which were expected to take these positions outside of politics. For these places, which did not include any of the more important offices in the gift of the President, relative permanency instead of rotation as a reward for party services became the rule. Each successive President added other offices to the list of the classified service by executive order until in 1915 almost three hundred thousand federal office holders, or sixty per cent of the total, were quite independent of politics. By the new law no officer should be required to contribute to the funds of the party or to render political service, and no member of Congress or executive officer should solicit or receive political assessments. One unforeseen consequence of this provision was to drive the party managers to applying in an increasing degree for their funds to great corporate and other business interests where they had once gone to the office holder for support. The law was often violated in spirit and even disobeyed. It reached a much smaller number of officers than the advocates of such reforms had desired. But it unquestionably tended to improve the tone of administration and, widely copied after a few years in the states and much later in the cities, it had an influence much greater than was at first apparent. The whole plan of appointment by competitive examinations was the result of direct study of earlier laws which had given purity to British administration

and was a modern illustration of the transportation across the seas of British institutions. As a relief to hard pressed Presidents the new idea proved a disappointment, for with the growth of federal functions, the number of office holders increased much more rapidly than the population. In handling such problems the President came to rely more and more on his Private Secretary, who became a very important officer and also continued to lean on the members of Congress much as had been done before.

Under Arthur, a treaty was secured allowing the suspension of Chinese immigration, the first general immigration law was passed, and a commission was appointed to investigate the tariff which had remained very high since the days of the war. But in spite of the fact that the revenues were producing a dangerous surplus and withdrawing unduly large sums from business uses, the influence of protected interests was too great and, disregarding the recommendations of a commission of business men, Congress made a new tariff in 1883, by the same process of log rolling that had now become characteristic, without serious consideration of the careful report before them. Both parties were divided on the question of a lower tariff as they were also on most of the questions before the nation. But on the whole and without anything approaching consistency, the Democrats were more favorable to reduction in the interests of the consumer than the Republicans who looked on questions more largely from the point of view of the manufacturing industries.

Arthur desired and in many ways seemed to merit a nomination, but as the time of the next election approached it was evident that he was no match in party popularity for Blaine who had managed not only to hold his own large following but to win many who had

once been Stalwarts. The nomination of Blaine by the Republicans was met by the Democrats who chose as their standard bearer Grover Cleveland of New York, who had won a reputation as a public-spirited reformer, first as Sheriff of his county, then as Mayor of Buffalo, and recently as Governor of his state. His series of victories in the most important of the close states marked him quite as clearly as a suitable candidate to the politicians as his excellent record did to the general public. The personalities of the two leading candidates in the election of 1884 were very far apart, for Blaine was a brilliant orator while Cleveland was somewhat ponderous in his public speeches. In their political philosophy and point of view it was not apparent that there was any clear difference, or that the policy of the two candidates as to public questions would be in any marked contrast.

As in the previous close elections the campaign was exciting but not fundamentally significant. The choice seemed to turn on the personalities of the two men, on their personal records, and on the relative capacity of the two parties to conduct the ordinary affairs of government.

Like the first Jacksonian campaign of 1828, the one in 1884 was full of personal charges and counter charges. Cleveland's public record was beyond criticism of this kind, but his opponents were able to find an early offence against good morals in his relations with a Buffalo widow. Blaine, whose family life was quite beyond reproach, was still under the shadow of the Mulligan letters which had helped to wreck his hopes in 1876 and 1880 and which seemed to show that he was willing to use a public office for private gain. The election was so close that it was evident that the result would turn largely on the outcome in New York. Could Blaine win enough

of the influential Irish vote to overcome the good impression that his Democratic opponent had made as governor? The Irish in New York were usually Democrats, but some of them were alienated by the Buffalo episode which the Democratic candidate had quite frankly admitted. When Blaine reached New York after a speaking trip in which he had undoubtedly won votes in the Middle West by his eloquence, he was welcomed by a committee of which the spokesman was a clergyman named Burchard. Dr. Burchard referred to the Republican party as the party which was opposed to "rum, Romanism, and rebellion." When Blaine did not at once soften the implications of this tactless praise, and since the political possibilities of the alliteration were at once seized by his watchful opponents, he lost all the ground which he had hoped to gain. Two other factors entered into the close result. As in the election of 1844, a third party, the Prohibitionist which had been organized in the seventies, now developed sufficient power to cast a substantial vote, and most of this strength was probably drawn from the Republican candidate. Blaine's luck could not have been worse, for on election day a rain fell which doubtless reduced the vote in the agricultural districts of New York where the Republican strength was the greatest. With the Independents against him and without any countervailing advantage from the Irish, Blaine lost New York by eleven hundred votes. The wonder was not that Blaine failed, but that he had managed to come so close to winning. Cleveland had been elected by the solid South and by four Northern States, Indiana, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. It was interesting to note that the Democratic strength in the last three came from what was substantially one great urban community. The defeated candidate consoled himself by writing to a

friend: "I feel quite serene over the result. As the Lord sent upon us an Ass in the shape of a preacher and a rain storm to lessen our vote in New York, I am disposed to feel resigned to the dispensation of defeat which flowed directly from those agencies." It is probable that the element of luck was not quite so important as it seemed, for if Blaine had been a candidate with a stronger political record, even the rain could not have swept away his hopes.

For the first time since James Buchanan, a Democrat was on the fourth of March of 1885 inaugurated President of the United States. A stranger to American politics in the eighties who had witnessed the great parades and listened to the fervid oratory of the campaign, might have expected such a change of parties to be fraught with immense possibilities for good or evil to the American people. But such was not the case. Cleveland was an honest and hard working administrator who soon won the respect though not the personal devotion of those who came into contact with him. His courage was beyond question but he was not a man of brilliant imagination, who could plan any large constructive scheme of legislation. Nor were the conditions ripe for such a movement any more than they had been for the last fifteen years. For Congress continued to be divided among the two parties and each of these in turn was without harmony on every question that might have been expected to create a legislative program. After a severe business depression in 1884 in which the most dramatic incident was the failure under discreditable circumstances of the firm of Grant and Ward, a brokerage concern to which the incautious ex-President had, as special partner, loaned the use of his great name, times soon improved and the surplus of

the preceding years continued to pile up to the actual embarrassment of the Treasury.[1]

As an administrator the President's attention was largely absorbed by two problems. After his election, Cleveland had definitely committed himself to the cause of Civil Service Reform. But his position was extremely difficult, for he did not succeed a President of his own party and was naturally beset by a crowd of eager partisans who could point plausibly to the fact that the offices were filled by their opponents and who naturally desired now to enter the promised land. In these difficult circumstances, Cleveland faithfully enforced the letter of the Pendleton Act. With regard to the positions that were not yet covered by the Civil Service Law, he was compelled to compromise, allowing some Republicans to remain in office and even adding large numbers to the classified service by executive proclamation, but also making many removals, some for other causes but thousands for political reasons under the system that had become traditional. The Senate attempted to revive the parts of the old and almost forgotten Tenure of Office Act which had been unrepealed since the memorable contest with Johnson and to require the President to give reasons for his removals, but they were finally compelled to give way by the force of public opinion which had come to believe strongly in executive discretion in such matters. The middle course which the President followed pleased neither the extreme Democratic partisans nor the eager advocates of complete Civil Service Reform who desired to create a Civil Service entirely independent of party control, and the bitter and often unscrupulous contest for offices contin-

[1] The presentment of the Grand Jury, which investigated the business of Grant and Ward, fully exonerated the General from any knowledge of the fraudulent operations.

ued to harass the new President as it had his predecessors.

The second task which filled Mr. Cleveland's days was equally ungrateful. Under the existing law, pensions to soldiers of the Civil War were allowed only in case of disabilities received in the army. With a surplus in the Treasury, thousands of individuals whose claims would not bear the close scrutiny of an administrative officer, would persuade individual Congressmen to introduce special bills for individual pensions. By the now familiar policy of logrolling, these bills were passed by the hundreds without real consideration in committee and with even less debate. To the surprise of every one the President considered each of these bills with laborious honesty and vetoed many of them on grounds which revealed to the American people the extent of the frauds to which they had been subjected. Not one was passed over his veto. The influence of such vetoes in promoting a sense of legislative responsibility, even when the individual sum was small, was undoubtedly a great and a patriotic service which won for Mr. Cleveland the increasing respect of thoughtful men of both parties including many of the old soldiers themselves, but such a policy also made for the President many bitter personal and political foes. The embers of the dying passions of the Civil War were again raked over and Cleveland was pictured as a descendant of the copperheads. The climax was reached when the President ordered the return to the South of the captured war flags, an order that aroused so great a storm that he was compelled to rescind it. It is worth noticing that the very policy in which Cleveland failed was carried out in 1905 under Roosevelt. The act was held to be wise and graceful and met with almost universal approval.

The one important Federal law that belongs to the first administration of Grover Cleveland was, like all

the other laws of this period, necessarily bipartisan and sectional. In the Granger Cases, of which the most celebrated was *Munn vs. Illinois*, the Supreme Court in 1876 had allowed the individual states to regulate railroad rates and those of some other public utilities. Ten years later, by a new decision, the Court virtually reversed its previous position and denied control of rates in interstate commerce to the states. With the increasing length of the various railroads such denial left the rates of railroads virtually to private and individual bargains. In the meantime the system of price agreements and pools and of secret rates and rebates had grown to prodigious dimensions and the railroads were almost compelled to favor large shippers to be able to meet the inroads of ruinous cutthroat competition. Towns with competing railroads had low rates, others had high rates, and certain large shippers, notably the Standard Oil Company, were able to get secret rates that gave them an immense and unfair advantage over smaller companies. The tendency to large industrial combinations was greatly aided and accelerated without much regard to the interest of the consumer or the small producer. The pressure of such conditions was especially burdensome for the western farmers who were dependent on the railroads both as producers and as consumers.

The interstate commerce law of 1887 was a decidedly new venture in American legislation and the forerunner of many similar laws of the future. Sponsored by a Democrat in the House of Representatives, Reagan of Texas, and by a Republican in the Senate, Cullom of Illinois, the new measure forbade pools, rebates, or discriminations for similar service, and created an administrative commission of five men to hear complaints and to act as the special guardians of the law in the public

interest. The new commission could not fix rates directly and had functions that were largely negative. Its rulings were subject to constant review in unfriendly courts and many of the unfair practices continued, but a beginning had been made which soon gave to the government an increasing number of functions that could not be defined sharply as judicial, executive, or legislative, but that had some features of the functions of each of the three traditional departments.

As the time approached for a new Presidential election, the President became increasingly convinced that the only way to limit the surplus which had now continued to pile up for years, was to reduce the tariff. His experience with the office holders and the pensioners had led him to believe that protective tariffs were certain to be subject to immense private pressure and that such laws were usually controlled by private rather than by public considerations. Cleveland was not a radical free trader, and he approached the problem rather from an administrative than an economic point of view. To the surprise and consternation of many members of his own party, the President devoted his last annual message to the subject of the tariff. He contended that the fundamental purpose of a tariff should be to secure revenue rather than to protect business against foreign competition. An act drafted in substantial accord with the President's views was passed by the Democratic House, but, of course, was rejected in the Republican Senate, and for the first time in many years, a definite issue was provided for the coming campaign (1888).

Failing to persuade Blaine to accept a nomination, the Republicans selected from a long list of favorite sons, an able lawyer from Indiana, Benjamin Harrison, the grandson of President William H. Harrison. Harri-

son's personal and public record were beyond reproach and the old charges against Cleveland as a bachelor had been largely laid to rest by his marriage, while in office, to his former ward, a lady much younger than himself, but whose dignity and charm made her an ideal mistress of the White House. The two candidates were both highly respected personally and the canvass was of the type that was called "a campaign of education." In a close vote, Harrison was elected, although his rival had a plurality of the popular vote. Cleveland was thus left in a good strategic position for the next campaign.

The Republicans were now in control of all the departments of government; the majorities in the two Houses were narrow and these majorities they managed to hold for only two years. The spirit of the new administration was expressed characteristically by the new President when he said that "the present is no time to measure expenditures in apothecaries' scales." He was speaking especially of pensions which Cleveland had done much to keep within legitimate bounds. The same idea was contained in the more pungent phrase of the new commissioner of pensions, a picturesque figure called Corporal Tanner, when he said, "God help the surplus!" Tanner did not remain in office for many months but in that time there were clear evidences that the surplus, troublesome as it had been to three administrations, needed all the help it could get.

The year 1890 was marked by the passing of four important laws, three of which were intended at least in part to reduce the surplus. By the Dependent Pension Law, pensions were assigned to old soldiers without regard to the time or the causes of their poverty. This was the very measure that Cleveland had vetoed toward the close of his administration, but which now

found ample support. Under the leadership of William McKinley of Ohio, the Republican majority came to the ingenious conclusion that they could reduce the surplus by increasing the tariff to such a point as to make it in many cases prohibitive. The McKinley tariff removed the revenue duties on sugar and replaced them by a frank subsidy, which naturally and more directly tended in the same direction as the high rates. Not to be outdone by the old soldiers and the protected industries, the silver interests which had never been satisfied with the minimum purchase and coinage of two million dollars of silver a month, as provided for under the law of 1878 which had been passed over the veto of President Hayes, were now demanding, as they had from the beginning, the free coinage of silver at a ratio of sixteen to one. They were appeased by a measure which increased the monthly purchases to four and a half million ounces, a quantity that was supposed to be sufficient to absorb the total annual production of the silver mines of the United States. The silver was to be bought at the existing market rate and was to be paid for by the issue of the legal tender Treasury Notes of 1890, a form of paper substantially similar to the greenbacks of the Civil War. The law allowed the redemption of these notes when presented to the Treasury in either gold or silver, but as a matter of fact they were redeemed in gold on demand.

These three laws were made possible at the moment by the existence of a surplus. The fourth law which bears the same date was the Sherman anti-Trust law, the first indication that the nation was highly disturbed by the growth of great corporations which sometimes approached the dimensions of monopolies. Some of the States, notably New York and Ohio, had proceeded against the so-called "trusts" under the terms of the

old common law. But the great corporations found it easy to evade such prosecutions by seeking incorporation in various ingenious forms under the laws of States that were more friendly to their growth. And in the meantime their activities naturally extended far beyond the limits of a single State.

No one in Congress had a very clear idea of the nature of the problem or of what ought to be done, if anything, to curb the rise of such monopolies. But the disclosures that had been made in the courts of Ohio and New York regarding the corrupt methods of such corporations as the Standard Oil Company had made them immensely unpopular and public opinion demanded a drastic remedy. Something had been accomplished by the Interstate Commerce Law of 1887, but it was evident that the causes of this novel movement in business went much deeper than the rebates that some of these companies had been able to secure from the hard pressed railroads. Senator George stated the case exactly when he said that "the sentiment that something ought to be done pervades this body almost universally." The new law prohibited "combinations in restraint of trade," but did not define exactly the meaning of so vague and difficult a phrase and provided no adequate machinery for enforcement. The act rested on the phrase in the constitution that gave Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. Neither Harrison nor his successors went out of their way to enforce the law, and a fatal blow seemed to be given to the power of the federal government to deal with the problem when, in the Knight case of 1895, the Supreme Court held that the law did not apply to a manufacturing combination, seeming to limit the power of the government to direct agencies of commerce, especially the railroads. After this decision, the development of "trusts" aided

to some extent by tariff protection from foreign competition, went on at an increased pace. The chief immediate significance of the law was in persuading many people that something really had been done to meet their desires. Very little consideration was given at the time to the fundamental economic factors which were creating the large combinations or to the necessary methods of wise regulation. The Sherman anti-Trust law was a significant indication of the tendency of an outraged and uninstructed public opinion to say more in a law than it is really willing to carry through in concrete cases. Of the same tendency there were to be in the future other eloquent examples. The Sherman anti-Trust law stood near the beginning and not at the end of the business movement which it purported to bring to an end.

The new tariff with its very high rates proved immensely unpopular and led to a "tidal wave" that soon destroyed Republican supremacy in Congress and brought Grover Cleveland to the White House in the election of 1892. When the Democrats assumed office in the spring of 1893 they were for the first time since the Civil War in complete control of the various agencies of government.[1]

[1] On the subject of this chapter see especially, Rhodes, J. F. *History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley.* There is an excellent life of *Grover Cleveland* by Robert McElroy. Of the many books on the trust problem, Jones (Eliot), *The Trust Problem in the United States*, is recent and authoritative and contains interesting historical materials. For financial history see especially, Dewey, D. R., *Financial History of the United States.*

CHAPTER XIII

CROSS-CURRENTS IN INDUSTRY AND POLITICS

We have seen how few were the really significant laws of the two decades of the seventies and the eighties and how fundamentally similar were the views of the two major parties and their leaders in this period. But under the visible surface, cross currents were running that were finally to culminate in the very significant and dramatic contest of 1896. The purpose of this chapter is to go back to pick up some missing threads and to carry the story to that new point.

The organization of labor in the period after the Civil War is probably to be explained as essentially a defensive movement on the part of skilled workers seeking to insure their position against the competition of the factory and the immigrant. Strong local unions did not flourish in the factory but in those occupations, railroad work, printing, the building trades, and mining, in which the skill of the individual was still an important factor. During the Civil War, these locals developed loose forms of federation in which the national, or, as it was often called, the international, union gave advice and assistance to the locals but left to them a large measure of autonomy in the control of their own dues and their own disputes with employers. The most remarkable of these unions of skilled labor were the four great railroad brotherhoods, which were essentially

business organizations with many features of insurance companies. The railroad brotherhoods were usually conservative in their policies.

In many unions, on account of the peculiarities of the federal system, the State organizations were more frequently engaged in politics while the national unions considered economic questions that did not require legislation. This situation was due to the fact that state laws affected the interests of labor directly while the functions of the national government had a very much slighter relation to the problems of capital and labor. Probably for this reason, too, attempts to found a national labor party outside the breastworks of the two chief parties did not meet with success. In the national field the organized workers were in a narrow minority and could not hope to control any election without making alliances with larger groups, especially the farmers, with whom their interests (particularly in the case of the railroad men) were as often in conflict as in harmony. Some attempt was made to ally the workers and the farmers in the greenback movement of the seventies, in the vain hope of raising real wages and the price of farm products at the same time by the issue of great quantities of paper money. But when this movement was utilized for their political purposes by ambitious men of the type of Benjamin F. Butler, the workers lost interest, and the policy of paper money which was expected to make life easy and wages high was definitely repudiated with the passage of the resumption bill of 1875 and with the actual return to specie payments in 1879. From that time, political interest in the national field turned to the somewhat similar device of the issue of silver from the mints in increased quantities. The contention maintained by the supporters of a gold standard of value that cheap money would raise wages only

nominally while at the same time the increase in the cost of living would cancel all the expected benefits, had a wide appeal and kept labor from committing itself completely to such a policy, either in the form of the printing of greenbacks or that of free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one.

The organized laborers, of whom the miners were probably the strongest single union, developed a definite philosophy to displace the old argument that the amount of work was limited and that the function of the union was to reduce production to prevent the recurrent evils of unemployment. While this "make work" feeling continued to some extent, it was obviously outworn in an age when the whole condition of industry was no longer static. The number of jobs and the rates of wages were rapidly changing and making places for new workers. The new spokesman of labor in the seventies was Ira Steward who believed that with shorter hours and especially with the general adoption of the eight hour day, the output of the workers would increase rather than diminish and the buying power of the public would also grow. With short hours and high wages the profits of the employer would be greater, on account of a larger market for goods, and the general tone of society would improve. Here was a philosophy emphasizing the solidarity of capital and labor rather than their conflict, which was as characteristic of industrial America as the very different theories of Karl Marx were of industrial Europe. As Steward said, "the charm of the eight hour movement is, that it gives time and opportunity for the ragged, the unwashed, the ignorant and ill-mannered, to become ashamed of themselves and their standing in society. . . . An operative running from the shop in the evening tired, hungry, and unwashed, has not time to be ashamed of his personal

appearance; . . . but the improvement which has been made in the appearance of ten hour laborers over those of the twelve and fourteen hour system, is suggestive of what two hours more of leisure may soon accomplish."

From the social, economic, and the political point of view, Steward continued for many years to argue for higher wages and shorter hours. "The overworked and underpaid are dangerous enough in any country, but especially so in America, where they have votes." High wages and prosperity would go hand in hand and alleviate the evils of crises which are due to the production of more goods than people are able to buy. According to Steward, the secret of real social and economic well-being lies quite as much in the capacity to consume goods wisely as in increased production. In its essential features, the ideas of Steward were adopted by the conservative leaders of American labor, especially the organizer of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers in the eighties, and such men as John Mitchell later and William Green today.

The first attempt to unite all the skilled workers in a national organization came in the late sixties but failed partly on account of the desire to use the new force in politics and largely because of the great industrial depression of 1873. The present organization dates from the era of prosperity which began in 1881 and the American Federation of Labor took its present name and mode of organization in 1886. From that time until 1926, the leader of the forces of the skilled workers was a remarkable Dutch-Jew, a cigar maker, born in London, who graduated from the leadership of his own union to the wider field and who remained for forty years the central figure in the national organization. Samuel Gompers believed in shorter hours, higher

wages and collective bargaining. For the most part he favored the use of the economic weapons of collective bargains, the strike, the boycott, and the union label rather than political pressure, to attain his ends, and except for a disastrous attempt in 1924 at the very end of his career, the American Federation has not ventured to endorse formally any national party. The central feature of the American Federation has been the autonomy of the local and national unions which compose it. While many strikes and boycotts have been carried on by individual unions, the Federation as such has refused consistently to enter an industrial dispute. Within the American Federation are many unions, some of which, especially that of the miners, are closely integrated and are ready to act on a national scale. In many others the local or the state unions are dominant, and the national union of each trade becomes a loose federation of the same type as the general organization. In the field of ideas the Federation has remained, on the whole, true to the early notions of Ira Steward and has refused, in spite of bitter conflicts, to commit itself to such general political panaceas as the single tax of Henry George or the collectivism of Marx and Bellamy.[1]

[1] For Ira Steward, see especially, Commons, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, IX, 277–330. For the American Federation of Labor, see Gompers, Samuel, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor*. This autobiography is interesting, but leaves many historical questions unsolved. The fundamental book on this subject is Commons, J. R., *History of Labor in the United States*. For the statistics of organized labor, see Wolman, Leo, *Growth of American Trade Unions*, 1880–1923.

Of late years some of the Unions within the Federation have become industrial unions containing large numbers of unskilled laborers, but for the most part it still remains the representative of the skilled trades. Some powerful unions, notably the Railroad Brotherhoods of Engineers, Conductors, Firemen, and Trainmen have remained outside the Federation.

Side by side with the comparatively conservative trade union movement which culminated in the organization in 1886 of the American Federation of Labor, a more ambitious plan was being worked out in a different manner. The panic of 1873 had greatly weakened the trade unions and many of them had disintegrated under the attacks of employers. Some had continued in a secret form and these lent themselves occasionally to radical and even criminal methods. Men who were known to belong to Unions were often discharged or discriminated against, and in the existing state of unemployment, secrecy often seemed necessary. The most notorious of these secret organizations was the Molly Maguires, in the coal fields of Pennsylvania, which did not hesitate to resort to the murder of obnoxious mine-managers. Although most of the members were Irish immigrants who had learned such methods in the bitter contest with landlords in their own country, they found no support either in their church or among the larger number of their own compatriots. The crimes of the Molly Maguires were brought to public attention by a daring detective who joined their organization and gained their confidence until he had a chain of evidence so complete that he was able to bring some of the leaders to justice on the gallows.

Some of the secret organizations among laborers were, however, quite conservative in character and did not differ from secret fraternal orders among other classes. One of these small organizations was the so-called *Knights of Labor*, which had been organized in 1869 by eleven tailors in Philadelphia under the leadership of Uriah Stephens. The Knights had an elaborate ritual of the usual kind in which they expressed their dislike for strikes and labor disturbances. Their society was open to laborers of all kinds, including professional and

business men, except bankers, lawyers, and saloon keepers. Their original ideal represented a belated outgrowth of the kindly Utopianism which had been so marked a feature of American life in the fifties. This purpose was nothing more than to emphasize the dignity of labor and to promote its interests by public education and propaganda. The organization did not recognize differences among trades or capacities and was, in contrast with the trade union movement which was growing up at the same time, closely integrated and centralized.

In spite of their high-sounding program, the Knights of Labor remained for many years small and unimportant. The Society was merely a cross between a small industrial union and a secret order. In 1877, as a result of the constant reduction of wages and the bitterness which followed the attacks on the unions after the panic, the virtually unorganized workers on some of the more important railroads struck for higher wages. For the first time, a strike extended beyond single localities and engaged the attention of the nation. The large numbers of unemployed sympathized with the workers, and more because there was no responsible organization among the strikers than for any other reason, the strikes in five cities developed into bitter contests with the police and the militia, against the riotous actions of mobs of strikers and their sympathizers. The governors of two states called on President Hayes for assistance, and more by their prestige than by their numbers, the federal soldiers were soon able to quell all disturbances and the strike ended in the complete defeat of the workers.

The conviction of the Molly Maguires and the defeat of the strikers in 1877 had greatly discredited secret methods and seemed to prove the necessity for a wider

organization than could be supplied by the trade unions. With increasing prosperity and a wider demand for labor, there was no longer the necessity for secrecy which always tends to follow a period of repression. Accordingly the Knights of Labor abandoned secrecy in 1881, the very year in which their rival, the American Federation of Labor, was first organized under a slightly different name, and elected to the Presidency of their organization, now become essentially a great industrial union, a man of great energy in the person of Terence V. Powderly.[1]

Labor unions tend to increase and flourish in times of prosperity and to decline in times of adversity much as their rivals the great business corporations and for much the same reasons. At least such was the case in those years of the early eighties when the newspapers were so largely filled with the careers of political leaders like Blaine, Grant, Arthur, and Cleveland. The leader of the Knights was personally conservative and fully committed to the idea of peaceful propaganda which had been the original cornerstone of his organization, but the society appealed to large numbers of unskilled workers especially on the railroads who had found no part in the more aristocratic unions of the powerful brotherhoods. The Knights of Labor increased from a few scores of men until it had hundreds, then thousands of members. At its crest in 1886, the order claimed a membership of one million dues-paying members, organized without regard to skill or occupation; but seven hundred thousand is probably a more accurate figure for its strength.

Powderly himself had a great part in the organization of his order, but when it came to directing its practical policies he lost control to men of less public spirit and

[1] See T. V. Powderly, *Thirty Years of Life and Labor* (1890).

wisdom. The most influential of these was one Martin Irons, who for some years dominated the machinery of the Knights of Labor in the Southwest. In 1885, the Knights of Labor directed a strike on the Gould railroads of the Southwest. The chief owner of this system was justly unpopular throughout the country, and the sympathy of the public generally was at the outset with the strikers. In these circumstances they were able to win an easy victory. The year 1886 was a year of unrest in which the sympathetic strike was utilized on a large scale. The Knights were joined by thousands of unskilled workers who were eager for immediate benefits. A second strike on the same Gould system, arising from the terms of settlement of the previous year, ended in complete failure. The new members left the organization almost as rapidly as they had entered it, and the Knights became a small group of petty merchants and farmers. When an Agrarian party, the Populists, was organized in the South and West, the Knights, for the most part, became merged in the new movement. The unskilled workers had proved too migratory to serve as the basis of a permanent organization, and the first attempt at industrial unionism in the United States had failed, leaving the field of organized labor entirely to the new American Federation of Labor which grew year by year until it was able to weather even the industrial depression of 1893 without the ruinous losses that had marked the history of the labor movement in the previous panics of 1837, 1857, and 1873.

One reason for the general failure of the strikes of 1886 was that the leaders attempted too much in trying to bring about at once and in all classes of production an eight hour day. Another reason was the attempt on the part of extreme radicals, some of them anarchists and many of them foreign born, to secure

control of the movement and to give public expression to their views. The spirit of unrest culminated in a very general series of strikes in Chicago which started at the McCormick works on the first of May (1886). On the third, the police attempted to break up a meeting at which inflammatory speeches were being made and, being met with jeers and stones, used their pistols. Four persons in the crowd of strikers were killed and many wounded. The next day, a similar episode occurred. When the police advanced on a small crowd that was listening to very bitter speeches, some one, who was never discovered or apprehended, threw a bomb killing one of the police and wounding others.[1]

The next day, seven leading Anarchists were arrested and another gave himself up voluntarily rather than to see his fellows punished alone. After a sensational trial, four were hanged as accomplices to the murder on the evidence of their speeches and writings. One committed suicide in prison, and the other three were imprisoned for long terms. These last were pardoned in 1893 by Governor Altgeld on the ground that there was no conclusive evidence that any of the men had had any direct connection with the murder. The Haymarket tragedy and its aftermath was a clear indication of the intensity of bitterness that was expressing itself in the new contests between organized capital and organized labor.

The growing unrest of the times that was finally to find political expression in the free silver campaign of 1896 and in the later movement called "Progressive" can be measured to some extent in the wide influence of three books, very different in ideas and in style, but

[1] See Commons, J. R. (Editor), *History of Labor in the United States*, II, 386–396.

alike in their attempt to solve by a short cut all the difficulties of society. The first of these very characteristic American Utopias, was *Progress and Poverty*, written by Henry George, a printer by trade, and a man of great ability, who had lived in California at a time when the best lands of the State seemed to have been absorbed by the great railroad corporations. Written in a lucid style and with a wealth of concrete illustration that compares favorably with so great a masterpiece as the *Wealth of Nations*, *Progress and Poverty* makes a subtle appeal by alluring arguments and undoubtedly deserves much of the great popularity that it won. The essential idea goes back to the Physiocrats, who argued that land is the source of all wealth. Writing with a California background, George felt that land was sufficiently abundant to support easily the people of the United States and to care for the legitimate expenses of government. Why then do we have poverty? Because the land is held in large amounts by those who do not use it productively, while others bear heavy burdens of taxation. By levying a single tax on land, especially on land held for purposes of speculation, all other taxes on productive capacity can be abolished and the land will fall to those who will develop it. Poverty and discontent will then disappear.

In spite of the conditions which George found in California in 1879, land was too widely distributed in the United States and there were too many free holding farmers to make his ideas capable of even a modified application. But the book, rejected at home, had an immense popularity in Europe, and George was acclaimed in many quarters as the prophet of a new economic era. He returned from a trip to England in the same year, 1886, which was marked by so many other important events in social history. Becoming a candi-

date for Mayor of New York, he engaged in a spirited campaign against both the old organizations. Although their economic views differed profoundly, George was supported by such labor leaders as Samuel Gompers, then at the beginning of his remarkable career. To meet the unexpected challenge, Tammany was compelled to nominate a merchant of honesty and ability, Abram S. Hewitt, while the Republicans turned to a young man who had made a good impression as a member of the legislature but otherwise unknown to fame, Theodore Roosevelt, to lead a forlorn hope and with little notion that the name of their standard bearer would sometime become a household word. In a close and bitter contest George was defeated by Hewitt, and many breathed a sigh of relief as if a great national peril had been avoided. Roosevelt, as had been expected, ran a poor third. In the meantime *Progress and Poverty* continued to sell in many editions on both sides of the Atlantic.

Two years after this memorable Mayoralty campaign, Edward Bellamy published a Utopia which while possessing less originality, attracted, for a time, wide attention. It was in the form of a novel and described the remarkable experience of a young man who awoke from a long sleep in the year 2000 to find the world transformed into an ideal condition in which competition had disappeared and all industry was controlled by an organized community. *Looking Backward* is chiefly important on account of its popularity and because it acquainted many hundreds of readers for the first time with the ideas of Utopian socialism. But the doctrine fell on barren soil in the United States, where conditions did not seem to demand so radical a remedy. Property was too widely distributed and individualism too deeply rooted in the national character to make even Bellamy more than the guide for a passing hour. Socialism

did not gain a firm foothold even among the leaders of labor for many years, and in spite of the attempt to found a so-called political party, remained the doctrine of a comparatively small number of foreign born workers until after 1896.

The third of these attempts in Utopian literature was *Coin's Financial School*, published by W. H. Harvey in 1894. The book was scarcely more than a pamphlet, illustrated by crude woodcuts, and in spite of the stir that it made at the time, was soon forgotten. From the literary point of view, it had none of the appearance of close reasoning or the charm of its predecessors. But the theme was timely and fitted into the American scene as the plans of George and Bellamy did not. The purpose of the author was to present in the form of a simple dialogue in the Socratic manner the advantages of the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one. The idea of creating wealth by making money cheap and abundant had been recurrent in the United States. In colonial times, the legislatures had objected strenuously to the demand of the home government that they limit their issues of paper money. As we have already seen, the fear of inflation was one of the factors that led to the adoption of the national Constitution in 1789, with the phrases that prohibited a state from making anything but gold or silver legal tender for the payment of debts, or passing laws that impaired the obligation of contracts. A part of the strength of the Jacksonian movement lay in its opposition to the national bank which might be expected to limit the issue of paper notes by the State banks. After the Civil War, many advocated the continuance of the greenbacks and even their increase, in the hope of making wages high and interest rates low. Then finally had come the free silver movement, partly appeased by the Bland-Allison silver

act of 1878 and by the Sherman law of 1890, both of which required the purchase by the government of large amounts of silver.

Economists pointed out certain fallacies in all these movements for inflation. Experience had shown that interest would not fall, for the demand for the cheap money would always keep one step ahead of any supply, however generous. Wages would not really improve, for the cost of living would increase even faster. Higher prices to the farmer would be met by higher prices for the things that he was compelled to buy. Above all, the bad money would drive out the good, in this last case silver would drive out gold, which would disappear to foreign countries leaving the United States on a silver rather than a bi-metallic basis and producing an actual contraction of currency in terms of buying power. But such arguments did not appeal to the many debtors in frontier communities who saw a rapid decrease of the price of wheat, corn and cotton and a consequent increase in the difficulty of meeting the notes for which their crops and in many cases the land itself were mortgaged. Behind each of these movements there was a just grievance of dropping prices that seemed to affect the interests of creditor and debtor very differently and a real need for a more elastic system of currency than could be supplied by strictly limited note issues. This last demand for an elastic currency was not met until the adoption in 1913 of the Federal Reserve System.

Harvey was thus sowing on ground that had been prepared by long years of ardent discussion and that had been fertilized by the crop failures in many sections of the South and West. In the dialogue between "Professor Coin" and his imaginary though illustrious pupils, the various objections to free silver were met with con-

siderable ingenuity. For example, would silver dollars be cheap and drive out the basic gold? Not at all, for with free coinage, silver would rise from a sixty cent dollar to one which on account of the new demands at the mint would command parity with gold. Unlike the single tax and socialism, this plan seemed to have the merit of conservative tradition, for the free coinage of silver and gold had existed in law until 1873 and had only disappeared as a result of a supposed plot in that year. With the return to the free coinage of gold and silver, the fluctuations in the amounts of the currency would not be affected by the changes in the amounts of either metal, for an increase in one would be offset by a decrease in the other. Prices and wages would be high and relatively stable. Debts and poverty would disappear.

Such was the argument of "Professor Coin," and of many other pamphleteers and orators.

As early as 1890 there had been signs that the good times of the preceding decade were numbered. In that year had come the failure of one of the strongest financial houses in England, the Barings, the result of unwise investments in South American securities. The demands on American funds and the strain on credit had been sufficient to cause anxiety, but astonishing crops in the next two years had averted the evil day.

The fundamental cause of the great panic of 1893 and the industrial depression of the years immediately succeeding was probably over-trading. The railroads had been pushed into the West much faster than the population could really use them. Farms had been occupied and equipped with borrowed capital at a time when the value of farm crops was inevitably falling.

The burden of debts was too heavy for a top heavy system of credits.

In addition to the fundamental reaction from too great prosperity, the uncertainty that existed as to the tariff, especially after 1890, and the even more serious uncertainty as to the kind of money in which debts would be redeemed undoubtedly increased the anxiety of those who had loaned money. The two chief measures of 1890, the McKinley tariff and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, had been quite too effective in reducing the surplus which, as we have seen, had for a decade been one of the chief topics of political discussion. The rates of the tariff were so high that importations were restricted and the revenues of the government were falling. Anxiety as to the possibility of paying the obligations of the United States in gold was rapidly growing. In the meantime, the constant purchase of silver, and the monthly issue of Treasury notes added greatly to the weight of financial requirements. Silver was brought to the mint, paid for in Treasury notes of 1890, and these in turn were redeemed in gold. The result was an endless chain which taxed the ingenuity of the Secretary of the Treasury. By the end of Harrison's administration, while the country was still uncertain as to the probable policy of his now elected successor, the traditional reserve of one hundred millions, a figure that had both a practical and a sentimental value as the symbol of the complete solvency of the federal government, was maintained with the greatest difficulty.

In these baffling circumstances, Mr. Cleveland assumed, for the second time, in March of 1893, the duties of his high office. The Democrats had won a fairly sweeping victory on a platform the chief feature of which was a demand for a downward revision of the tariff. Although both of the leading candidates, Cleve-

land and Harrison, were sound money men and thoroughly committed to the redemption of all government obligations in gold, strong elements in both parties were advocating the free coinage of silver and the redemption of notes and bonds in either silver or gold. The elements of discontent which had been gathering strength for some years especially in the West and South, had organized in 1891 a strong third party, the Populists. For the campaign of 1892, they held a national convention and nominated a ticket headed by General James B. Weaver. Their platform was a bitter protest against existing political and social conditions: "Corruption dominates the ballot box, the legislature, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized. . . . The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced; business prostrated; our homes covered with mortgages; labor impoverished; and the land concentrated in the hands of capitalists. . . . The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few. . . . From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice, we breed the two great classes of tramps and millionaires."

Such were the complaints, which sounded strangely similar to those that had once led to Shay's rebellion. The remedies proposed, except free-silver, were a list of those policies that the next generation was to call Progressive. At the head stood the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one, to the end that the per capita circulation of money might reach fifty dollars. Even more radical was the demand for the government ownership of railroads and telephone systems. On the political side came the popular election of Senators, the initiative and referendum on laws, the Australian ballot, and a single term for a President.

In the interest of labor, the Populists demanded the eight hour day and the prevention of the use in strikes of armed Pinkerton detectives.

The point of the last recommendation was emphasized in the same month in which the radicals met in convention in Omaha by a bitter strike between recently organized steel workers and the Carnegie Steel Company at Homestead, Pennsylvania. In this contest a pitched battle occurred between the strikers and Pinkerton detectives employed by the company. The fundamental issue of the strike was the recognition of the union and of the principle of collective bargaining. The strike ended with the complete defeat of the workers and the virtual collapse of the union. For many years thereafter the steel companies dealt with individual laborers without the support of any union. The twelve hour day was not abolished in the steel mills until 1921.

For the first time since 1860, a third party had played an important part in a Presidential election. Weaver polled more than a million votes and gained control of six states in the Northwest, with an electoral vote of twenty-two. The strength of the forces of discontent was even greater, for many members of the new Congress were committed to more than one of the policies that found place in the Omaha platform.

Few Presidents have been more unfortunate, in connection with financial conditions, than Mr. Cleveland, for in the first few weeks of his term, the surplus dropped below the point of safety and some of the strongest business houses went to the wall. Burdened as he was with the eternal problem of appointments that had engrossed so largely his attention during his first term, and surrounded by discordant voices of protest and advice, Cleveland decided to summon Congress together at the earliest possible moment. It was his purpose to secure

the repeal of the Sherman Act and thus prevent the continued operation of the endless chain that was draining the Treasury of its gold.

None but his closest friends knew that at the very time when this call went out, the future of the gold standard hung on the precarious thread of the life of a very sick man. Mr. Cleveland had been attacked by a cancer of the mouth and was operated on in the privacy of a friend's yacht. Although the operation was very serious, no external incision was necessary. In the anxious condition of business, rumors of the President's condition were assiduously denied and, in spite of the indiscretions of one of the attending physicians, the secret was so well kept that the real story was not known for several years. Since the Vice-President was known to be favorable to the cause of free silver, the skill of the physicians in this case was of momentous national importance. On August 7, 1893, the date originally selected by the President and his physicians as the earliest on which he might be expected to be out of danger, Congress met to consider the President's recommendation. The debate was long and bitter and lasted into October. The Sherman Act was repealed, but party lines had been quite destroyed and the victory was gained only by the use of the executive patronage and influence in ways which made many enemies in his own party for the chief executive.

The barn door was now safely shut, but for a time it seemed that the horse was stolen. So large an amount of Treasury Notes had been issued that with the Civil War greenbacks still in circulation, and in the general collapse of business, the ordinary revenues were quite unequal to the task of maintaining a safe gold reserve. The government was no longer buying silver, but just as fast as it acquired gold, holders of paper obligations

appeared who placed before the Treasury the unwelcome alternatives of paying gold or of accentuating the existing depression by acknowledging its inability to maintain a gold standard.

By the resumption act of 1875, the President had been given power to borrow money on government bonds for the purpose of maintaining specie payments. Cleveland and his Secretary of the Treasury boldly interpreted this as authority to borrow money to be applied to the maintenance of a gold standard, and before the close of his administration, the Treasury had borrowed, for the first time in a period of peace, the unprecedented sum of two hundred and sixty millions of dollars. So great was the crisis that even this policy was barely able to keep pace with the constant demands of an anxious public. When an issue of government bonds was announced, gold would be drained from the Treasury to pay for them. On one occasion the harassed President was compelled to turn to the great banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, and to borrow sixty-two millions on the express condition that a large part of the gold should be imported from abroad and that the Morgans should use their immense influence to prevent the further drain of the gold from the Treasury. The Morgans were willing to loan on favorable terms if the government would guarantee the payment of principal and interest in gold. But the silver interests in Congress were quite too strong. Under the leadership of a young orator from Nebraska, William Jennings Bryan, they advocated the payment of a part of the government obligations in silver, large quantities of which metal were stored uselessly in the Treasury. Such payments would obviously have been a step to the freer use of silver to which they were committed. In these circumstances Mr. Morgan drove what seemed at the time a hard

bargain and loaned gold to the government on terms much higher than the general public were willing to give but with the advantage for the country that a large part of the necessary gold was to be brought from abroad. When the terms of the contract were known, and especially, when exaggerated accounts of the undoubtedly large profits of the bankers, were published, both Cleveland and Morgan were bitterly denounced. The term "Wall Street" became for the first time a common article of political discussion. But for the moment, at least, the endless chain was broken, and with the slow return of somewhat better times, an impression of the permanence of the single gold standard had been created which prevented a similar crisis in the future. Before Cleveland left Washington, the gold reserve had been substantially reëstablished by the use of bold measures that the outgoing President always regarded as one of his chief claims to fame. But his insistence on the repeal of the silver purchase act, his constant refusal to use silver for the redemption of paper, and above all his appeal to a great banker in an emergency, had divided his party and had made his other tasks doubly difficult. The names of Cleveland and Morgan had become in many parts of the South and West a synonym for Wall Street, which in turn was regarded as a symbol for all the predatory forces of a private kind against which the oratory of the agrarian Populists was constantly directed.

When Congress met in regular session, in December of 1893, to consider the question of the tariff which had been central in the Presidential campaign, the Democrats had, as we have seen, a large majority in the House and a bare control of the Senate. Under the influence of the President, the Wilson Bill passed the house in substantial accord with the promises of the campaign.

The new tariff went far in the direction of cheaper raw materials and lowered duties even on manufactured articles. To compensate for the lower duties, an income tax of two per cent on incomes above four thousand dollars was provided and this was accepted, although with reluctance, by the President. Such a tax had been used during the Civil War and had met with the approval of the Supreme Court.

From the President's point of view, so far so good. But many disappointments were to come. When the bill, which had been steered through the House by William L. Wilson, of West Virginia, reached the Senate, it soon appeared that some Senators were willing to allow downward revision on articles produced in other states but not on any of the products of their own. Even the Democrats were far from united and, under the leadership of Gorman of Maryland and Calvin Brice of Ohio, the duties on certain important articles were again raised until the Wilson bill represented but a moderate improvement over the Republican law that had preceded it. The power of a well organized Senate was never made so clear, for on account of the lateness of the session and the necessity for completing the appropriations, the Senate was able to secure the acceptance of their amendments by the House and President Cleveland felt compelled to allow the measure to become law although as a protest he withheld his signature.

In 1895, by the narrow majority of a single vote, the Supreme Court held the income tax to be unconstitutional, on the ground that it was a direct tax, and this decision lessened revenues that were already unduly meager. The majority opinion of the Court is interesting. It rested less on technical legal grounds than on the dangers to the property interests of the country of an income tax with a large exemption. If an income tax of two

per cent could be laid on larger incomes and on those only, why not one of ten, twenty, fifty per cent? Marshall had said long since, that the power to tax is the power to destroy. So the Court now felt. The technical objections to a direct tax not apportioned among the states according to population were frankly subordinated to the dangers of what seemed so radical a step. The whole decision was a clear evidence of the increasing importance in the shaping of American law of economic and social considerations. A tax which the court had not hesitated to accept in the emergency of the Civil War, was declared to be clearly unconstitutional when it was brought forward as one of the chief items in the creed of the Populists.

The prestige of the court in the income tax case was lessened not only by its reversal of a previous decision of long standing but by the closeness of the vote. The situation was the more unfortunate, for one of the judges who had been committed to the validity of the new law had changed his mind to join the majority. On the other hand, metropolitan papers which had denounced the Court when it was thought likely that they would approve an income tax, now joined in a chorus of praise. Thus, the *New York Sun* commented editorially, "In a hundred years, the Supreme Court of the United States has not rendered a decision more important in its immediate effect or reaching further in its consequences than that which the *Sun* records this morning. There is life left in the institutions which the founders of this republic devised and constructed. There is a safe future for the national system under which we were all born and have lived and prospered according to individual capacity. The wave of socialistic revolution has gone far, but it breaks at the foot of the ultimate bulwark set up for the protection of our liberties. Five to four, the

Court stands like a rock." At such a moment, the dangers of a sixteenth amendment seemed sufficiently remote.

Troubles never come singly, especially in a time of panic. Unemployment had been general and labor disturbances frequent since the very beginning of Mr. Cleveland's second term. A great exposition to celebrate the discovery of America had opened in Chicago in the summer of 1893, and, in spite of hard times, had brought to that city as many as twelve million people. Hundreds had been left stranded to face a very hard winter. In the spring of 1894, a picturesque individual, the self styled "General" Coxey, had attempted to organize an army of the unemployed and to lead them from the Middle West to lay their complaints before the government. On April 28th, the "Army of the Commonwealth of Christ" reached Washington, a depleted and bedraggled gathering of tramps. Straggling across the lawns of the Capitol, they were arrested and imprisoned for disobeying the sign to "keep off the grass."

But the fiasco of Coxey's army, was only a sign of more serious unrest. In May, 1894, the Pullman Company, one of the most perfect monopolies in the country, announced a reduction of wages of twenty per cent. When a committee of the workers waited on Mr. Pullman for redress of their grievances, they were promptly discharged. In the meantime five-sixths of the employees of the company had joined a new industrial organization, the American Railway Union, which, under the able leadership of Eugene V. Debs, former Secretary of the more conservative Brotherhood of Firemen, was seeking to enroll the unskilled workers without regard to craft lines, after the fashion of the now defunct Knights of Labor. The Railway Union had grown by leaps and bounds and soon contained as

many as one hundred and fifty thousand members. When the Pullman workers decided to strike, against the advice of Debs, who saw that the times were not propitious, the larger Union joined in a great sympathetic movement, that for a time seemed to threaten a complete dislocation of all the transportation facilities in the West.

When the strike was announced, Debs issued a manifesto asking for order in its conduct: "I appeal to you to be men, orderly and law-abiding. Our cause is just. The great public is with us and we have nothing to fear. Let it be borne in mind that if the railroad companies can secure men to handle their trains, they have that right. Our men have the right to quit, but their right ends there. Other men have a right to take their places, whatever the propriety of so doing may be. Keep away from railroad yards or rights of way, or other places where large crowds congregate."

There can be little doubt of the sincerity of this advice. As late as June thirtieth, government officials testified that the trains were running without obstruction, whenever the companies could secure competent crews. But the number of men available for such service was small, and in the circumstances there was serious danger of disturbances. On July second, the Attorney General in Mr. Cleveland's cabinet, Richard Olney, secured through special counsel, a sweeping injunction from the federal courts which virtually outlawed the strike and prohibited further efforts on the part of Debs to lead and direct it. The injunction was based, partly on the theory that the strike was a conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce of the United States and with the carrying of the mails, and rested also on the Sherman anti-Trust act of 1890. For the first time in its history, it is interesting to note that this new and vir-

tually untried statute was used effectively against a labor union. The immediate effect of the injunction was to place the strike under the orders and control of the courts and to put a force of four thousand United States marshals in opposition to the strikers. Two days later, after certain mail trains had been held up, these strong measures were reinforced by the presence of federal troops, which were sent by the President to quell an insurrection, in the face of a protest by the radical governor of Illinois, Altgeld, that no such insurrection was in existence and that the militia of Illinois was quite competent to keep the peace. A proclamation was issued by the President requiring the dispersal of the angry crowds, in terms that virtually amounted to a declaration of martial law. For ten days, the situation seemed to be worse rather than better, and in spite of the presence of the troops, cars were burned and property was destroyed to the amount of some three hundred thousand dollars. On July tenth, Debs and the other leaders of the sympathetic strike were arrested for contempt of court, and the strike rapidly collapsed. An element of weakness from the beginning was the rivalry of the more conservative unions which advised against the continuance of the strike.

Debs was committed to jail for six months for contempt and the minor leaders for smaller terms. The real question at issue was whether the judicial power of the federal government has the right to use sweeping injunctions, not so much to protect property which is in litigation before the court, but to prevent strikes which interfered with interstate commerce. The case of Debs was carried to the Supreme Court, which decided in 1895, in spite of the protests of some able lawyers, that precisely such a power did in fact exist. The pertinent part of the decision is as follows: "The United

States may remove everything put upon highways, natural or artificial, to obstruct the passage of interstate commerce, or the carrying of the mails. . . . It is equally within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and determination as to the existence and the character of any of them, and if such are found to exist or threaten to occur, to invoke the power of those courts to remove or restrain them, the jurisdiction of the courts to interfere in such matters by injunction being recognized from ancient times and by indubitable authority."

The sending of federal troops to put down a strike within the limits of a State, in spite of the protest of the governor of that state, illustrates more clearly than any incident of the times the immense increase of the powers of the federal government that had been witnessed by the generation after the Civil War. The lesson was made more pointed by the fact that the President in question was not a Republican but a Democrat. Above all, the Judicial Department of the Government had gained an immense, though perhaps a dangerous prestige. *In Re Debs* sanctioned the use of powers in certain emergencies which went far towards including functions that in the heyday of the theory of the separation of powers would have been regarded as legislative and executive rather than strictly judicial.

The President valued the decision, because it seemed to him to establish "in an absolutely authoritative manner, and for all time, the power of the national government to protect itself in the exercise of its own functions." On the other hand to the Populists of the West and the workers of the cities the administration seemed to have used the authority of the courts for the defence of capital against labor. Some old-fashioned Jeffersonian individualists, who were neither Populists

nor laborers, pointed out that a person might now be committed to jail without indictment or trial by jury. But such voices were few and weak, and the whole incident added to the growing prestige of the courts. The press generally joined in a chorus of hearty if somewhat undiscriminating praise. The public passed over fine questions of legal or constitutional theory, that would once have seemed immensely important, and saw only that a dangerous general strike had been prevented by vigorous and courageous action.

The American Railway Union was the last attempt for many years at industrial unionism in the United States, and Eugene V. Debs turned from the labor movement to head the forces of socialism, previously insignificant in numbers and unimportant in influence. In 1896, Debs was satisfied to support Bryan for the Presidency, but he was already considering more radical solutions of social problems. As he himself described the process, "The Chicago jail sentences were followed by six months at Woodstock, and it was here that Socialism laid hold of me in its own irresistible fashion. Books and pamphlets and letters came to me by every mail, and I began to read and think and dissect the anatomy of the system in which workingmen, however organized, could be shattered and battered and splintered at a single stroke. . . . The American Railway Union was defeated but not conquered—overwhelmed but not destroyed. It lives and pulsates in the Socialist movement, and its defeat but blazed the way to economic freedom and hastened the dawn of human brotherhood."

Debs had remarkable qualifications for the task which he had set himself. In spite of his radical political and social views he had the respect and affection of his neighbors in Terre Haute, Indiana, who agreed with the homely lines of his friend, James Whitcomb Riley:

"Go, search the earth from end to end,
And where's a better all-round friend
Than Eugene Debs?—a man that stands
And jest holds out in his two hands
As warm a heart as ever beat
Betwixt here and the Mercy Seat."

He was a good speaker and an indefatigable campaigner, and it is not too much to say that the political strength of organized Socialism in the United States has been so far largely a personal tribute to one man.

In four successive campaigns Debs was a so-called candidate for the Presidency, although, of course, he realized fully that these campaigns were for him as for the Prohibitionists and other minor parties, merely exceptional opportunities for propaganda. But the Socialist vote grew so rapidly that for a time it seemed destined to become one of the important factors in American politics. In his first campaign, Debs polled a vote of one hundred thousand. By 1904 this number had grown to four hundred thousand, and four years later to four hundred and fifty thousand. But the high water mark of his prosperity was reached in 1912 when, largely on account of discontent with the two major parties, the Socialist vote almost reached a million. Then came the war, creating differences and animosities in Socialist ranks. With a new candidate the Socialist vote in 1916 was for the first time greatly reduced, and, especially after the arrest and imprisonment of Debs for resisting the draft during the World War, Socialism seems likely to be absorbed in other more general movements which have a larger promise of political success. One of the strange features of the situation was that the strength of Socialism as a political movement lay not in the industrial regions of the East, but in such Western States as Oklahoma and

Montana where it was evidently a more extreme expression of the same forces of discontent which had produced the Populism of 1892.[1]

Long before the close of his eventful administration, it was quite evident that Mr. Cleveland was a man without a party, the most lonely figure in American political life. The conservative forces of the nation had won four important victories, the repeal of the silver law, the passing of a protective tariff, the income tax decision, and the suppression of Debs, and two of these victories had been due to the personal leadership of the President. The fact of the matter was that, except for his disbelief in high tariffs, the Democratic President was in quite the wrong party. For many years, especially in the North and East, there had been a definite trend among men of wealth and education to join the Republican group to which they were attached at least in part on account of the idea of protection. Mark Twain has told in his autobiography how apostacy to the Republican faith was often punished in Connecticut by social ostracism.

The father of Mark Hanna had been a consistent Democrat, but when the son entered business, he became the most trusted leader of the conservative Republicans, and Hanna was only a type of many similar changes. The only possible source of Democratic strength was in the discontent of the West and South and in the adoption of the panacea of free silver, of which the most outspoken and uncompromising enemy was President

[1] The only adequate account of the Pullman strike of 1894 is in the admirable biography of *Grover Cleveland* by Robert M. McElroy, Vol. II., Chapter V. For Socialism and related topics, see, Haynes, F. E., *Social Politics in the United States*, p. 188 ff.

For the Populist movement, see F. L. McVey, *The Populist Movement* (1896) and F. E. Haynes, *James Bird Weaver* (1919).

Cleveland. Many Republicans praised and trusted Cleveland, but with his views on tariff reform and his political connections, he could not hope to win their votes. Not even the danger of war with England over Venezuela and the Monroe doctrine could regain for the administration its lost popularity. All the early indications pointed to a Republican year in 1896.

According to custom, the Republicans met first to select their candidates. But this task had been largely discounted. For four years, Mark Hanna, an able business man of Cleveland, Ohio, who had served his apprenticeship in municipal politics, had devoted his whole time and a sum of money which was estimated by his biographer at one hundred thousand dollars, to the task of securing delegates for his close personal friend, William McKinley, a task in which he was greatly aided by the undoubted personal charm and urbanity of his protégé. In spite of the opposition of older bosses of the type of Tom Platt of New York and Matthew Quay of Pennsylvania, who now saw their glory departing from them, Hanna had been diligent in politics as in business. Picking up delegates, sometimes in blocks and again singly, and in spite of the unforeseen accident of a business failure which had been due to McKinley's unfortunate signature on the note of a friend, at an immense sacrifice of time and money, Hanna had been able to assure his complete success some weeks before the formal meeting of the convention. Although Hanna did not hesitate to use a long spoon when he supped with the devil, the actual purchase of votes had been definitely discouraged, and standards of political honesty had been maintained at their customary level.

In these circumstances, the only question before the convention was the attitude which should be taken on the burning question of a gold standard. McKinley

had made his reputation on a policy of high protection. Both Hanna and McKinley had been classed as bimetalists, and McKinley had even voted for free silver in 1877 and for the passage of the Bland-Allison silver act of 1878 over the veto of President Hayes. Now that the conservative forces of the country had been committed, largely by the influence of President Cleveland, to a single gold standard, these were convenient matters to forget, or at least not to emphasize unduly. The panic, according to the two friends, had been due to the wicked reduction of the tariff in 1894, and the remedy was a higher tariff in 1897. As to the money question, they were satisfied with a plank which called in rather vague terms for "the maintenance of the existing standard of value." But the convention was thoroughly conservative and recognized the quite obvious fact that the tariff question was now almost academic. Through its other leaders the phrase was changed into a definite demand for the existing gold standard, an insertion for which in after years Kohlsaat of Illinois, Lodge of Massachusetts, Foraker of Ohio, and Platt of New York each claimed the credit. Although they feared that such frankness might endanger the election and make the task of the party unnecessarily difficult, Hanna and McKinley accepted the change with what grace they might, and the issue was joined sharply between the maintenance of a gold standard and the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one, unless bimetalism should be accepted by an international agreement, the chances of which every one knew to be very slender indeed.

When the Democrats met in Chicago in July, it was evident that the forces of discontent that had been gathering force for at least four years, and which had been defeated so often and so signally on the national field,

were here met to repudiate a Democratic President and to make a final try for a decision. The convention was addressed in impassioned words by such new leaders of the popular uprising in the South as Tillman of South Carolina and Hogg of Texas. Altgeld of Illinois, fresh from his recent contest with President Cleveland over the issue of States Rights, represented the Middle West. From the first vote, it was apparent that there was a clear division between the East and the rest of the country, and on every important question, the conservative East, under the leadership of David B. Hill of New York, was outvoted by almost two to one. When the convention was over, Hill summed up the attitude of his class and section when he said, "I am a Democrat still—very, very still."

The majority of the platform committee presented a report which showed how completely the party had been converted to the views of the Populists of 1892. The central planks demanded the renewed enactment of an income tax, and contained a hint that some method, left quite vague, might yet be found to bring the Supreme Court to terms; a law was to be passed to restrict the use of the injunction to suppress strikes; and above all, a new era of prosperity was to be inaugurated by a return to the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one, without waiting for the consent of any other nation.

On these three clear and definite issues and on the coördinate proposal to pass a resolution of praise of the outgoing President, the minority, of course, presented a different report, and the debate waxed long and bitter. Of the recognized leaders of the majority, Tillman and Hogg were too far South, Altgeld was quite too radical, and Richard Bland of Missouri, who was the leading advocate of free silver, was regarded as a doctrinaire and

besides lacked personal magnetism. The evidence now available shows that these considerations had not been lost on the young orator from Nebraska, Mr. William Jennings Bryan, who had served two terms in Congress, where he had joined issue with the President on the question of free silver, and who had spent the last two years on the lecture platform in the Middle West in the advocacy of the same cause. His speech on this subject had been prepared with minute care and had been practised on a hundred platforms. Bryan did not expect the nomination, but he had asked a few friends for their support, and through the assistance of Senator Thomas of Colorado, he had secured the strategic position at the close of the debate on the proposed platform. If the lightning were to strike, Bryan was not adverse to standing under a tree.[1]

All witnesses testify to the immense effect of Bryan's speech, for, measured in the light of its purpose and the circumstances of the occasion, it was undoubtedly a very striking performance. The orator was in his very prime, being barely thirty-six years of age. The audience was weary with the somewhat rambling discourses which had preceded it, and Bryan had the good sense to limit himself to a bare twenty minutes. With his magnificent presence, his deep and musical voice, and his air of evident sincerity he played on his audience as a musician would play on a great organ. Every word carried to the furthest limits of a great hall. When he reached his peroration, even his enemies were carried away by the frenzied excitement of the moment: "You come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favor of the gold standard; we reply that the great cities rest

[1] On this point see Sullivan, Mark, *Our Times*, I, p. 121, a book which contains a very entertaining account of the campaign of 1896; the author is a well informed newspaper correspondent.

upon our broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country. Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold."

The platform was adopted by the usual overwhelming vote, and while two hundred delegates from the unimpassioned East sat in ominous and gloomy silence and refused to vote, on the fifth ballot William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska was made the standard bearer of the party which a bare four years before had been led to victory by Grover Cleveland of New York. American political history can point to no more dramatic and significant a revolution.

Strangely enough, in this campaign, as in every other contest in his life Bryan always regarded himself, and in some degree justly, as a conservative rather than a radical. For a whole generation he was the mouthpiece of the small farmers of the West, and his influence with them was due in no small measure to the appeal which he always made to an old remedy and to an old idealism. In this respect Bryan is of course in a different class from such an avowed radical as Debs or even in a later day La Follette.

Without appreciating this element of conservatism in Bryan, it is impossible to understand either his psychology or that of the great body of conservative farmers whom he led through so many contests. It was others who had changed, and not he. In 1896, he spoke

for "the dollar of the fathers," when others were seeking a new gold standard; in 1900, he appealed for isolation instead of imperialism; in 1908, for the older era of small business against the great trusts which had come with the industrial revolution; and so on, down to his last great stand, for the old religion and the old temperance, against the insidious inroads of a new science. To him, in 1896, it was Mark Hanna and all for which he stood, which was new, untried and dangerous. In his quotations, Bryan always appealed to past leaders and to old books, to Jefferson, to Lincoln, to the Bible.

In 1896 he was at his best. He covered eighteen thousand miles and probably reached more persons by the music of his voice than any other man who had ever lived. Elderly men today remember the great crowds and the appearance of enthusiasm. Until October there was, in the opinion of astute political observers, a very real likelihood of his election. Then the tide began to turn.

What his opponents feared almost as much as free silver was the threat of an income tax and of a weaker Judiciary, and Hanna had no trouble in collecting sums for the campaign which in that day seemed prodigious. In previous campaigns, great business interests like that of the Havemeyers had contributed to both parties, in the comfortable assurance that the whole thing was more or less of a sham. But not now. There was quite too much at stake. The Democrats received some large sums from the silver interests, but their sinews of war were comparatively meager.

McKinley remained in Canton and delivered from his front porch carefully prepared and dignified addresses, while Hanna made for himself a virtually new position as the Chairman of the Republican Campaign Committee, and marshalled his forces with the skill of a

great strategist. Documents disproving the doctrine of free silver were sent out by the hundreds of thousands. Speakers were enlisted where they could do most good, and suppressed where they might do harm. Pages of interesting matter were supplied to country newspapers free of charge. Not a single mistake was made. McKinley was shrewdly placed before the country as "the advance agent of prosperity." The whole campaign was a masterpiece of political advertising by the greatest master of that art whom America has yet produced.

Against such forces, even the eloquence of the unaided Bryan could not stand, and when the smoke of battle cleared away on the evening of Tuesday, November 3, 1896, McKinley was triumphantly elected by an electoral vote of 271 to Bryan's 176. In a great total of fourteen million votes, McKinley had a plurality of six hundred thousand. The issue had been sharply drawn between the convictions of the South and West on the one hand, and those of the Middle States and New England on the other. The votes and the influence of New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts proved decisive. It was the most genuinely significant political contest since 1860, and the result represented, in the perspective of the years, the dawn of a new era in American history.[1]

[1] For the campaign of 1896, see especially, Croly, Herbert, *Life of Marcus A. Hanna*, one of the ablest and most illuminating of recent biographies. Beard, C. A., *Contemporary American History*, Chapter VII, and Rhodes, J. F., *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, Chapter I, are suggestive. For Bryan, see Bryan, W. J., *The First Battle*, and his recent *Autobiography* (1926).

CHAPTER XIV

ADVENTURES IN DIPLOMACY (1865–1895)

From the point of view of diplomacy, the quarrel over slavery and the war that followed were an interlude that merely delayed a process of expansion and aggressive diplomacy of which there were many indications in the earlier period. At the very beginning of Lincoln's administration, the American minister to Mexico, Corwin, negotiated a treaty in which he attempted to prevent foreign intervention by an American guaranty of the debt to Mexico in a form which made that country a virtual protectorate. The treaty arrived at a moment when the hands of the United States were more than full with domestic difficulties and was, of course, quietly smothered in the Senate. In spite of Seward's dream in 1861 of rebuilding the broken unity of the nation by an aggressive foreign policy, he was compelled to watch with what patience he might the intervention of the French in Mexico and the establishment under European protection of the empire of Maximilian. In spite of the preoccupation of the nation first with war and then with business, the old idea of manifest destiny was a definite part of the national psychology, and though the phrases changed and the circumstances were vastly different, the final acquisition of Porto Rico and the period of colonial expansion that followed the War with Spain were an

exact expression of ambitions which went back at least as far as the administration of Pierce and the Secretaryship of William M. Marcy. "Manifest Destiny" had now become "The White Man's Burden."

As soon as Lee surrendered at Appomattox, the released energies of the nation appeared in the insistent demand for the withdrawal from Mexico of the French troops. Seward's note to France, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, was successful partly on account of European complications which required the close attention of Louis Napoleon and also because of the presence on the Rio Grande of 40,000 veteran soldiers under Sheridan. The abruptness of the demand was made more pointed by the fact that Seward did not hesitate to use for the first time the undiplomatic and expensive agency of Field's newly completed cable.[1]

No European minister recognized more clearly than the Russian Stoeckel the renewed vigor of the idea of expansion, especially as it was illustrated by the Secretary of State, William H. Seward. The Russians had been friendly during the Civil War, and they had never forgiven England for the blows which had fallen at Sebastopol. But it was not abstract friendship nor even the fear of England, whose strength in North America was consolidated by the creation of the Dominion of Canada, that led to Stoeckel's welcome commission to sell Alaska to the Americans. The fact of the matter was that the Russian American Company, in which many persons close to the Czar, were interested, had

[1] The withdrawal of Spain from Santo Domingo and the islands off the coast of Peru in 1866 which she had occupied against Seward's protest were additional evidence of the renewed vitality of the Monroe Doctrine.

One of the most suggestive brief accounts of American diplomacy is Latané, J. H., *From Isolation to Leadership.*

made a sad botch of their business affairs. Shares of stock that in 1854 had been valued conservatively at five hundred rubles were now worth not more than seventy-five and were still dropping. The company had tried mining and had failed. It had engaged in the fur trade and had lost money. Russia desired to expand toward the Amur River rather than in America. Accordingly, the author of the idea of selling this vast region, was not Seward but the Grand Duke Constantine, the brother of the Czar. In no country in the world did personal interest play a larger part in diplomacy than in Russia, and a philosopher might find in the incident a hint of the causes that finally led many years later to the downfall of so proud an aristocracy.

When Stoeckel landed in an American port in February of 1867 with his orders to sell Alaska for five million dollars if possible, he was none too sanguine, and he took the wise precaution to enlist as his attorney so experienced a lobbyist and manipulator of public opinion as our old friend Robert J. Walker, once of Mississippi, and more lately of Pennsylvania, Kansas, and Liverpool.

When the Russian arrived in Washington, he discovered that he did not have to sell Alaska after all as he had expected, for he found Seward even more anxious to buy. Long before the war the American had been an eager advocate of expansion and had made speeches in which he pictured the immense future of the young Republic as a power in the Pacific. Here was his opportunity, and, by a policy of astute indifference that appears in the Russian despatches, Stoeckel received offers of six millions, of six and a half millions, of seven millions, at which point the Russian felt that it was prudent to close, only making the stipulation that two hundred thousand dollars should be added on account of the difference in exchange. To avoid any possible

withdrawal Seward even offered to pay the expenses of a cable to Russia at a cost of forty-five thousand francs. At midnight, the clerks were called in and the bargain was consummated, to the equal delight of the American Secretary and of the Servant of the Czar, who was soon rewarded by a letter of profuse thanks and a more substantial gift of twenty-five thousand rubles, which the Russian regarded as but a niggardly return for so great a service.

Charles Sumner, at that time practically master of the Senate, regarded with suspicion a bargain which might add prestige to the hated administration of Andrew Johnson. But it was not easy even for a classical scholar, to overlook the recent friendship of Russia or the evident advantages of the purchase, and with Sumner's support, the treaty was easily ratified on April 8, 1867, by a vote of thirty-seven to two. Why the two, does not appear clearly in the record.

The difficulties of the indefatigable Stoeckel were not yet ended, for the House of Representatives had to join with the Senate in making the necessary appropriation. A group of Americans who were said to have sold munitions to Russia at the time of the Crimean war, brought up some claims which had been discredited by American courts and, organizing a powerful lobby, tried to tack a provision to the appropriation by which they would be paid out of the Alaska purchase money. The atmosphere of Washington at that time was too often influenced by intrigue and sometimes by actual corruption, and Stoeckel and Walker were compelled to pay in the form of "special outlays" a large portion of the extra two hundred thousand that they had secured from Seward, before they could assure the passage of the appropriation bill. Alaska did not grow in wealth and population as fast as the eager advocates of annexation had

prophesied, but the action of the Government was important for it marked the close of the period of continental expansion by the United States and the turning of Russia to new interests that were later to be of momentous consequence.[1]

After the withdrawal of France from Mexico and of Spain from her imperial adventures in Santo Domingo and Peru, the only serious foreign problem was that which had arisen with England as a result of the depredations of the *Alabama* and the other Confederate cruisers that had been built, early in the war, in British shipyards. Irish patriots had organized a so-called Fenian movement and sympathizers in America were anxious to stir up a war. The administrations of Johnson and Grant had difficulty in preventing armed raids from American territory directed against Canada. In addition to the Irish there were many Americans who did not desire to see the old disputes laid at rest. Senator Sumner saw in the *Alabama* claims an excuse for the seizure of Canada, and, with the influence belonging to him as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, he occupied a strategic position for bringing his views before the public.

On the other hand, the victory of Prussia over Austria in 1866 had seriously disturbed the European balance of power and there were already indications of a more dangerous conflict between the new Empire which Bismarck had created and France. With Ireland restless and with a European war imminent, England could not afford other enemies across the seas. In these circumstances, the liberal government of Gladstone negotiated a treaty which referred to arbitration all the claims that

[1] The details of the story have been discovered and told from materials in the Russian archives by F. A. Golder, *The Purchase of Alaska, Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXV, 411 (1919).

had resulted from the Civil War in America. When this treaty was presented to the Senate for approval in 1868, it was already burdened by the unpopularity of the waning administration of President Johnson and of Secretary Seward. Sumner had helped Seward in the matter of Alaska, but a peaceful solution of our difficulties with England was another matter.

The proposed convention was reported adversely to the Senate by the Foreign Relations Committee and Sumner took advantage of the situation to indicate the full extent of his claims. These were of three kinds: first, a bill of direct damages to American commerce, for ships sunk by the *Alabama* and the other raiders, capable of exact calculation and amounting to some fifteen millions of dollars; second, a larger claim of one hundred and ten million dollars for commercial losses, especially enhanced insurance and the withdrawal of almost a million tons of shipping from the American flag to seek the protection of that of Great Britain; and third, an incalculable claim of two thousand millions of dollars for what Sumner regarded as the prolongation of the war on account of the friendship of Great Britain to the South. Sumner thought that the war had cost four thousand millions. By some process which he did not make clear, he estimated the consequences of British recognition and aid as having doubled the length of the war. In his speech and especially in a memorandum prepared about the same time Sumner proposed the preposterous solution of a cession of Canada, a solution to which the people of Canada were of course even more bitterly opposed than Great Britain herself. Although it is not likely that Sumner was taken quite seriously, enough of the bitterness of the war remained to cause the rejection of the recently negotiated Johnson-Clarendon Convention by the almost unanimous vote of the Senate.

Fortunately for the cause of peace, soon after the beginning of the new administration, President Grant and Senator Sumner became involved in a very bitter personal and political quarrel. Grant was as eager for expansion in the Caribbean as Sumner was for Canada. Without consulting his cabinet, Grant secured a treaty with Santo Domingo, from which the Spaniards had recently withdrawn, providing for the cession of that once much coveted island to the United States. In this ambition, Grant was evidently a whole generation ahead of his time, and the project itself as well as the high-handed methods of the President were subjected by Sumner to the most bitter denunciation and ridicule. Even the popularity of Grant was unable to convince the Senate of the wisdom of his favorite scheme of national expansion, and tropical imperialism had to wait for a more favorable day. But the influence of Grant was sufficient to cause the deposal of his enemy from the position of leadership in the Senate which the veteran from Massachusetts had come to regard as virtually a vested right.

The ground was now cleared for fresh negotiations with England. Both governments were sincerely anxious for the settlement of all the old scores. The Gladstone ministry sent a distinguished group of diplomats to Washington to meet with the Americans appointed by Hamilton Fish, the able Secretary of State in the cabinet of Grant. The character of the diplomats and the place of meeting were clear indications of the prestige which the United States had won by her recent victory. As a result, the Treaty of Washington was concluded in which every question in dispute was referred to arbitration. These issues ranged from the unsettled North West boundary, which was referred to the Emperor of Germany, to the old problem of the

fisheries, and newer claims for damages to English citizens during the late war. But all these matters yielded in interest to the generous provisions made for the settlement of the *Alabama* claims.

England had no desire to have neutrals in some future war treat her commerce as she had treated that of the United States. Indeed, the danger of her policy had been pointed out as early as 1862, and, as we have already seen, in spite of the laxness of her laws, America had little to complain of British neutrality after that year. But the damage had already been done. Now, the British commissioners expressed regret at the losses which had fallen to American commerce, and formulated definite rules under which her responsibility for the depredations of the *Alabama* were to be determined. The substance of these rules was that a neutral is bound by international law to exercise due diligence to prevent the escape from her ports of vessels of war capable of doing damage to the commerce of a friendly nation. The question whether Great Britain had properly performed her neutral duties as thus interpreted, and the determination of damages if she had not, were referred to an arbitration court of five judges, one to be nominated by the King of Italy, one by the President of Switzerland, one by the Emperor of Brazil, and the remaining two by Great Britain and the United States. The court was to meet in Geneva.

The treaty of Washington was promptly ratified by the two nations. The British representative was a distinguished jurist, Alexander Cockburn, Lord Chief Justice of England. The American was Charles Francis Adams, the American Minister to Great Britain during the late war, and, accordingly, better acquainted with the matter at issue than any living man. The three foreign countries also appointed men of ability and dis-

tinction, and the representative from Italy was selected to preside over the court.

The stage seemed to have been set for the satisfactory solution of a very dangerous problem. It had been generally assumed, at least in England, that the only claims which had been referred to arbitration were the direct, tangible, and easily listed group of losses that had been due to the voyages of the Confederate raiders. But when the Court came together for preliminary organization and to receive the cases of the two contestants in December of 1871, the English public was startled to learn that the American case included the indirect claims for the loss of American tonnage, though not those for the prolongation of the war, which had been one of the reasons for the rejection of the previous treaty. The American counsel had probably presented these indirect claims without any expectation of their approval but with the hope of securing judicial consideration and a definite settlement of the contention which had been raised in the Senate by Charles Sumner. But whatever the purpose, the result was most unfortunate. The English press joined in a cry that the generosity of the Gladstone government had been abused by a piece of sharp practice. The demand from leaders of both parties was for withdrawal. In the circumstances, such withdrawal might possibly have been followed by war. The failure to arrive at a settlement would in any case have constituted a serious setback for the cause of arbitration.

Fortunately, the Court had adjourned until spring to give the various judges time to study the arguments of the two contestants, and thus there was time for angry passions to cool. The English member of the Court, Sir Alexander Cockburn, had from the beginning been opposed to the whole idea of arbitration and he was so

certain that at the opening of the second session Great Britain would withdraw from Geneva, that he had not even taken the pains to study the documents in the case. A great peril to the cause of peace was now averted by the tact and wisdom of the American member, Charles Francis Adams.

There is a tradition in America that among their many virtues, the possession of tact is not one of the outstanding characteristics of the Adams family. But, whatever may have been the reasons for the rise of the tradition, there was little in the conduct of the grandson of John Adams to justify it at this time. Having first consulted his colleagues individually, a task for which his complete command of French gave him advantages, and having secured an admission from Cockburn that such a solution would prevent the withdrawal of England, Adams proposed that the Court should unanimously refuse to consider in any way any of the indirect claims on the ground that they were too vague to be justiciable under the rules of law. From that time on everything went comparatively smoothly. Adams considered every question with dignified impartiality, as an international judge, and not in the character of an advocate. More than once he joined with the others in opposing the claims of his own country. Adams was quite as much the hero of the Geneva arbitration as Gallatin had been in 1814 of the negotiations at Ghent. With the single dissenting vote of the angry Cockburn, the sum of fifteen million dollars was awarded to the United States. Gladstone remarked that he regarded the sum, great as it was, as mere dust in the balance compared with the friendship and good understanding of the two great peoples which was thus assured.[1]

[1] See Morley, John, *Life of Gladstone*, II, 393–413, an excellent account of the episode.

With the settlement of the *Alabama* claims in 1872, foreign affairs became less important in the life of the nation than they had been for a generation. For twenty-three years no question of equal gravity arose. The industrial revolution, with its effects on manufactures and wealth, was indeed creating little by little the need for new markets and new sources of raw materials and laying the foundations of that surplus wealth which was in the name of imperialism to seek foreign investment in the twentieth century, but these changes lay quite too deep to arouse the attention of the generation which lived through them. In the meantime the eyes of the nation were turned towards the West, and in its commerce it remained a market for the more fully developed industrial nations of Europe exchanging for the most part wheat, corn, and lumber for the finished products of the British factory. Even the ambition to build and own a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific which had seemed so important in the fifties was pushed into the background by the rapid completion of the great transcontinental railroads. When a French Company secured from Colombia the right to build such a rival to the Suez Canal in 1878 and under the inspiration of De Lesseps actually commenced work five years later, the American Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, who protested in the name of the old American ambition, had evidently forgotten the very existence of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which made it impossible for the United States to build and fortify such a canal, until his attention was directed to the matter by the better informed Foreign Office of Great Britain.

Occasionally an incident occurred the full significance of which was not to be realized for many years. In the late seventies, a reciprocity treaty was arranged with the Hawaiian Islands to which American traders and

missionaries had gone almost from the moment when these interesting islands were discovered by Captain Cook. This treaty amounted to a custom's union and allowed the importation of Hawaiian sugar duty free. Hawaii promised not to alienate her independence. At almost the same time, an American naval captain acquired coaling rights in the harbor of Pagopago in the Samoan Islands. From that time an American ship was usually to be found in this good harbor. In 1889, at the very close of Cleveland's first term, Germany, seeking her place in the sun, was prevented from annexing the islands only by the presence of British and American war vessels, and a naval contest was narrowly averted in these distant waters by the fortunate interposition of nature in the shape of a hurricane which destroyed the vessels of all the rivals. As a result the United States entered into a joint agreement, a virtual "entangling alliance," subjecting the islands to the joint protection of the three powers. The Samoan treaty of 1889 was the first sign of that policy of coöperation in the Pacific which was to be so marked a feature in the twentieth century of the diplomacy of John Hay. Ten years later, in 1899, after the Spanish American war, the joint arrangement was brought to an end. The United States kept Pagopago, the other islands falling to the lot of Germany in partial compensation for the territory gained by the United States in the Philippines.

In spite of the Chinese exclusion act of 1882, relations with both China and Japan continued on friendly, if somewhat patronizing, terms. American merchants did a thriving business, especially in Manchuria, and remote towns of the distant East were made familiar to the ears of western Americans by the reports of returning missionaries, who did important educational and social

work. But even in the Pacific the interest of America seemed to decline rather than to grow, and that too, although the coast line of the Republic had been so greatly extended by the recent acquisition of Alaska. With the introduction of petroleum, the whaling ship that had once carried the American flag to the most distant waters of the Pacific, became as strange and unusual as the galleons of Spain. With the whaling industry, the fur trade on the Pacific also declined, except for the rise of a large and lucrative demand for the skins of seals. The new fashion in furs led to the slaughter of immense numbers of the animals in the breeding season and thus to the useless destruction of the young. The seals were rapidly being exterminated, when, in the eighties, the American authorities determined to interfere. Canadian sealers were seized beyond the three-mile limit, and, though the purpose was praiseworthy, the American contention that the whole of Bering Sea was within the territorial waters of Alaska and that the seals were American domesticated animals subject to naval protection, proved to be legally untenable when the whole matter was in 1892 referred to arbitration. The Alaskan seal arbitration was noteworthy, for the arbitrators not only assigned damages to the aggrieved Canadians, but had been given authority to make rules for the protection of the seals, thus introducing a quasi-legislative element into their deliberations. The new rules, applying as they did only to American and British ships, proved inadequate and in 1911 they were extended to cover the sealing vessels of other nations.

In his two terms as Secretary of State, first under Garfield and later under Harrison, Blaine attempted to reëstablish the old dream of Bolivar of a Pan-American Union. In this union the United States was to play

the leading part. But most of his efforts in this direction ended in failure. The American attempt to intervene in the war between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile over the nitrate fields had no effect in reducing the harsh terms imposed by the victorious Chilians. Similarly, as we have seen, his desire to secure a concession for the building of the canal across one of the isthmuses was blocked by Great Britain under the terms of the Clayton Bulwer treaty of 1850. In 1889, under Blaine's leadership, a Pan-American Congress met in Washington, but the good effects of this meeting were largely lost when in the next year the very high rates of the McKinley tariff went into force; and Blaine's influence was further weakened by his unnecessary harshness in dealing with Chile after a mob had insulted certain American sailors. The introduction into the McKinley tariff of provisions for reciprocity was largely due to the influence of Blaine.

By the terms of the McKinley tariff, sugar was to be admitted duty free, American producers being compensated by a frank subsidy. As an unexpected consequence of this policy, the old advantages which the Hawaiian sugar planters had long enjoyed tended to disappear, and they found themselves unable to compete readily with sugar from Cuba. A movement had long been contemplated by the wealthy planters to overthrow the native queen and to apply to the United States for annexation. The possibility of a share in the sugar subsidy offered at least one argument for such a political change. At the close of Harrison's administration, under the guidance of the American minister and the protection of American marines, the expected revolution occurred, in quite the approved fashion, and the new provisional government, representing the sugar planters, at once negotiated a treaty of annexation to the United States. Their action was prompt,

but the time was too short. For the friendly administration of Harrison came to a close with the treaty with the Hawaiian Republic still unratified. President Cleveland was sturdily opposed to imperial adventures whether by his own country or any other, and in 1893 he withdrew the pending proposal from the consideration of the Senate. The work of revolution was however not undone, and the new Republic bided its time until in the changes of politics the Republicans were again in power under McKinley. Hawaii was annexed in 1898, as had been done with Texas, by joint resolution of the two houses and not by treaty and, unlike the other sections of the rising American colonial empire, the Islands became an organized territory after the old fashion rather than an insular possession after the new.

For more than twenty years, the American people had taken little interest in foreign affairs and the course of diplomacy had run, on the whole, smoothly. Most of the citizens had come to believe in the illusion of perfect isolation that appeared to make very remote the danger of conflict with a European power. From this dream they were rudely startled by the message of President Cleveland to Congress, on December 17, 1895, in which he brought into the limelight an obscure boundary controversy between Venezuela and British Guiana. From this message, it appeared that Great Britain had refused to accept arbitration on the issue. In the name of the Monroe Doctrine, the President asked for the appointment of an American commission to investigate the merits of the controversy and to defend a weak South American state against the danger of aggression. The message closed with phrases that were ominous to the idea of security: "The dispute has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent on the United

States to take measures to determine . . . the true division line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. . . . When such report is made . . . it will be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands . . . which after investigation we have determined of right to belong to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibilities incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. . . . There is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong."

With the text of the message the President submitted the previous correspondence of the details of which the American people had been entirely unaware, and he made no attempt to conceal the gravity of the situation. Most of the newspapers assumed that Great Britain was entirely in the wrong but that she would not tolerate an investigation of her nefarious course. Stocks fell, jingoes shrieked for war, and some of the speakers were unwilling even to wait for a reply.

No American can today examine candidly the documents in the case without being led to the unwelcome conclusion that in this case, in contrast with some that had preceded it, the advantages of sound information and of courtesy, were on the whole with the British Foreign Minister, rather than with the new American Secretary of State, Richard Olney. Not the least of the claims of Lord Salisbury to the position of a statesman of a high order is to be found in his conduct of this difficult matter.

South American boundaries, in a thinly settled country, are proverbially vague. The present dispute was of long standing going back at least to 1841. Both sides had made the usual extravagant claims. In recent

years, the area in question had become increasingly important on account of the discovery of gold. The extreme British claims would have carried with them the control of the mouth of the Orinoco, while those of Venezuela would have destroyed almost entirely a British colony including regions which had been occupied for as much as sixty years exclusively by British subjects. Various projects for arbitration had failed on account of the dilatory tactics of Venezuela and recently on account of the unwillingness of Great Britain to submit to so uncertain a hazard areas occupied by her citizens for so many years. During Mr. Cleveland's first term, largely through the tactful efforts of Secretary of State Bayard, a general arbitration treaty with Venezuela had been signed by Lord Granville but this had been immediately withdrawn by Granville's successor, Lord Salisbury.

From that time the position of Great Britain had been entirely consistent. She was willing to refer to arbitration the part of the region which did not contain long established British settlements and which lay to the east of a line known from the name of the original surveyor as the Schömburg line. But she refused to arbitrate the total claims of Venezuela which rested largely on historical considerations going back as far as the famous demarcation line of Pope Alexander in the fifteenth century. Such historical arguments she regarded as invalidated by actual settlement. On the other hand, Secretary Gresham urged the arbitration of the entire dispute, but without the slightest intention of pushing the question to the limits of an ultimatum.

In the early summer of 1895, Gresham died and was succeeded by an able lawyer, Richard Olney, who will be remembered as the Attorney General who had been the central figure in the dispute over the question of an

injunction in the Chicago strike. Olney had had no experience in international affairs, but he devoted a month to the study of the documents collected by his predecessors. He became convinced, and was able to persuade the President, that Venezuela was about to be treated with grave injustice. If boundaries were to be extended in America by a European power in the familiar guise of a disputed line, then the Monroe Doctrine was challenged. Without the Monroe Doctrine, South America would become the scene of imperialistic adventures. Cleveland was sincere in his dislike of imperialism directed against weak states, as he had shown when the aggressor was Germany in Samoa and the United States itself in Hawaii. Now it seemed to be Great Britain that was attempting domination, and with the full approval of the President, Olney wrote and sent the ultimatum which contained the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to be thereafter known as the Olney Doctrine. Olney demanded arbitration of all the matters in question, on the broad ground that "today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." It was now June, and the note demanded a satisfactory answer before the meeting of Congress in December.

The two Americans who knew most about the dispute, both of them supporters of the Monroe Doctrine and close friends of the administration, agreed that the demand for so sweeping an arbitration of such claims was not justified by the facts. When he learned of the Olney note, John Bassett Moore, the leading American authority on international law, wrote to a member of the cabinet: "The whole system of arbitration presupposes that the nations will be reasonable in their claims. The claim of Venezuela to all territory west of the Esse-

quibo is not a scrupulous claim. . . . For twenty years Venezuela, instead of settling her boundary dispute, has, in various ways, some of them obviously dishonest, been trying to drag the United States into the dispute, and the United States has progressed good-naturedly, step by step, without examining the merits of the case, till at length with a sudden impulse it leaps over the precipice blindly. And what is the position we now hold? It is substantially this: 'When a weak American republic asserts a claim to territory in America as against a strong European occupant, and offers to submit its claim to arbitration, the European power, if it refuses the offer, is to be considered as holding the territory by force, and as infringing the Monroe Doctrine.' This is the sum and substance of our position."[1]

Thomas F. Bayard, formerly Secretary of State, was now ambassador in London. He was also greatly troubled by the form of the Olney contention and wrote to the President: "In my correspondence as Secretary of State—also with Judge Gresham since I came here—and personally with you—my opinions have been genuinely stated—and as the Venezuelan transactions and history are unfolded I am not able to shake off a grave sense of apprehension in allowing the interests and welfare of our country to be imperilled and complicated by such a government and people as those of Venezuela."

Lord Salisbury had replied to the Olney note of June, 1895, declaring that the Monroe Doctrine "had received the entire sympathy of the English government," but denying that it could be applied properly to the present

[1] James Bryce wrote to an American friend: "I had been prepared to advocate from my seat in the House, the desirability of utilizing arbitration for the adjustment of the issue. But the undiplomatic and aggressive character of the Olney letter made it impossible for me to speak in support of the American contention."

situation. He said that his government "had repeatedly asserted their readiness to submit to arbitration the conflicting claims of Great Britain and Venezuela to large tracts of territory which from their auriferous nature are known to be of almost untold value. But they cannot consent to entertain, or to submit to the arbitration of another power or of foreign jurists however eminent, claims based on the extravagant pretensions of Spanish officials in the last century and involving the transfer of large numbers of British subjects, who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a British colony, to a nation of different race and language, whose political system is subject to frequent disturbance, and whose institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate protection to life and property."

Ambassador Bayard found the reply of Salisbury in good temper and moderate in tone and was evidently convinced by his arguments. To Secretary Olney, however, Lord Salisbury's despatches were far from satisfactory, and he advised the President to apply to Congress for an appropriation to meet the expenses of an independent investigation of the merits of the controversy. When the true line had been determined by the United States, it should be willing to defend Venezuela in the possession of the territory which the commissioners had found to belong to her.

The advice of Olney was followed by President Cleveland in the message of December, 1895, to which we have already referred. In spite of the growing unpopularity of the administration, both parties joined in support of his policy. The necessary appropriation was promptly voted and the President appointed a distinguished commission to determine the boundary.

Ten years earlier, such measures would have been almost certain to lead to war. But the circumstances

were now unusually favorable for the success of an aggressive policy on the part of the United States. Soon after taking up his post, Ambassador Bayard had written, "Great Britain has just now her hands very full in other quarters of the globe. The United States is the last nation on earth with whom the British people or their rulers desire to quarrel, and of this I have new proofs every day in my intercourse with them. The other European nations are watching each other like pugilists in the ring." Early in January, following the sensational message of President Cleveland, had come the raid of Jameson into the Transvaal, the arrest of Jameson by the Boers, and a telegram of congratulations from the Kaiser to President Kruger. England had never felt so greatly the dangers of isolation. The purpose of President Cleveland was generous and his methods were not so dangerous as they seemed to the newspapers. England had determined to win the friendship of America, and her statesmen were convinced of the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine as a weapon against the colonial aspirations of other powers which were seeking their place in the sun.

In accordance with the new policy, the American commissioners were given every facility for pursuing their inquiries. On January 13th, Salisbury offered indirectly to call a conference of all the countries having colonies in South America for the purpose of endorsing the Monroe Doctrine and of agreeing not to extend their influence in that continent. He further offered to refer to an arbitration court in which the United States would have a part, all territory in which settlements had not been made.

It will be noticed that the only new thing in this British note of January 13, 1896, was the idea of securing the formal international endorsement of the Monroe

Doctrine. The offer of arbitration was in all essential respects the same which had been available all the time. Following American precedents from the beginning, Olney preferred to leave the Monroe Doctrine to American interpretation, wisely fearing the danger of referring it to international approval. But the proposed arbitration was accepted as if it fulfilled completely the President's original demand for the arbitration of the *entire* dispute, which it clearly failed to do.

One month before the close of President Cleveland's administration a treaty was ratified between Venezuela and Great Britain. The document was unique, for it was signed in the State Department in Washington. The two commissioners on the part of Venezuela were to be selected by the United States. Two others were appointed by England, and these four chose the fifth. The final award in 1899 was on the whole favorable to England, for by the terms of the arbitration as well as in the selection of the judges Salisbury had very shrewdly protected her interests. But the whole incident was regarded in America and largely in Europe as a great diplomatic victory which had placed the Monroe Doctrine on a new and more certain foundation. Instead of bringing war, the policy of President Cleveland had given an opportunity for the display of friendship by England to America. A diplomatic revolution had taken place, not, as was generally supposed, on account of the action of the President, but for other and more deep seated reasons, which was to be of immense advantage to both countries in the next quarter century. After 1895, the story of the diplomatic relations of England and America is one of increasing friendship and good will. The immediate consequence was the negotiation of a general arbitration treaty between the two countries; but, much to the disappointment of President Cleveland

in America and Lord Salisbury in England, this treaty failed on account of the jealous insistence of the Senate on the maintenance of its own prerogatives. In spite of this failure, it is not too much to state that a friendly understanding almost equivalent to an informal diplomatic entente existed from this time in the affairs of the two countries whose quarrels had led so often to the verge of war.[1]

[1] The most adequate account of the Venezuela incident is to be found in R. M. McElroy, *Grover Cleveland*, Volume II, Chapter VI.

It is only fair to state that the account given in the text is different from that which has been generally accepted in America and which assumes that Great Britain yielded in important respects to the threat of war.

CHAPTER XV

IMPERIAL EXPANSION

President Cleveland had set his face against imperialism but events were to prove too strong for him. The Wilson tariff of 1894 had reëstablished the duties on sugar which had been admitted free under the McKinley bill. One of the unforeseen consequences of this change was to create a financial and industrial depression in Cuba. Thousands of workingmen on the sugar plantations found themselves out of employment. Taxes were high and discontent with the autocratic control of the Spanish Governor which had been general for a century was easily fanned into a flame of revolt.

The revolution had commenced in 1895. The insurgents were strong in the thinly occupied eastern end of the island, while the people in the west and especially in the capital, Havana, were on the whole favorable to the continuance of Spanish rule and fearful of even limited measures of autonomy. The war was essentially a guerrilla contest without pitched battles. The policy of the insurgents was to destroy property and so bring Spain to terms. For one year, the mother country attempted to temporize with the situation, but in 1896 General Weyler was sent to bring the revolt to an end by ruthless measures. A chain of blockhouses was extended across the island to isolate the area of revolt, and the Spaniards, unable to distinguish foes and

friends, placed the whole population of certain regions in great camps where they could be watched. The miseries of the "reconcentrado" system were almost indescribable. Hundreds starved to death and thousands yielded to tropical diseases. The war was brutal on both sides.

A previous revolt had lasted for ten years from 1868 to 1878, but, at that time American investments in the island had been comparatively small, and the details of the situation had not been brought home to the American people by the newspapers. Having so recently objected to the recognition of Southern belligerency by European powers and being even then engaged in collecting the *Alabama* claims, the United States was in a very poor position to interfere with an attempt to put down a revolt by force. Even when in 1873 a filibustering ship which flew the American flag, the *Virginius*, was captured by the Spanish authorities outside the three mile limit and fifty members of her crew were executed as pirates, American action had not gone beyond diplomatic measures to secure apology and reparation. Very soon thereafter Spain was able to reëstablish her authority over the last of her great possessions in America. For almost twenty years comparative peace had reigned in the exhausted island.

The situation in 1896 was wholly different. American investments were substantial although very small compared with those of today; and were officially estimated at fifty millions of dollars. American population had grown and the consumption of sugar in the United States had advanced even more rapidly. Cuba was the chief source for one of the most important food products consumed by the rising industrial population of the neighboring republic and the basis of one of the great industries, that of the American Sugar Refining Com-

pany. In every city, newspapers of a new class had arisen that were seeking in the very ends of the earth for stories that had "a human interest." Atrocities that would once have passed unnoticed were now blazoned in headlines of lurid hue, and the indefatigable newspaper correspondents performed deeds of heroism, disregarding dangers of climate and bullets in quest of "beats." The American reading public became convinced that Spain was still the same country which they vaguely connected with the Inquisition. The heroism of the insurgents and the barbarism of the Spaniard became articles of faith. The flame was fed by one-sided accounts and thousands of people became eager for intervention in the name of humanity. The essential appeal was to the same motives which led many communities to make great sacrifices in missionary effort.

The insurgents had been able to secure funds in the United States and the waning administration of President Cleveland found it difficult to prevent the departure of armed expeditions from American ports in furtherance of the Cuban cause. But the President resisted all pressure to recognize the belligerency of a movement which had neither a fixed capital nor a navy, and continued to perform the obligations of neutrality. Such a policy was unpopular, and, in the campaign of 1896, speakers on both sides were interrupted by demands regarding their attitude to the Cuban question. An offer of mediation by President Cleveland was rejected by the Conservative government of Spain, which stretched every nerve to bring the revolt to an end before March 4, 1897, but all without avail.

William McKinley had been elected as the "advance agent of prosperity," and both the President and his chief sponsor, Mark Hanna, hoped to devote their attention to internal economic policies in the interests of

business. Neither had the slightest desire to place prosperity at the uncertain hazard of a war. Accordingly, the Cuban policy of President Cleveland was continued in spite of increasing pressure from newspapers, churches, and the general public. Congress was called in special session, not to intervene in Cuba, as so many desired, but to revise the tariff and to make it more completely protective. The result was the Dingley tariff of 1897 which remained on the books without important changes until 1909. For the moment nothing was done about currency, for the return of prosperity had made it easy to redeem the obligations of the government in gold without new legislation.

In the meantime affairs in Cuba went from bad to worse. In the autumn the murder of the Conservative prime minister Canovas and the succession of the liberal Sagasta, seemed to indicate a favorable change. Weyler, who was pictured in the American press as "the butcher" was recalled, Blanco was sent to relieve him, autonomy was promised to Cuba under a colonial legislature that was to meet in May, and the harsh measures of Weyler were modified. Both Hanna and McKinley were immensely relieved and, when Congress met in December, the President advocated a policy of watchful waiting. But the insurgents refused the olive branch, and the war went on with unabated cruelty. The insurgents burned sugar plantations and murdered their enemies and the Spaniards treated prisoners as traitors. Neither side had any regard for life or property.

Two incidents tended to increase the rising spirit for war. On February 9th, the *New York Journal*, one of the leading advocates of intervention, published a private letter of the Spanish minister, De Lome, secured, according to Secretary Day, "by surreptitious, if not

criminal methods." In this letter De Lome characterized the President as a time-serving politician, and described his announced intention to assist in the experiment of autonomy as insincere. The writing of such a letter was an act of incredible folly, for McKinley was honestly seeking peace, and its publication gave the Jingoes in Congress the very weapon they were seeking. De Lome, of course, immediately resigned to avoid recall, and, with admirable self restraint, the administration considered the incident closed.

But worse was to follow. On the advice of Fitzhugh Lee, Consul-general at Havana and an eager advocate of intervention, the battleship *Maine* had been sent to watch American interests in that port. On February 15th, the word arrived of a terrible catastrophe. The *Maine* had been destroyed by an explosion with the loss of almost its entire crew of three hundred men. The newspapers assumed that the battleship had been destroyed by the orders of the Spaniards, and the slogan "Remember the *Maine*" was blazoned in the headlines.

Again McKinley moved cautiously. At first, the popular theory was discredited, and the Secretary of the Navy described the explosion officially as an "unfortunate accident." Indeed, most thoughtful men saw from the beginning, that Spain would have been most unlikely to connive at so terrible a deed. At the same moment a Spanish battleship, the *Viscaya*, was in New York, and retaliation would have been quite too easy. The whole incident evidently played into the hands of the insurgents.

An expert commission was appointed which made a careful inquiry, being aided in every reasonable way by the Spanish authorities. As a result of their inquiries, the commission came to the conclusion, fully justified when the hulk of the battleship was raised in 1911,

that the primary explosion had been external, but without being able to secure any evidence that established the guilt of any individual or party. To this day, the loss of the battleship *Maine* continues to be an unsolved mystery. It seems probable that the act was that of private individuals, but whether they represented the Spanish or the insurgent side is a question which with the passing of the years, seems likely to remain forever unsolved.

Many Americans took the descriptions in the newspapers with caution, but, while they were awaiting the report of the *Maine* investigation, they were deeply impressed by a speech of Senator Proctor of Vermont, generally trusted as able and conservative. Proctor had made an independent study of conditions in Cuba, where he had traveled at an earlier period: "Outside of Havana," he said, "all is changed. It is not peace nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a 'trocha,' a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown up on the inside and a barbed wire fence on the outer side of the trench. . . . I saw no house or hut in the four hundred miles of railroad rides . . . except within the Spanish trochas." Senator Proctor reported that the scheme of autonomy had few friends and offered no hope of solving the problem. "There is no doubt that General Blanco is acting in entire good faith; that he desires to give the Cubans a fair measure of autonomy. . . . He has of course a few personal followers but the army and the Spanish citizens do not want genuine autonomy, for that means government by the Cuban people. And it is not strange that the Cubans say it comes too late."

Congress was prevented from declaring war only by the reluctance of the President. When he had advance

information of the unanimous report that the *Maine* had been destroyed, not by accident but by an external explosion, the time for more vigorous measures had evidently arrived. On March 31st, General Woodford, the American minister to Spain, who was working eagerly for peace, presented to the Spanish government what proved to be an ultimatum. Though couched in courteous language, the President's instructions virtually demanded the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba. "The President instructs me to say that we do not want Cuba. He also instructs me to say with equal clearness, that we do wish immediate peace in Cuba. He suggests an armistice, lasting until October 1, negotiations in the meantime being had looking to peace between Spain and the insurgents, through the friendly offices of the President of the United States."

The Spanish ministers probably had no hope or even desire of continuing the struggle in Cuba. But they were in a difficult position, for Spanish opinion was highly incensed, and any appearance of yielding to the United States would probably bring revolution and the downfall of the monarchy. They knew that the chief continental powers were eager to save Spain. The Kaiser was interested in the fate of the monarchy. Austria was closely connected with the Spanish reigning house. France had large investments in Spanish bonds, many of which were protected by the revenues of Cuba.

If it had not been for the bitter enmity between Germany and France and the open friendship of England to the United States, it is probable that the two powers would have intervened in the rising quarrel. As it was, Spain was encouraged to temporize until it was quite too late. On the suggestion of the Powers, the ministry refused the mediation of the President but accepted that of the Pope. On Sunday, April 10th, the new Spanish

minister to Washington, announced to the President that the Queen had yielded to the wishes of the Pope and had directed General Blanco to suspend hostilities; that after May 4th, the date on which the autonomous legislature was to meet, "the Cuban people would have all the liberty they could expect." One week earlier, it is possible that such a solution, although it evidently looked towards some form of autonomy rather than independence, might have been accepted, but the President's message was already written, and in the light of the available evidence, it was apparent that the new plan would not be accepted by the Cuban people.

The President's message was sent on April 11th, and after a debate of one week, on April 19th, the anniversary of the battle of Lexington and of the first bloodshed of the Civil War, the fateful resolutions were passed giving the President the desired authority to use the land and naval forces of the United States to give independence to Cuba. In these resolutions the United States disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." Thus through the doorway of humanitarian idealism, the American people passed into a new and unforeseen career of imperialism.[1]

[1] For the efforts of the European powers and especially Germany to save Spain, see Shippee, L. R., *Germany and the Spanish American War, American Historical Review*, July, 1925. General Woodford always believed that the Spanish offer of April 10, late as it was, should have been used for further negotiations to prevent war. Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, 67, accepts this view. Latané, *The United States as a World Power*, 24, regards the war as inevitable.

There can be no doubt that the war was immensely popular and that President McKinley had endangered his prestige by his hesitation. Roosevelt had described the general feeling when he wrote, "McKinley has no more backbone than a chocolate eclair." The people were untroubled by the doubts that have since been raised by historians as to whether the war might have been prevented by longer patience. The cause was just, and the dangers not too great to prevent a spirit of joyful adventure. A loan of two hundred millions in three per cent bonds was oversubscribed seven times, irritating stamp taxes were cheerfully paid, and the volunteers poured into the camps in embarrassing numbers to the tune, "There'll be a hot time in the old town tonight."

For the war the navy, though small, was ready, while the army had to be created after the beginning of hostilities. Commodore George Dewey had already concentrated a small fleet in Hong Kong, ready to sally forth at a moment's notice to meet the Spanish fleet in Manila, seven hundred miles away. On the night of April 30th, he entered the harbor, which, fortunately for his adventure, was unprotected by mines. The next morning he found the Spanish ships drawn up in battle array before their arsenal at Cavite. The Spanish guns were inferior in range, and Dewey was able to sail back and forth before the doomed ships and to destroy them at leisure without the loss of a man. One curious feature of the battle was the American withdrawal for a short time to give time for breakfast.

Dewey had performed his task with skill and courage. He might have taken the city of Manila at any time, but without an army of occupation he knew the step to be useless, and waited for the arrival of soldiers. It was a period of anxiety. The only Spanish warships in

the Pacific were now destroyed, but the harbor was visited by neutral vessels representing Great Britain, Japan, France, and especially Germany which soon had a squadron equal or even superior to that of the Americans and commanded by an admiral higher in rank than Dewey himself. What did the Germans want? They were in constant communication with the Spaniards in the city and even interfered with the efficiency of the blockade. Dewey's natural fears of some hostile movement on the part of the Germans were relieved to some extent by the equally evident good will of the British commander.

As a matter of fact we know today that the Germans were only waiting to pick up whatever crumbs might fall from the American feast, and that the Kaiser had no intentions of taking any aggressive steps. He had written to his Ambassador in Washington, "His Majesty the Emperor deems it a principal object of German policy to leave unused no opportunity which may arise from the Spanish American War to obtain maritime fulcra in East Asia." The commander of the Asiatic fleet had suggested that the Philippine insurgents might be willing to accept a German protectorate, and the Spanish commander in Manila was anxious to yield Manila to the Germans rather than to see it fall into the hands of the hated Yankees. But the German admiral was never given orders to risk hostilities, for the Kaiser in the matter of the Philippines as in the one of mediation was made cautious by the knowledge that he could not afford another enemy. When the war was over and America had determined to keep the Philippines, he had to be satisfied with the purchase of the Carolines from Spain.

Not having an army, Dewey brought the old leader of the Filipinos, Emilio Aguinaldo, from his exile in

Singapore to lead the insurgents who were attacking the city from the land side. The Spaniards were closely besieged in the city. Aguinaldo proved an able leader and soon organized a government, with which Dewey was instructed to coöperate without formal recognition. Finally, after three months of waiting, the American army under General Merritt had arrived and the Filipinos were persuaded to step aside long enough to allow the Americans to enter the city. The Spaniards by pre-arrangement made only such perfunctory defence as seemed to be required to save their honor. While Manila was being bombarded and occupied, the British squadron took a position between Dewey and the Germans in such a way as to prevent any interference. Neither side knew that twelve hours before the occupation of Manila by the American army, August 13, 1898, a protocol for peace had been signed in Washington.[1]

While these events, having something of the character of comic opera, were taking place in the distant and unknown Philippines, Cuba had come to occupy the center of the stage. The original plan of the War Department was to raise and organize an army during the summer and to delay important movements until the dangers of the tropical season were somewhat passed. In the meantime, a small expedition should go to Cuba to hearten and help the insurgents who were expected to be able to render more efficient aid than in the event

[1] Shippee, L. B., *Germany and the Spanish American War*, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, 1925, Dewey, *Autobiography*, C XVII, and Jeanette Keim, *Forty Years of German-American Political Relations*, 1919, p. 220–231, contain the fundamental materials for the study of the early period of American presence in the Philippines. Von Diederich's statement is to be found in translation in the *Journal of the Royal Service Institution*, August, 1914.

proved possible. The chief military expedition of the summer should go to Porto Rico and not to Cuba. In the meantime, a strict blockade should be maintained and supplies carried to the insurgents by the navy. The small army destined for Cuba was gathered at Tampa under the command of General Shafter, a somewhat superannuated veteran, weighing more than three hundred pounds, and accordingly utterly unfit for a campaign in the tropics. The selection of the commander was of a piece with other arrangements, for the soldiers were supplied with woolen clothing quite suitable for a fall campaign in Montana. Most of Shafter's preliminary army of seventeen thousand men were regulars, but it contained a few regiments of volunteers, notably one called the Rough Riders, recruited by Theodore Roosevelt among the cowboys of the West. Roosevelt had resigned for this purpose from the office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy where he had rendered important service, but, recognizing his lack of experience, had yielded the command to his friend, an army surgeon, Leonard Wood. Arrangements for the war were somewhat hampered by the military inexperience of the Secretary of War, General Alger, who proved to lack the necessary administrative qualities, and by the personal hostility of the Secretary and the commander-in-chief of the army, General Miles.

The course of the war was determined by orders received by the Spanish admiral Cervera, at that time in the Cape Verde Islands, to carry his wholly unprepared fleet to the West Indies, in the vain hope of defending Porto Rico for Spain. Although Cervera told the ministry that his fleet could not compete with the Americans, and that he could do more good by getting ready and then defending the coast of Spain against probable attack, the ministry feared to seem inactive just as they had

feared to yield to the ultimatum of the American President. And Cervera was too good a sailor to disobey.

On paper the Spanish fleet seemed much stronger than it really was and when news came that it had started across the Atlantic, a wholly unreasoning panic existed among the cities of the seaboard. When Cervera reached Martinique, he learned that the American fleet under Sampson had already preceded him to San Juan in Porto Rico, and knowing how unfit his vessels were to meet the Americans, especially after so long a voyage, he made a dash for the protection of the land-locked harbor of Santiago in the eastern end of Cuba, reaching safety on May 19th. No more unfortunate position could have been selected, for Santiago was unconnected with Havana by rail and ten thousand soldiers in the immediate neighborhood could not be increased for lack of proper transportation facilities for food and munitions. The Spanish fleet had found a prison rather than a refuge.

After a curious game of hide and seek, which was unduly prolonged on account of the insistence of Commodore Schley that the Spaniards were in Cienfuegos, a port further west and connected with Havana by rail, even after their entrance into Santiago had been learned from a spy in the telegraph office in Havana, the Spaniards were discovered and the definite blockade began on May 29th.

The entrance to the harbor of Santiago is narrow and covered by high hills. The final success of the war depended for each side on naval preponderance, for without a navy neither country could use its soldiers. It was obviously impossible to force an entrance by ships alone, and Shafter's improvised army was sent to coöperate with the navy in the capture of Santiago and the destruc-

tion of Cervera's fleet. Although the Spaniards had an army of more than two hundred thousand men in Cuba, the majority was concentrated in the neighborhood of distant Havana, and could not be used in the emergency.

In a scene of indescribable confusion, the American soldiers were finally loaded on their transports, and, accompanied by the indefatigable newspaper reporters, who announced every move before it was well commenced, made its way to an anchorage a few miles to the east of the beleaguered city. With the aid of the navy, the soldiers disembarked and began to make their way through an almost trackless jungle towards Santiago. On July first, the outer lines of the Spaniards had been reached. The Spanish forces were planted on hills protected by block houses, and though their numbers were all too small, for the Spanish commander had made the mistake of trying to cover every point at once instead of concentrating his troops against the main American army, the soldiers of Spain fought well for the honor of their country. Especially at El Caney, a blockhouse on a hill, somewhat to the northeast of the main battle, a few hundred Spaniards held at bay all day long a division of seven thousand Americans, and did not yield until their commander had been killed and the troops themselves more than decimated by repeated charges. On San Juan and Kettle hills, on each side of the main trail toward the city, the fighting was less severe. By night the hills were occupied, and the Americans could look down on the harbor of Santiago, a mile and a half away.

The Americans had undergone a difficult march and a hard fight. They had won their objectives with gallantry, but with a loss of fifteen hundred men in killed and wounded, in itself an indication of the determination

with which at least a part of the Spanish army had fought. Curiously enough, discouragement reigned among the commanders of both camps. Shafter was sick behind the lines, unable to mount a horse or to study the position in person, and his second in command, General Joe Wheeler, the famous cavalry leader of the Civil War, who had been appointed for sentimental reasons, was no longer young and was on the invalid list and was hardly fitted for active service. In these circumstances, Shafter actually advised a retreat to await reinforcements, a step from which he was dissuaded over the cable by the War Department, which feared the consequences on the country. The Spanish commander was also persuaded that his doom was sealed and that Santiago could not stand an hour against assault.

Admiral Cervera had placed some of his sailors in the trenches to aid in the defence of the city and would have preferred to continue where he was, destroying his ships in case of the capture of the city. For military reasons, Cervera's plan was undoubtedly wise, for the American fleet was much stronger than his own. Under the well conceived plans of Admiral Sampson, the ships were arranged in a semicircle from which at night a search light played upon the narrow mouth of the harbor. Navigation of the channel had been made difficult though not absolutely impracticable by the sinking of the collier *Merrimac*, a dangerous service in which Lieutenant Hobson and twelve sailors of the fleet had all but succeeded.

Again as in the matter of his main voyage, Cervera was overruled by his superior officers, and especially by Captain General Blanco, who feared the political consequences of sacrificing the fleet without a shot. Escape was almost impossible, for if a Spanish vessel succeeded

in eluding the vigilant Americans, it was difficult to imagine where it could have gone to find greater safety. The Spanish admiral and his captains saw that they were to make a heroic gesture to sustain the ancient greatness of their name. Each vessel as it came out would draw the concentrated fire of the American fleet, whose guns of greater range would make havoc long before the Spanish vessels were close enough to return the fire. According to Admiral Chadwick, the leading authority on the strategy of the war, Cervera would probably have been well advised to try to escape at night and then to scatter his ships in the hope of winning through to safety with one or two. But Cervera feared to attempt the navigation of the difficult channel in the face of a blinding searchlight, and he also felt that he owed it to his valiant crews to run along the coast where some, at least, might be saved after the inevitable destruction of their vessels. Accordingly the time was set for nine-thirty on the morning of July third. Each vessel as it left the harbor was ordered to turn west along the coast. And so they came out in single file to meet their fate.

Captain Concas of the flagship, the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, was aware of the dramatic significance of a moment which spelled the doom of the Spanish fleet. "With the battle flag hoisted, the *Infanta Maria Teresa* advanced ahead of the other cruisers, which for the last time gave the honors due their admiral, saluting him with hurrahs that manifested the spirit of the crews, worthy of a better fate. . . . My bugles were the last echo of those which history tells were sounded in the taking of Granada; it was the signal that the history of four centuries of greatness were ended and that Spain had passed into a nation of the fourth class." For without the ships that were going to immediate destruc-

tion, a million soldiers could not serve the cause of Spain.

Just outside the harbor mouth, the American ships, the *Iowa*, the *Texas*, the *Oregon* which had arrived in time after a dramatic voyage around the Horn, with the *Brooklyn*, a squadron under the immediate command of Admiral Schley, were ready to meet their prey, while a few miles to the east, Admiral Sampson, on his way for a conference with General Shafter, saw the smoke of battle in time to join in the final pursuit and to allow the swift *New York* to be in at the death and to receive the surrender of the last of the Spanish cruisers, the *Cristobal Colon*. By two-thirty in the afternoon, the last of the Spanish fleet had been driven a broken hulk to the protection of the shore. In the judgment of Theodore Roosevelt, it had been a captain's fight. The American vessels had scarcely been struck, and only one man was killed. Among those saved and made a prisoner was the gallant Spanish admiral.

With the destruction of the Spanish fleet, the war was virtually ended. On July 17th the Spaniards surrendered Santiago, without the necessity for a costly assault, though if they had known the extent of sickness and discouragement in the American camp they might have waited. The prisoners were sent to Spain without parole. A few days later, a powerful expedition under General Nelson Miles disembarked on the south coast of Porto Rico where it met very slight resistance. By the twelfth of August, it had overrun the southern and western parts of the island and was preparing to advance towards the fortress of San Juan, when news of peace stopped further hostilities. The American fleet was about to cross the Atlantic and blockade the ports of Spain, when on July 26th Spain made the first overtures for peace. On August 3d, at a time when negotia-

tions had reached a difficult stage, the officers of the Santiago army signed a round robin demanding withdrawal on account of the prevailing malaria. With the connivance of the commander, General Shafter, the round robin was given to the newspapers before it reached the War Department, the immediate responsibility for this unmilitary step being taken by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt of the Rough Riders. On the next day, orders were given for the withdrawal of the soldiers to Montauk Point, Long Island. A controversy arose between the Secretary of War and Roosevelt, the War Department stating that the order was to be given in any case and that the publication had merely embarrassed the government at a critical moment. But the publication of the round robin added to the growing popularity of the chief author, whose exploits in command of the Rough Riders had been given full publicity. The people believed that he had cut through red tape and had thus compelled the quick action that saved the unnecessary loss of life. Theodore Roosevelt emerged as the chief hero of the war, and was immediately accepted by the reluctant boss, Tom Platt of New York, as the one available candidate for governor of that state.[1]

Even the publication of so unfavorable a report on the condition of the American army in Cuba did not delay the negotiations which went on apace. The peace protocol, negotiated in Washington through the friendly offices of the French Ambassador, Jules Cambon, was signed on August 12th, but on account of the absence of a direct cable, too late to prevent the capture of Manila

[1] A critical and discriminating account of the round robin episode is to be found in Chadwick, *The Spanish War*, II, 252 ff.

For Roosevelt's connection with it see, Roosevelt, *Autobiography*, 267.

on the next day. Spain agreed to evacuate Cuba, and to cede Porto Rico and the little island of Guam in the Ladrones. The United States was to hold Manila until the definite disposal of the Philippines should be arranged in the final treaty.

The preliminary treaty or protocol had decided most of the questions arising from the war. Two still remained for negotiation with the Spanish commissioners. What should be done with the debt of Cuba? What should be done with the Philippines? On the first point, the Americans were clear. Spain expected assistance from French public opinion since many of the Cuban bonds had been sold in the French market, but France was unable to interfere, for much the same reasons which had kept Germany neutral. Cuba was liberated, free from any burden of debt, thereby receiving an advantage which the insurgents could never have secured for themselves.

On the new and unexpected question of the Philippines, the administration was in doubt until long after the negotiations had commenced. The final decision to insist on the cession of the whole archipelago was to some extent a mere choice of evils. Spain could not hold them against insurrection. The Filipinos were reported to be unable to organize a stable government. If the United States withdrew, the islands would surely become a bone of contention between Germany and her rivals in the East. As McKinley studied public opinion, he found a strong tendency to favor the retention of the Philippines, especially among those classes which saw in American control a new opportunity for missionary endeavor. Germany had, in November, 1897, seized Kiaochow, the key to the Shantung peninsula, and the various powers were engaged in a scramble for conces-

sions in China. The Philippines would be a base for the protection of American commerce in China.

The importance of this last consideration was indicated in the original instructions to the American commissioners in which occurs for the first time the phrase, "the open door," which was to be for many years the basis of American diplomacy in the Orient: "Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. . . . Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. In view of what has been stated, the United States can not accept less than the cession in full rights and sovereignty of the island of Luzon."

The final decision to demand the cession of the whole archipelago was bitterly resisted by the Spanish commissioners, who were placated to some extent by a payment of twenty millions of dollars. It also met strong opposition in the United States, the chief argument being that such annexation of an alien and distant people was contrary to the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, of the national Constitution, and, in foreign policy, of the Monroe Doctrine. The opposition in the Senate was so strong, that the Treaty of Paris was barely ratified, having only a single vote to spare. Even then it had to rely on the personal influence of William J. Bryan, who came to Washington and urged his friends to vote for the treaty. Bryan wanted to accept the Philippines in order to give them immediate independence under American protection as was to be done with Cuba.[1] It was chiefly on this issue that Bryan ran for the Presidency in 1900; but, in spite of the outbreak of a bitter and costly war between the Americans and the

[1] This statement is based on a letter from Mr. Bryan to the author (1924).

Filipinos under the leadership of Aguinaldo, Bryan was defeated and McKinley was triumphantly reëlected. Apparently, although other questions entered to some extent into the election, the American people had determined to accept the hazards of imperialism.

The organized power of the Filipinos was weakened by the capture in the spring of 1901 of their leader Aguinaldo. The last embers of opposition had been quenched by the next year, and Civil Government, with a large measure of self-government in local affairs, was immediately organized under plans made by Elihu Root as Secretary of War and carried out with great skill and tact by William Howard Taft as Governor. Aguinaldo became loyal and friendly and his son fought in the American ranks during the World War. In 1917, under a Democratic administration, the Filipinos were given complete control of their own legislature, subject to the veto of a Governor appointed by the President. Economic conditions in the Philippines improved greatly, but the movement for independence continued to have strong supporters in the islands. To this day, the question of the Philippines may be considered one of the unsettled problems of American policy.

In the case of Cuba, the United States was committed by the resolution which commenced the war to the very policy which Bryan and the anti-imperialists desired for the Philippines. American occupation was to be temporary. President McKinley was an excellent judge of men; in addition to finding an admirable Secretary of State in John Hay and a brilliant Secretary of War in Elihu Root, he deserves the full credit for the selection of Taft for the Philippines and General Leonard Wood as military governor of Cuba.

The Americans remained in Cuba until 1902. The greatest achievement of their administration was in san-

itation and preventive medicine. The governor himself was a trained physician, and with his encouragement, Major William Crawford Gorgas cleaned streets, built sewers, and removed filth. In spite of these efforts, yellow fever continued to attack those who were not immune, and it was evident that the chief problem for the control of the tropics had not been solved.

In these circumstances, the Surgeon General of the Army sent a special commission under the leadership of Doctor Walter Reed to study the causes of yellow fever and to put the matter on a scientific basis. In Havana Dr. Reed found an able Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Finlay, who had advocated for many years a theory, arrived at without experimental proof by a process which was described as scientific clairvoyance, that the dread disease was not due to filth or to the contact of the infected, but exclusively to the bite of one variety of mosquito, the so-called Stegomyia. Baffled in other directions, the Reed commission took this theory as a hypothesis. Two members of the commission, Dr. James Carroll and Dr. Jesse W. Lazear, allowed themselves to be bitten by the suspected mosquitoes. Both took yellow fever. Dr. Carroll recovered, but his health was so impaired that he died a few years later. Dr. Lazear died. His superior officer, Secretary Elihu Root, said, "The name of Dr. Jesse W. Lazear . . . should be written in the list of martyrs who have died for humanity." Others less celebrated were found to allow experiments to be made on a large scale, and the exact conditions under which yellow fever arises were fully and scientifically established. Using the results of the Reed investigation as the basis of his work, in spite of constant discouragements from "practical" men who still believed in the older filth theory, with wonderful tact in dealing with the sceptical, Major Gorgas was able to banish

the most dreaded of tropical diseases first from Cuba, then from the Panama Canal Zone, once a hotbed of the disease, and now (1926) for more than twenty years entirely free from it. It was yellow fever that had defeated the French in Panama, a fact to which the old cemetery at that point bears eloquent witness. In that sense, Gorgas and Reed may be considered the true builders of the Panama canal.[1]

General Wood, as military governor, established order and justice and organized a convention to draft a constitution and to establish permanent relations between the United States and Cuba. By the terms of the so-called Platt amendment, written by the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, and incorporated reluctantly into the new Constitution and later into a treaty, Cuba agreed not to create a debt that could not be discharged by the ordinary revenues and not to alienate her independence, and granted to the United States a right to intervene in the future "for the preservation of Cuban independence" and "for the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty." On May 20, 1902, the American troops withdrew, leaving Cuba in better condition than she had enjoyed for many years. Cuba ceded to the United States a naval station on Guantanamo Bay. Later in the year, against great opposition, a reciprocity treaty was arranged, which, mindful of the difficulties that had been the cause, at least in part, of the original revolt, admitted Cuban sugar at a reduction of twenty per cent and gave reciprocal advantages in Cuba to American goods.

By these arrangements, Cuba became an autonomous protectorate. Under the terms of the Platt amendment,

[1] On the elimination of yellow fever see Sullivan, Mark, *Our Times*, Chapter XVII.

the United States intervened to prevent revolution in 1906, and her soldiers remained for three years. More than once since that time marines have landed to protect property. American investments have grown by leaps and bounds, especially after the European War, and now amount to almost two thousand millions of dollars. The dominant financial interests are those represented by the National City Bank of New York, which controls public utilities and immense areas of sugar land. The American minister to Cuba occupies a position as chief adviser to the Cuban government, more in line with the functions of a British Commissioner at the Court of an Indian Prince than with the ordinary duties of a diplomatic officer.

By the Insular Decisions of 1901, the Supreme Court accepted the theory that the new islands constituted an American Empire for which government might be provided without some of the limitations, for example as to uniform tariffs and jury trial, which apply to the other parts of the United States. In Porto Rico and the Philippines, especially, before the death of McKinley, governments had been set up that differed in essential respects from those that had once been familiar in the territories of the West; but with the passing of the years, American citizenship has been conferred on the Porto Ricans, and the creation of elective legislatures in both Porto Rico and the Philippines have made these differences less and less significant. Today, Hawaii, Porto Rico, and even the Philippines are governed in essential respects much as Arizona and New Mexico were before they were admitted to statehood. In curious and unexpected ways, the old ideas of the Ordinance of 1787 have been extended to strange new lands across the seas.

The process of imperial expansion, which began in 1898, has gone on unchecked, becoming increasingly

AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE CARIBBEAN 1926
TERRITORY OF U.S
PROTECTORATES OF U.S
GULF OF MEXICO
CARIBBEAN SEA
KEY WEST
NASSAU
BAHAMAS
TROPIC OF CANCER
HAVANA
CUBA
GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION
SANTIAGO
CAP HAITIEN
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
SANTO DOMINGO
PORT AU PRINCE
JAMAICA
KINGSTON
SAN JUAN
ST THOMAS U.S.
PORTO RICO
VIRGIN IS.
ST JOHN U.S.
ST CROIX U.S.
ST. CHRISTOPHER
NEVIS
ANTIGUA
MONTSERRAT
LEEWARD IS.
BARBUDA
GUADELOUPE
MARIE GALANTE
DOMINICA
MARTINIQUE
ST. LUCIA
ST. VINCENT
BARBADOS
GRENADA
WINDWARD IS.
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
MARGARITA
CURACAO
CRUZ (DUTCH)
BUEN AYRE
PUERTO CABELLO
CARACAS
BARRANQUILLA
MEXICO
BRIT. HONDURAS
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
TEGUEIGALPA
SAN SALVADOR
SALVADOR
SITE FOR U.S. NAVAL STATION
NICARAGUA
MANAGUA
LITTLE CORN I. TO U.S.
GREAT CORN I. TO U.S.
BLUEFIELDS
GREYTOWN
COSTA RICA
SAN JOSE
COLON
PANAMA CANAL
PANAMA
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
MAGDALENA
VENEZUELA
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LONGITUDE WEST FROM GREENWICH

economic in its purpose. In 1903, as we shall see in the next chapter, Roosevelt acquired the Canal Zone in the Isthmus of Panama; in 1905, by an agreement with the reigning dictator of Santo Domingo, later legalized by treaty, the United States acquired the right to protect investments in Santo Domingo by the collection of customs. American investments grew in that ancient seat of Spanish power as they had grown in Cuba, and this expansion of American interests led to armed intervention in 1916 that lasted until 1924. The revenues of the Dominican Republic continue (1926) to be collected by American officers.

In like manner, marines were landed to protect American interests in Nicaragua in 1912, and by a treaty made in 1916, that country also became a virtual American protectorate. The collection of revenues under military protection began in Hayti in 1915. In all these countries as well as in others in Central America, American investments, especially those by the United Fruit Company, have grown very rapidly in the last ten or fifteen years, and have been accompanied by increasing political pressure to safeguard the principal and interest. The countries of the Caribbean have become an American sphere of interest. Even a country so far away as Bolivia accepted (in 1920) a large American loan on terms which place the revenues and the national bank under the virtual control of officers selected in New York. The economic penetration of Venezuela in the quest of asphalt, and of Mexico and Colombia by companies interested in oil, and the creation of new banking and commercial facilities in all the countries of Latin America since the World War, constitute important indications of the new position of the United States as an investing country, seeking new opportunities for surplus capital, no longer in the West, but beyond the seas.

No prophet is required to foresee the significance of such changes in the next period of American history.[1]

[1] For the Spanish American War, see especially, the three volumes by Admiral F. E. Chadwick, entitled, *The Relations of the United States and Spain.* These volumes contain the essential Spanish as well as the American documents. For the aftermath of the war see J. H. Latané, *The United States and Latin America.* Nearing and Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy*, contains important materials. This book is very suggestive, though some of the conclusions must be accepted with caution. An impartial discussion is to be found in Stuart, G. H., *Latin America and the United States*, Chapters X, XI, XII. In 1917 American power in the Caribbean was strengthened by the purchase of three islands in the Virgin group from Denmark.

CHAPTER XVI

THE RISE OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

In the first year of his second term, William McKinley, while attending the Buffalo Exposition, was shot without apparent reason by a recent immigrant and, after lingering for a week between life and death, died on September 14, 1901. Hay had regarded his dead chief at first as merely a kindly politician, but before his death, had come to admire his very real courage, wisdom, and strength. Franklin K. Lane, one of the leaders of the Progressive movement, later Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and Secretary of the Interior, on whom the ties of party always rested lightly, wrote of him long after his death: "McKinley was simple in his nature, and at bottom a dear boy of kind heart, who put his hand into the big fist of Mark Hanna and was led to glory." And this was the common view at the time, but scarcely fair. More than most men who have shouldered heavy responsibilities, William McKinley grew with his office. In his last speech, the former high priest of protection, made a plea for a lower tariff wall in the interests of commerce and peace: "We cannot hope to sell forever and never buy." Such a plea from such a source was in itself a subtle indication of the commercial revolution that was just beginning in America and that few men had the wisdom to recognize. On the death of McKinley, the Vice President, Theodore

Roosevelt of New York, was hastily summoned from his vacation in the Adirondacks to take the oath of office.

The new President, young, aggressive, and brilliant, assumed office with a promise, undoubtedly sincere, to carry on unchanged the policies of his predecessor. He had the singular good fortune to inherit from McKinley a cabinet of unusual ability, and the good sense to attach its members to his own administration. In John Hay, he had one of the great American Secretaries of State, an experienced diplomat, with unusual personal charm and a wide acquaintance with European and especially British leaders of opinion. Elihu Root, as Secretary of War, was not only the leader of the American bar, but in the organization of the army under a general staff and in the creation of a new colonial empire he had shown capacity to mold American institutions to new conditions with the full knowledge of the great lawyer but without the narrow legalistic bias that sometimes accompanies ability at the bar. Taft in the Philippines, Wood in Cuba, and Knox as Attorney General were also men of assured capacity.

One of the most heartening features of the age which followed the Spanish American War was the development of new standards of public service that made it possible for the nation to call into high office men who had won their spurs in other fields than politics. Perhaps the chief reason for this was that, for the first time since the Civil War, the business of government had become a high adventure in which the very greatest capacity would not be wasted. In contrast with the period of the seventies, the eighties, and the nineties, a man of energy could now accomplish in Washington something of real moment. For government was beginning to touch life at many points and to call for administrative powers of a high order.

The story of Root's appointment in 1899, for example, was one which it is safe to say could not have been told ten years earlier: "Having just finished my labors of the year and gone to my country home, I was called to the telephone and told by one speaking for President McKinley, 'the President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to take the position of Secretary of War.' I answered, 'Thank the President for me, but say it is quite absurd. I know nothing about war. I know nothing about the army.' I was told to hold the wire, and in a moment there came back the reply, 'President McKinley directs me to say that he is not looking for any one who knows anything about the army; he has got to have a lawyer to direct the government of those Spanish islands and you are the lawyer he wants.' Of course," proceeded Root, "I had then on the instant, to determine what kind of a lawyer I wished to be, and there was but one answer to make, and so I went to perform a lawyer's duty upon the call of the greatest of our clients, the government of our country."[1]

Right here then, was to lie one of the claims of Theodore Roosevelt to fame. Whatever mistakes or failures were to his credit in foreign and domestic affairs, he built upon foundations already laid and was able to win to the public service an unusual number of able men, and to permeate administration with his own undoubted spirit of high patriotism and energetic devotion to the general welfare. He had the capacity of a great administrator who does not undervalue the qualities of the heart in winning an allegiance which was always partly personal. Observers, both American and foreign, are agreed that the *esprit de corps* of Washington in the days of Roosevelt was quite unlike anything that had gone

[1] Rhodes, J. F., *The Administrations of McKinley and Roosevelt*, 105.

before. Roosevelt will perhaps be remembered longer for such undramatic tasks as the reorganization of the consular and diplomatic service than for many other things that had a larger place in the newspapers of his day. In this respect he was aided by the laborious work that had already been done for Civil Service Reform under Cleveland, by the skill of McKinley in selecting high officials, and by his own high contempt for the mere ability to make money unless such capacity was accompanied by other and greater gifts.

The leaders of the generation that had unexpectedly entered the Spanish American War had become accustomed to regard business and government as allies, an alliance in which government played a decidedly subordinate rôle. When any measure was suggested in the interests of what was deemed the general welfare but which might carry incidental dangers to property, government was sharply limited by the positive and implicit restrictions of the constitution. But when government could be used to protect and enlarge the sphere of business interests, its powers were quite sufficient for any emergency. The climax of this theory came in 1895, the year when the Supreme Court declared the income tax unconstitutional, decided that the Sherman Act did not apply to the creation of manufacturing monopolies created by the purchase of stocks, and, at the same time, fully upheld the extreme powers that had been used to suppress the Chicago strike. The alliance between business and government was the essential basis of the powers of such state bosses as Platt in New York, Quay in Pennsylvania, and on a higher plane in the national field, Marcus Alonzo Hanna of Ohio. Its acceptance by both parties was indicated by the generous contributions that such interests as those of the Havemeyers made with marvellous impartiality

to the campaign chests of both sides. The political creed was subtle, and demanded that government should be at once strong and weak, but always with proper and necessary discriminations in the interest of those whom John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, in an earlier day, would have called "the wealthy, the good, and the wise." Entirely in accord with the spirit of his day, William McKinley had been elected in 1896 as "the advance agent of prosperity" and in 1900 by an equally frank appeal to the unquestioned advantages of "the full dinner pail." And McKinley had accepted the creed, had lived up to its implications, and had made a wise, patient, and successful President.

But McKinley was dead and Theodore Roosevelt reigned in his stead. There were incidents in his record as Governor of New York to give pause to the older leaders. For example he had insisted on the taxation of the franchises of corporations on the ground that such a measure was required by "common decency"; he had refused to appoint men to such strategic positions as insurance inspectors who were recommended to him by the great insurance companies themselves through their representative in politics, "Boss" Platt; above all, he had carried his executive and legislative program by a frank appeal to public opinion through a publicity which was contrary to the rules of the game as it had usually been played up to his time.

In executive office, he used the same initiative, untrammelled by restrictions, which was common enough in American life but familiar only in the realm of business where no constitutions exist to hamper energy or to lessen enterprise, to trouble or to make afraid. At a later time, Roosevelt stated more fully his theory of executive office as he had already practiced it in New York. Speaking of the Presidency he said, "The most important

factor in getting the right spirit in my Administration, next to the insistence upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people, was my insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional powers. . . . I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the nation could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. . . . I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power."[1]

The doctrine of implied powers which Hamilton and Marshall had established for the legislative department of the nation in an age when the chief need was for legislation, Roosevelt now determined to apply to the acts of the executive when the center of interest had passed from the halls of legislation to the offices of administration.

In contrast with Andrew Jackson with whom he was often to be compared, Theodore Roosevelt was by birth, by training, and by instincts, as his very use of the expression, "the plain people," indicates, a phrase which Jackson could not have used, an aristocrat within a democracy, basing his authority on the popular will, but determined to use that authority not for the ends that the people thought they wanted, but for their own good, sometimes even in spite of themselves. Thus too, he had the highest regard "for small, civilized nations," notably Belgium, or Holland, and none at all for nations like Colombia which he persisted in believing to be

[1] Roosevelt, *Autobiography*, 389.

uncivilized and "ruled by bandits." In foreign affairs, the key to Roosevelt's policy was the spirit of white aristocracy in which Kipling had written in 1899 the phrase, so soon to become the sheerest cant, "the White Man's Burden." At a later time, Roosevelt advocated universal compulsory military training as a permanent American policy, not because the people wanted it, but because it was good for them and they ought to have it. McKinley was a democrat working for what his enemies believed to be aristocratic ends. Roosevelt was a true aristocrat, who "happened to be born a gentleman," as Hay remarked, working for the ends of democracy. To understand Roosevelt, we must imagine Hamilton truly converted to the creed of Jackson, but unable to adjust that creed, sincerely held, to his own deep rooted convictions and instincts. The ideals of Roosevelt were important because like those of Jackson in his day, they exactly mirrored America, but an America which with the passing of the frontier and of the small farm, and with the immense increase of great industrial fortunes, was less democratic than it fondly believed itself to be.

It was no wonder that the older leaders had accepted with great reluctance Theodore Roosevelt as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency, and only because in that office, though "unsafe" he would do less harm to the order for which they stood than in the Governorship of New York. And now he was President, by the will of fate, and had promised to walk in the footsteps of the dead McKinley!

As might easily be imagined under such a President and in such times, the years were crowded with events. In 1902, came the incident which is perhaps most illuminating in a study of the methods of the new President. The anthracite coal business was highly organized, both on the side of capital and that of labor. Six men virtually

controlled the whole business, the leader of the operators being George F. Baer. The strong union of miners had an able President in John Mitchell. In the spring of that year, a strike broke out in which for the moment the superficial difference referred to the wages of the workers and conditions of work. Fundamentally there was a deeper issue, for the coal operators were determined to have a fight to the finish and to destroy the power of the unions once for all. A previous strike two years before in the year of the Presidential election had been compromised at the earnest request of Hanna who was sincerely committed to the principle of collective bargaining and who urged the disastrous result of such a strike on the reëlection of McKinley. As the summer of 1902 wore to fall, the shortage of coal became appalling. From the orthodox point of view, here was a question with which the national government had no concern, except possibly to use troops to repel the inevitable disorders. Actually, the situation concerned in a vital way the welfare of thousands and even millions of people. As Roosevelt saw it, the matter was national. He often saw things that way.

Under a strict construction of the Constitution, the coal strike was entirely a matter for the State of Pennsylvania. Roosevelt determined that if he had to intervene, he would use the army not merely to prevent disorders in a private struggle, but to take over and run the mines in the interests of the public. Whether some inkling of this decision was allowed to leak out and to reach the owners we cannot say. In any case, there was a surprising change of front. Both sides agreed to arbitrate their differences. A distinguished commission was appointed by the President which virtually recognized the unions. By their decision, an agreement was reached which prevented another strike for more

than twenty years. The whole incident was the most characteristic expression of what Roosevelt was later to call the "New Nationalism."

To many people in the time of Roosevelt, the United States seemed to be rapidly changing from a democracy into a plutocracy. In spite of state and national laws, under the force of powerful economic considerations, the small business enterprises of the seventies had been transformed, first through informal pools and agreements, later by the surrender of stock to trustees, and more recently through great holding companies or unified corporations which brought together not only establishments of the same kind in "horizontal" combinations, but now began to control the various initial processes of manufacturing and to carry goods from the mine to the consumer in forms of combination which for the lack of a better name came to be called "vertical." Behind these combinations, were great banking interests with which the rich profits of business were placed for new investment. The combined shares of small companies often increased in value on account of the supposed advantages of a unified business in dealing with labor, with jobbers, and with overproduction. In 1901, the movement had a dramatic climax in the organization under the leadership of the most powerful financier in America, J. Pierpont Morgan, of a great vertical combination, which, under the name of the United States Steel Corporation, unified the most powerful elements in an important industry. The imagination of the public was caught by the huge capitalization of more than a thousand millions of dollars. In spite of the organization of other similar enterprises, notably the International Harvester Company, the American Sugar Refining Company, and the American Tobacco Company, the "billion dollar steel trust," had no rival in the

prints of the day except the well established Standard Oil Company. The success of the manufacturer had made him a banker. Through his functions as an investor of surplus wealth, the same financial interests now controlled the policy of many enterprises of very different kinds, railroads, factories, and mines.

The old convention system of making political nominations had been inexpensive and reasonably efficient. It tended to bring men of ability into politics. But it also gave great power to very few men. The convention was often controlled by a political "boss" who was unquestionably subservient to those powerful interests, sometimes local and with increasing frequency national, to which radical leaders like Bryan and La Follette gave the general name "Wall Street." Leaders of finance kept their fingers on the public pulse and dictated nominations of legislators, judges and Congressmen, often wise selections, usually patriotic, but never unfriendly. Local public utilities were protected by the clumsy and complex character of city governments with bicameral city legislatures elected by wards and with responsibility distributed. Larger interests were equally guarded by the Senate the members of which were selected by glorified conventions in the form of the State legislatures. It must not be supposed that control was perfect or necessarily selfish, but enough examples of greed and corruption came to light to give the incentive for a movement which came to be termed Progressive.

Back of the Progressive movement, there was developed a new philosophy of government. Instead of regarding government as essentially a policeman for the protection of property, it was to become a positive agency for the promotion of public welfare. Before it could assume its new functions the radicals believed that changes had to be made in its structure. In 1901, after

a severe storm which devastated the city and created the necessary emergency, Galveston introduced a simplified form of government by commission, a system later copied by many cities and modified into the city manager plan. The whole idea was to simplify and centralize responsibility. In 1903, Wisconsin, which had a remarkable governor of great energy and ability in Robert M. LaFollette, substituted for the old convention plan of nominating candidates for office, the direct primary. The direct primary corrected some evils, but substituted others, and, unlike the commission form of government, has proved on the whole a disappointment to its authors. The expenses of campaigns greatly increased and men of modest means were unable to enter politics. The direct election of United States Senators was practically secured by the so-called Oregon plan, which bound the legislature to obey the results of a previous primary. In Texas, with quiet unostentation but almost as efficiently as in Wisconsin, Edward M. House used his great powers of persuasion to elect progressive governors and to promote reforms. Direct control of legislation was secured in some states by the initiative and referendum, copied from Switzerland. More radical still, and less widely adopted, was the idea of the recall of public officers and even judges when their acts were no longer satisfactory to the electors.

The new machinery, some of it unwieldly and ineffective, was not to be an end but a means. The new progressive legislatures, especially in the West, passed laws reducing railway fares, decreasing the hours of labor, especially in dangerous occupations, providing for employer's liability in cases of industrial accidents, and above all, prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, usually leaving this question to the local option of counties or smaller subdivisions of the

state. The movement to give the franchise to women spread rapidly through the West, and became almost as characteristic of the Progressive movement as prohibition or the direct primary.

One of the immediate consequences of these changes was to create contests which cut sharply through old party lines. The independent vote increased in importance. For example, to secure a dry candidate, it became increasingly necessary for a Republican to vote the Democratic ticket, or the reverse. In the eighties, a Republican was almost always sure to be a Republican until death. Now, he might frequently be found committing what had been political treason by voting a "scratched" ticket. The most powerful agency for the promotion of prohibition was not a party, but an unpartisan organization, largely supported and controlled by evangelical churches, the Anti-Saloon League of America. Men who were "progressive" on one issue, for example the direct primary, or the control of railroads, or woman suffrage, might be conservative when it came to shorter hours or to prohibition. But in general a Progressive, came to mean a man who believed in a majority of the new devices for bringing government closer to the people and for using it for the promotion of human welfare. As to the precise devices which would accomplish these ends there was wide variety of opinion. The general result was to make politics for the first time in a generation vital and interesting.

The Progressive movement was greatly aided by the rise of cheap monthly magazines, well printed and illustrated, of which at the beginning the most notable was *McClures'*. In contrast with the older reviews with their literary flavor, these new magazines, carried stories of business and politics in a form well calculated to bring the new problems to the attention of millions of

readers. Some of these new writers were ill-informed but most of them told the truth. Perhaps the most significant contribution to what Roosevelt called "the age of the muckrakers" was Ida M. Tarbell's *History of the Standard Oil Company* which told the unknown though suspected story of the connection between railroad rebates and the rise of one great American corporation.

In spite of his epithet, Roosevelt himself may be termed not unfairly the greatest of the muckrakers. He drew his lessons from the corrupt conditions which as a young man he had witnessed in the municipality and in the legislature of New York. From his high position, in Presidential messages and speeches, he denounced "malefactors of great wealth" though he kept the balance true by dubbing certain radical labor leaders in almost the same breath as "undesirable citizens." He described the White House as a "bully pulpit," as indeed it was. Perhaps his chief service to the nation was in helping to arouse a dormant public conscience.

The Progressive movement was, at least in the beginning, and necessarily from the nature of its complaints and remedies, a matter of cities and states. LaFollette, U'Ren, House, "Golden Rule" Jones, Tom L. Johnson, and other such men were its leaders. By its very vagueness, it drew into its embrace many men of different backgrounds who could not easily have found a place in the earlier movements, the Greenback idea, Populism, or Free Silver, which had been its forerunners. Its power, and from the conservative standpoint, its danger, lay in the fact that it typified an attitude toward life, rather than a platform.

The chief obstacle in the way of the new Progressive measures was the power of judicial review of legislation under state and national constitutions. Indeed, many

a legislator voted for a measure which he knew to be unwise, in the certainty that his mistake would be corrected by the courts. In its examination of Federal laws, the Supreme Court of the United States has been conservative and the number of national laws which have been declared unconstitutional is surprisingly small. As a matter of fact, most of the carelessly drawn bills which seemed to interfere unduly with the rights of property have emanated from the state legislatures. These enactments fell under the judicial ax by the scores and even the hundreds. Occasionally one of these measures reached the Supreme Court of the United States under the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids statutes that "take away life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The best known incident of this kind was the so-called *Lockner Case*, involving the validity of a law of New York that limited the hours of work in public bakeshops to ten a day. The decision of the court was handed down by Mr. Justice Peckham, a survivor of the older jurisprudence. Peckham argued that such a law was unconstitutional as an infringement of the natural and constitutional right of a man to work as long as he pleases. The most notable feature of the utterance of the Court was a spirited and ironical dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, arguing for the necessity, under modern conditions, of increased powers of regulation in the state in the interests of the public health and welfare. The opinion of Justice Holmes became the basis of later successful defence of similar laws before the courts and the judicial charter of the Progressive movement in its wider implications. The majority opinion was publicly denounced by President Roosevelt, and the whole incident was the concrete basis for the later demand of advanced Progressives for the recall of judges or judicial opinions or for some

other weapon by which democracy might find expression free from what the radicals called the "dead hand of the courts."

In spite of Justice Peckham and the bakeshop case, there was already evidence that the judges, being human, were affected by the new currents of public opinion which were flowing around them. In 1903, two decisions were handed down which it is safe to say would have been quite impossible ten years earlier. In the *Lottery Case*, the Court held that the powers of the Federal government extended to the prohibition of Lotteries in which tickets were carried in interstate commerce across state lines. Progressives saw in this decision the possibility of a federal police power under the commerce clause of the constitution and began to search for occasions for its use.

In the same year with the Lottery decision, to the surprise of the business interests of the country, the Court ordered the dissolution of the Northern Securities Company, a holding company intended to unify the great Western railroad interests of Edward H. Harriman and James J. Hill. In this opinion the Court had virtually reversed its decision of 1895 that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act did not apply to the creation of holding companies. President Roosevelt advertised the case as a great victory for the administration which had brought the suit. But the immediate consequences were small, for the union of the railroads was probably inevitable and wise and, though they dissolved their formal partnership, they seem to have continued to work together as almost a single system. At least they did not return to the ruinous cutthroat competition which seems to be implied as an ideal in the literal interpretation of the half considered phrases of the Sherman law. But in a wider way the decision was significant, for it opened the way to

the ultimate control by the federal government of both railroads and other great corporate interests in ways that were to bear fruit and that seemed to have been forever closed by the earlier cases.

President Roosevelt, as we have seen, had already aligned himself with those general tendencies which were soon to be called Progressive. In 1902, largely through his influence, the Reclamation Act had been passed to provide for the irrigation of western lands. In later years by executive proclamations which illustrated fully his theory of the implied powers of the executive, Roosevelt withdrew from entry valuable lands which were falling into the hands of corporate interests, and used his great influence to persuade both the national and the state governments to join in the creation of forest reserves and for the national control of its undeveloped mineral areas. The conservation movement was promoted by a meeting of all the state governors under the leadership of Roosevelt. On the whole, the conservation movement was more popular in the East than in the West, which was still dominated by the old and aggressive pioneer spirit for the rapid exploitation of natural resources under state control. Thereby hangs a story in the next administration.

Taking the hint from the decisions of the Court in 1903, the national government now definitely entered the field of social legislation. By the Hepburn Act, the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission were increased and it was authorized to order a reduction when there was proof that any given rate was unfair. This law virtually gave back to the Commission the powers which it was supposed to have under the original act of 1887 but which had fallen under the adverse scrutiny of an unfriendly court. The law did not go so far as was desired by extreme Progressives like La

Follette, but it was a step in the direction of national regulation.

Similarly, under the influence of Roosevelt and in answer to the Progressive movement and the decision in the Lottery case, Congress passed a "pure food and drug act" which compelled the eradication of certain evils that had been advertised by the muckrakers. By the meat inspection act, federal inspectors were given power to compel sanitary conditions in the great packing plants. Both these measures, sponsored by the magazines, were not only in direct assistance of the public health, but proved to have a direct value of a business kind in the extension of American commerce.

In spite of the decision in the Northern Securities case, Roosevelt dealt somewhat gingerly with the difficult question of the trusts. The results of that case had taught the country that the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, which had remained a dead letter for twelve years after its passage, was a dangerous weapon if taken too literally. It forbade and established penalties of a drastic kind for combinations in restraint of trade. But the dissolution of these great business units which were now so deeply embedded in the economic structure of the country might be either a farce or, if real, might lead to a panic in which many innocent business men would be involved. The truth of the matter was that while many sections of the country, especially in the West, feared the power of great business combinations, the majority of the people had never really desired the enforcement of the law. In these circumstances Roosevelt developed a theory of "good" trusts and "bad" trusts. The mere size of a combination should not subject it to prosecution provided it did not use methods unfair to smaller competitors. Roosevelt had no belief in the advantages of competition for its own sake, and he therefore favored

regulation of corporate affairs rather than legal dissolution.

In line with his theory, he persuaded Congress to create a Bureau of Corporations to get the facts, and instituted suits against a few combinations, notably the so-called "Beef Trust," thereby adding to his growing popularity. Others he left untouched. In 1907, largely as a result of an investigation of the affairs of the great insurance companies, in which Charles Evans Hughes won his spurs, and which proved that the funds of these companies were managed wastefully and were too largely under the control of the great New York Trust Companies which used them for dangerous speculative ventures, one of the trust companies closed its doors and an alarming financial panic developed. For some weeks money was very scarce, business failures were imminent, and the country learned the necessity of a more elastic system of currency which in later years was to lead to the Federal Reserve System. While the panic was at its height, representatives of the United States Steel Corporation called on the President and told him that they could save at least one important business man and perhaps stop the panic if they were allowed to acquire the stock of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company. They did not care to do this unless they were assured that they would not be prosecuted under the Sherman law. Roosevelt did not hesitate in what he regarded as the interests of the public to give the desired permission.

The Bureau of Corporations soon developed into the Department of Commerce and the policy of Roosevelt was adopted in 1911 by the Supreme Court in applying what it called the "rule of reason" which is evidently only another way in which to describe Roosevelt's "good" and "bad" trusts. The idea of regulation as

distinguished from the older frontier ideal of dissolution was finally applied to the problem in 1913 in the creation of the Trade Commission, one of the important acts of the Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson. Knowing how dangerous it was, Roosevelt left the persistent question of tariff revision to his successor. It is not clear that he ever studied or recognized the significance of the problem.

With the passing of the years, the President had made many enemies, but he had selected his enemies as well as his friends with great political sagacity. On occasion, especially in diplomacy, Roosevelt could keep a secret as well as any man. But he did not shun the strong white light that beats upon a throne. He had an instinctive capacity for the dramatic presentation of his measures and some of the same genius to sum up a policy in a vigorous phrase which Hanna had used with telling effect. Accordingly his popularity with the small merchants and farmers of the country grew by leaps and bounds. The people were sure of his honesty and courage, and at the same time he managed to keep the good will of many large business men who saw in a counter-reformation an essential weapon of conservatism. In 1904 he had been renominated by his party, after the withdrawal of his only possible rival, Senator Mark Hanna, and was elected over the conservative Democrat, Judge Alton B. Parker, in a campaign in which the victory was so complete as to deprive it of the usual dramatic interest which often attaches to a Presidential election. After the election, he had promised that he would respect the American tradition against a third term and, in spite of great pressure, refused to become a candidate in 1908. But the political strength of the President was so great that he was able to dictate the nomination of his Secretary of War, the former Governor

of the Philippines, William Howard Taft. Taft was represented to the country as the heir of the policies of Roosevelt and was easily elected over the renewed candidacy of William Jennings Bryan. Theodore Roosevelt left the stage on which he had played so great a part and was lost for some months in a hunting expedition in the wilds of Africa. Politically, would he return? There was the question.

CHAPTER XVII

THE DIPLOMACY OF HAY AND ROOSEVELT

To appreciate the changed position of the United States as a world power, it is necessary to turn back to the moment when John Hay was called to Washington in 1898 to become Secretary of State in the cabinet of McKinley.

The acquisition of the Philippines had given to the United States what the Kaiser called "a maritime fulcrum" in East Asia. The moment was significant, for the Powers were even then engaged in the partition of China. The policy of the "open door" in China had already been suggested by William R. Day to the Commission of Peace with Spain as one of the chief American interests, and now, with his resignation to become the head of that commission, became the first task of the new Secretary of State, John Hay, whom President McKinley recalled from England to become the new head of his cabinet.

Hay thus defined the American policy in the East: "We are of course opposed to the dismemberment of that Empire, and we do not think that the public opinion in the United States would justify this government in taking part in the great game of spoliation now going on. At the same time we are keenly alive to the importance of safe-guarding our great commercial interests in that Empire and our representatives there have orders to

watch closely everything that may seem calculated to injure us, and to prevent it by energetic and timely representations. . . . We do not consider our hands tied for future eventualities, but for the present we think our best policy is one of vigilant protection of our commercial interests, without formal alliances with other Powers interested."[1] In line with this policy, Hay requested each of the European Governments to respect the existing treaty ports and vested interests; to allow the Chinese tariff to be maintained and be collected in the respective spheres of influence; and not to discriminate against other foreigners in port and railroad rates.

Fortunately for Hay, there existed in England at this time a strong feeling against further imperialistic ventures, and Great Britain accepted the open door with evident relief. The other Powers were too divided by jealousies to demur, and reluctantly agreed to respect the new principles. Indeed the coöperation between England and the United States was so friendly and their interests ran so close together to give rise to a rumor that there was a formal alliance. Such an alliance was, of course, impossible under a system that required the ratification of treaties by the Senate. The United States cannot possibly have a secret alliance. But the rumor was somewhere near the truth as an indication of the growing community of interests between the two countries. If they had deemed it possible there are clear indications that both John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt would have welcomed a formal alliance between England, the United States, and Japan to prevent encroachments by France, Germany, and especially Russia, in China.[2]

[1] Thayer, W. R., *Life of John Hay*, II, 241.

[2] For evidence on this statement, see documents in Thayer, *Life of Hay*, II, 221, and especially, Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-*

It was probably fortunate for all three countries that no such alliance was possible.

John Hay's plan to save China for the open door came close to being wrecked by the outbreak of the Boxer uprising in 1900. The Boxer movement was anti-foreign. Its purpose was to drive the "foreign devils" out of China and to preserve China for the Chinese. It seems to have been aroused to some extent by the activities of missionaries who weakened the sanctions of the native religions and especially by the political rapacity of the Powers in seeking spheres of influence. The Empress and the Chinese government were in secret sympathy with the Boxer leaders. On June 14th, the Boxers attacked the foreign legations at Peking, and for almost two months they held the European colony in the position of a beleaguered garrison. The besieged group numbered five hundred, including women and children. They had but scanty supplies of food and ammunition. For one month no tidings reached the outside world. Finally on July 20th, Secretary Hay received the following despatch: "For one month we have been besieged in British Legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops. Quick relief only can prevent general massacre.—Conger." Fortunately for China, the presence of the Americans in the Philippines made it possible for Secretary of War Root to join the other Powers in despatching a strong expedition to the relief of the imprisoned foreigners.

On August 14th, Conger cabled Hay: "Do not put

Japanese War, 112, 113, 115. Roosevelt in 1905, assured Japan, that though no formal agreement could be made, the United States could be counted on to coöperate with England and Japan in China "as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations." This came very close to making this country an informal member of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

trust in Li Hung Chang. He is an unscrupulous tool of the cruel Dowager. There can be no adequate negotiation with Peking until the high authors of this crime have surrendered. Imperial troops firing on us daily. Our losses sixty killed, one hundred and twenty wounded. We have reached half rations of horse flesh. Have food only for a fortnight. Six children have died. Many others sick." On that day the relief expedition entered the city and the Boxer movement collapsed.

The German minister had been killed and this gave Germany an excellent pretext for seizing more Chinese territory. Russia and the rest would have been not far behind. Hay insisted on the withdrawal of the troops, limiting the demands on China to an indemnity, and as he put it, "held on like grim death to the Open Door." With the assistance of Japan and England whose interests were at the moment similar, and with the prestige of such early and active participation in actual relief, the Secretary of State was able to avert the immediate partition of China. The whole incident had added greatly to American influence in the Far East. The Chinese indemnity had been exorbitant, but the part received by America and not actually expended for the families of those who suffered in the Boxer uprising was later returned to China and made the basis for scholarships for Chinese students in American Universities.[1]

When by the accident of an assassin's bullet, Theodore Roosevelt became President, domestic problems, insistent as they were, did not form his major interest. With his eager and aggressive personality, he enjoyed to the full the opportunity that had been created by the prestige

[1] The amount returned was almost half of the original indemnity of $24,440,000. The use was suggested by the Chinese. *Am. Hist. Review*, XXXII, 64.

that came to the nation after the Spanish American War. For the moment as a result of the skillful diplomacy of John Hay, the problem of China had been postponed but other questions were soon to arise that called for the characteristic methods of Roosevelt.

In the year in which he became President, the new and intimate friendship with England had borne fruit, not entirely unaided by the difficult situation in which that country found herself as a result of her war in the Transvaal. It will be remembered that the natural American dream of a canal across one of the isthmuses of Central America had been prevented by the self denying ordinances of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, under which England and the United States engaged not to attempt to secure exclusive control of any such canal. At the time, the treaty had seemed to be an advantage, for it was expected that a private company would be able to do the work. But the failure of the French Company, which in the eighties had sunk millions of dollars and hundreds of lives in the enterprise, had shown the futility of such a dream. For many years, England had held to the letter of the bond and had been unwilling to release the United States from her promise or to allow her to build such a rival for the successful Suez canal. Now, in 1901, Lord Salisbury not only freed America from her burdensome promise, but in the Hay-Pauncefoote treaty of that year agreed by implication that the canal should be fortified when finished. The first and seemingly the most difficult step had been taken.

In the meantime, a challenge was being prepared to the future security of the canal and of the Monroe Doctrine from an unexpected direction. Venezuela had many creditors, among them England, Germany, and Italy. Failing to collect their claims by ordinary methods, the three powers instituted what was called a "pacific

blockade" of the coast. After a year of pressure in this direction, England and Germany severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela in 1902 and planned bombardment and the temporary occupation of Venezuelan ports. When the United States protested, England indicated willingness to withdraw but Germany persisted in refusing to refer the debts to arbitration. The history of China was full of examples of such "temporary" occupation. Roosevelt now cut the Gordian knot. When the crisis was at its height, the President summoned the German ambassador to the White House and announced that Dewey had been given orders to take a squadron to Venezuela and to prevent any seizure of territory. If Germany withdrew, the whole matter would be kept secret and the Kaiser given credit for a generous deed. England was no longer supporting Germany and there was nothing to do but accept the inevitable. The German fleet sailed away, the debts were referred to mixed commissions under arrangements worked out by the Hague Court, and after being scaled down to a very small proportion of the amounts claimed, were finally paid. This is the incident to which Roosevelt referred when he praised a policy of "speaking softly and carrying a big stick." Why England entered the enterprise in the first place, and why she withdrew at the crisis, is a story which has not yet been told. It is at least evident that without that timely change of policy, the situation would have been very serious.

Having thus safeguarded the approaches to the canal, the next problem was the question of a route. Congress was divided between the advocates of the Nicaragua and the Panama isthmuses. When it was found that the interests of the French company which had commenced to dig the canal could be purchased for forty millions of dollars, Congress, under the leadership of

Senator Mark Hanna, an eager advocate of Panama, authorized the President to build the canal by that route provided a satisfactory treaty could be made with the Republic of Colombia. Otherwise the canal was to be built through Nicaragua.

In accordance with this law, Secretary Hay offered Colombia a lump sum of twenty-five millions with an annual rental of a quarter of a million for the necessary right of way. The offer was accepted by the Colombian minister and a treaty, the Hay-Herran convention, signed in Washington. When the Colombian Congress met to consider the treaty, intense popular opposition developed at the alienation of national territory. Whether for that reason, or as Roosevelt believed, because the dictator of Colombia expected to make a better bargain and even to confiscate the share which was to be given to the French company, the Congress of Colombia almost unanimously rejected the treaty, just as the Senate of the United States has more than once rejected treaties that had been signed by the executive.

President Roosevelt decided on grounds that do not seem to be warranted by any evidence available, that the whole proceeding was blackmail and prepared a message to Congress in which, instead of choosing the alternative which was open to him of building by Nicaragua, he advocated the seizure of the isthmus and the building of the canal without waiting for further negotiations. This high handed step was defended by the dangerous argument that it was necessary in the interests of civilization.

When it was evident that the Colombian Congress was going to adjourn at the end of October without taking favorable action on the proposed convention, two groups of people were bitterly disappointed, the representatives

of the French company which had an important equity in the canal, and the people of Panama, who had revolted more than once against the central government of Colombia. The United States had a treaty with Colombia, signed in 1846, by which it guaranteed the neutrality of the isthmus and the sovereignty of Colombia. Under the terms of this treaty, the United States had interfered more than once to prevent insurrection and to keep the transit facilities open. But now the terms of the treaty were to be used in precisely the contrary sense.

Rumours of insurrection were rife. On October 10th, Roosevelt wrote to a friend, "Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at this moment; but for me to say so, publicly, would amount to an instigation of revolt, and therefore I cannot say it." A few days later one of the leaders of the revolutionary party in company with Bunau-Varilla, the former chief of engineers of the French company, called on the President and the Secretary of State, but were disappointed not to receive the direct encouragement which they desired. It is safe to conclude, however, that they were not discouraged. On November 2nd, the *Nashville* arrived off Colon with orders to "prevent the landing of any armed force, either government or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama." Since the only access to the isthmus was by sea, it is evident that this measure created a situation very favorable to a revolution.

Nor was the President disappointed in his hopes. At 3.40 P.M. November 3rd the following dispatch was sent to the American consuls in Colon and Panama: "Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed. Loomis, Acting." At 8.15 a reply

was received from the consul at Panama: "No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night. Situation is critical." At 9 P.M. a second dispatch was received from the same official: "Uprising occurred tonight, 6; no bloodshed. Army and navy officials taken prisoners. Government will be organized tonight." Three days later, the Republic of Panama was recognized by the United States, and by a treaty signed on November 18th, the United States secured the coveted strip on the most favorable terms, the treaty being signed with the pen of the American representative of the French interests.

The incident naturally created a very unfavorable impression throughout Latin America and undid much of the work which had been done to promote good understanding. It was unquestionably a good thing for the people of Panama, for the French stockholders, for the United States, and perhaps for the general interests which we call "civilization." But it was bitterly remembered by the people of Colombia. Under the Wilson administration, a treaty was negotiated with Colombia which made an apology and assigned to that country forty million dollars in lieu of damages.

President Roosevelt always acknowledged quite frankly his part in securing the isthmus and defended his actions as wise and necessary. He called the Wilson treaty "blackmail" and the influence of his friends was sufficient to prevent ratification. With the death of Roosevelt and the election of President Harding opposition disappeared and the treaty was easily ratified. Senator Lodge, who had previously opposed the treaty, now supported it on the ground that it was necessary for American commercial interests in South America. Other speakers of both parties referred to it as a simple act of justice required to make amends for acts whose

propriety was doubtful from the point of view of international law or morality.[1]

The work of building the canal was now pushed rapidly forward under the eager and efficient leadership of President Roosevelt. When the two civilian engineers first appointed proved unequal to the task and resigned, the President selected from the army George W. Goethals and gave him almost unlimited authority. Unhampered by red tape and greatly aided by the sanitary measures of Dr. William Crawford Gorgas who was able, against great opposition, to introduce the methods which had destroyed the fear of yellow fever in Cuba, the canal was completed in 1914, just after the outbreak of the European war, at a cost of four hundred millions of dollars.

In the same busy year which saw the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone, a dangerous quarrel with Canada came to a climax. Alaska had long seemed distant and unimportant, but with the discovery, in 1897, of gold in the Klondyke, adventurous miners of all countries pushed through from the coast to the new gold fields. The boundary between Alaska and Canada was defined as lying "thirty miles behind the windings of the coast." But the coast was cut by deep fiords, and the Canadians set up the claim that the thirty miles were to be measured from the mouths of these narrow bays thus giving them access to deep water. The Americans regarded this contention as baseless and argued that the deepest indentation was part of the windings of the coast. Other questions between Canada and the United States were held in abeyance until this boundary dispute was settled.

[1] The best account of the Panama incident is in Latané, *The United States and Latin America*, Chapter iv. Before the final treaty with Colombia was ratified, the words of apology were eliminated by amendment.


ALASKA
BOUNDARY CONTROVERSEY
(1867-1903)
WATERSHED
CLAIM OF UNITED STATES
CLAIM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AWARD OF TRIBUNAL
SCALE OF MILES
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
MARINE LEAGUES
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
LONGITUDE WEST FROM GREENWICH
141° 140° 138° 136° 134° 132° 130° 128°
62° 60° 58° 56° 54°
PELLY
LOWER
RIVER
WHITE R
MT CONSTANTINE
LAKE KLUANE
MT WALSH
KASHWITNA R
ST ELIAS
MT
MALASPINA GLACIER
Lake Laberge
TESLIN RIVER
FRANCES R
LIARD R
DYEA
WHITE PASS
SKAGWAY
CAPE FAIRWEATHER
MUIR GLACIER
TAKU R
CAPE SPENCER
CAPE BINGHAM
LYNN CANAL
JUNEAU
CHICAGOF ISLAND
ADMIRALTY ISLAND
CHATHAM STRAIT
BARANOF ISLAND
SITKA
CAPE EDGCOMBE
KUPREANOF ISL
WRANGEL
DIXON ENTRANCE
CAPE KNOX
ROSE PT
QUEEN CHARLOTTE ISLAND

Theodore Roosevelt was unwilling to leave to the uncertain hazards of ordinary arbitration, a contention in which he was confident that the United States was entirely correct. He dreaded the inevitable tendency of arbitrators to compromise. But he offered to refer the question to a joint commission, three Americans and three members appointed by Great Britain. At the same time he allowed it to be known that in case the six negotiators failed to come to a conclusion the matter would not be arbitrated but he would order troops to Alaska to run the line at what he regarded as the correct place. In these circumstances, Great Britain appointed two Canadians who voted in favor of their own position but as the sixth member of the commission selected the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Alverstone. The sixth member joined with the three Americans in maintaining the American claim and in settling the last dangerous question at issue between Great Britain and the United States. Roosevelt was criticized in Great Britain and the United States for appointing on the commission persons whose views on the controversy were well known. But the President felt that he had merely given Great Britain a graceful opportunity to retire from an untenable position. He had at least been perfectly frank in refusing to represent the method of settlement as an impartial arbitration. The fairness and ability of the sixth member were generally recognized and he was praised in America and England for an act of courage. In Canada, the decision was, naturally, less popular.

In 1905, finding Santo Domingo heavily in debt and the whole situation similar to the Venezuela case of three years before, Roosevelt, by executive action, without waiting for the formality of a treaty, set up an American receivership of customs in that island. The result was a virtual protectorate which was later copied

in Nicaragua and Hayti and which increased the control of the United States over the Caribbean. The danger of foreign intervention to collect debts was to some extent removed in the Hague Conference of 1907 when, with the support of the United States, the Calvo Doctrine, proposed by an eminent jurist of Argentine, was partially ratified by the nations which promised in the future not to collect contractual debts by force until arbitration had been refused by the debtor state.

While the United States had been strengthening its control in the West Indies, Russia had established her position in Manchuria where she threatened at once the safety of Japan and the policy of the open door. When, in 1904, war broke out between the two Eastern rivals the sympathies of the American government and people were largely with Japan. But as the struggle went on and Japanese victory succeeded victory, there were evident dangers that the financial collapse of Japan and the military defeat of Russia would disturb the balance of power in the East on which depended the policy of the open door, and would leave China as well as Korea a prey to all the rivalries which had been postponed in 1900. Roosevelt was accordingly eager for a peace without victory, at least too overwhelming a victory. In her control of Korea and Manchuria, Japan had won all she could reasonably hope to assimilate in the near future. Her financial credit was dangerously weak, while Russia was face to face with a revolution that might so completely change the European situation as to lead to an immediate world catastrophe. The difficulty was that neither power could speak of peace without seeming to indicate weakness.

In these circumstances, Roosevelt, not only for humanitarian reasons but for those that he regarded as essentially American, having first discovered with great

skill that such an offer would be really welcome to both belligerents, offered to mediate and to bring the antagonists together to consider peace. For reasons of his own, the German Kaiser was quite as eager to promote peace as the American President. In these preliminary inquiries, the President and the Kaiser worked on the same side. The peace conference was held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Roosevelt remained in close touch with the deliberations. He was able to persuade Japan to give up the idea of a monetary indemnity and Russia to cede the lower part of the island of Sakhalin. Thus peace was made. A danger in the East was removed. The diplomacy of Roosevelt had not been unfriendly to Japan, but some elements in that nation always believed that America had interposed to deprive her of the legitimate fruits of victory and a certain amount of tension existed after 1905 in the previously friendly relations of the two chief powers of the Pacific.[1]

In the meantime, opposition to the increasing Japanese immigration on the Pacific slope had been rising into a demand for absolute exclusion. Japan was naturally proud of her rapid rise to the position of a world power, and the situation was full of perils. In 1906, the school authorities of San Francisco closed the schools to the children of Japanese. Such action seemed to President Roosevelt a clear violation of the treaty rights of Japan, and he announced that the treaties of the United States took precedence over any state law or municipal ordinance and that they would be enforced. Through the good offices of a member of the cabinet who was himself a Californian, the matter was compromised, and only those Japanese who were over sixteen were excluded

[1] The materials for a fuller study of this subject are to be found in Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (1925).

from the ordinary schools. To satisfy the desires of California and to set at rest other questions, Secretary of State Root exchanged notes with the Japanese Ambassador to Washington by which Japan promised to prevent the emigration to America of coolie laborers and to respect the status quo in China. This so called "gentleman's agreement" of 1908, being purely executive in origin, did not have either the dignity or the dangers of a formal treaty, but it marked a distinct diplomatic victory for the United States.

While these negotiations were being completed, partly as a great training maneuvre but largely as a gesture which might indicate the naval strength of America, Roosevelt assembled the fleet and ordered it on a trip around the world. In characteristic fashion, the President did not wait to make his decision until he had the funds from Congress, well knowing that if the fleet should reach the Pacific, Congress would be compelled to appropriate the money to bring it back. The voyage was a great success and the members of the expedition were treated with distinguished courtesy, especially in Japan where the vessels stopped on their outward voyage.

In his solution of the Japanese controversy, Roosevelt emphasized the new bonds of common interest between the United States and Great Britain. He thus summarized his policy in a private letter to Balfour in England: "One practical problem of statesmanship . . . must be to keep on good terms with these same Japanese and their kinsmen on the mainland of Asia, and yet to keep the white man in America and Australia out of home contact with them. It is equally to the interest of the British Empire and of the United States that there should be no immigration in mass from Asia to Australia or to North America. It can be prevented, and an

entirely friendly feeling between Japan and the English speaking peoples preserved, if we act with sufficient courtesy and at the same time with sufficient resolution."

More significant than any other incident, in the light of later events, of the passing of the era of isolation and the growth of world influence was the participation of the United States in the Algeciras Conference of 1906. For the second time within a year, Roosevelt became the mediator in a bitter quarrel with which most Americans would have felt that they had little concern. From recently published documents, it appears that the essential negotiations were conducted in Washington and the plan finally adopted at the Conference for the temporary solution of the Moroccan question was signed by Elihu Root. The negotiations were furthered by the close personal friendship between Theodore Roosevelt and Ambassadors Sternburg of Germany and Jusserand of France.

In 1904, England and France had been drawn together by the common enmity of Germany and had arranged an *entente*, later to be developed into an alliance. As the immediate symbol that old quarrels were to be forgotten, England was to be given a free hand in Egypt and France in Morocco. Germany was left out in the cold and, though the terms of the agreement were secret, Germany began to feel, and with some reason, that her important business interests and legitimate political ambitions were being smothered by those of the great French investors in Morocco. In these circumstances, Germany demanded either the open door in Morocco or the partition of that country, and openly threatened war. The Kaiser appealed to President Roosevelt for diplomatic assistance in securing what he deemed his rights. The suggestion of the President was a general conference of eleven nations. France at first demurred, for she felt

that her special privileges in Morocco had been gained, as Jusserand put it, "by making corresponding concessions to others," by which he evidently meant Egypt. Roosevelt used all his powers of persuasion to prove to Jusserand the dangers of war. France was not ready, Russia had her hands more than full, and the entente was too new to promise more than diplomatic support.

Reluctantly, France agreed to enter a conference with power to create for Morocco what would later be called a mandate. So far this was a diplomatic victory for Germany. But in the conference itself, the United States represented by two delegates, one of them Henry White who was later to accompany President Wilson to a more significant conference at Paris, refused to support the Austrian and German plan for a division of the country into virtual spheres of influence, and proposed a plan of its own, prepared by Secretary Root, by which the police of the Sultan should be under French and Spanish officers. This plan was adopted, though somewhat sugar-coated by the inclusion of the idea of the open door in commercial matters.

Under international mandate, France had obtained nearly the same rights which she had previously acquired by her private agreement with England. More significant still, in proposing its chief features and in ratifying the Algeciras Convention, even with safeguarding reservations, the United States had come dangerously close to abandoning once for all its traditional policy of isolation. On paper, we had agreed to no definite obligations. Actually, we had joined with England in supporting French diplomacy, and thereby had averted, at least for the moment, the dangers of a general war.[1]

[1] The essential documents for American participation at Algeciras are given for the first time in J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*, (1920), Chapters 36, 37. The European background of the

incident is given clearly by B. E. Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 1902–1914, *American Historical Review*, April, 1924. In addition to the above, Roosevelt's *Autobiography*, W. R. Thayer, *Life of John Hay*, and the *Selection from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge* have proved especially valuable in the preparation of the above chapter. Beard, C. A., *Contemporary American History* is especially illuminating in its interpretation of the early Progressive movement.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE HEIRS OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

THE four years of William Howard Taft and the first term of Woodrow Wilson, in spite of the fact that the two Presidents belonged to different parties and were opposed to each other in politics, form substantially a single period in which a surprising number of the ideas that had once been ridiculed as "Populistic" came to be admired as "Progressive" and were written into law.

No one who came under the generous influence of the new president could deny his ability or the charm of his personality which had done so much to smooth early American difficulties in the Philippines. Taft was later to be described in the heat of a bitter campaign as conservative and even reactionary, qualities which were supposed to arise from his legal and judicial training. In contrast with Roosevelt, he regarded his office as one strictly limited by the direct powers which he had received under the laws and was perhaps too cautious in failing to supply to Congress the leadership which it lacked. But in the time of McKinley or even Cleveland he would have been regarded as a Progressive.

In any case, it must not be supposed that the Taft administration was barren of achievement. For the first time since 1870, the Federal Constitution was successfully amended. The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified by the requisite number of states before Taft left

office, decided an old controversy and gave Congress the right to levy an income tax. The proposal for a Seventeenth Amendment was given impetus by disclosures of corruption in the selection of Senator Lorimer from Illinois, and provided for the election of United States Senators directly by the people. Within a few years, the type of men elected to the Senate had changed greatly, and the national government had become more democratic than the fathers of the Constitution had ever intended. But though the Senate was changed, many observers denied that the average quality of the members had been improved.

Other measures of importance during Taft's administration were the establishment of the parcel post, the introduction of which had been opposed bitterly by the great express companies and which gave increased importance to the business of the mail order houses; the establishment of postal savings banks; the requirement placed on Senators and Representatives to make sworn statements of the sources of contributions to their political campaigns; the control given to the Interstate Commerce Commission over telephone, telegraph and cable lines; the authority given to the President to withdraw public lands from entry for the purpose of conserving the minerals and other natural resources; the use by the national government of federal powers of a police nature in order to bring about the enactment of the Mann Act which was directed against the so-called "white slave traffic"; the creation of a national children's bureau; and the institution in the White Mountains and in the Southern Appalachians of great forest reserves. The cause of prohibition was strengthened by a federal act, which had been passed over the veto of the President, but that was later declared by the Supreme Court to be constitutional, which forbade the

transportation into territory made dry by state laws, or by local option, of intoxicating liquors.

The list of changes is impressive, especially in view of the fact that, after the middle of his term, Taft had a divided Congress such as had been the rule in the seventies and the eighties. But in spite of these achievements it was soon evident, that, though the President was personally admired, he was losing ground politically. He had none of the necessary genius for publicity which is liked in a democracy, and many of his best deeds went unheralded. The Secretary of the Interior, Richard M. Ballinger, had the Western point of view and believed in the rapid development of public lands. He was charged by Gifford Pinchot, known as the father of the conservation movement, with undue favors to great corporate interests. When President Taft supported Ballinger against Pinchot, stories of the quarrel were carried to Roosevelt, then on his way back from Africa, and Taft was rather unfairly pictured to the country as unfriendly to conservation.[1]

But the rock on which the administration split was the tariff. In the campaign of 1908, the Republicans had promised to make a revision of the tariff, whose rates of more than forty per cent bore very heavily on the consumer and especially the Western farmer. The most bitterly criticized section of the old tariff was the so-called "Schedule K" which practically prohibited the importation of foreign textiles. Most people expected a downward revision. The bill introduced by Representative Payne of New York and passed by the House substantially fulfilled these expectations. But, as in the days of Cleveland, when the bill reached the Senate it was changed, under the able leadership of Senator Aldrich

[1] See, Rose M. Stahl, *The Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy* (*Smith College Studies*, 1926).

of Rhode Island, who represented the textile interests, until it was doubtful whether the consumer had gained at all by the process of revision. Taft was disappointed, but unlike Cleveland in a similar emergency, he signed the bill. The West and South felt that they had been swindled, and were not appeased by the introduction into the bill of a small tax on the income of corporations. The South did not matter, but when President Taft defended the tariff in Minnesota in the interests of a united party, he was appealing to a motive which had none of the weight it might have had before the rise of the Progressive movement. The result was an overwhelming Democratic victory in the Congressional elections of 1910.

After 1910, constructive measures were impossible. The administration continued its suits against the most obnoxious of the trusts and in 1911 secured the legal dissolution of the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company, although the Court softened the seeming harshness of its decree by an *obiter dictum* in which it reinterpreted the Sherman law and held that it applied only to *unreasonable* restraints of trade. Since the stocks of the dissolved companies were held by the same persons who had owned the unified corporations, the immediate consequences were negligible. As might have been expected, business continued to group itself in large units, but the great corporations became more cautious in their methods.

The last two years of Taft's administration brought a series of disappointments. A reciprocity measure with Canada, admitting farm products at reduced rates in return for advantages to American manufactures, was very unpopular in the West and was passed only with the aid of Democratic votes. At the last moment, it was unexpectedly rejected by Canada, which had fears of

becoming an industrial satellite of the United States. General arbitration treaties with Great Britain and France, broader than any that had been suggested up to that time, were rejected by the Senate in spite of a warm personal appeal by the President to the country to take its stand for international peace.

Mr. Taft had done much to secure constructive measures of reform, but when he indicated with characteristic frankness that he was opposed to the new ideas of the direct primary, the initiative and referendum, and especially the recall, he lost the good will of the Progressive elements in the party, which began to search eagerly for a new leader who might carry them to victory. Their first choice was Robert M. LaFollette, and it began to look as if the contest in the Republican party was to lie between the President and the radical leader from Wisconsin.

In the municipality and the state the old party organization had been controlled by the city or the state boss.[1] Recent investigations had revealed the compactness of these "machines" and their amazing power. In the House of Representatives, important committee appointments and the initiative in legislation were largely in the hands of the Speaker and three party associates who constituted the powerful "Committee on Rules." A union of Progressive Republicans with Democrats to take away the chief powers of the Speaker were an indication of the breakdown of the old party harmony.

In the meantime, the former President had finished his hunting expedition in Africa and had ended his journey with a triumphal tour in Europe. There were already signs that Theodore Roosevelt was too vigorous to retire into the dignified seclusion of the ex-Presidency. There

[1] Gosnell, H. F., *Boss Platt and His New York Machine* (1923), is one of the few really illuminating, objective studies of this subject.

is an old Spanish proverb that "when two men ride a horse, one must ride behind." Even if Roosevelt had desired it, his followers were in no mood to allow such a position to their former chief. In 1910, soon after his return from Africa, Roosevelt assumed an active part in a campaign for the direct primary in New York and took over much of the old power of Platt in directing the nomination of the candidate for governor. In the Democratic land-slide of that year his candidate was defeated, but Roosevelt was not discouraged, and early in 1912, he had announced his own candidacy for the Republican nomination in opposition to both Taft and LaFollette.

Since Roosevelt had been one of the President's closest friends and had dictated his nomination, his motives for standing in the way of a second term for Taft became the subject of bitter controversy. His enemies ascribed his action to mere personal ambition,[1] but fortunately the recent publication of a part of his voluminous correspondence makes it easier to estimate these motives with fairness. There are some indications that, at an early date, Roosevelt began to regret his self denying promise of 1908. But though he was ambitious, ambition was probably not the fundamental or at least the conscious incentive.

There was little in the record of President Taft to which Roosevelt was directly opposed. Most of the laws which had been passed were quite in line with recommendations of his own as President. He did not object to the high Payne-Aldrich protective tariff, and even praised it publicly in terms almost as strong as those of the President himself. But, with his keen judgment of public opinion, Roosevelt was convinced that the climax of the Progressive movement was being reached

[1] See especially the *Autobiography* of R. M. LaFollette.

and that the voters of the country were about to demand more radical leadership than either he or Taft had previously supplied. In his editorials in the *Outlook*, he showed that he had become converted to a general policy of social legislation, such, for example, as, child labor laws, employer's liability laws, federal control of great business units, the restriction of immigration, and prohibition, and that to safeguard such a program he was ready to curtail the old powers of the judiciary by providing for democratic control of constitutional opinions.[1] In the second place, he did not believe that Taft could be elected, and he was too good a party man to look with equanimity on the selection of a Democrat. LaFollette was too radical even for the new Roosevelt and would not have enough regard for the rights of property. Roosevelt, accordingly, became a candidate in order to save the Progressive cause from its friends and his party from its enemies.

As early as March, 1910, Roosevelt wrote to Senator Lodge from the banks of the upper Nile, "It seems to me that we shall probably find that we must fight the campaign on Taft's administration, and therefore must renominate him. . . . But, I am absolutely free to act as I deem wise for the country, in any way, and shall keep my freedom exactly as you urge." As he heard more of dissensions in the party, Roosevelt's attitude became more critical. On April 11th, still in Africa, he wrote: "The qualities shown by a thoroughly able and trustworthy lieutenant are totally different, or at least may be totally different, from those needed by the leader, the commander." Who the leader was to be, it is not difficult to guess! And again, he thus analyses

[1] Before the close of his life, Roosevelt had returned to his earlier convictions and was no longer in favor of the so-called "recall of judicial opinions" which he advocated in 1912.

the difficulties of the situation: "It looks to me as if the people were bound to have certain policies carried out, and if they do not get the right kind of aggressive leadership—leadership which a cabinet of lawyers, or an Administration which is primarily a lawyer's Administration, is totally unfit to give—they will turn to the wrong kind of leadership." And then here comes the most significant sentence of all, written in the early spring of 1910, "I might be able to *guide* this movement, but I should be unable to *stop* it, even if I were to try." For a time after his return, he waited to see whether Taft would recover his lost popularity, and when that seemed hopeless, to use his own vigorous phrase, "he threw his hat into the ring."[1]

Early in 1912, Roosevelt, speaking of Taft, said: "It is possible that the Democrats in Congress may play the fool, and give him the chance to appear the strong leader, the man who must be accepted to oppose them." But the Democrats, under the able guidance of Oscar Underwood, refused to play the fool, as they had often done before in similar opportunities, even to relieve their old antagonist from so momentous a responsibility. A series of detailed tariff measures were passed, reducing some of the most unpopular parts of the Payne-Aldrich law in the interests of the farmer and the consumer. These bills were vetoed by the President and failed to become laws, but they committed him more closely to the cause of high protection.

It has been often stated that the defection of Roosevelt defeated Taft and elected Wilson. But the two most astute political observers in the country, Bryan and Roosevelt himself, believed that neither LaFollette nor

[1] For the psychology of Roosevelt at this period, see *Selections from the Correspondence of Roosevelt and Lodge*, II, 362, 367, 370, 373, and especially, Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Times*, 298.

Taft could be elected. Party quarrels, even before the return of Roosevelt, had gone quite too deep. It was a Democratic year, in which any reasonably Progressive candidate of the Democratic convention was likely to be elected unless the Republicans could unite the two divided sections of their party. It is probable that Roosevelt may be absolved from what he would have regarded as the greatest of his sins.[1]

As it was, Roosevelt's counter-reformation came fairly close to success. The preliminary campaign was different from that of other years, for, under the influence of the Progressive movement, thirteen states provided for the selection by popular vote of instructed delegates to the nominating conventions. Largely from these states, naturally the most progressive, Roosevelt was able to gain more than three hundred delegates. From the other states in which the older convention plan still prevailed, President Taft was able to secure enough delegates to insure his renomination. According to precedents, the Taft delegates were recognized by the national committee, the leaders of which believed that the President had earned a second term.

The bitterly disappointed Roosevelt delegates sat silent while the convention, under the able leadership of Elihu Root, and with the aid of the traditional Republican delegates from the South, proceeded to approve the platform and to select their candidate. The Republican leaders, unlike Roosevelt, preferred certain defeat to the nomination of the man who would have changed the essential nature of the organization

[1] The fact that the united vote of Taft and Roosevelt in the election would have easily selected either one does not prove the contrary, for such a calculation assumes that none of that vote would have gone to Wilson, even though the Republicans had presented a single candidate.

as the representative of the industrial and business interests of the country. The Roosevelt delegates then withdrew to organize what was called a new party which they named Progressive. At a convention in August, which had much of the enthusiasm and quality of a religious revival, on a platform which was much more radical than the candidate, Theodore Roosevelt was for the second time nominated to the Presidency of the United States.

Whom would the Democrats nominate? As early as 1906, George Harvey, the editor of *Harper's Weekly*, who as head of a great publishing house was supposed to be the literary representative of Wall Street, had been pushing the cause of Woodrow Wilson, the President of Princeton University. When in 1910, the difficulties of Wilson at Princeton, largely due to his eager effort to push democratic changes somewhat faster than met with the approval of a conservative constituency, had virtually made his position untenable, Harvey persuaded James Smith, the Democratic boss of New Jersey, to accept his protégé as the candidate for the Governorship of that state.

Wilson made a remarkable campaign in which he met fully the desires of the Progressive leader, George L. Record, and pledged himself to all those reforms, especially regarding public utility corporations, which were dear to the Progressive heart. Once elected, to the surprise of everyone, he fulfilled his pledges, using the prestige and the patronage of his position to secure reforms which Record had long advocated in vain. In a dramatic fashion that would have been quite worthy of Roosevelt himself, he broke with the "boss," refusing to support him for the United States Senate, a position which had come to be regarded as the proper reward of all good bosses.

As the year of the Presidential election approached, Edward M. House, who had long been the dominant figure in Texas politics and whose point of view was distinctly liberal and progressive, came to the conclusion that Wilson was the best candidate for the Presidency. The two men met in the fall of 1911 and began a close personal friendship which was to have remarkable results. Through House, Wilson met Bryan, the acknowledged leader of the more progressive wing of the party. Wilson's enemies tried to prevent an alliance with Bryan by publishing an old letter in which the Governor had expressed a pious wish "that Bryan might be knocked into a cocked hat." But the effect of the Joline letter was offset by a quarrel with Harvey when Wilson came to the conclusion that Harvey's support was injuring him in Progressive circles. The break with Harvey was used by House to prove to Bryan that Wilson was a genuine liberal who would not fall under the influence of Wall Street. One of Bryan's most charming traits was a certain personal magnanimity, and when the two men met at a Jackson Day dinner, Bryan put his arm around Wilson's shoulder, and without committing himself definitely at the moment to his candidacy, thereafter mentioned him in his speeches as one whom Progressive Democrats might safely support.

Wilson's chief rival for the nomination was the Speaker of the House, an amiable orator of the old fashioned type, Champ Clark of Missouri. Failing, against the opposition of Bryan, to gain sufficient support for Harmon of Ohio or Underwood of Alabama, the conservative elements of the party now concentrated on Champ Clark, who inherited the somewhat dangerous friendship with George Harvey which Wilson had so fortunately lost.

When the Democratic convention met in Baltimore,

the interest throughout the country was intense, for it was evident that if no serious blunder was made by the Democrats, the nominee of that assembly would be the next President of the United States. Clark had pledged to his candidacy a majority, but not the necessary two-thirds, of the members. The Wilson delegation was smaller, but compact, and, under the skillful diplomacy of Colonel House, it was well organized before the meeting of the Convention. A leading figure on the floor of the Convention was William Jennings Bryan, present not as delegate but as the representative of a group of newspapers. Bryan probably realized that there was no prospect of securing the nomination for himself, although there were suggestions from outside that in the event of a deadlock he still hoped that the selection might come to him. His influence was, in the later hours of the Convention, undoubtedly an important factor in determining the votes of wavering delegates. He had convinced himself that Champ Clark, the candidate who through a long series of votes secured the support of the Tammany delegation, was not the man of the hour, and, at a dramatic moment in the Convention, Bryan openly urged the nomination of Wilson. Under the methods of the Democratic organization, the votes of the states were cast as a unit and Mr. Murphy, representing Tammany Hall, gave, through forty-five series of votes, the ninety votes of New York for Champ Clark. It was stated later by Independents who claimed to have inside knowledge, that Murphy did not expect to secure, and did not wish to secure, the nomination of Clark. He believed, however, that with his ninety votes he could probably secure the power to make the final decision, and it was said to be his intention to nominate some such representative of Tammany Hall as his friend Judge Gorman. Wilson's candidacy had the important sup-

port of a group of Independents from New York, working under the leadership of Thomas Mott Osborne, late Mayor of Auburn. These men were definitely opposed to the old-time politician Champ Clark, and to any candidate representing, or even approved by, Tammany Hall. The turn finally came on the forty-fifth ballot, when Osborne succeeded in persuading the Indiana delegation with the promise, or at least the expectation, of the nomination as Vice-President of their candidate Marshall, to transfer the Marshall votes to Wilson, and, on the forty-sixth ballot, Wilson was nominated. Thus, with a political record of only two years, with the assistance of a few close friends possessing political experience and with some fortunate enmities, the former college professor had come within sight of the greatest office within the gift of the American people.[1]

It was soon evident that the real contest lay between Wilson and Roosevelt. Mr. Taft would not be able to weather the double attack upon his policies. As a matter of fact, the two leading candidates were not so far apart from each other or even from the President as their partisans at the time imagined. After the campaign, the speeches of Theodore Roosevelt were gathered to-

[1] In discussing Wilson, in this and the following chapter, Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, and Hendricks, *Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page*, two books which should be read together to get a well-rounded impression, have proved of great value. *The Letters of Franklin K. Lane* is also valuable. The materials for a definite biography of Wilson have not yet appeared. In the meantime, Dodd, W. E., *Woodrow Wilson and his Work*, presents an important interpretation. The account of Bryan's attitude to the Democratic nomination is based on a personal conversation with him in the early summer of 1912. These sources have, of course, been supplemented by the newspapers and the public papers of the period. The public papers of Woodrow Wilson are to be found in Baker, R. S., and Dodd, W. E., *The New Democracy*, and Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement.*

gether under the title, *The New Nationalism*, while those of Mr. Wilson were called *The New Freedom*. The two men were later to develop very significant differences especially in foreign policy. But in 1912, domestic questions, the trusts, currency reform, the tariff, and other such like issues occupied the center of the stage, and except on the tariff, there are few views in one book which a non-partisan reader may not easily match in the other. All this was natural and inevitable, for each of the three candidates had been caught, to a greater or less extent, by those currents of idealism and revolt against an old order which were flowing so strongly around them. Each was in some degree an heir of the Progressive movement.

The most dramatic incident in the campaign was an attack on the life of one of the candidates, Theodore Roosevelt. Though wounded, he insisted on going on with the speech which had been scheduled. The other candidates were well advised to declare a truce in the campaign until his recovery. As most observers had long foreseen, Wilson was chosen by a large electoral plurality, although he polled only forty-two per-cent of the popular vote, about the same as Bryan had received in his three campaigns. Taft carried only three states. Roosevelt ran a surprisingly good second. Like Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson was a minority President, although in 1912 as in 1860 it is probably a mistake to assume that the result was necessarily due to the division of his opponents.

In his theory of the Presidency, Woodrow Wilson occupied a position substantially similar to that of Theodore Roosevelt. In their contests with the "boss" system, the one in New York and the other in New Jersey, both men had been led to seek a new link between politics and administration which might supply the

necessary place which the boss had occupied in the system that was changing. If the "boss" were no longer to hold the center of the stage, if the powers even of such a Speaker as "Uncle Joe" Cannon were to be withdrawn, then some one else must take his place and give to the discordant elements of a party that represented sections and localities the coherence necessary for concrete achievement. The new master must be the chief executive, selected by the people, not only as an administrator but also as the leader in policy of the party which had elected him. This theory of executive power, half conscious in Roosevelt, came to be fully conscious in Wilson, as he showed by returning to the ancient practice of the first two Presidents and delivering in person his messages to the assembled Congress.

In the selection of his cabinet, Wilson had a difficult task, for the Democrats had been out of office so long that they had available but few trained administrators. But even there Wilson showed that he felt that his chief task would be in the field of legislation rather than of administration. Mr. Bryan was made Secretary of State, in spite of his lack of technical capacity for his task, not on account of personal gratitude alone, but just as civilians in England are made "Lords of Admiralty," because his influence would be needed to smooth the way for the success of proposed legislative measures. The unforeseen consequence was that, to a large extent, Mr. Wilson became his own Secretary of State, as McKinley had been in the days of the aged Sherman, and that he had to devolve delicate negotiations into the hands of a wise but unofficial adviser, Colonel Edward M. House.[1]

[1] One has only to read the story of Jackson's *Kitchen Cabinet* to realize that Wilson was not the first President to rely very largely on unofficial advisers.

Although by the testimony of all that knew him well, Mr. Wilson had unusual personal charm and conversational capacity of a high order, he had none of that exuberant vitality which had made Roosevelt delight in the constant social contacts that were to prove of so great advantage to him. Needing to conserve his energies, he left to his cabinet and to the members of Congress many of those difficult questions of patronage which had borne so heavily on such a President as Garfield and in which Roosevelt, apparently, took keen delight. Like Harrison, Wilson was a speaker of charm and with rare powers of persuasion. He was at his best before a crowd but did not enjoy the harassments of personal interviews with comparative strangers, which, accordingly, he was apt to delegate, perhaps too often, to such friends as Mr. House or his private Secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty.

The Democrats in Congress had for the first time in a generation a majority in all branches of the Federal government, and remembering how poorly they had used a similar opportunity in the days of Cleveland, they yielded to a master who held them to their tasks until a series of achievements had been written into law that fulfilled, as Mr. Wilson said in 1916, "not only the promises of their own platform, but many of those of the Progressives as well."

It must not be supposed that these measures were Wilson's in the sense that he was their author, any more than it could be true that the laws which had been passed when he was Governor of New Jersey had been his own. In a larger sense they merely completed the list of changes that had begun in the days of Roosevelt and to which others had been added under Mr. Taft. Now, as in the later days of the League of Nations, and contrary to a common view, Wilson leaned heavily on others

for advice, gained his views from many men, and then made them his own by the courage and persistence with which he advocated them. His chief mistake as a politician was, perhaps, in not always being willing to give the full public credit to others for the work that they had done or the ideas that they had contributed to the common stock. But the solidity of his achievements soon made it obvious that the Democrats, had, for the first time since Jackson, found a political leader of unusual sagacity.

The first item in the Democratic program was the reduction of the tariff, for which the leaders of Congress had the advantage of four years of constant discussion. The Underwood Tariff Act, signed by the President on October 3, 1913, provided for large reductions in the duties on important raw materials and food stuffs, cotton and woolen goods, iron and steel, and placed more than one hundred commodities on the free list. For the first time since 1846, the tariff had been placed on a revenue basis. More significant still, on the strength of the recently ratified Sixteenth Amendment, a small graduated income tax was adopted with an exemption on incomes below three thousand dollars and with rates varying from two to eight per cent. After the outbreak of the World War in 1914, Europe no longer exported on a large scale and the tariff failed to bring in normal revenues. The income tax was increased in 1916 and more than once to produce the unusual revenues required by the war. The extraordinary demands of the war period created expenses within two years of almost thirty thousand millions of dollars. The United States was the only country which attempted to meet a full third of the war expenses by taxation.

Since the majority of large incomes are concentrated in the great industrial states of the Northeast, the income

tax tended to deepen the line of sectional cleavage between the interests of the East and the West and South which has always been the key to many American political contests. The principle of the income tax was defended on grounds of justice, the burden falling according to ability to pay, and after 1917, on grounds of sheer necessity. But the opposition was in the beginning bitter and probably accounts for much of the criticism which Wilson met on other measures. In a very widely copied editorial of 1926 the old arguments against the income tax and in favor of a sales tax and of customs' duties are repeated in a form that illustrates the nature and the intensity of the opposition: "The income tax was socialistic or communistic in its origin and it is oppressive in its continuance. It is the part of the plan of certain parties to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. For all the profits in this country arise from successful business men and those business men should be encouraged and not hampered in their prosperity." But, in spite of such complaints, it was soon evident that the income tax had come to stay.

Having adopted a new plan of taxation, the next step was the organization of an equally revolutionary system of national banking. It had long been argued that the existing system of banking did not provide for an elastic currency and that there were no means for the ready transfer of money to the sections of the country in which extraordinary demands arose, especially the West in crop moving time. A Monetary Commission had been appointed in 1908, under the leadership of Senator Aldrich, which made elaborate investigations, but its proposals leaving the control of the banking system in private hands had been received coldly. Now, under the leadership of President Wilson and with the active coöperation of the Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo,

of Senator Owen of Oklahoma, and of Representative Carter Glass of Virginia, the Federal Reserve Act was passed in December of 1913.

Under the provisions of the new measure, the country was divided into twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each one to contain a bank in which the surplus of private banks might be deposited and which might issue Federal Reserve Notes based on commercial paper. These new notes soon proved to give the desired elasticity to the currency. A non-partisan but public Federal Reserve Board appointed by the President was given sweeping powers over the whole system, especially with regard to rates of discount and the mobilization and ready transfer of funds from one part of the country to another. The peculiar circumstances of the United States had been met with ingenuity. The opponents of the new system would have preferred a single bank with branches under private control; but in spite of some criticism during the trying period of deflation in 1921, the Federal Reserve System came to be generally approved as an important constructive measure to meet the fundamental needs that once sought expression in such crude forms as the Greenback Movement and the agitation for Free Silver. The selection of a center for a single national bank, like the Bank of England, would have been a much graver problem in the United States of 1913 than it had been when Hamilton secured the passage of his measures in 1791.

Somewhat similar, were the Federal Land Banks to provide rural credits, organized in 1916, the stock of which was largely subscribed by the Federal Government. One of the important consequences of the war was an immense increase in the powers of the Federal Government in its relations to both the individual and the States, as illustrated especially by appropriations in aid of good

roads and other matters which had previously fallen under the exclusive domain of the States. The demand for direct assistance to the farmer through some form of subsidy was not fully satisfied by the appropriations for the Land Banks and continues to be a major question in politics.

By the creation of the Trade Commission, the control of large business units was made an administrative rather than a judicial function. A commission of five was given the right to define and to prohibit with the aid of the courts "unfair methods of competition." The Sherman Anti-trust Law was not repealed but it was largely superseded by the Clayton Law which prohibited specific business practices, such as discriminations in prices and interlocking directorates, thus striking a blow at the most recent form of the Protean movement for corporate unification. In the Clayton law, the old grievance of 1895 was met by exempting farmers organizations and labor unions from prosecution under the anti-trust laws and limiting the old power of injunction by requiring the safeguard of a jury trial for contempt of court when not committed in the presence of the court. Strikes, peaceful picketing, and boycotts were defined as not in violation of Federal law. But the advantages which labor leaders expected from this measure were to some extent lessened by decisions in which the Supreme Court held in 1921 and 1922 that the Clayton measure applied only to direct and not to sympathetic strikes and that a labor union is liable for damages, including the triple damages of the Sherman law. With these four measures, the Democrats had enacted their complete constructive program as it had been planned in 1912. Other steps were taken to meet unforeseen emergencies.

In 1916, at the moment of grave danger in foreign

relations, the great Railroad Brotherhoods threatened a general strike which would have tied up the transportation facilities of the whole country. They demanded the recognition of the basic eight hour day, with the same wages as were then being received for ten hours and with time and a half for longer hours. President Wilson attempted to solve the problem by appealing to the railroad executives to accept the eight hour day and to arbitrate the question of overtime. This they refused to do, on the ground that the whole movement was essentially a demand for wages higher than the existing rates would justify.

As the crisis approached, President Wilson appeared before Congress and asked for a law requiring the acceptance of the basic eight hour day, but without the provision for a higher rate of pay for overtime. He also asked for power to prevent strikes on railroads in a form that amounted to compulsory arbitration. By the Adamson Law, passed by large majorities, Congress accepted the first part of the President's plan, which referred to the immediate contest, but failed to consider the more constructive recommendation which would have given the government power to prevent strikes pending a Federal investigation. Even as it was, the Adamson Law was regarded as an extreme expression of the new powers of the government in regard to industry. To the surprise of many lawyers, it was unanimously approved by the Supreme Court, which gave the law early consideration to prevent the same crisis which the President had feared. On account of the fact that it was passed in the height of a Presidential campaign, the law was bitterly criticized as an unnecessary surrender to the labor unions. But with the knowledge which we have today of the critical condition of foreign affairs, it becomes more and more clear that the President, Congress, and the Supreme

Court had coöperated with astonishing rapidity and success in preventing a very great calamity. In the campaign of 1916, his connection with the Adamson law, probably lost the President as many votes as it gained, but it was a factor in the Democratic success in Ohio, the home of the Railroad Brotherhoods and the only state in the industrial region carried by the Democrats.

If the Progressive movement is defined as one to develop the powers of government for social reform, it is evident that Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson had been its heirs. An amazing number of changes had been accomplished. State after state had adopted the direct primary and had accepted the idea of employer's liability, minimum hours for women, laws forbidding labor of children, and other such measures. Now the war was to hasten the adoption of ideas which had within the memory of living men been regarded as fit only for cranks and, if recognized at all, written into the platforms of minor parties. Two federal laws attempting to prevent the labor of children, were in 1917 and 1918, declared unconstitutional, but even the courts were increasingly friendly to such measures, as when the Supreme Court of the United States declared valid a law of Oregon which limited the hours of labor of women to ten a day.

The coming of the war in Europe had acted automatically to stop the great flood of immigration that had been so marked a feature of the last two decades. In some years more foreign born persons were leaving to join the army than had come to the shores of the United States. With the growth of labor unions and with wider knowledge of the difficulties of ready assimilation which the war brought about, and in spite of an actual shortage of labor, a literacy test was passed in 1917 over the veto of President Wilson. This measure was a forerunner of the quota law of 1921 which provided that only three

per cent of the persons of any European nationality resident in the United States in 1910 might be admitted. In 1924, the quota was reduced to two per cent and the basis made the census of 1890. At the same time, without regard to the susceptibilities of Japan, immigration from Asia was absolutely prohibited. The result of these measures was to change completely not only in quantity but in character the type of immigration to which for a generation the country had been accustomed. There can be little doubt that the new policy, for better or worse, has few rivals in significance in the social history of the country. Among the more immediate and incidental effects were the negro movement to Northern cities, the Mexican immigration into Texas, and the new stimulus to the invention of labor saving appliances, especially to do the heavy work for which the country had always depended on the immigrant. Electrical devices to help in house work, for example, began to sell in increased numbers.

The prohibition movement in America had begun with Neal Dow's campaign in Maine in 1851. Other states followed the example of Maine in adopting prohibitory laws, but the attention of the nation was soon absorbed in the slavery conflict, and the interest in prohibition waned. The newer immigrants were usually opposed to such measures. A National Prohibition Party was organized in 1869 whose candidates carried on effective propaganda; but the party was never able to secure much more than 250,000 votes. In October, 1895, the Anti-Saloon League of America was created. This organization refused to affiliate with any party, but it soon learned how to meet the powerful liquor lobbies and how to play the game of politics. It became, in the words of one of its leaders, "a giant politician reaching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. . . . It had a powerful

lobby at Washington and an enormous publishing house in Westerville, Ohio. It literally turned out its newspapers and its publications by tons weekly. What it realized was that vote getting is a trade of experts; that votes are made back home in the pleasant summer time. There in the corner grocery store or the Bible Class it silently, year after year, built up the Congress and legislatures that gave us national prohibition."

As late as 1907, the Anti-Saloon League was still devoting its attention to state and local laws. "Local option" was spreading over many counties in the West and South. There were only three prohibition states, Kansas, North Dakota, and Maine. The Anti-Saloon League seemed unduly optimistic when it prophesied national prohibition in fifty years. But Oklahoma embodied prohibition in its constitution the same year, and from that time the movement went forward very rapidly. In 1915, nine states had adopted such laws, and in the next four years the number grew to thirty-two. Congress, in 1913 passed over the veto of President Taft the Webb-Kenyon Bill "to prohibit the shipment of intoxicating liquors into any state where they are intended to be used in violation of state laws." The entrance of the United States into the world war made possible the final victory of the movement. In July, 1919, under the war powers, a federal law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors went into effect. In the meantime, in January of the same year, this policy had been incorporated into the Constitution by the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, with the provision that it should go into effect one year later. Most astonishing still, the Amendment had been ratified by every state except Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey. Without the approval of the recognized leaders of either party except Roosevelt, America had

embarked on a social experiment of the most far reaching and revolutionary character. The final results of this adventure it is as yet quite too early to estimate.

The adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment was followed by the enactment in 1920 of the Volstead law, which defines an intoxicating beverage as one containing not less than one-half of one per cent of alcohol. The enforcement of the new law called for the service of a large staff of officials. The Civil Service Reform Association demanded that these officials, department heads and subordinates, should be selected under the provisions of the civil service law. The politicians, however, succeeded in securing the exemption of the Volstead act employees. As a result, the character of this force was not good and a large number was dismissed from the service for bribery. The direct expenses of enforcement grew from year to year, the appropriation for 1926 from the national treasury being almost twenty million dollars, and the outlay required from each state was heavy.

The movement for equal suffrage to women had begun in the far West in 1869. In 1918, fifteen states had adopted the reform, but of these only two were east of the Mississippi. And yet in 1920, the same year as the Prohibition Amendment became effective, and in some part as a corollary to that experiment, but with greater difficulty, the rights of the States over the suffrage were limited to the extent that they might no longer discriminate against any person on account of sex.

The passage of the two amendments and of the Volstead Act in the enforcement of Prohibition, may be fairly regarded as the culmination of a general movement which had begun in 1900. The inevitable reaction had already set in. In domestic affairs even more than in foreign policy, the defeat of the Democrats in 1918 and

1920, and the election of a President who prided himself on his similarity to McKinley, mark the end of an era, and the probable beginning of a new period in the history of the nation. The policies of the next few years were, by almost common consent, to be "safe and sane." How crowded the years had been! For the moment every one breathed a sigh of relief and thought of the good old times.[1]

[1] Of the older books on the Progressive movement, Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, is especially suggestive. Among the many new books on special phases of this subject, Haynes, F. E., *Social Politics in the United States*, is a useful summary, bringing information down to 1924. The *Report of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America* (1925) is an important document for the study of recent aspects of the prohibition movement.

CHAPTER XIX

THE END OF ISOLATION

When Woodrow Wilson became President on the fourth of March of 1913 there were only two small clouds on the horizon. Like Jefferson, he undoubtedly expected to give his chief attention to such domestic problems as he had discussed in *The New Freedom*.

Conditions in Mexico were chaotic. The long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz had brought outward peace and even prosperity but had rested from the beginning on a feudal land régime and on the virtual slavery of the twelve million Mexicans who were peons. The great landed estates were lightly taxed and the peons, earning wages of about ten cents a day, were held to their tasks by laws, harshly enforced, which made it impossible for them to move while they were in debt. In the old age of Diaz, the situation had been complicated by the discovery of astonishingly productive fields of oil near Tampico, which soon attracted British interests, especially those of Sir Weetman Pearson, later Lord Cowdray, and of a group of Americans of whom Edward Doheny was perhaps the most prominent. The full story of the Mexican revolution of 1910 has not yet been revealed, but it is apparent that the movement under Francisco Madero which overthrew the power of the aged Diaz was in part one for agrarian and social reform and that it also derived a portion of its strength from the rivalry between American and British interests which had been securing

valuable concessions from the former master of Mexico.[1]

Francisco Madero was an ambitious idealist who had shouldered an almost impossible task. Although he belonged to the wealthy class, he had promised to create small farms instead of great estates, to provide for the education of the people, and to repeal the peonage laws, laws that in principle went back to the days of the Spanish empire in the new world. Such a program naturally aroused great opposition, and in 1912, the inevitable counter-revolution broke out. Madero was deposed, and after the fashion of Mexican revolutions, was promptly murdered under circumstances that threw grave suspicion on his successor, General Victoriano Huerta. Huerta was a frank reactionary, determined to give to Mexico the same rule of "a strong man" with all the attendant miseries to the Mexican people that had characterized the power of the imperial Diaz. In Mexico City, it was well known that Huerta was on friendly terms with the Pearson interests and especially with the violently anti-American British Ambassador, Sir Lionel Carden. Huerta was promptly recognized by Great Britain, but President Taft had very properly refused to commit the United States and bequeathed the problem to his successor.

President Wilson's sympathies, from the beginning, were strongly with the revolution. Huerta had never been able to maintain his authority very far from the capital. In the North, he had two rivals, Carranza and Villa, who regarded themselves as in some measure the heirs of Madero. In the disturbed condition in which Mexico found itself, foreign property and life were unsafe, and a strong demand arose for intervention such as had

[1] The best study of the subject is C. W. Hackett, *The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910–1926* (World Peace Foundation, IX, 5). See also F. E. Rippy, *The United States and Mexico* (1926).

taken place in Cuba. In these circumstances, the President sent John Lind, former Governor of Minnesota, as his special envoy to Mexico. Lind was instructed to ask Huerta to retire and to arrange for a free election to the Presidency. Encouraged to some extent by the British ambassador, Huerta refused and the Mexican problem became complicated by a second international difficulty which the administration had inherited.

In 1912, in preparation for the expected opening of the Panama canal, Congress had passed an act which exempted from the payment of tolls American coastwise vessels. The treaty of 1901 with Great Britain provided that the canal when built should be open to all merchant vessels "on terms of entire equality." Whatever technical arguments might be used for the exception in favor of coastwise vessels, the law was in clear violation of the spirit of the treaty. As long as a law stood on the books which seemed to place a disproportionate share of the expenses of the canal on British ships, it was evident that Great Britain would not be unduly anxious to aid the United States in the adjustment of its Mexican difficulties. Ambassador Page wrote on August 28, 1913, "If the United States will repeal the Canal toll discrimination, we can command the British fleet, British manufacturers—anything we please. Till we do these things, they'll regard us as mean and stingy and dishonorable."[1]

The President had become convinced some months before that the United States was in the wrong in the matter and at the first opportunity, he came before Congress with an appeal for the repeal of the obnoxious discrimination. In this effort he was successful by a large majority.

[1] *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 193.

The air immediately cleared. British support of Huerta was removed. Sir Lionel Carden was transferred to Brazil. Lord Cowdray was encouraged to give up important concessions in Ecuador and Colombia which were so extensive that they seemed to threaten the autonomy of the two countries and even to involve the Monroe Doctrine. The foundation had been laid for even more friendly relations with Great Britain.[1]

The United States now had a free hand in Mexico but, it must be confessed, scarcely knew what to do with it. Huerta, in spite of his isolation, refused to retire, and taking advantage of a minor incident in which some American marines were arrested at Tampico, but actually for the purpose of preventing arms and ammunition from reaching Huerta, by the authority of Congress, President Wilson on April 21, 1914, ordered a force of marines to seize Vera Cruz. The occupation was accomplished with a loss of nineteen Americans killed and seventy wounded. Three months later, Huerta yielded to the blockade and fled to Europe.

The occupation of Vera Cruz had aroused intense feeling throughout Latin America. At Mobile in the previous autumn President Wilson had promised that the United States would never seize any American territory to retain it as a conquest. The Latin American republics were to be encouraged to maintain constitutional governments and the United States would use its influence to keep them from being unfairly treated by foreign capitalists. Now these promises were looked upon as having been intended in a Pickwickian sense. To prove the sincerity of his desire to coöperate with Latin America, the President accepted the intervention of the three strongest states, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and to the great disappointment of eager advo-

[1] *Life and Letters of Page*, I, 251.

cates of intervention, withdrew from Vera Cruz soon after the flight of Huerta.

By the terms of the mediation, Mexico was to be left to choose its own President. But Villa and Carranza soon fell to fighting one another, and conditions did not improve. Wilson insisted that, in the long run, it would be better for Mexico to win self government than to have a foreign country force upon her alien institutions. He was eager for the formation of a league of American Republics which would agree to the arbitration of all differences, would guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the members, and would prevent the use of the territory of one for revolutionary attempts on the others. This plan, which was to serve as an example to Europe, failed, largely on account of the reluctance of Chile to arbitrate her old dispute with Peru. But in the interests of Pan-Americanism, President Wilson sought the advice of six of the Latin American States, whose representatives were in close touch with the Mexican situation, and late in 1915 recognized Venustiano Carranza as the *de facto* President of Mexico.

The disappointed rival, Pancho Villa, now began a series of border raids into the United States. It was plausibly suggested in the newspapers of the day that Villa was in the pay of oil interests, which feared the consequences of the radical policies regarding land to which the new President of Mexico was committed, and even that he was being used by Germany, with whom relations were critical, to embroil the United States in a petty war. But convincing evidence on these matters has not come to light. In any case, a part of the regular army and of the national guard were sent to the border in 1916, and under the command of General Pershing conducted a raid of several hundred miles into Mexico in pursuit of the elusive Villa. Villa was not caught,

but when the raid threatened to become a serious war with Mexico, the troops were recalled. Wilson was evidently determined to leave Mexico to the Mexicans. For a time conditions improved. Villa was persuaded to become a farmer, and in 1917 Carranza was recognized as the Constitutional President. In 1920, Carranza was defeated by new rivals and murdered much as Madero had been before him. Unlike Huerta, the new President, Alvaro Obregon, was in favor of the reform policy which had led to the first revolt. He brought to Mexico the best government it had ever enjoyed. But even after his recognition in 1923, the security of American investments in Mexico under the radical agrarian reforms of the Constitution continued to trouble the affairs of the two countries.

While Wilson was trying to guide Mexico into paths of constitutional self-government and to develop his idea of Pan-Americanism, the whole world had been caught in the flames of a mighty conflagration.

The catastrophe had not been unforeseen. As early as 1905, President Roosevelt, always well informed regarding the foreign situation, had written: "I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England." It was for this reason that Roosevelt used what influence he had to further the settlement at Algeciras of the Morocco controversy.[1]

In these years, the speeches of the Kaiser who always

[1] Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 472.

appealed to military motives, and especially one in Vienna in 1909 in which he described himself as coming to the aid of Austria "in shining armor," added to the spirit of fear and distrust. In Germany, rumors of military and naval "conversations" between England and France and later Russia, were used to create a feeling that war was inevitable, and in the minds of some leaders, perhaps desirable.

It was a vicious circle. Sir Edward Grey, who has written his memoirs in an illuminating spirit of candor and detachment, described the situation precisely, when he said: "More than one true thing may be said about the causes of the war, but the statement that comprises most truth is that militarism and the armaments inseparable from it made war inevitable. Armaments were intended to produce a sense of security in each nation—that was the justification put forward in defence of them. What they really did was to produce fear in everybody. Fear causes suspicion and hatred; it is hardly too much to state that between nations, it stimulates all that is bad and depresses all that is good."[1]

The situation had grown worse rather than better. In 1912, the triple entente of Russia, France, and England had hardened into a military alliance, matched on the other side by the close union of Germany, Austria, and Turkey. In each of the allied countries, the great majority of the people eagerly desired peace, but there were leaders, weak in England, but very powerful in Germany, Russia, and France, who preferred war to the continuance of the excessive burden of armaments and the nerve racking strain of uncertainty. Germans like von Moltke, von Tirpitz, and many others saw in war the possibility of a greater German Empire reaching through the heart of Europe to the centre of Asia;

[1] Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-five Years*, II, 53.

Russians like Isvolsky and later Sazonoff had never given up the idea of the acquisition of Constantinople and the union of the Slavs under the leadership of Russia; and Frenchmen like Poincaré and Foch still dreamed of the return of the lost provinces to France. No one of these visions could be realized without a European war. As early as 1909, Alexander Isvolsky, then minister of Foreign Affairs, later Ambassador to France, had written, "The realization of the high ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkan peninsula, which are so close to Russia's heart, is only possible after a fortunate issue of the struggle of Russia with Germany and Austria Hungary." On December 5, 1912, his hopes seemed nearer to fulfilment with the aid of France. Isvolsky wrote from Paris to Sazonoff in St. Petersburg, "In a recent talk with me, Poincaré remarked that opinion in France is strongly propeace, and that he has always to keep this in mind. We are all the more indebted to him for his fixed resolve most loyally to fulfil his duties as an ally in case of need." Early in 1914, Colonel House, who had gone to Europe in the vain hope of finding some means of averting the catastrophe which seemed to be impending, wrote to President Wilson, "The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark mad. Unless some one acting for you can bring about a different understanding, there is some day to be an awful cataclysm. No one in Europe can do it. There are too many jealousies, too much hatred. Whenever England consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria. England does not want Germany wholly crushed, for she would then have to reckon alone with her ancient enemy, Russia; but if Germany insists upon an ever increasing navy, then England will have no choice."[1]

[1] *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 249. See also, Stieve, F., *Isvolsky and the World War*, 15, 16.

Between the lines of such documents, of which there are many, as well as in the more familiar expressions of the more extreme militarists in Germany and Austria, a thoughtful reader may discern the fundamental causes of the World War. At the last moment the war came when minor partners, who did not weigh the full responsibilities of their actions, got out of hand and drew others with them.

Late in June, 1914, Servian plotters, with the aid of army equipment and with the connivance of at least one member of the Servian government, murdered the heir to the Austrian throne at Serajevo.[1] Germany gave Austria a free hand to punish Servia, and after a month of hesitation and delay, Austria sent an ultimatum demanding punishment of the murderers. In this note, Austria weakened a case, in which she had an undoubted grievance, by making demands which were scarcely consistent with Servian independence. Within forty-eight hours, Servia, advised by France, sent a conciliatory reply which even the Kaiser desired Austria to accept as a basis for discussion. But Austria felt sure of the help of Germany, a hope in which she was encouraged by German military leaders; and though Servia had gone much further than was expected in making amends, proceeded to declare war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey in England made earnest efforts to solve the problem by diplomatic means, aided to some extent by the Kaiser and the Czar, both of whom realized the dangers of the situation. But while these negotiations were proceeding with some hope of success, Russia, under the leadership

[1] On this incident see, Edith Durham, *The Serajevo Crime* (1925), *Serajevo*, by R. W. Seton-Watson (1926), and important articles by S. B. Fay in *New York Times Current History Magazine* (October and November, 1925). The difficulty went back to 1908, when Austria had annexed lands in which Servians predominated.

of Sazonoff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, mobilized her troops on July 30th. This meant war. France was definitely committed to the aid of Russia; England hesitated for three days, but on August 2d, Sir Edward Grey promised the French Ambassador to protect France against an attack. In an important speech in the House of Commons on August 3rd, Grey emphasized the obligations of England to France and the necessity of defending Belgium. Belgium had made sincere efforts to preserve her neutrality; and a remark by the German Chancellor, that the international treaty by which this status was guaranteed was to be regarded as "a mere scrap of paper," undoubtedly helped to commit the British people to a direct part in the war. So the conflagration spread, and what had seemed at first a minor quarrel in the Balkans had become a World War. At the last moment, leaders in Germany and France who had said and done much to make war easy and peace impossible, drew back appalled. But the harm was already done, and they were caught in the intricate meshes of their own military and diplomatic machine.

As the evidence accumulates, it becomes increasingly clear that though many persons foresaw and expected war, neither group *deliberately* planned a world conflict. The situation has been well described as "international anarchy." Germany and Austria preferred war to diplomatic defeat in the Balkans; Russia and France preferred war to letting Austria have her way. The war was the result, perhaps inevitable, of the whole system of alliances and armaments, and in the origin, development and working of that system, the Central Powers, more particularly Germany, played a conspicuous part. But while Germany was responsible, there was no unique responsibility—for Russia and France were not far behind. No one of the continental

powers wanted peace badly enough to make the necessary sacrifices.[1]

To most Americans who read of the beginning of war in that first week of August, 1914, the news seemed much like the tale of other great catastrophes. Their government might find it possible to mediate, their charity might lessen the inevitable suffering, but they themselves were fortunately separated from the dangers of the situation by the accident of three thousand miles of ocean. President Wilson's appeal for neutrality in thought and deed was afterwards bitterly criticized, but at the moment it was generally accepted as an expression of a traditional American attitude to the affairs of Europe. As late as September, Theodore Roosevelt, writing in the *Outlook*, congratulated America on the possibility of neutrality. Even Ambassador Page, soon to become an eager advocate of intervention on the side of the Allies, wrote from London: "The United States is the only great Power wholly out of it. The United States, most likely, therefore, will be able to play a helpful and historic part at its end. It will give President Wilson, no doubt, a great opportunity. It will probably help us politically and it will surely help us

[1] At first sight the question of the origin of the war belongs to European history. But, in the light of the results, it is increasingly evident that it is a topic which the American historian may not ignore. The literature on the causes of the war, based on the earlier documents and also on those published in Germany, Austria, and Russia since 1919, is very extensive. Among the newer books, G. Lowes Dickinson, *The International Anarchy, 1904–1914* (1926), is one of the best. See also illuminating articles "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902–1914," by B. E. Schmitt, in *American Historical Review* (April, 1924), and, "The Origins of the War," by S. B. Fay, *Am. Hist. Review* (1920, 1921). *Les Origines Immédiates de la Guerre, 28 Juin—4 Août 1914*, by Pierre Renouvin (Paris, 1925), is an important review of the immediate antecedents of the war by a French scholar.

economically."[1] In these sentences, Page was describing a typical American reaction to the war and was undoubtedly furnishing the key to the policy of President Wilson. There were groups that from the beginning eagerly desired the victory of Germany or England, but these represented more of the loyalty which they had for an old time heritage than of the spirit of the new country to which they had come. Even the news of the invasion of Belgium could not be expected to have the same effect in America that it had in England, although the number of Americans who desired Allied victory was by this action undoubtedly increased. But the wrong which had been done Belgium was offset to some extent by the tightening blockade of Germany and of neutral countries contiguous to it. The seizure of American mails, the growing list of contraband, and the exclusion of cotton and later food stuffs from Germany made enemies for England, especially in the South and West. In the latter part of 1914, and the early part of the next year, there were many evidences of criticism of the Administration for not pressing its protests even to the length of an ultimatum. Notes that Page, in London, thought too harsh and unsympathetic to the Allied cause, were regarded in many parts of America as being so mild as to sacrifice the traditional American attitude as to the rights of neutrals.

The sympathies of the millions of Americans of German heritage were naturally given to Germany, while the further millions of Irish stock were, according to old-time Irish tradition, opposed to any coöperation with England. But such influences were offset by the very much more important ties of language, nationality, and business which connected the United States with England. After 1895, the diplomatic relations of the two

[1] *Life and Letters of Page*, I, 302.

countries had been increasingly friendly. Throughout the country, and especially in the cities of the Atlantic seaboard, the sympathies of a large and influential class were very definitely on the side of England and her allies. The friendship of Great Britain had become a cardinal point in American foreign policy. It is undoubtedly the case that the larger proportion of American citizens were convinced that the success of Germany meant the domination of the world by military imperialism, something to which America was definitely opposed.

The economic depression at the beginning of the war had been short-lived. American factories were soon crowded with orders from France and England. An era of unparalleled prosperity began that was to continue unchecked until 1920. Wages were high, fortunes were made almost over night. The demand for luxuries was only equalled by the craze for entertainment. For the moment at least, materialism seemed to have conquered. But behind the feverish activity, the older spirit of idealism, without which America can never be understood, was still present and vital.

The German plans for the spring of 1915 demanded that the Allied shortage in munitions should not be replenished. On February 4th, the German Admiralty issued the proclamation that destroyed almost at once the whole basis of the spirit of genuine neutrality. It declared that after February 18th, German submarines would destroy without warning any enemy merchant vessels in a war zone which surrounded the British Islands. In spite of President Wilson's proclamation that he would "hold Germany to a strict accountability for such acts," the threat was carried out. On May 7th, the *Lusitania* was sunk, with a loss of more than a thousand lives. From that moment the tone of the

newspapers changed and America could not be said to be neutral in thought.

Rather than risk war over the submarine controversy, Secretary of State Bryan resigned. President Wilson was as eager as Bryan himself to keep America out of the war, but he was certain that he could only do it by exacting a promise from Germany to give up the submarine war. As protest succeeded protest and yet the sinking of vessels went on, the patience of the country was strained almost to the breaking point. The great majority of Americans still desired to avoid war if possible. In reply to an ultimatum after the sinking of the *Arabic* in August, the German government finally yielded, partly in response to the eager solicitations of its Ambassador in the United States. On September 1, 1915, Germany gave the definite pledge that "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." For a few months the promise was reasonably kept, and America breathed a sigh of relief and tried again to think of the war as European.

But the respite was to be short-lived. With the opening of the next spring campaign, there was evidence of the renewed activity of the submarine. In April, 1916, the Channel steamer *Sussex* was sunk with the loss of American lives. The Germans had taken advantage of the expression that limited their previous promise to "liners." This time there was no delay. Threatened with an immediate breach of diplomatic relations which could lead only to war, Germany broadened her previous promise and extended it to all merchant vessels. Even then the diplomatic victory was not clear cut, for Germany attempted to make her promise conditional on the

ending of the British blockade, and there was an ominous hint that a time might come when she "would resume complete liberty of action." Such as it was, the agreement was kept for almost a year and the crisis was postponed from 1916 until 1917. From the German point of view, it marked a victory for the policy of Ambassador Bernstorff over the naval leaders in Berlin.[1]

The tone of the German note in May, 1916, made it clear that the settlement was only a truce. If the war lasted for many more months, Germany was sure to use the submarine on a large scale whenever that weapon seemed to be essential for winning the war. American neutrality now entered on its third stage. The first year of the conflict had been a period of isolation and neutrality. The second year, from the spring of 1915 until the German reply to the *Sussex* ultimatum, had been one of controversy over the submarine, with the dispute with the Allies over the blockade as an undertone. In the very height of this controversy, President Wilson had with difficulty prevented the passage of the McLemore resolution which prohibited Americans from travelling on armed merchantmen. An American embargo on the export of munitions was also suggested and was strongly urged, but met with the successful opposition of the President, on the ground that it would be an act of direct unfriendliness to the Allied cause. It was evident that if America had to choose, she would choose to aid the Allies rather than Germany. Now the only hope of peace seemed to the President to lie in securing a "peace without victory." The period was to be one of mediation and definition of the aims of the war.

In 1915, certain treaties had been framed between England, France and Italy which had to do with the

[1] See Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America.*

terms that would be enforced as a result of a successful war. Territorial acquisitions were promised to Italy as a condition of her support, and the assent of Russia was later secured to acquisitions along the Rhine by France. As the war progressed, it became evident that the Allies were not in a position to carry out any such engagements, and these treaties were laid aside until the moment of complete victory.[1]

If America entered the war on the side of the Allies the President was anxious to make it clear that she was fighting for worthy ends. Early in 1916, Colonel House went to Europe to lay the President's plan before the Allies. As Grey tells the story, "Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a Conference should be called to end the war. Should the Allies accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany. . . . Colonel House expressed an opinion decidedly favorable to the restoration of Belgium, the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine to France and the acquisition by Russia of an outlet to the sea, though he thought that the loss of territory by Germany in one place would have to be compensated to her in other places outside of Europe." Such a plan seemed to the President just and reasonable and if it were rejected by Germany, America would enter the war with a whole heart.

Unfortunately, there was little hope of success in this direction. The leaders of all the belligerent nations were hoping for more considerable advantages. They knew that the President was confronted with opposition in Congress and that he would probably find it difficult

[1] On the secret treaties of 1915, 1916, and 1917 see Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, I, 23–81.

to make his promise good.[1] The leaders of the various nations at war had promised victory to their people, and they could not discuss peace without appearing to admit weakness. A few men, notably Lord Lansdowne in England and Caillaux in France, preferred a negotiated peace to the further ruinous losses of a war that seemed to many to have reached stalemate. But their voices were drowned in a storm of angry protest. As Winston Churchill put it, "a conflagration had commenced which had to burn itself out." Ambassador Page was bitterly opposed to the whole plan and was as eager as any man in England for the complete and sweeping victory for which he hoped. House argued in vain that victory won at such a price would leave Europe helpless—as, indeed, she already was—to solve her problems without assistance from outside.[2]

Again and again, during the campaign of 1916, the President returned to the same theme, and indicated that the situation was a mere truce: "We are holding off," he said in one of his speeches, "not because we do not feel concerned, but because when we exert the force of this nation we want to know what we are exerting it for. . . . Define the elements, let us know that we are not fighting for the prevalence of this nation over that, for the ambitions of this group of nations as compared with the ambitions of that group of nations; let us once be convinced that we are called into a great combination to fight for the rights of mankind, and America will unite her force and spill her blood for the great things which

[1] See the story of the "Sunrise Conference" of April, 1916, between the President and Representatives Clark, Flood, and Kitchin. White, W. A., *Woodrow Wilson*, 329.

[2] For the American attempt at mediation, see Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-five Years*, II, Chapter 23; Page, *Life and Letters*, III, Chapter 10, and *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 82 ff.

she has always believed in and followed." Again he warned his followers: "I know that you are depending upon me to keep the nation out of war. So far I have done so, and I pledge my word that, God helping me, I will—if it is possible. You have laid another duty upon me. You have bidden me see that nothing stains or impairs the honor of the United States. And that is a matter not within my control. Do not exact of me an impossible and contradictory thing."

In spite of such evidences of the seriousness of the situation, the campaign of 1916 was fought on the claims of the President as one "who has kept us out of war." The achievements of the first term, the attitude of union labor, and other factors entered into the situation, but without the belief that Wilson would prove a magician and reconcile two desires which he had defined as almost necessarily contradictory, it seems likely that the Republican candidate Hughes would have been successful in the very close election of that year. As it was, the Democrats carried only two states east of the Mississippi and north of Mason's and Dixon's line.

With the political campaign over, the President made one more effort, this time in a public appeal, to define what he called a peace without victory. By this he meant a peace that should bring no conquests, no additions of territory, and no indemnity. Such a peace was to be followed as early as practicable after the close of the war by an Association or League of Nations, which should have the purpose and the authority to prevent any future wars.

Germany was willing to enter a conference, but would not specify her terms; while the conditions that the Allies had in plan were such as everyone knew could be secured only as the fruits of an overwhelming victory. Accordingly, when Germany announced, on January 31,

1917, her resumption of the weapon (the submarine) that the year before she had been ready to lay aside, America was obliged by the whole course of her previous negotiations to enter the war without having secured the terms for which Wilson had been striving. Diplomatic relations were broken with the prompt dismissal of Ambassador Bernstoff on February 3rd. The war, which, in 1914, had seemed so distant, had finally drawn America into its vortex. Wilson's plan of mediation had failed, as, under somewhat similar conditions, Jefferson had failed with his embargo; but it had done service in making clear to the people that, under the existing conditions, peace could be secured only by means of war.[1]

The correspondence of President Wilson concerning the loss of American lives on the *Lusitania*, begun in May, 1915, and continued through two years, was never brought to a logical conclusion unless America's declaration of war in April, 1917, may be considered as representing such conclusion. The immediate ground for the decision of America to enter the war was her indignation with Germany for continuing to sink passenger vessels without taking any measures to protect the lives of non-combatants. Americans were determined that no nation that employed such measures should be allowed to profit by them. The majority of the American people, including not a few earnest pacifists, had finally been convinced,

[1] Theodore Roosevelt, the American Rights League, under the presidency of Major Putnam, and other critics of the President, took the ground that he ought to have broken off diplomatic relations with Germany and declared war in May, 1915, at the time of the *Lusitania* tragedy. A minority of the citizens, under the leadership of William J. Bryan, contended that the United States ought, in spite of the submarine tragedy, to have remained neutral. The President's plan represented a compromise between these two extreme positions.

as the evidence accumulated, that England and her Allies were fighting in a war against war and to preserve the world from the domination of military imperialism, and that it was clearly the duty of America to take part and to carry its share of the burden.

The motives of a people engaged in an undertaking like war are never simple, and economic considerations, while not consciously dominant, were also present. In the period of delay from the delivery of the German note on January 31st to the declaration of war on April 6th, Ambassador Page emphasized the economic argument for war which was undoubtedly an important factor in the final decision. The Allies had reached the limit of their credits with private bankers and their account with J. P. Morgan and Company was largely overdrawn. The financial failure of the Allies would create a panic which would have disastrous effects in America. As Page saw the situation, the only hope lay in placing the credit of the American Government at the service of the Allied cause: "Of course we cannot extend such a credit unless we go to war with Germany. . . . It is not improbable that the only way of maintaining our present preëminent trade position and averting a panic is by declaring war on Germany. The submarine has added the last item to the danger of a financial world crash."[1]

While the United States was waiting for the inevitable overt act which would mean war, the British Government gave out a note from the German Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Zimmerman, picked up some weeks before by their secret service in Mexico, in which Zimmerman advised Carranza to make war on the United States and promised Mexico assistance in regaining the "lost provinces," Texas, Arizona, and New

[1] *Life and Letters of Page*, II, 271.

Mexico. An effort was also to be made, in case of war with the United States, to draw Japan into the struggle. The incredible folly of this note, coupled with the lack of humor which had offered to allow a single American ship to visit Great Britain each week provided its sides were painted in red and white stripes, convinced the most pacific Americans that the issue was between the liberties of America and the sovereignty of Germany. No friend of the Allies could have desired more efficient anti-German propaganda.

On March 15th, the world was startled to learn that the Czar had been forced to abdicate and that Russia had become a Republic. The Allies and America had the expectation, which in the end proved to be in vain, that continued assistance could be secured from the harassed and weary people of Russia in a war which could now with certainty be described as one "to make the World safe for democracy." The last motive for American hesitation had disappeared. On March 20th, after news had been received of the increasing havoc wrought by the submarine, President Wilson summoned the Congress which was to lead America to war. On the second of April, the President, speaking in person, delivered to Congress his war message, and war was declared on April 6th, 1917.

When the United States entered the conflict, few expected the demand that arose later for a great American army in Europe. The submarines were sinking ships at the appalling rate of almost a million tons a month. With available shipping it was estimated that it would require at least six months to transport half a million men to France. The leaders of the Allies defined their needs as ships, money, and food. Under the leadership of Lloyd George and Clemenceau, Great

Britain and France were at length producing munitions in sufficient quantities for their own needs and would be able to supply the first American soldiers.

Largely for the moral effect, a small expedition under General John J. Pershing was soon sent to France. Learning from the experience of the Allies and remembering the lessons of the Civil War, the President insisted on raising an army by a general draft, and, by the advice of General Pershing, refused to accept the services of a separate division of volunteers even under the distinguished leadership of Theodore Roosevelt. The old invidious distinction between the volunteer and the drafted man was not allowed to appear. Roosevelt remarked to a friend, when the President placed his veto on the bill that had been approved by Congress authorizing the organization of a Roosevelt division, that "it was going to be a very exclusive war."

The Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, provided for the increase of the Regular Army to 287,000 men and for the registration of all men from twenty-one to thirty, from whom a reserve army of a million men was to be selected. With the passing of the submarine menace and with the continued success of the German troops, the age limits were changed and were made from eighteen to forty-five. At the close of the war, the army included three and a half million men of whom nearly two millions were in France and more than a million on the fighting lines. The names on the conscription lists had aggregated in all nearly ten millions. England had, with great reluctance, accepted a draft, but nearly two years had been required before the full English force could be landed in France. America, aided by the experience of her allies, had found the means within less than one year to secure the services of a powerful army.

As the need for soldiers became clear, the adminis-

tration was severely criticized for not having a well trained army at the very beginning. Plans for such an army had been formulated by Secretary of War Garrison in 1916, but had failed on account of the opposition of Mr. Bryan who did not desire any steps which looked to war. Mr. Garrison had been succeeded as Secretary of War by Newton D. Baker of Cleveland. Mr. Baker had been an opponent of an early American participation in the war and for that reason his appointment was criticized. But he proved to be an able and hard working administrator, and deserves a high place among American war ministers.

As in every war, there were inevitable waste and extravagance. The failure to provide aeroplanes in large numbers was especially disappointing. Ships were built at excessive cost, and most of these proved valueless after the war. Undue profits were made by contractors, especially in the creation of army camps. But there were no scandals, such as had been too frequent in previous wars, which touched the honor of any officer of government.

The Secretary of the Navy was Josephus Daniels of North Carolina, whose experience as a newspaper editor had scarcely fitted him for the arduous duties of his present position. But he was wise enough to leave technical problems to a Naval Board at the head of which was Admiral Benson, and the naval operations, particularly those involving the transportation of millions of soldiers across the Atlantic, were efficiently conducted. On the outward voyage, only two ships were sunk with a loss of three hundred lives. The representative of the navy in European waters was Admiral Sims, who coöperated efficiently with the British admiralty in the intensive campaign against the submarines.

One of the largest tasks of the war fell to the Treasury

Department under William G. McAdoo. In a few months, through intensive "Liberty Bond" campaigns, the government borrowed the savings of the people to the extent of twenty billions of dollars. Another ten billions was raised by increased taxation for which the recently adopted income tax amendment furnished certain authority. Of the thirty billions secured in these two ways, almost one third was placed to the credit of the Allies for the purchase of food, clothing, and munitions of war.

Business men, without regard to party, were called upon to help in the solution of special problems. Many of these citizens refused to accept a salary, but since it was necessary for the routine of the Treasury that they should be on the payroll, they were awarded compensation at the rate of one dollar a year and were called "Dollar a Year Men." One of the most remarkable of such personalities made known by the war was that of Herbert Hoover. Hoover had already earned an international reputation by the tact and skill with which he had conducted relief measures in Belgium; and he was now called upon to organize one of the many new functions of the government, that of the Food Administration. He proved to have a positive genius for patriotic advertising and for the selection of able subordinates. Largely by appeals to the spirit of self sacrifice, and without burdensome laws, immense quantities of food were saved and sent to Europe. The movement towards national prohibition was greatly hastened by the war demand for the conservation of cereals.

America had never felt so completely the presence and the power of the Federal Government. In December of 1917, the whole railroad system of the country was placed under government control, with William G.

McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury, as Director General. Early in the war, prices were fixed on wheat to encourage production, and somewhat later on coal to prevent excessive charges. Both sets of prices were criticized before the end of the war as being unjustly low. Labor disturbances were prevented by the creation of a special Labor Board, the importance of which was indicated by the appointment of ex-President Taft as one of the joint Chairmen. The Labor Board applied constantly the principle of collective bargaining. In such conditions, with a shortage of labor and rising prices, the labor unions increased enormously in size and influence.

As government became more complex, new agencies were created without much regard to symmetry. Washington was crowded with office holders, experts, and military men by the thousands. In the exercise of new functions, there was inevitable confusion. Various boards competed with each other in making purchases, thus increasing greatly the already burdensome cost of war.

In the early winter of 1918, President Wilson had to meet a constitutional crisis similar to the one that came more than once to President Lincoln in the Civil War. The failure to send a large army to France in 1917, the slowness in providing munitions, and especially the personal unpopularity of the President with many members of Congress, led to a movement for the creation of a special committee on the conduct of the war which would practically supersede the President and the Cabinet. The President made skillful use of the occasion to secure sweeping powers for the simplification of military matters under the General Staff, and of industry under a special agency, the War Industries Board, which under the able chairmanship of Bernard M. Baruch, exercised many of

the functions that in England belonged to the special Minister of Munitions. For the second time in the history of the nation, in spite of partisan bitterness, the patriotism and good sense of the majority in Congress had kept them free from the doubtful experiment "of swapping horses in the middle of the stream." The President retained his powers as Commander in Chief.

In its relation to the individual, the whole war government was necessarily a powerful autocracy, touching life at every point. The power of the government was reinforced by the unofficial but very real pressure of society. Under the special war powers, freedom of speech was restricted and business was placed under control of exceptional regulations. Information regarding the war was furnished by a special government agency. Even the colleges were furnished with standardized courses in which history became strange and unfamiliar. Much of this was necessary. Men acquiesced until the war was won. But they remembered and when the time came they revolted. The decline of the Progressive Movement, the disruption of the Socialist Party, and even the defeat of the Democrats in 1918 and 1920, were in part the natural reaction of an individualistic society against a social control that they had accepted cheerfully during an emergency. Alone among the wars which America had fought, this war, victorious as it was, produced no hero. It was, perhaps, not fair, but it was natural.[1]

The winter of 1917–18 was one of great anxiety. The newspapers were filled with criticisms of the conduct of the war, many of them unfair. Side by side with abundant evidences of high patriotism and generous idealism, came the reign of extravagance and the nervous quest

[1] Zechariah Chafee, *Freedom of Speech* (1920), is an able criticism of one phase of war government.

for pleasure which always accompany war. There was no thought of anything but victory, but as the news arrived of the complete Russian collapse and of the November Revolution in which the Bolsheviki under Lenin and Trotsky gained an easy victory on a platform of immediate peace, and as the campaign of 1917 displayed the military weakness of Italy which seemed destined to go the same path as Servia and Roumania, and when all this was followed in the spring of 1918 by the great German drive toward Amiens, men shook their heads and prophesied that the war, old as it already was, would still be long and costly. Perhaps in 1919, or in 1920, the German lines may break? Who knows?

The very gravity of the situation produced reform. One of the chief American contributions to the war was their insistence on a unified command, at first under a Supreme War Council, representing all the Allies, and at length when this did not suffice, under Marshal Ferdinand Foch. By the early summer of 1918, this step had been reluctantly accepted by the British commanders.

Previous to May, 1918, the participation of American troops in the active operations had been comparatively unimportant. The soldiers were mostly employed in training camps under instructions given by their own officers, and these were aided by the service of English and French officers, taken mostly from the groups of the disabled. As the troops arrived, they were distributed and were brigaded with the veteran divisions of the French and English. At Cantigny, on the 28th of May and, four days later, at Chateau-Thierry, the Americans, fighting under their own officers, were able to prove their value and to render important service in checking a dangerous German drive. French generals expressed their preference for a continuation of the arrangement of distributing the Americans among the French and

English veteran divisions, but General Pershing insisted that the time had come for the Americans to have an army of their own, under their own commanders, and under their own flag. The brilliant service rendered in the small actions, referred to above, helped to bring about a decision in favor of Pershing's contention. President Wilson exercised pressure to the same end, and early in September the final arrangements had been completed, and the task of clearing the Germans out of the salient of St. Mihiel, near Verdun, which had for two years been a continuing threat to the French lines, was given to the American force.

More comprehensive operations were to follow. In the final drive, which began on September 26, 1918, the American commander had been assigned the difficult ground of the Argonne, behind which ran the chief German line of communications through Sedan and Mezières. The period of trench warfare was at an end, and with the open fighting, as the Germans were forced back, the Americans showed themselves at their best. Early in November, the Germans, with their back to the Ardennes, were facing an appalling disaster. The American advance had pressed a German army into a position in which there was good prospect of securing the surrender of some hundreds of thousands of troops near the historic battlefield of Sedan. French and English forces were pressing forward in the North. Germany's allies, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria had sued for a separate peace on terms which had amounted to unconditional surrender. In Berlin, the German Government itself was threatened with revolution. The Kaiser was about to abdicate and flee. On the sixth of November, Germany asked for an armistice and, five days later, accepted the stringent terms of the Allies. On the eleventh of November, at eleven in the morning, firing ceased.

It was high time, for there were already indications that further victories would lead to a radical revolution in Germany, such as had already come about in Russia, and the Allies would be left with no responsible governments with which to execute peace treaties.

As the war entered its last phase, the President of the United States had not forgotten his hopes of a generous peace which had been his main theme in the now half forgotten days of "peace without victory." As overwhelming victory approached, the difficulties which Wilson had foreseen increased. The various peoples, including many in the United States, had caught the war spirit and now desired the punishment of Germany more than any form of idealism which looked to a larger future. Nevertheless the President persisted, with the double purpose of committing the Allies to his program, and of undermining the morale of the enemy by showing that the war was not, as they had been led to suppose, for conquest. In this last hope he was successful, and it is the testimony of all observers in Germany that the hope of such generous terms as Wilson offered had much to do with the loss of the will for victory and the sudden crumpling of the German defence in the late summer and early fall of 1918.

The President's plan was already familiar when he elaborated it in his famous "fourteen points" in the early winter of 1918. Belgium was to be restored with other German conquests; Russia was to be welcomed into a society of free nations "under institutions of her own choosing"; the same principle of self determination was to be used in all other cases, even including the Ottoman Empire; colonial claims were to be adjusted impartially in the interests of the subject populations; armaments were to be reduced to the lowest point consistent with safety; private property at sea was to be exempted from

capture to insure the freedom of the seas[1]; the covenants of peace were to be openly arrived at; and the whole generous program was to be capped by the creation of a League of Nations to insure peace and to serve as a substitute for the outworn system of alliances. In other places, Wilson had already promised that indemnities were not to be exacted. In November of 1918, Wilson seemed to have gained a great diplomatic victory, for at the time of the Armistice, largely on account of the dangers of revolution, his plans for peace were accepted in principle by the Allies as well as by Germany.

The ink was barely dry on the signatures for the Armistice, when signs of the inevitable reaction appeared. Wilson was charged with vagueness but the terms he had in mind were well understood and, for that reason, soon caused resentment. The war had been fought for the defeat of Germany, and now Germany must be punished.

Unfortunately for his plans, at this crisis the President made a serious mistake in yielding to the pressure of political advisers, and asking for the election of a Democratic Congress. The appeal seemed to make Wilson a partisan rather than a national leader and played into the hands of his opponents. The Republicans were overwhelmingly victorious, and though such a generous leader of the party as Taft continued to stand behind the President in the chief outlines of his foreign policy, Theodore Roosevelt did not lessen his returning popularity when he said: "Mr. Wilson and his Fourteen Points and his four supplementary points and his five

[1] This item was not defined sharply, but the meaning was clear in the light of previous diplomacy, especially at the Hague Conferences. The whole program as announced on January 8, 1918, is to be found in Scott, *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, 354–373. In signing the Armistice, England made a reservation as to the freedom of the seas, but accepted the other points.

complementary points and all his utterances every which way have ceased to have any shadow of right to be accepted as expressive of the will of the American people. . . . Let them (the Allies) impose their common will on the nations responsible for the hideous disaster which has almost wrecked mankind." Here from America, on the very eve of the most important peace conference in history, was a frank appeal for vengeance.

Nor were European leaders far behind. Lloyd George in England, dissolved Parliament and was returned to power on the promise that Germany should "pay to the last shilling," which he estimated to be at least one hundred billions of dollars. In France, Clemenceau, appealed in December for a vote of confidence, promising that he would support the system of alliances. "God," said Clemenceau, "gave us his Ten Commandments, and we broke them. Wilson gave us his Fourteen Points—we shall see." And yet these terms were the very ones which the Allies had solemnly accepted "in principle" just eight weeks before the diplomats met in Paris. Unless Wilson were able to win a remarkable victorious fight against immense odds of national feeling, the Congress of Paris would be, like that at Vienna, and so many more in the weary list, a mere meeting to divide Joseph's coat of many colors and to plant the seeds of future wars. So much was foreseen by Mr. Balfour, who doubtless remembered similar occasions and sagely remarked, "It is going to be a rough and tumble affair, this Peace Conference."

Should the President go to Paris himself? The arguments were fairly balanced. On the one hand the precedents were against the absence from the country of the President. Such functions had previously been delegated. The American people are conservative, as witness the third term tradition, and would be likely

to misunderstand his motives. The President would assume a tremendous responsibility for the inevitable disappointments of any peace. On the other hand, Woodrow Wilson was President of the United States with his term less than half done, and whatever one might say, the Constitution placed squarely on his shoulders the control of the foreign policy of the country until the end of his term. The problems were very complex, every country was to be represented by its Prime Minister, and with a definite program to support, Wilson would have caused immense delay and difficulty if important questions had to be referred back to him as they had been to President McKinley in the relatively simple problems after the Spanish American War.

Whatever may have been the correct answer to this question, in the view of most friendly critics of his policy, Wilson made a mistake in not including in the commission some representative members of the opposite party. Roosevelt was of course impossible, for he was out of sympathy with the whole notion of a generous peace. But such a leader as William Howard Taft had shown the same magnanimous attitude to the President's foreign policy which one expects in England from the leader of "His Majesty's Opposition." He was definitely committed to the President's chief desire of a League of Nations and would have brought real strength and unquestioned prestige to the American delegation. With Taft, or Elihu Root, on the Commission, the treaty brought back from Paris for the consideration of the Senate would have seemed not a Democratic treaty, or a President's treaty, but a national undertaking. The chances of adoption by the necessary two-thirds vote of the Senate would have been greatly increased. Instead, the President selected useful and able subordinates, Edward M. House, who knew the situation better than

any other American, Secretary of State Lansing, General Tasker Bliss, and as the only Republican, chose an experienced and able diplomat of the old school, but not the political leader he needed, in the person of Henry White. Evidently Wilson was considering only his contest in Paris and did not think enough of the storm which was to break in America, although the clouds were already dark on the horizon.

President Wilson was received with acclamations in France, England, and Italy. Everybody wanted a "just peace," but such a peace as would give to every nation what it wanted! Few realized the immense sacrifices of ambition which lay concealed in the President's program. When these sacrifices were once revealed, the President's popularity disappeared as by a stroke of magic. The real tussle was to come when the Conference met. It was destined to remain in session from January 12, 1919, until the final signature of the Treaty of Versailles on June 20th. The detailed work necessarily was done by committees, and the final decisions were made at first by the "Big Ten," representing the five principal allies, and in the end by the "Big Four," Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, and Wilson. The problems, sufficiently complex in themselves, were made more so by the constantly shifting European situation, still swirling with the vestiges of war.

There can be no doubt that the purposes of the President as he approached his high adventure were based in a generous idealism and a compelling sense of duty. But in the accomplishment of these purposes, he was weakened from the beginning by the knowledge of his European opponents, accustomed to the Parliamentary system, that his party had been recently defeated and that the commission did not represent the party which had won. His chief task was to lie in reconciling his

program with a system of secret treaties, founded on the principles of the old diplomacy, which denied at every point the ideas to which Mr. Wilson was committed. It was at once one of the gravest of the President's mistakes and misfortunes that he had not been informed by the State Department of the very existence of these treaties, although some of the most important had been published by the *Manchester Guardian* and the *New York Nation* as much as a year before. Secretary of State Lansing testified before a Senate Committee that he had never seriously considered the treaties in their effects on American diplomacy at Paris!

But the fundamental difficulty in the program of the Fourteen Points lay very much deeper and is not to be ascribed to the human limitations of any one man. Georg Brandes, the Scandinavian scholar, said to an American, "I admire and appreciate the principles of President Wilson; but I cannot understand how anyone who has his eyes open for a moment believes in their realization. . . . Wilson's policy of moderation is the only right one. . . . War cannot bring peace. Only love and mercy bring peace, and where are love and mercy?" But many men who did not recognize the immense handicaps, still expected a perfect treaty. Such a result was probably beyond human wisdom to achieve.

A candid critic of the situation must confess that Wilson was able to save only shreds and patches of his original program. Almost unaided, and with great courage, he prevented the virtual annexation by France of the whole left bank of the Rhine with its population of six million Germans. Italy was also kept from gaining the Dalmatian coast and thus cutting Jugo-Slavia from the sea. But these victories, important as they were, were won at great cost. In many other respects, it is

more easy to point out the divergencies than the similarities between the completed Treaty and the Fourteen Points. The fundamental idea of self determination was already weakened by the presence of French, British, and American soldiers in Russia to put down the revolution. The Saar Valley was given to France for a term of years. German peoples were assigned to Poland and to Italy. Austria, dismembered as she was, was forbidden to seek her natural allegiance with Germany. Bulgarians in Macedonia were assigned to Servia. The defeated nations were excluded from the League of Nations and the amount of reparations was left to be decided by a calculation of the largest amount which could be collected. Nothing was done regarding disarmament except by Germany. Every vestige of the vast German colonial empire was taken away quite impartially, and given for the most part to France and to England and her colonies, in the form of "mandates." Nothing was said of abolishing economic barriers, and new ones were created. Japan was given a free hand in Shantung for five years, in spite of the protests of China, which was one of the Allies, and so it went. Now many of these decisions were inevitable, some were wise, but they cannot be made to square with the President's program as accepted at the armistice.

From the wreck, President Wilson saved one thing of vast importance in which he saw the possibility of remedying the undoubted faults of the treaty. The idea of a league of nations was of course the product of many minds. The fundamental notion went back at least to Dante. In America, Edward M. House, President Lowell of Harvard, ex-President Taft, and many others had long advocated such a solution of international problems. A "League to Enforce Peace" had been created in America early in 1912. Leaders of British

thought were also considering similar plans. The mechanism of the League was largely the work of the former Boer leader, General Smuts, and of Lord Robert Cecil, the son of the great British Prime Minister. But by the zeal of his advocacy Woodrow Wilson became in a peculiar sense the prophet of the League of Nations.

The "Covenant," adopted at Paris, provided for an executive council representing nine powers, and a deliberative assembly of all the members of the League. The Council must meet annually and take under advisement any matters threatening international peace. The members of the League were to agree not to make war without submitting the matter either to arbitration or the consideration of the Council. Decisions by the Council must be unanimous. A court was created to consider justiciable questions. No secret treaties were to be allowed. A treaty to be binding had to be registered and published. In Article Ten, the members of the League undertook "to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

When the President, already a sick man on account of influenza, reached America, he found that he was to face a struggle even more bitter than that in Paris. The treaty was between two fires. Conservatives opposed the League because it might place heavy burdens on the United States and might limit their freedom in international affairs. Liberals pointed out the obnoxious features of the Treaty to which the League was bound. The whole matter was confused by becoming inextricably mingled with partisan politics, until few people could consider the questions involved on their merits. The debate in the Senate began on September 10th when the

Treaty was reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations in a document that was largely a bitter personal attack on the President. As Senator McCumber, a Republican, pointed out, "not one word is said, not a single allusion made, concerning either the great purposes of the League of Nations or the methods by which these purposes are to be accomplished. Irony and sarcasm have been substituted for argument and positions taken by the press or individuals outside the Senate seem to command more attention than the treaty itself."

On September 25, 1919, the President, who had attempted to carry the matter to the country in an educational campaign, became ill while speaking at Pueblo, Colorado, and returned to Washington much enfeebled, leaving the friends of the League without adequate guidance and the administration without a head. The Senate was divided into four groups: the absolute opponents of the whole idea of the Treaty, led by LaFollette, Borah, and Johnson; a second group, of which the most prominent member was Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, who were working for the same end by means of sweeping amendments and reservations; a third group of "mild reservationists," including such men as Senator McCumber, who favored the experiment of the League of Nations provided reservations were adopted that would safeguard the interests of the United States and define sharply the sole power of Congress to declare war; and last of all the Democratic minority which approved the Treaty as it had been brought from Paris. The last two groups were clearly able to ratify the treaty, if they could only get together. But whatever he might have done when well, President Wilson from his sick bed refused to allow the amendment or change of Article Ten which had become the storm center of discussion, even when it was pointed out to him by Senator Hitch-

cock and other sincere friends of the League that the changes were a distinct improvement. Even so, in the final vote on March 19, 1920, the amended treaty failed of ratification by only seven votes. A hint from the President would have been enough to save an important part of the work for which he had sacrificed so much. The League of Nations was organized but without the official sanction of the country which more than any other had been responsible for the idea.

The election of 1920, on which the eyes of many Senators had been fixed, even at the height of the debate, resulted in an overwhelming Republican victory. The successful candidate, Warren G. Harding of Ohio, had announced that he was opposed to the League of Nations but in favor of an Association of Nations. The necessary fog had thus been created in which friends and enemies of the League might walk amicably hand in hand to the polls. But time was to show that the country was weary of the whole bitter discussion and was not willing to reopen it. The period of the Progressive Movement and of the Great War had come to an end, and the winning slogan was "Back to Normalcy." America, disillusioned, gathered around her the garment of the sea, worn thin as it was by the aeroplane, the submarine, the radio, and all the modern bonds of communication and of commerce, and determined to solve her own problems in her own way. A new era had begun which was to remind the older generation of the golden days of Republican supremacy under William McKinley and Marcus A. Hanna.[1]

[1] The story of the Peace Conference is to be found in R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, E. M. House and Charles Seymour, eds., *What Really Happened at Paris*, and B. M. Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty.* Bassett, J. S., *Our War With Germany*, McMaster, J. B., *The*

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

BATTLE FRONT, NOVEMBER 11, 1914

FURTHEST GERMAN ADVANCE

LINE ON NOVEMBER 11, 1918

THE WESTERN FRONT IN THE WORLD WAR